FINCH, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment following conviction of defendant of murder in the first degree. We retain jurisdiction to decide this case on the basis of this Court’s order entered April 9, 1973, following our decision in Parks v. State, 492 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. banc 1973). We affirm.
[423] On December 4, 1968, during the course of a robbery of a restaurant in St. Louis, Mike Lograsso, the proprietor, was shot and killed. Defendant was arrested at about 10:00 a. m. on December 8, 1968, after other suspects previously arrested had said that defendant was involved.1 He was taken by the arresting officers to the homicide office at central police headquarters where Sgt. Troupe, the officer in charge of the investigation of this homicide, was interrogating Leroy Fair, another suspect.
Without giving defendant a Miranda warning or otherwise advising him of his constitutional rights, Sgt. Troupe said to defendant, “What did you do with the shotgun ?” or “Where is the shotgun ?” Defendant answered, “Leroy, you know I gave you the shotgun. I don’t know where it is at.” Troupe then advised defendant not to make any further statements. Shortly thereafter defendant was taken by the police to the juvenile court building and turned over to the custody of the juvenile court.2 Officers testified for the state that defendant was not questioned about the robbery or homicide at the time he was taken into custody or while he was being taken to police headquarters and that he was not interrogated at headquarters about the events other than the foregoing question directed to him by Sgt. Troupe.
After defendant had been delivered to the juvenile building, the police asked that they be allowed to interrogate him about the robbery and homicide. Permission was granted and at about 1:00 p. m., on December 9, 1968, defendant was questioned at the juvenile center. Present were Sgt. Troupe, Detective Dowd (who had arrested defendant), Richard Christman, the deputy juvenile officer, defendant’s mother, and the defendant himself.3
At the outset of the interrogation on December 9, juvenile officer Christman told defendant that the officers present were members of the St. Louis police force. Christman then told the defendant that he did not have to make a statement; that any statement he made could be used against him; that he had the right to an attorney, including an appointed attorney if he could not afford one; that he probably would be certified for trial as an adult due to his past record;4 and that in adult court there was the possibility of a death sentence for the crime of which he was accused. After each part of that warning, the juvenile officer asked the defendant if he understood. The defendant replied that he did, that he did not want an attorney (the officer testified that the defendant’s mother left this decision up to the defendant) and that he would make a statement. In the interrogation by the police which followed (in the presence of the juvenile officer and defendant’s mother), defendant confessed participation in the planning and commission of the robbery, saying he stood by the door holding a shotgun while the others entered the restaurant.
[424] Prior to the trial, there was an eviden-tiary hearing before the court on defendant’s motion to suppress both the statement he made to Sgt. Troupe at police headquarters following his arrest on December 8 and the confession he made the following day during the interrogation at the juvenile building. Some additional evidence was heard before the trial started. The court ruled that the December 8 statement about the shotgun was not admissible because defendant had not been given his Miranda warning at that time. As a result, this statement was not admitted in evidence at the trial. However, the court held that the December 9 confession given at the juvenile center was voluntary and was admissible in evidence. The court refused to quash that confession, and testimony with reference thereto was received in evidence at the trial of defendant.
An opinion was written and adopted in Division One reversing and remanding this case on the basis that admission of defendant’s confession violated the principles established in Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).5 As a result of a dissent in Division, the case was transferred to the Court En Banc, where after reargument, the divisional opinion was not adopted and the case was reassigned for preparation of a new opinion. In writing this opinion, portions of the prior opinion are utilized without the use of quotation marks.
We first consider the proposition, strongly urged by defendant and the basis of which this case was ruled in Division, that the decision in Westover v. United States, supra, dictates a reversal in this case.
In Westover the petitioner was arrested by Kansas City police as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies. In addition, a report was received from the FBI that he was wanted on a felony charge in California. He was arrested during the evening and after being placed in a lineup he was booked. The Kansas City police then interrogated him that night and again throughout the following morning. Shortly before noon they notified the FBI that they were through interrogating Westover and the FBI could question him. Three FBI agents then continued the interrogation at the Kansas City police headquarters and after about 2 ½ hours, Westover signed separate confessions to each of two robberies about which he had been questioned. The Kansas City police had never advised Westover as to his constitutional rights but one of the federal agents testified at the trial (and a paragraph on each of Westover’s confessions so recited) that the FBI agents had advised Westover that he did not have to make a statement; that any statement he made could be used against him; and that he had the right to see an attorney.
