State v. Wright

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: August 22, 2025
• Docket: 258PA23
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 258PA23

Filed 22 August 2025

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. ERIC WAYNE WRIGHT

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision

of the Court of Appeals, 290 N.C. App. 465, 892 S.E.2d 253 (2023), reversing and

vacating an amended order entered 28 July 2022 by Judge Lisa Bell in Superior

Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 25 February 2025.

Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, by Caden William Hayes, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Katy Dickinson-Schultz, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.

Daniel K. Siegel, Bridget Lavender, and Michele Delgado for American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina, amici curiae.

NEWBY, Chief Justice.

In this case we address whether law enforcement officers violated defendant’s

Fourth Amendment rights by searching defendant’s backpack, which contained a

stolen handgun, with defendant’s consent. Warrantless searches are permissible

when a defendant gives voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances.

Here the circumstances, including the trial court’s properly supported finding that STATE V. WRIGHT

Opinion of the Court

officers returned defendant’s identification, show that defendant voluntarily

consented to the search of his backpack. We therefore reverse the decision of the

Court of Appeals.

On 29 January 2020, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Officers

Nicholas Krause and Christopher Martin received a tip from a confidential informant

that a man matching defendant’s description was riding a bicycle and carrying an

illegal firearm on Phifer Street. The officers subsequently located defendant with a

bicycle on Phifer Street. When defendant took a shortcut on a dirt path marked with

a “No Trespassing” sign, Officer Benjamin Slauter followed him while Officers Krause

and Martin drove around to intercept defendant. In response to the officers’

questions, defendant provided his identification card. Officer Martin asked defendant

to step off his bicycle and remove his backpack, which he did. With defendant’s

permission, Officer Martin conducted a protective pat-down. Throughout their

interaction with defendant, officers never raised their voices or brandished their

weapons.

After the pat-down, Officer Martin asked defendant several times for

permission to search defendant’s backpack for weapons. Defendant agreed to the

initial request but changed his mind and subsequently declined multiple times to

allow officers to search his backpack, telling them he was scared. Officer Slauter then

asked defendant to open his backpack so the officer could look inside, and defendant

agreed to this request. To see the contents, Officer Slauter asked defendant to lower

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the backpack, and the officer saw the grip of a handgun in the backpack. Officers

placed defendant in handcuffs, and upon learning he would be searched incident to

arrest, defendant informed Officer Slauter that defendant had cocaine in his pocket.

The officers later determined that the handgun found in defendant’s backpack was

stolen.

Defendant was charged with possession with intent to sell cocaine, unlawfully

carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a stolen firearm, possession of a firearm

by a felon, and attaining the status of a habitual felon. On 2 September 2020, he

moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, contending that the

officers lacked reasonable suspicion and probable cause. The trial court denied

defendant’s motion. In Finding of Fact 20, it concluded “[t]hat Officer Martin

appeared to have retu[r]ned [d]efendant’s identification card based on the

conversation between them and the actions that were visible on the [body worn

camera].”1 The trial court further decided that defendant “freely consented to opening

his backpack and therefore allowed for the legal search of his property” and that the

tip from the informant in conjunction with the officers’ knowledge of the area

provided reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Defendant gave notice of appeal

from the trial court’s ruling and entered an Alford plea to all charges.2 Defendant was

1 This finding is numbered 13 in the trial court’s original order and 20 in the amended

order. For clarity, we refer to it throughout as “Finding of Fact 20.” 2 Under North Carolina v. Alford, a trial court may accept a guilty plea where the

defendant does not concede his guilt but consents to being sentenced by the trial court. 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970). “An individual accused of crime may voluntarily,

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sentenced to 87 to 117 months in prison.

The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for further findings of fact and

conclusions of law regarding whether defendant trespassed by taking the dirt path

and whether officers reasonably believed he had trespassed. State v. Wright, No. 21-

247, slip op. at 5–7 (N.C. Ct. App. May 17, 2022) (unpublished). The trial court

entered an amended order denying defendant’s motion to suppress, again finding that

officers returned defendant’s identification and holding that defendant consented to

the backpack search and the officers had reasonable suspicion and probable cause for

the stop. Defendant untimely appealed from the amended order and filed a

corresponding petition for a writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals. State v.

