State v. Young
Opinion
Opinion
This case is before us on remand from our Supreme Court. State v. Young, 258 Conn. 79, 101, 779 A.2d 112 (2001). The defendant, Michael A. Young, first appealed to this court from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of three counts of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-110b, one count each of breach of the peace in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) (2), disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) (1), reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64 and criminal mischief in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-117 (a) (1) (A). In his first appeal, the defendant claimed that “the trial court improperly (1) instructed the jury that the defendant’s failure to produce a certain witness permitted [552]*552the jury to infer that the witness’ testimony would have been adverse to the defendant, (2) precluded evidence of the victim’s prior misconduct, (3) admitted evidence of a telephone conversation without a proper evidentiary foundation, (4) precluded the defendant from impeaching the victim regarding an alleged act of fraud and (5) allowed the state to impeach the defendant’s character with misconduct evidence.” State v. Young, 57 Conn. App. 566, 568, 750 A.2d 482 (2000), rev’d in part, 258 Conn. 79, 779 A.2d 112 (2001). In that decision, this court addressed all of the defendant’s claims except the claim concerning the prior misconduct evidence.1 Our Supreme Court granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal2 and ultimately remanded the case to this court with direction to consider the unreviewed claim. Having considered that claim, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted the evidence of the defendant’s prior misconduct. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The facts that the jury reasonably could have found are set forth in both State v. Young, supra, 258 Conn. 84-88, and State v. Young, supra, 57 Conn. App. 568-70. The following facts are necessary to resolve the defendant’s remaining claim.
[553]*553Before the trial commenced, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the state from inquiring into his prior felony convictions. Regarding that motion, the court ruled to exclude the defendant’s felony conviction for marijuana possession because it was more prejudicial than probative. At trial, the defendant testified in his defense about incidents that occurred on November 25 and 30, but invoked his privilege against self-incrimination regarding the charged offenses stemming from an August 4,1995 incident. On cross-examination, the defendant offered unsolicited testimony that he had been wrongly arrested and harassed by the police. Thereafter, the state questioned the defendant about his prior acts of misconduct.3 Defense [554]*554counsel objected to the line of questioning, arguing that it was improper for the state to inquire into the underlying facts of the defendant’s prior arrests. The court overruled the defendant’s objection, finding that the defendant had opened the door to the cross-examination regarding his prior arrests by mentioning them in his response to the state’s question about why he had believed he would be arrested for the November, 1995 incident.
[555]*555In his original brief to this court, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly allowed the state to impeach him with prior acts of misconduct. He further claimed that the prosecutor’s line of questioning with regard to those prior acts constituted prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal of his convictions.* 4 We disagree.
At the outset, we set forth our standard of review and the applicable law. “A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is afforded great deference. . . . The trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence and the scope of cross-examination. Every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morgan, 70 Conn. App. 255, 263, 797 A.2d 616, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 919, 806 A.2d 1056 (2002). Moreover, we have previously recognized that “if a party delves into a particular subject during examination, he is said to have ‘opened the door’ for further examination regarding that subject. State v. Graham, 200 Conn. 9, 13, 509 A.2d 493 (1986). The doctrine of opening the door cannot, of course, be subverted into a rule for injection of prejudice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morascini, 62 Conn. App. 758, 766, 772 A.2d 703, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 921, 774 A.2d 141 (2001).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in finding that [556]*556the defendant had opened the door to questions about his prior arrests and that the state was entitled to cross-examine him on the subject. Therefore, we conclude that the court properly permitted evidence of the defendant’s prior acts of misconduct. Finally, we do not agree that the cross-examination so prejudiced the defendant as to warrant a new trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
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