The Supreme Court reversed Westover’s conviction, stating as follows:
“On the facts of this case we cannot find that Westover knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and his right to consult with counsel prior to the time he made the statement. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover, he had been in custody for over 14 hours and had been interrogated at length during that period. The FBI interrogation began immediately, upon the conclusion of the interrogation by Kansas City police and was conducted in local police headquarters. Although the two law enforcement authorities are legally distinct and the crimes for which they interrogated Westover were different, the impact on him was that of a continuous period of questioning. There is no evidence of any warning given prior to the FBI interrogation nor is there any evidence of an articulated waiver of rights after the FBI commenced its interrogation. The record simply shows that the defendant did in [425] fact confess a short time after being turned over to the FBI following interrogation by local police. Despite the fact that the FBI agents gave warnings at the outset of their interview, from Westover’s point of view the warnings came at the end of the interrogation process. In these circumstances an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights cannot he assumed.
“We do not suggest that law enforcement authorities are precluded from questioning any individual who has been held for a period of time by other authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate warnings. A different case would be presented if an accused were taken into custody by the second authority, removed both in time and place from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised of his rights and given an opportunity to exercise them. But here the FBI interrogation was conducted immediately following the state interrogation in the same police station— in the same compelling surroundings. Thus, in obtaining a confession from Westover the federal authorities were the beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local in-custody interrogation. In these circumstances the giving of warnings alone was not sufficient to protect the privilege.” 384 U.S. 1. c. 495, 86 S.Ct. 1639.
It is to be noted from the above that the Supreme Court concluded that Westover did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to remain silent and that the confession, coming as it did during what the court concluded was simply an extension by the FBI of the police interrogation, resulted from the pressure applied by the local in-custody interrogation. That is not the situation in this case. Instead of 14 hours of interrogation by the local police which occurred in Westover, we have only a single question asked by the local police officer when the defendant was brought into the room where the officer was interrogating Leroy Fair. That con-stituted the complete police interrogation of this defendant. He was then taken to the juvenile headquarters and turned over to juvenile authorities. His confession came the following day while he was in the juvenile building in the presence of the juvenile officer and his mother after he had been fully advised as to his constitutional rights by the juvenile officer. There was no evidence of any interrogation preceding this interview in the juvenile building other than the single question asked by Sgt. Troupe about what defendant had done with the shotgun.
We hold that what occurred comes within the exception recognized in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Westover when they stated that they did not suggest that authorities are precluded from questioning an individual simply because he was held earlier by other authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate warnings. Here the defendant had been taken over by the juvenile authorities and was in their custody and in their building. He was questioned only after he was adequately advised of his rights and given an opportunity to exercise them. A reversal is not dictated by Westover.
In connecton with this matter of the effect of the interrogation by Sgt. Troupe at police headquarters on December 8, defendant also claims that the confession of December 9 must be excluded on the basis of the doctrine about the effect of letting the cat out of the bag which is enunciated in United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 1398, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947) in these words:
“Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be looked upon as the fruit of the first.”
[426] It is defendant’s contention that he let the cat out of the bag as to his guilt in this matter by his remark in the presence of Sgt. Troupe and Leroy Fair about the shotgun and that his subsequent confession was the fruit of that improper interrogation by Sgt. Troupe.
We disagree with this contention. In the first place, in Bayer, one Radovich made a confession on September 5 or 6, 1944, at a time when he was under arrest and was confined in the psychopathic ward in the station hospital at Mitchell Field. He was denied callers, communications and various other facilities at that time. Thereafter, on March 15 or 17, 1945, he was questioned by an agent of the FBI. After being given adequate warning, he again confessed to the matter with which he was subsequently charged. At that time he was still at Mitchell Field but only under administrative restrictions which meant that he could not leave the base without leave.
At this trial, the first confession by Rad-ovich was not offered or received in evidence (the court in its opinion assumes that confession to have been inadmissible). However, the second confession was received in evidence and Radovich was convicted. The court of appeals reversed the conviction on the basis that this second confession was “patently the fruit of the earlier one” and hence inadmissible. The Supreme Court, after making the foregoing statement about the effect of letting the cat out of the bag, went on to say, l. c. 540, 67 S.Ct. 1398:
“But this Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making a usable one after those conditions have been removed. The Silver-thorne and Nardone cases, relied on by the Court of Appeals, did not deal with confessions but with evidence of a quite different category and do not control this question. The second confession in this case was made six months after the first.”