Wright, 290 N.C. App. 465, 470, 892 S.E.2d 253, 259 (2023).

The Court of Appeals granted defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Id.

at 470–71, 892 S.E.2d at 259. The Court of Appeals held that Finding of Fact 20 was

not supported by competent evidence. Id. at 472–73, 479, 892 S.E.2d at 261, 265.

Moving to the legality of the search, the Court of Appeals held that the tip provided

by the informant, with whom Officer Martin had worked for nearly a year and who

previously had provided information that had been corroborated, supported

reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk defendant but not probable cause to search

defendant’s backpack. Id. at 474–75, 478–79, 892 S.E.2d at 261–62, 264–65. The

knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id.

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Court of Appeals also determined that defendant did not voluntarily consent to the

search of his backpack. Id. at 476–78, 892 S.E.2d at 263–64. The court emphasized

the repetition and frequency of the officers’ questions, the circumstances of the stop,

and defendant’s statement that he was scared. Id. at 477–78, 892 S.E.2d at 263–64.

In the court’s view, under the totality of the circumstances, “[defendant’s] consent

was the result of coercion and duress and therefore was not freely given.” Id. at

477–78, 892 S.E.2d at 264. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the amended

order and vacated defendant’s Alford plea. Id. at 479, 892 S.E.2d at 265.

The State filed a petition for discretionary review in this Court, challenging

the Court of Appeals’ holdings regarding Finding of Fact 20, probable cause, and the

voluntariness of defendant’s consent. We allowed the State’s petition.

We review the denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether competent

evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether those factual findings

support the trial court’s conclusions of law. State v. Tripp, 381 N.C. 617, 625, 873

S.E.2d 298, 305 (2022). A “trial court’s findings of fact ‘are conclusive on appeal if

supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.’ ” State v.

Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (quoting State v.

Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000)). This is so because “[t]he

trial judge who presides at a suppression hearing ‘sees the witnesses, observes their

demeanor as they testify and by reason of his more favorable position, he is given the

responsibility of discovering the truth.’ ” State v. Bartlett, 368 N.C. 309, 313, 776

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S.E.2d 672, 674 (2015) (quoting State v. Smith, 278 N.C. 36, 41, 178 S.E.2d 597, 601

(1971)). “Competent evidence is ‘evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support the finding.’ ” Smith v. Smith, 387 N.C. 255, 258, 912 S.E.2d 762,

765 (2025) (quoting In re J.M., 384 N.C. 584, 591, 887 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2023)).

“Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo,” where “ ‘the court considers the matter

anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of the lower tribunal.” State v.

Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (quoting State v. Williams, 362

N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008)).

The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution protects citizens against

unreasonable searches and seizures by government actors. U.S. Const. amend. IV.

“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or

magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a

few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437

U.S. 385, 390, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.

347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)). “[O]ne of the specifically established exceptions

to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted

pursuant to consent.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041,

2043–44 (1973).

The Supreme Court has held that

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. For, no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting ‘consent’ would be

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no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed.

Id. at 228, 93 S. Ct. at 2048. “For a consent search to be valid, the State has the

burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given, without coercion,

duress[,] or fraud.” State v. Long, 293 N.C. 286, 293, 237 S.E.2d 728, 732 (1977) (citing

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 91 S. Ct. at 2048). Whether a defendant’s consent to a

search is voluntary or the result of coercion is a question of fact based on the totality

of the circumstances. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 248–49, 93 S. Ct. at 2047–48,

2058–59; State v. Powell, 297 N.C. 419, 425–26, 255 S.E.2d 154, 158 (1979).

Defendant argues that the trial court’s finding of fact that officers returned

defendant’s identification is unsupported by competent evidence. After Officer Martin

patted defendant down for a weapon, defendant asked him, “We good?” Officer Martin

replied, “Yeah, you good,” and defendant thanked the officer. This interaction

provides competent evidence that reasonably supports Finding of Fact 20, that

officers returned defendant’s identification. We therefore turn to whether the trial

court’s findings of fact support its conclusion of law that defendant voluntarily

consented to the search of his backpack.

