State v. Worsham

834 P.2d 1033, 114 Or. App. 170, 1992 Ore. App. LEXIS 1420
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedJuly 8, 1992
Docket90-1047-C-1; CA A66436
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 834 P.2d 1033 (State v. Worsham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Worsham, 834 P.2d 1033, 114 Or. App. 170, 1992 Ore. App. LEXIS 1420 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinions

[172]*172EDMONDS, J.

Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. ORS 475.992. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. We affirm.

Defendant contends that the affidavit in support of the warrant does not establish probable cause to search his residence. The information in the affidavit supporting the warrant came from a confidential reliable informant (CRI) who, in turn, had obtained his information from another unnamed person. The affidavit said:

“On March 20, 1990, the CRI informed me that an unknown, white, male adult was selling large quantities of marijuana from his residence on a daily basis. The CRI further informed me that this residence was 17275 Jones Road, County of Jackson, State of Oregon. The CRI has further informed me that within the last 72 hours, the CRI has been to the residence at 17275 Jones Road, County of Jackson, State of Oregon, with a second, unwitting individual, to purchase marijuana. Further, the CRI advised that during the time the CRI was at said residence, the CRI was made to stay outside of the residence in the vehicle that the CRI has arrived in. The unwitting individual accompanying the CRI, advised the CRI that he intended to purchase more than one ounce of marijuana from the male individual in the residence. This unwitting individual further advised that he has purchased more than an ounce of marijuana from the unknown white male adult at said residence on prior occasions. Said CRI further advised that the unwitting individual went into said residence and stayed for no less than 10 minutes. The CRI advised that upon the unwitting individual returned [sic] to their vehicle, the unwitting individual showed the CRI more than one ounce of marijuana which the unwitting individual stated had been purchased from the unknown white male inside of said residence. The CRI further advised that the unwitting individual further advised the CRI that the unwitting individual had observed approximately ten (10) pounds of marijuana inside the residence. This marijuana was kept within garbage sacks inside of a refrigerator.
“The CRI further advised that the unwitting individual related to the CRI the intention of returning to said residence [173]*173at a later date to either burglarize or rob the occupants of said residence for the remaining pounds of marijuana.”

Defendant asserts that the affidavit fails to demonstrate either the reliability of the unnamed person’s information or that person’s credibility.

In State v. Young, 108 Or App 196, 200, 816 P2d 612 (1991), we said that ORS 133.545(4)1

“is a codification of the test of search warrant affidavits derived from Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108, 84 S Ct 1509, 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, [393 US 410, 89 S Ct 584, 21 L Ed 2d 637 (1969)]. The two-pronged Aguilar ¡Spinelli formulation is that the affidavit supporting a search warrant must demonstrate an unnamed informant’s veracity and the basis of the informant’s information. State v. Horwedel, 66 Or App 400, 674 P2d 623, rev den 296 Or 638 (1984). The veracity component can be demonstrated by facts showing either that the informant is credible or that the information supplied is reliable.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the statute, the unnamed person who supplied information to the CRI is an “informant” to whom the Aguilar! Spinelli test applies.

There is no information in the affidavit about the unnamed informant’s credibility. However, that person’s veracity can be demonstrated by showing that the information supplied is reliable. The informant’s statements that “he ha[d] purchased more than an ounce of marijuana from the unknown white male at said residence on prior occasions,” that he “intended to purchase more than one ounce” at the residence and that he intended to return to the residence to rob the occupants of the remaining marijuana are reliable because they are statements against penal interest. See State v. Alvarez, 308 Or 143, 776 P2d 1283 (1989). Additionally, the affidavit demonstrates the unnamed informant’s basis of information: His statements are either a product of his [174]*174personal observations or assertions of his subjective intent. Accordingly, they satisfy ORS 133.545(4) and we cannot excise them.

The CRTs statement about his observations of the informant returning to the car with marijuana after he had gone into the residence also satisfies ORS 133.545(4), because the affidavit sufficiently demonstrates the CRTs veracity2 and the basis of his information. On the other hand, the CRI’s statement that the informant said that he had seen approximately 10 pounds of marijuana inside the residence should be excised because, although the affidavit adequately demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge, it fails to demonstrate facts regarding the information’s reliability. When the unexcised portions of the informant’s statements and the CRI’s statements are read together, the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that marijuana will be found in the residence. The trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion.

The special concurrence would overrule State v. Young, supra, and hold that an unnamed person in an affidavit who gives information to a CRI is not an “informant” within the meaning of ORS 133.545(4) and, therefore, that the unnamed person’s credibility or the reliability of the information need not be shown. The special concurrence says:

“The ‘unwitting citizen’ in this case had no intention of communicating to the police his desire to return to rob defendant. He cannot be considered an ‘informant.’ He is merely a source of some of the informant’s information. ” 114 Or App at 177.

That interpretation of ORS 133.545(4) is inconsistent with the statute’s history. The legislature intended that ORS 133.545(4) reflect Fourth Amendment requirements as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. State v. Russell, 293 Or 469, 473, 650 P2d 79 (1982). When the statute was adopted, the test announced in Aguilar/Spinelli was in force. Even though that has changed, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213, 103 S Ct 2317, 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983), ORS 133.545(4) [175]*175has not, and the Aguilar ¡Spinelli test still controls the analysis under the statute. State v. Alvarez, supra.

In Aguilar and Spinelli,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Gaskill
340 Or. App. 459 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2025)
State of Iowa v. Isaac Andrew Baldon III
829 N.W.2d 785 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 2013)
State v. Payne
946 P.2d 353 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1997)
State v. Chezem
865 P.2d 1307 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1993)
State v. Cotter/Ray
864 P.2d 875 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1993)
State v. Brotherton
859 P.2d 565 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1993)
State v. Kapsalis/Scroggins
859 P.2d 1157 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1993)
State v. Strance
848 P.2d 1226 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1993)
State v. Young
834 P.2d 1040 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1992)
State v. Worsham
834 P.2d 1033 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
834 P.2d 1033, 114 Or. App. 170, 1992 Ore. App. LEXIS 1420, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-worsham-orctapp-1992.