The court then went on to rule that admission of the second confession was not error.
Defendant’s brief also cites and relies upon the cases of Gilpin v. United States, 415 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1969) and Harney v. United States, 407 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1969). In both of those cases, the Court of Appeals held confessions inadmissible on the basis that they were the products of prior improper interrogation without adequate warnings, relying on Westover and Bayer. However, both cases recognize that the Supreme Court in Westover pointed out that when there are multiple confessions, statements given after appropriate warnings are not necessarily rendered inadmissible by a lack of proper warning before earlier in-custody statements and that the factual situation in each particular case must be examined in order to determine whether earlier unconstitutional conduct makes inadmissible the subsequent statement after proper warning. For example, in Harney, 407 F.2d l. c. 589, the Court said:
“In Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court made clear that prior custodial interrogation without proper warnings does not automatically make inadmissible subsequent in-custody statements given during interrogation after appropriate warning. Instead the facts and circumstances must be examined on an ad hoc basis to determine the existence of, and extent of, a causal relationship between on the one hand the earlier, unconstitutional conduct (and the statement which is a product thereof if a statement was made) and on the other hand the statement made later. Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v. Knight, 395 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Pierce, 397 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1968); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, supra.”
[427] Likewise, in the cases of United States v. Knight, 395 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1968) and United States v. Hale, 397 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1968), the Court recognized that an ad hoc determination of admissibility based on totality of the circumstances is required in each case. In both of these cases, the Court determined that a later confession, made after proper warning, was properly admitted in evidence even though there had been earlier interrogation in which some information was obtained without adequate warning to the suspect.
Applying the rule announced in the foregoing cases, we note that here the second interrogation occurred at a different time and place (the following day at the juvenile building instead of police headquarters) and that it was attended by the defendant’s mother and the juvenile court officer as well as police officers so that the nature of the setting in which the interrogation occurred was quite different than that of the preceding day. The evidence does not indicate that the December 9 statement was coerced by the question and answer on December 8.
In addition, the statement by defendant on December 8 in response to Sgt. Troupe’s question about the shotgun was not a confession. Defendant did not say that he was at the restaurant at the time of the robbery and the shooting or that he had participated in either the planning or execution thereof. He did not even identify any particular shotgun or when or where he gave it to Leroy Fair. This single statement to Leroy Fair (in response to the question by Sgt. Troupe) that he had given the shotgun to Leroy and didn’t know where it was would not have been enough to make a submissible case against this defendant.6 That being true, it follows that defendant did not by that statement on December 8 confess or let the cat out of the bag. He is not entitled to have the December 9 confession excluded on the basis that he did.
The second issue for resolution is defendant’s contention that his motion to suppress his confession of December 9 should have been sustained and evidence thereof excluded on the basis that its use in other than juvenile court proceedings is prohibited by § 211.271(3) RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.7 In resolving that question, we must ascertain the meaning of the statute. In so doing, we undertake “to ascertain the lawmaker’s intent, from the words used if possible; and to put upon the language of the legislature, honestly and faithfully, its plain and rational meaning and to promote its object, and the ‘manifest purpose of the statute, considered historically’ * * *." Cummins v. Kansas City Public Service Commission, 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920, 925 (banc 1933). Another well established rule of statutory construction is that a statute must be construed in the light of what it seeks to remedy and in light of the conditions obtaining at the time of its enactment. Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W.2d 77 (1944). Accordingly, it is proper to consider the case law on the admissibility of statements by the juvenile to the juvenile officer prior to the time the legislature acted to amend § 211.271(3).
Prior to amendment in 1969, § 211.-271(3) RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., provided as follows.
[428] “3. Evidence given in cases under sections 211.011 to 211.431 is not lawful or proper evidence against the child for any purpose whatever in a civil, criminal or other proceeding except in subsequent cases under sections 211.011 to 211.431.”
In State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo.1966), frequently referred to as Ar-beiter (1), a conviction of first degree murder was reversed because of the admission in evidence of statements of defendant (a 15 year old juvenile at the time of the offense) made to police after they took him into custody. Instead of turning defendant over to juvenile authorities as soon as he was taken into custody as directed by § 211.061, the police took him to police headquarters and questioned him extensively, obtaining the statement which was introduced in evidence. In deciding the case, the court did not rule upon § 211.271(3) RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., other than to say:
“We reject appellant’s contention that subsection 3 of § 211.271, by its terms, renders inadmissible statements resulting from police questioning from the moment that a child is taken into custody. The prohibition of that section is against the use of evidence given in juvenile court cases against the child in criminal proceedings. The statements here in question were not ‘evidence given’ in a juvenile court case.” 408 S.W.2d l. c. 29.