During their interaction with defendant, Officers Martin and Slauter

maintained a calm and conversational demeanor, never raising their voices or

brandishing their weapons. Defendant told officers that he was scared of them but

did not explain why. Defendant initially agreed to allow officers to search his

backpack before withdrawing his consent and denying their requests to search. The

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fact that defendant then changed his mind and gave his consent does not mean that

his later agreement was involuntary. Defendant not only agreed to allow officers to

look inside his backpack but personally opened his backpack for officers to search.

Based on these findings of fact, the trial court properly concluded that defendant’s

consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.

Because we conclude that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his

backpack, we need not analyze whether officers had probable cause for the search,

and we hold that discretionary review was improvidently allowed as to that issue.

The trial court properly found that officers returned defendant’s identification and

that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his backpack. We therefore

reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

REVERSED; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED.

Justice RIGGS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

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Earls, J., dissenting

Justice EARLS dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Wright

voluntarily consented to the search of his backpack. The majority applies the wrong

legal analysis and fails to examine all of the relevant facts. Under the totality of the

circumstances, Mr. Wright’s consent was the product of coercion rather than free will.

Mr. Wright did not voluntarily consent to the search of his backpack. His eventual

“yes” was not an “essentially free and unconstrained choice,” Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,

602 (1961)), but rather a compelled response to relentless questioning and mounting

psychological pressure.

The Fourth Amendment guards against unreasonable searches. A search is

reasonable if supported by probable cause (and generally a warrant). Id. at 219. That

standard requires a “fair probability” that officers will uncover evidence of a crime

“in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Probable cause also

turns on the “totality of the circumstances”—the whole picture, not isolated

facts. Id. at 230–31.

If a person consents to a search, that consent excuses officers from having to

obtain a warrant. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219. But for consent to pass constitutional

muster, it must be “freely and voluntarily given.” Id. at 222 (cleaned up). This means

that a defendant’s permission must reflect an “essentially free and unconstrained

choice.” Id. at 225 (quoting Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602). Consent is invalid if the

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defendant’s will is “overborne” and their permission coerced through “explicit or

implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.” Id. at 225–26, 228.

Whether consent is voluntary depends on the “totality of all the surrounding

circumstances.” Id. at 226. Courts weigh the “characteristics of the accused,” the

“details of the interrogation,” and the “psychological impact” of the officers’ conduct

in context. Id. This framework also accounts for the vulnerability of the individual.

As Schneckloth makes clear, people in fragile or compromised situations may yield to

even subtle coercion. The Fourth Amendment ensures that only true, voluntary

consent can validate a warrantless search.

Ultimately voluntariness is a mixed question of law and fact. See State v.

Romano, 369 N.C. 678, 691 (2017) (“Whether a consent to a search was in fact

‘voluntary’ is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the

circumstances.” (cleaned up)); State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222 (1994) (addressing

the voluntariness of a confession as a legal question). It asks not just what happened,

but whether consent was freely given under the law of the Fourth Amendment. Trial

courts resolve factual disputes—what officers said, how they acted, whether a

defendant nodded or spoke. But whether those facts add up to voluntary consent

under constitutional standards is a legal question for the courts.

Precedent confirms the distinction. In Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985),

the Court held that the ultimate question of whether a confession was voluntary

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments required independent federal review as

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a legal determination even where “subsidiary factual questions” are entitled to

deference. Id. at 112. The Court reasoned that it is appropriate for the appellate court,

as the expositor of the law, to give plenary review to the question of the voluntariness

of a confession. “Where . . . the relevant legal principle can be given meaning only

through its application to the particular circumstances of a case, the Court has been

reluctant to give the trier of fact’s conclusions presumptive force and, in so doing,

strip a federal appellate court of its primary function as an expositor of law.” Id. at

114.

