Opinion
MIHALAKOS, J.
The defendant, Jermaine Young, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a)1 and 53a-54a2 and murder in violation of § 53a-54a. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) instructed the jury regarding intent and (2) marshaled the evidence presented to the jury in its charge. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On September 26, 1997, the victim, Dennis Carr, Jr., was standing in a driveway located at 711 Congress Avenue in New Haven with Stacey Footman,3 Kooley Home, Roosevelt Green, Marquise Beverly and Carl Harrison. At approximately 10 a.m., a blue Mazda operated by Alan Goodson stopped in front of the driveway. The defendant, who was a passenger in the Mazda, put on a ski mask and began firing a gun out the passenger window of the Mazda into the crowd of people standing in the driveway. The victim was shot in the back of the head and later died as a result of the gunshot wound.
Shortly after the shooting, Goodson and the defendant took the blue Mazda to an auto body shop to have [12]*12it painted gold. Thereafter, the defendant was arrested in Massachusetts and, at the time of his arrest, provided the police with a false name. In a substitute long form information, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit murder and murder.
The trial commenced on October 19, 1999, and the defendant’s sole defense was that of mistaken identity. He did not, however, present any witnesses after the state rested its case. After the court instructed the jury, the defendant took an exception to the court’s charge, claiming that the court improperly marshaled the evidence regarding motive and consciousness of guilt. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts, and the defendant received a total effective sentence of fifty years. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be provided as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly instructed the jury on the essential element of intent regarding both the murder and conspiracy to commit murder charges by reading the entire statutory definition of intent provided for in General Statutes § 53a-3 (ll).4 Specifically, the defendant argues that the court violated his due process rights when it read the entire statutory definition of intent, including the portion that states “to engage in such conduct.” He claims that the court’s instructions improperly permitted the jury to return a verdict of guilty of the charged crime of murder based on a finding that the defendant engaged in proscribed conduct that resulted in the victim’s death.5 [13]*13In addition, the defendant argues that it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled as a result of the court’s instruction on the element of intent. He claims [14]*14that the court’s charge misled the jury because it allowed the jury to find him guilty of both murder and conspiracy to commit murder without ever finding that he specifically intended to cause the death of another person. We disagree.
The defendant concedes that he did not properly preserve his claim for appeal by taking an exception to the charge as given. He seeks review under the doctrine set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).6 We will review the defendant’s claim pursuant to Golding because the record is adequate, and an improper instruction on an element of an offense is of constitutional magnitude. See State v. Austin, 244 Conn. 226, 235, 710 A.2d 732 (1998).
“When reviewing [a] challenged jury instruction . . . we must adhere to the well settled rule that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a court’s charge is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. ... As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as improper. . . . [I]n appeals involving a constitutional question, [the standard is] [15]*15whether it is reasonably possible that the jury [was] misled.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rodriguez, 63 Conn. App. 529, 534, 777 A.2d 704, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 936, 776 A.2d 1151 (2001).
On several occasions, the court properly instructed the juiy that the state was required to prove that the defendant intended to cause the death of another person, whether that person was the victim or another. “Although [w]e agree with the defendant that that portion of § 53a-3 (11) dealing with intent to engage in proscribed conduct is irrelevant to a murder prosecution pursuant to § 53a-54a ... we conclude that the charge read as a whole did not mislead the jury.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Maia, 48 Conn. App. 677, 686-87, 712 A.2d 956, cert. denied, 245 Conn. 918, 717 A.2d 236 (1998). Viewing the instruction in its entirety, it was not misleading because the court repeatedly instructed the jury that to find the defendant guilty of murder, it first had to find that the defendant intended to cause the death of another person.7 Therefore, the defendant cannot prevail under the third prong of Golding because he has failed to establish that a constitutional violation clearly exists and that it clearly deprived him of a fair trial. See id., 688.
II
The defendant also claims that the court improperly marshaled the evidence in favor of the state in its jury [16]*16instruction, thereby violating his right to a fair trial. Specifically, he argues that the court emphasized the evidence in favor of the state regarding motive8 and consciousness of guilt9 while unfairly minimizing the defendant’s mistaken identity defense. We disagree.
[17]*17“A trial court has broad discretion to comment on the evidence adduced in a criminal trial. ... A trial court often has not only the right, but also the duty to comment on the evidence. . . . The purpose of marshaling the evidence, a more elaborate manner of judicial commentary, is to provide a fair summary of the evidence, and nothing more; to attain that purpose, the [trial] judge must show strict impartiality.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, 62 Conn. App. 643, 647-48, 772 A.2d 166 (2001). “Fair comment does not become improper merely because it tends to point out strengths, weaknesses, or difficulties of a particular case. .
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Opinion
MIHALAKOS, J.
The defendant, Jermaine Young, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a)1 and 53a-54a2 and murder in violation of § 53a-54a. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) instructed the jury regarding intent and (2) marshaled the evidence presented to the jury in its charge. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On September 26, 1997, the victim, Dennis Carr, Jr., was standing in a driveway located at 711 Congress Avenue in New Haven with Stacey Footman,3 Kooley Home, Roosevelt Green, Marquise Beverly and Carl Harrison. At approximately 10 a.m., a blue Mazda operated by Alan Goodson stopped in front of the driveway. The defendant, who was a passenger in the Mazda, put on a ski mask and began firing a gun out the passenger window of the Mazda into the crowd of people standing in the driveway. The victim was shot in the back of the head and later died as a result of the gunshot wound.
Shortly after the shooting, Goodson and the defendant took the blue Mazda to an auto body shop to have [12]*12it painted gold. Thereafter, the defendant was arrested in Massachusetts and, at the time of his arrest, provided the police with a false name. In a substitute long form information, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit murder and murder.
