[854] SUNDBY, J.
Willie Williams used the shotgun which is the subject of this appeal in the commission of a crime. Under sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats. (1985-86),1 the shotgun could not be returned to him. He therefore transferred the weapon to Harris. He then moved the trial court under sec. 968.20(1) to return the gun to Harris. The court denied his motion. Williams and Harris appeal. We affirm the trial court’s decision.
The state argues that when the seized property is a firearm used in the commission of a crime, sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., permits its return only to the person who was the rightful owner of the firearm on the date of the offense, if that owner had no prior knowledge of and did not consent to the commission of the crime.2 The trial court so held.
Williams and Harris contend that sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., deals with possession of a firearm, not ownership. They claim that there is no reason why the shotgun cannot be returned to Harris, since he is now the “rightful owner” of the gun and he had no prior knowledge of nor did he consent to Williams’ crime. They argue that what they seek to do is exactly what was done in Milwaukee v. Dyson, 141 Wis. 2d 108, 413 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1987).
[855] We conclude that sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., is ambiguous. The fact that the parties disagree as to the meaning of a statute is not a controlling consideration. Town of Two Rivers v. DNR, 105 Wis. 2d 721, 728, 315 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Ct. App. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Milwaukee Met. Sewerage Dist. v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 63, 72, 375 N.W.2d 648, 652 (1985). “The test is whether well-informed persons should have become confused.” Two Rivers, 105 Wis. 2d at 729, 315 N.W.2d at 381.
A reasonably well-informed person could conclude that sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., does not prevent the owner who used a firearm in the commission of a crime from transferring the firearm to an innocent person who becomes the “rightful owner” as sec. 968.20(1) requires. An equally well-informed person could conclude that the “rightful owner” is the person, other than the person who committed the crime, who owned the firearm when the crime was committed.
The guiding principle of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the legislature. ... When a statute is ambiguous, a reviewing court may resort to extrinsic aids to determine legislative intent.
“One of the most valuable extrinsic aids of judicial construction is legislative history.” Milwaukee Co. v. Labor & Ind. Rev. Comm., 113 Wis. 2d 199, 204, 335 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Ct. App. 1983). [Citations omitted.]
State v. Vonesh, 135 Wis. 2d 477, 482-83, 401 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Ct. App. 1986) (heading omitted). We note that the state agrees that resort to the legislative intent is appropriate.
[856] The legislative history of sec. 968.20, Stats., supports the trial court’s conclusion. Section 968.20 was created by sec. 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969. A note to the section by the judicial council criminal rules committee states:
This section is a new provision which establishes a simplified procedure for obtaining the return of property seized with or without a warrant. Obviously if such property is needed for use as evidence, it need not be returned unless arrangements can be made for its subsequent use as evidence. Contraband need never be returned.
Prior to the enactment of sec. 968.20, sec. 963.04, Stats. (1967), governed the return of seized property. This section was previously numbered sec. 363.04, Stats. Section 363.04 was revised in the criminal code revision, sec. 233, ch. 631, Laws of 1949, to read:
Property seized under a search warrant or validly seized without a warrant shall be safely kept by the officer... so long as necessary for the purpose of being produced as evidence on any trial. As soon as may be thereafter it shall be disposed of as follows, upon the order of the court:
(8) Firearms, ammunition, explosives, bombs, infernal machines, and like devices, which have been used in the commission of a crime, shall be shipped to, and become the property of the state crime laboratory.
The 1969 revision eliminated any reference to firearms.
The “simplified” procedure contained in sec. 968.20, Stats. (1969), proved to be too simple. In particular, a gap in the legislation was found to exist [857] with respect to seized firearms. Section 14, ch. 260, Laws of 1977, created sec. 968.20(3) to provide a procedure to dispose of seized firearms. No special provision was made with respect to seized firearms used in the commission of a crime. By sec. 884, ch. 221, Laws of 1979, the legislature expanded the procedures for the disposal of firearms. Again, however, no special disposition was required of firearms used in the commission of crimes. Firearms used in the commission of crimes were dealt with in sec. 2, 1983 Wis. Act 278 which created sec. 968.20(lm)(b).
The history of sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., establishes that the legislature intended the term “rightful owner” to apply only to the innocent person who owned the firearm at the time of commission of the crime. In its analysis of 1983 Wis. Act 278, the legislative reference bureau stated:
This proposal revises the treatment of seized firearms .... If the person committed a crime with a firearm ... the firearm ... may not be returned to him or her. The rightful owner of a seized firearm ... may reobtain that property if the owner had no prior knowledge of and gave no consent to the commission of the crime. [Emphasis added.]
Plainly, a person who did not own the firearm at the time of commission of the crime could not “reobtain” that property.
The trial court correctly concluded that, under sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., the shotgun could not be returned to Harris because he was not the rightful owner at the time Williams committed the crime of reckless use of a firearm. The shotgun could only be disposed of as provided in sec. 968.20(3) to (5).
[858] Dyson is inapposite because the guns which were transferred in that case were not used in the commission of a crime.
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[854] SUNDBY, J.
Willie Williams used the shotgun which is the subject of this appeal in the commission of a crime. Under sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats. (1985-86),1 the shotgun could not be returned to him. He therefore transferred the weapon to Harris. He then moved the trial court under sec. 968.20(1) to return the gun to Harris. The court denied his motion. Williams and Harris appeal. We affirm the trial court’s decision.
The state argues that when the seized property is a firearm used in the commission of a crime, sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., permits its return only to the person who was the rightful owner of the firearm on the date of the offense, if that owner had no prior knowledge of and did not consent to the commission of the crime.2 The trial court so held.