Thereafter in State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. banc 1968), known as Arbeiter (2), the court considered whether to prohibit the circuit judge from enforcing an order for a subpoena duces tecum for production of juvenile court records so as to permit inspection and copying by the circuit attorney. The motion seeking the subpoena alleged a belief that Arbeiter had made statements and admissions to juvenile court personnel concerning the murder which would be disclosed by the file and which would be admissible in evidence.
In declining to prohibit the circuit judge, the court held that after a juvenile court has relinquished its jurisdiction over a juvenile to a circuit court, the latter has the power and authority to open juvenile files and records for inspection “by persons having a legitimate interest therein”. The circuit attorney was held to be such a person. The court reserved for later consideration the admissibility of information which might be obtained from the juvenile court file. However, a concurring opinion, approved by three judges, suggested that if a juvenile made a voluntary confession after being given all required constitutional warnings and rights, such confession might be admissible in a criminal trial even though that same information had been used in the juvenile proceedings. A dissenting opinion took the position that § 211.271(3) as it then existed gave the juvenile the substantive right not to have used against him any information obtained from him during the juvenile proceedings. Thus, as matters stood after this decision, it was not settled whether under some circumstances a statement by the juvenile to juvenile court personnel could be used in a later criminal trial.
Against the background of the decisions in Arbeiter (1) and (2) and the uncertainty as to admissibility of statements obtained by juvenile officers in the juvenile court proceedings, the General Assembly in 1969 amended § 211.271(3) to provide as follows:
“3. After a child is taken into custody as provided in section 211.131, all admissions, confessions, and statements by the child to the juvenile officer and juvenile court personnel and all evidence given in cases under this chapter, as well as all reports and records of the juvenile court, are not lawful or proper evidence against the child and shall not be used for any purpose whatsoever in any proceeding, civil or criminal, other than proceedings under this chapter.”8
[429] The key words in this amended statute insofar as this case is concerned are that “all admissions, confessions, and statements by the child to the juvenile officer and juvenile court personnel * * * are not lawful or proper evidence against the child * * * in any proceeding * * * other than proceedings under this chapter.”
Defendant argues that the General Assembly by the foregoing language intended to establish an absolute prohibition to admission in evidence in a criminal trial of any statement to or in the presence of a juvenile court representative regardless of circumstances. Pointing out that this statute makes no reference to interrogation by police, to the presence of a parent, to the giving of constitutional warnings or to the circumstances of the interrogation, he contends that it is not permissible for the court to consider any of these matters in determining the admissibility of any admission, confession, or statement made by the juvenile during the period he is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (a period which begins immediately upon his being taken into custody). Sec. 211.061; Arbeiter (1), supra. In other words, he argues that § 211.271(3) is a complete and unconditional bar to the use against him in criminal cases of any statement he makes during this period of time.
We reject defendant’s interpretation of amended § 211.271(3). In our view the specific reference in the amended statute to statements, admissions and confessions made to juvenile officers and juvenile court personnel, considered in the light of the decisions in Arbeiter (1) and (2), indicates that the amendment was adopted to answer the question left open by Arbei-ter (1) and (2) with reference to admissibility of statements such as those made by Arbeiter to his juvenile officer. It expressed a legislative intent that juvenile court personnel should not be permitted to utilize the relaxed, parens patriae relationship existing between them and a youth to secure a statement or confession of a crime and then use it against him in a prosecution under the general criminal law.
If the General Assembly had intended, regardless of circumstances and of persons present and participating, to completely insulate juveniles from giving statements or confessions usable in criminal trials so long as the juvenile remains subject to juvenile court jurisdiction, we think it could and would have clearly so stated. In that event, instead of limiting the amendment to statements or confessions to juvenile officers or other juvenile court personnel, the statute would have stated simply that any admission, confession or statement taken by anyone from a juvenile subject to juvenile court jurisdiction would be inadmissible in any proceeding other than one in the juvenile court itself.