The trial commenced on October 19, 1999, and the defendant’s sole defense was that of mistaken identity. He did not, however, present any witnesses after the state rested its case. After the court instructed the jury, the defendant took an exception to the court’s charge, claiming that the court improperly marshaled the evidence regarding motive and consciousness of guilt. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts, and the defendant received a total effective sentence of fifty years. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be provided as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly instructed the jury on the essential element of intent regarding both the murder and conspiracy to commit murder charges by reading the entire statutory definition of intent provided for in General Statutes § 53a-3 (ll).4 Specifically, the defendant argues that the court violated his due process rights when it read the entire statutory definition of intent, including the portion that states “to engage in such conduct.” He claims that the court’s instructions improperly permitted the jury to return a verdict of guilty of the charged crime of murder based on a finding that the defendant engaged in proscribed conduct that resulted in the victim’s death.5 [13]*13In addition, the defendant argues that it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled as a result of the court’s instruction on the element of intent. He claims [14]*14that the court’s charge misled the jury because it allowed the jury to find him guilty of both murder and conspiracy to commit murder without ever finding that he specifically intended to cause the death of another person. We disagree.
The defendant concedes that he did not properly preserve his claim for appeal by taking an exception to the charge as given. He seeks review under the doctrine set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).6 We will review the defendant’s claim pursuant to Golding because the record is adequate, and an improper instruction on an element of an offense is of constitutional magnitude. See State v. Austin, 244 Conn. 226, 235, 710 A.2d 732 (1998).
“When reviewing [a] challenged jury instruction . . . we must adhere to the well settled rule that a charge to the jury is to be considered in its entirety, read as a whole, and judged by its total effect rather than by its individual component parts. . . . [T]he test of a court’s charge is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. ... As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . . . we will not view the instructions as improper. . . . [I]n appeals involving a constitutional question, [the standard is] [15]*15whether it is reasonably possible that the jury [was] misled.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rodriguez, 63 Conn. App. 529, 534, 777 A.2d 704, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 936, 776 A.2d 1151 (2001).
On several occasions, the court properly instructed the juiy that the state was required to prove that the defendant intended to cause the death of another person, whether that person was the victim or another. “Although [w]e agree with the defendant that that portion of § 53a-3 (11) dealing with intent to engage in proscribed conduct is irrelevant to a murder prosecution pursuant to § 53a-54a ... we conclude that the charge read as a whole did not mislead the jury.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Maia, 48 Conn. App. 677, 686-87, 712 A.2d 956, cert. denied, 245 Conn. 918, 717 A.2d 236 (1998). Viewing the instruction in its entirety, it was not misleading because the court repeatedly instructed the jury that to find the defendant guilty of murder, it first had to find that the defendant intended to cause the death of another person.7 Therefore, the defendant cannot prevail under the third prong of Golding because he has failed to establish that a constitutional violation clearly exists and that it clearly deprived him of a fair trial. See id., 688.
II
The defendant also claims that the court improperly marshaled the evidence in favor of the state in its jury [16]*16instruction, thereby violating his right to a fair trial. Specifically, he argues that the court emphasized the evidence in favor of the state regarding motive8 and consciousness of guilt9 while unfairly minimizing the defendant’s mistaken identity defense. We disagree.
[17]*17“A trial court has broad discretion to comment on the evidence adduced in a criminal trial. ... A trial court often has not only the right, but also the duty to comment on the evidence. . . . The purpose of marshaling the evidence, a more elaborate manner of judicial commentary, is to provide a fair summary of the evidence, and nothing more; to attain that purpose, the [trial] judge must show strict impartiality.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, 62 Conn. App. 643, 647-48, 772 A.2d 166 (2001). “Fair comment does not become improper merely because it tends to point out strengths, weaknesses, or difficulties of a particular case. . . . The trial court may, at its discretion, call the attention of the jury to the evidence, or lack of evidence, bearing upon any point in issue and may comment upon the weight of the evidence so long as it does not direct or advise the jury how to decide the matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Caballero, 49 Conn. App. 486, 493, 714 A.2d 1254, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 924, 719 A.2d 1170 (1998).
As previously stated, we review the entire charge to determine whether it is reasonably possible that it misled the jury. See State v. Rodriguez, supra, 63 Conn. App. 534. “In determining whether it was . . . reasonably possible that the juiy was misled by the trial court’s instructions, the charge to the jury is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statement, but it is to be considered rather as to its probable effect upon the jury in guiding [it] to a correct verdict in the case. . . . The charge is to be read as a whole and individual instructions are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 534-35.
[18]*18The defendant argues that the court made favorable comments in its charge that mirrored the state’s theory, but “failed completely to set forth the defendant’s position.” A review of the charge in its entirety reveals that although the court provided a more detailed account of the state’s evidence, it fairly summarized the defendant’s theory of defense, which was one of mistaken identity. After instructing the jury regarding the elements of the crimes charged, the court provided a detailed account of the defendant’s theory of defense.10
In addition, the defendant did not testify, nor did he present any witnesses or evidence in addition to cross-[19]*19examination during the state’s case-in-chief. “One reason more time was spent in [marshaling] the state’s evidence is that there was more of it. . . . While the court’s comments must be fair so as to not mislead the jury, [t]he nature and extent of a court’s comments depend largely on the facts of a case and the manner in which it was tried.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Caballero, supra, 49 Conn. App. 494. After reviewing the charge in its entirety, we conclude that the court did not marshal the evidence so as to unduly prejudice the defendant or deprive him of his right to a fair trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.