The same logic drove Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995) (requiring de

novo review of Miranda custody determinations), and Ornelas v. United States, 517

U.S. 690 (1996) (mandating independent review of probable cause and reasonable

suspicion). Consent searches involve the same inquiry. The relevant question is

whether an encounter became coercive—an inquiry that requires the application of

legal principles. Appellate courts must respect trial courts’ factual findings but

independently determine whether those facts satisfy constitutional voluntariness.

This Court has followed a similar path. In State v. Reed, 373 N.C. 498 (2020),

we reviewed whether a defendant consented to extend a traffic stop as a conclusion

of law based on the trial court’s findings. Id. at 514. Both the majority and dissent

agreed that consent was a legal determination. See id. at 520–21 (Newby, J.,

dissenting). Even earlier cases that called voluntariness a “question of fact” did not

reflexively defer to trial courts. See Romano, 369 N.C. at 691. In State v. McDowell,

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329 N.C. 363 (1991), we scrutinized the trial court’s findings before determining they

supported the legal conclusion that the defendant’s consent was voluntary. Id. at 377.

And in the confession context, this Court has long recognized that whether police

conduct overbore a defendant’s will is a legal question subject to plenary appellate

review. See State v. Richardson, 316 N.C. 594, 600–01 (1986). The same principle

applies to consent searches.

Voluntariness turns not just on whether a defendant uttered “yes,” but

whether that “yes” was freely given, not merely the result of submission to

authority. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). If a defendant, like Mr.

Wright, verbally agrees to a search, that is a factual finding. But whether that

agreement was voluntary under constitutional principles is a question of law. That is

a constitutional judgment, and it is one this Court must decide.

Under the totality of the circumstances test established in Schneckloth, courts

must examine three critical factors: “the characteristics of the accused,” “the details

of the interrogation,” and “the psychological impact” of the officers’ conduct. Id. at

226. When properly applied to the facts of this case, these factors compel the

conclusion that Mr. Wright’s purported consent was the product of coercion, not free

will.

The first factor requires examination of Mr. Wright’s personal circumstances

and vulnerability at the time of the encounter. See id. at 226. This analysis recognizes

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that individuals in “possibly vulnerable subjective state[s]” may yield to even subtle

forms of coercion. Id. at 229.

Mr. Wright was an individual particularly susceptible to police pressure. He

was homeless, walking alone on a cold night, lacking the security and stability that

might otherwise permit resistance to unwanted police intrusion. His homelessness is

not merely descriptive—it is legally significant. Those without housing face constant

police scrutiny and understand that even polite noncompliance can escalate to arrest

or worse consequences. See id. (recognizing that psychological vulnerability affects

voluntariness).

Moreover, Mr. Wright explicitly expressed his fear, telling officers twice, “I’m

scared.” Rather than acknowledging this distress or taking steps to alleviate it, the

officers dismissed his concerns. Officer Slaughter responded dismissively: “Whatchu

scared about?” Officer Martin added: “You don’t have to be scared.” These responses

ignored rather than addressed the very vulnerability that Schneckloth requires

courts to consider.

Additionally, Mr. Wright’s fear was neither irrational nor legally irrelevant.

As an African American man confronting multiple armed officers at night, his

apprehension reflected documented realities of police encounters. United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (citing as consent

factors the “threatening presence of several officers” and “display of a weapon”).

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The second factor examines the specific circumstances and conduct of the police

encounter. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229. Here, the details reveal a systematic

escalation of demands designed to wear down Mr. Wright’s resistance.

The officers employed a pattern of mounting demands: they ordered Mr.

Wright to stop, confiscated his identification, directed him to dismount his bicycle and

remove his backpack, conducted a frisk, and then persistently demanded access to

his backpack. Each compliance led to another demand, creating an atmosphere where

cooperation bred further intrusion rather than concluding the encounter.

Critically, the officers engaged in repeated, insistent requests after Mr.

Wright’s clear refusals. In barely one minute, Officer Martin asked five times to

search the bag while Officer Slaughter added several additional requests. Courts

have consistently recognized that such persistence weighs against voluntariness. See

United States v. Raibley, 243 F.3d 1069, 1075–76 (7th Cir. 2001); State v. Garcia, 827

P.2d 727, 731 (Kan. 1992). When “no” repeatedly meets renewed requests, the

interaction shifts from asking to demanding.