If defendant’s position were adopted, it would mean that until the juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction by certifying the youth for trial as an adult, no one could interrogate him for purposes of criminal prosecutions, regardless of such things as the seriousness of the crime, the juvenile’s past record, the persons present to safeguard and preserve the juvenile’s rights, the nature and tone of the interview (whether adversary or friendly and relaxed), and the steps actually taken to advise the juvenile as to his rights and the potential use of any statements made. This is not what the statute says, and we conclude is not what the General Assembly intended by the amendment it adopted. As we said in construing this same section of the statute in State v. Richardson, 495 S.W.2d 435, 440 (Mo. banc 1973), “We are bound by what the General Assembly said, not what it might have said. The language of § 211.271(3) is clear and explicit.”
The question then is whether the confession made by this defendant on December 9 was made to juvenile officer Christman within the contemplation of § 211.271(3). We conclude that it was not. This was not a relaxed conversation between the ju[430] venile officer and the youth wherein the latter was confiding in the juvenile officer after he was told that he was among friends who wanted to help him by supervision and care under direction of the juvenile court. Rather, defendant was told that the officers present to question him were from the police department. He was told that in view of his past record he probably would be prosecuted under the criminal laws as an adult. He was told that he could receive the death penalty (this was before the decisions which eliminated the death penalty as a possibility under then existing Missouri statutes). He was told that he would not have to make any statement and that anything he said could be used in court against him. His mother was present and they both were told that defendant had the right to be represented by an attorney, including an appointed attorney if necessary. The decision on this was left to the boy by his mother, and he indicated he did not want an attorney. He then was questioned by the police officer, not the juvenile officer. We conclude and hold that this was a statement to the police officer and therefore not within the provisions of § 211.-271(3). The mere presence of the juvenile officer to warn the youth of his rights and to make sure that they were accorded to him, when all the facts and circumstances are considered, did not make the confession to the police officer a statement to the juvenile officer.
In addition to relying on amended § 211.271(3), defendant also cites and relies upon Harling v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 174, 295 F.2d 161 (1961) which adopted a per se exclusionary rule on the basis that principles of fundamental fairness preclude use in criminal cases of damaging statements or confessions made by juveniles before the juvenile court has surrendered its exclusive jurisdiction. In State v. Sinderson, 455 S.W.2d 486, 493 (Mo.1970) this court, in discussing Harling and State v. Maloney, 102 Ariz. 495, 433 P.2d 625 (1967), said:
“The court in Arbeiter (3) did not purport to adopt an absolute bar (as in Harling and Maloney) to any statement made by a juvenile while within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. We conclude now that we should not adopt such a rule. Rather, in the absence of any statute providing otherwise, we agree with the view expressed by the Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Gullings, 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311, 313, when it said: ‘Presuming that federal constitutional Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are granted, we believe that an absolute prohibition is not required so long as it is made clear to the juvenile that criminal responsibility can result and t'hat the questioning authorities are not operating as his friends but as his adversaries.’ ” 9
The rule in Sinderson was reaffirmed in State v. Stevens, 467 S.W.2d 10 (Mo.1971).10
Having concluded that the 1969 amendment of § 211.271(3) did not adopt an absolute prohibition against use of every statement obtained from the juvenile while subject to juvenile court jurisdiction, we reaffirm the rule announced in Sinder-son, modified only to the extent required by the 1969 amendment. Restated, that rule is that if, after he has been granted his federal constitutional Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, a juvenile subject to jurisdiction of the juvenile court makes a voluntary statement to someone other than a juvenile officer or other juvenile court personnel, and if it is made clear to the juvenile that criminal responsibility can result from any statement he makes and that the questioning authorities are operating as his adversaries rather than his friends, [431] such statements are admissible in evidence against the juvenile in a criminal trial.
The rule we adopt does not make juvenile proceedings a mere adjunct to the criminal process nor nullify the juvenile code or its effectiveness. Sec. 211.061 requires that immediately after being taken into custody, the juvenile shall be taken before the juvenile court or delivered to the juvenile officer or person acting for him. Compliance with that statutory requirement protects the juvenile against interrogation before such delivery. Arbeiter (1), supra. Thereafter, the juvenile is subject to jurisdiction of the juvenile court and whether he is interrogated by other than juvenile court personnel depends on whether permission is granted for such interrogation by juvenile court personnel. In most juvenile proceedings, this question will not arise. Where it does not, any statement made will be to the juvenile officer or other juvenile court personnel and under § 211.271(3) will not be usable other than in the juvenile court. In more serious crimes, a request by police personnel to interrogate may well be made. When it does, a decision will be made by juvenile authorities, based, no doubt, on the nature and seriousness of the alleged offense, the record and history of the juvenile himself, and other pertinent facts and circumstances. If questioning is permitted, the juvenile authorities are in a position, as here, to see that the juvenile’s rights are fully explained and protected, that he understands those rights, and that he is aware of the potential consequences of any statement he may make. Use in criminal trials of voluntary statements made under such circumstances will not violate any confidence or undermine or destroy the parens patriae relationship existent when only the juvenile and juvenile court personnel are involved.
Defendant’s third contention is that the court “erred in refusing to hold an evi-dentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury on the question of whether defendant’s statements of December 9, 1968 were made voluntarily, because such hearing is a constitutional condition to the admission of testimony as to self-incriminating statements and had not been held prior to defendant’s trial.”
The transcript discloses that on October 23, 1969, defendant filed two motions in which he sought to suppress his statements of December 8 and 9, 1968. An amended motion was filed December 8, 1969, and a hearing thereon at which testimony was taken was held December 9, 1969. At the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Kirk-wood ruled that the motion should be passed on by the trial judge. Consequently, he set aside the submission and reassigned the cause to Division 16.
Subsequently, on June 5 and 8, 1970, hearings on defendant’s motion to suppress were held before Judge Palumbo in which Judge Palumbo had before him the testimony taken before Judge Kirkwood plus additional evidence and extensive argument of counsel. Judge Palumbo sustained the motion to suppress the December 8 statement but overruled it as to the December 9 statement. He filed a memorandum opinion in which he made detailed findings and conclusions including an express finding that the statement of December 9 was voluntary and was not procured by coercion, threats, or fear and was not induced by promises of leniency.
When the case was reached for trial, defendant filed additional motions to suppress, asserting among other things that Judge Palumbo had not ruled on certain grounds asserted. Judge Holt gave counsel the opportunity to and he did offer additional evidence, after which the motions were overruled.
We conclude that what occurred is sufficient to comply with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964) and Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967). The court with unmistakable clarity found the December 9 statement to be voluntary and hence admissible.
[432] Although not included in his third assignment nor in his motion for new trial, defendant in argument complains as to Instruction No. 5 whereby the issue of volun-tariness was submitted to the jury under the Missouri procedure which is in accord with the so-called Massachusetts practice approved in Denno. No issue with reference to that instruction is preserved for appellate review.
Defendant’s fourth assignment relates to allegedly prejudicially erroneous closing argument on behalf of the state. It recites that the assistant circuit attorney argued “that correction of the defendant was the jury’s duty to prevent crime in the City of St. Louis, protect the public from crime, and from the dangerous propensities of defendant.” He argues that the comments objected to were not supported by the evidence, were irrelevant and tended to prejudice and inflame the jury against defendant.
In the first place, we note that in his motion for new trial, defendant’s only complaint with reference to said argument was that “The Court erred in permitting the Assistant Circuit Attorney * * * in his closing argument, over objection, to make generalized statements about crime in the City of St. Louis, and the jury’s opportunity to do something about it.” Without further lengthening this already rather long opinion by detailing the specific statements discussed in defendant’s brief, we observe that we have considered them in the light of the generalized allegation in the motion for new trial and the various cases cited and have concluded that reversible error is not shown. The trial court has considerable discretion in allowing or rejecting particular argument to the jury. We do not find that the trial court abused that discretion.
Finally, defendant complains of the admission in evidence of a double-barreled shotgun as an exhibit in the case. We overrule this assignment. The gun was identified as one which had been in the possession of some of the participants in the robbery on the day it occurred. There was a shotgun at the restaurant when the robbery occurred. Witness Claude Johnson testified that one McKinney was holding the shotgun. Defendant, in his confession, said that someone handed him a shotgun and that he stood at the door, holding that gun. Afterwards, he delivered it to Leroy Fair. Some of the boys took the gun to the home of Verbie West after the robbery and shooting, where it was found a few days later. There was ample evidence to justify admitting this gun in evidence.
Judgment affirmed.
MORGAN, HOLMAN and HENLEY, JJ., concur.
DONNELLY, C. J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed.
SEILER, J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion, filed.
BARDGETT, J., dissents and concurs in separate dissenting opinion of SEILER, J.