The officers also failed to inform Mr. Wright of his right to refuse consent.

When Mr. Wright asked whether he had a choice, Officer Martin evasively responded,

“I’m asking you.” This failure to clearly advise of rights constitutes a significant factor

against voluntariness under Schneckloth. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.

Most tellingly, Officer Slaughter presented a false choice: “Can you open your

bag for me so I don’t have to look inside it?” This phrasing conveyed that the search

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would occur regardless of Mr. Wright’s preference—the only question was whether

he would facilitate it. Such language transforms apparent consent into compelled

submission.

The third factor requires assessment of how the officers’ behavior would

psychologically impact the individual under scrutiny. The totality of the officers’

conduct created an atmosphere of coercion that overwhelmed Mr. Wright’s capacity

for free choice.

The environmental context amplifies psychological pressure. The encounter

occurred on a dark, cold, isolated street where Mr. Wright stood alone facing three

armed officers who surrounded him—one on each side and another in the squad car,

effectively blocking his path. Officer Krause retained Mr. Wright’s identification, a

form of control that courts have recognized as indicative of seizure rather than

consensual encounter. Royer, 460 U.S. at 504. The body-worn camera footage

establishes the following sequence: At the start of the encounter, Mr. Wright handed

his identification to Officer Krause, who took it back to the police vehicle. Officer

Krause did not return until after the officers had searched Mr. Wright’s backpack,

found the gun, and placed him in handcuffs. Even then, Officer Krause was still

holding Mr. Wright’s identification while questioning him about his criminal history.

The trial court did not say Officer Martin returned Mr. Wright’s ID—it said he

“appeared” to do so. A factual finding must “reflect a conscious choice between the

conflicting versions of the incident in question which emerged from all the evidence

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presented.” In re Green, 67 N.C. App. 501, 505 n.1 (1984). There is a critical difference

between saying something appeared to happen and saying it happened. See In re

D.T.H., 378 N.C. 576, 585–86 (2021) (disregarding a trial court’s finding that failed

to resolve a material conflict).

Officer Slaughter’s hand position on his weapon throughout much of the

encounter, while subtle, reinforced the power dynamic. A weapon need not be drawn

to convey its implicit threat. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988);

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring)

(noting the effect of a “threatening presence” and “display of a weapon”).

The mere presence of accessible weapons underscores official authority and

signals potential consequences for resistance.

The officers’ dismissive treatment of Mr. Wright’s expressed fear compounded

the psychological pressure. By refusing to acknowledge his legitimate concerns, they

demonstrated indifference to his emotional state and signaled that his consent was

expected rather than requested. This approach is antithetical to the voluntary

consent required by the Fourth Amendment.

The majority’s focus on the officers’ calm demeanor and conversational tone

misses the constitutional forest for the procedural trees. Coercion need not involve

shouted commands or drawn weapons to be constitutionally impermissible. See

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229. Subtle pressure applied to vulnerable individuals can

be equally effective—and equally invalid.

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Mr. Wright’s ultimate capitulation after repeated refusals was not a change of

mind but an act of surrender. His “consent” was the product of relentless pressure

applied to a frightened, homeless man who had no realistic means of escape. The

circumstances—his vulnerability, the officers’ persistent demands despite his

refusals, and the psychologically coercive atmosphere—demonstrate that his

submission was compelled, not voluntary.

When the State seeks to justify a warrantless search based on consent, it bears

the burden of proving that consent was “freely and voluntarily given.” Schneckloth,

412 U.S. at 222. The State has failed to meet that burden. Mr. Wright’s consent was

neither free nor voluntary but rather the predictable result of official coercion applied

to an individual lacking meaningful alternatives.

For these reasons, I would suppress the evidence obtained from the search of

Mr. Wright’s backpack because that evidence was obtained in violation of Mr.

Wright’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.

Justice DIETZ joins in this dissenting opinion.

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