Williams and Harris contend that sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., deals with possession of a firearm, not ownership. They claim that there is no reason why the shotgun cannot be returned to Harris, since he is now the “rightful owner” of the gun and he had no prior knowledge of nor did he consent to Williams’ crime. They argue that what they seek to do is exactly what was done in Milwaukee v. Dyson, 141 Wis. 2d 108, 413 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1987).
[855] We conclude that sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., is ambiguous. The fact that the parties disagree as to the meaning of a statute is not a controlling consideration. Town of Two Rivers v. DNR, 105 Wis. 2d 721, 728, 315 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Ct. App. 1981), overruled on other grounds, Milwaukee Met. Sewerage Dist. v. DNR, 126 Wis. 2d 63, 72, 375 N.W.2d 648, 652 (1985). “The test is whether well-informed persons should have become confused.” Two Rivers, 105 Wis. 2d at 729, 315 N.W.2d at 381.
A reasonably well-informed person could conclude that sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., does not prevent the owner who used a firearm in the commission of a crime from transferring the firearm to an innocent person who becomes the “rightful owner” as sec. 968.20(1) requires. An equally well-informed person could conclude that the “rightful owner” is the person, other than the person who committed the crime, who owned the firearm when the crime was committed.
The guiding principle of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the legislature. ... When a statute is ambiguous, a reviewing court may resort to extrinsic aids to determine legislative intent.
“One of the most valuable extrinsic aids of judicial construction is legislative history.” Milwaukee Co. v. Labor & Ind. Rev. Comm., 113 Wis. 2d 199, 204, 335 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Ct. App. 1983). [Citations omitted.]
State v. Vonesh, 135 Wis. 2d 477, 482-83, 401 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Ct. App. 1986) (heading omitted). We note that the state agrees that resort to the legislative intent is appropriate.
[856] The legislative history of sec. 968.20, Stats., supports the trial court’s conclusion. Section 968.20 was created by sec. 63, ch. 255, Laws of 1969. A note to the section by the judicial council criminal rules committee states:
This section is a new provision which establishes a simplified procedure for obtaining the return of property seized with or without a warrant. Obviously if such property is needed for use as evidence, it need not be returned unless arrangements can be made for its subsequent use as evidence. Contraband need never be returned.
Prior to the enactment of sec. 968.20, sec. 963.04, Stats. (1967), governed the return of seized property. This section was previously numbered sec. 363.04, Stats. Section 363.04 was revised in the criminal code revision, sec. 233, ch. 631, Laws of 1949, to read:
Property seized under a search warrant or validly seized without a warrant shall be safely kept by the officer... so long as necessary for the purpose of being produced as evidence on any trial. As soon as may be thereafter it shall be disposed of as follows, upon the order of the court:
(8) Firearms, ammunition, explosives, bombs, infernal machines, and like devices, which have been used in the commission of a crime, shall be shipped to, and become the property of the state crime laboratory.
The 1969 revision eliminated any reference to firearms.
The “simplified” procedure contained in sec. 968.20, Stats. (1969), proved to be too simple. In particular, a gap in the legislation was found to exist [857] with respect to seized firearms. Section 14, ch. 260, Laws of 1977, created sec. 968.20(3) to provide a procedure to dispose of seized firearms. No special provision was made with respect to seized firearms used in the commission of a crime. By sec. 884, ch. 221, Laws of 1979, the legislature expanded the procedures for the disposal of firearms. Again, however, no special disposition was required of firearms used in the commission of crimes. Firearms used in the commission of crimes were dealt with in sec. 2, 1983 Wis. Act 278 which created sec. 968.20(lm)(b).
The history of sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., establishes that the legislature intended the term “rightful owner” to apply only to the innocent person who owned the firearm at the time of commission of the crime. In its analysis of 1983 Wis. Act 278, the legislative reference bureau stated:
This proposal revises the treatment of seized firearms .... If the person committed a crime with a firearm ... the firearm ... may not be returned to him or her. The rightful owner of a seized firearm ... may reobtain that property if the owner had no prior knowledge of and gave no consent to the commission of the crime. [Emphasis added.]
Plainly, a person who did not own the firearm at the time of commission of the crime could not “reobtain” that property.
The trial court correctly concluded that, under sec. 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., the shotgun could not be returned to Harris because he was not the rightful owner at the time Williams committed the crime of reckless use of a firearm. The shotgun could only be disposed of as provided in sec. 968.20(3) to (5).
[858] Dyson is inapposite because the guns which were transferred in that case were not used in the commission of a crime.
It is argued on behalf of Williams, that due process requires that a person convicted of a crime be able to transfer his or her property interest in a firearm used in the commission of the crime. We disagree. We conclude that the state may, in the exercise of its police power, confiscate a firearm used in the commission of a crime. The principles which apply to contraband extend to a statute which provides for the confiscation of such firearms. The forfeiture of contraband is an exercise of police power, related to the law of criminal offenses. State v. Voshart, 39 Wis. 2d 419, 435, 159 N.W.2d 1, 9 (1968). The concept of contraband “is hardly more than a form through which the Government seeks to prevent and deter crime.” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 n. 11 (1967), quoted in Voshart, 39 Wis. 2d at 435 n. 33, 159 N.W.2d at 9-10.
Section 968.20(lm)(b), Stats., satisfies legitimate police power objectives. First, it operates before the fact to deter persons from using firearms in the commission of crimes. Second, and most important, it minimizes the likelihood that a firearm which has been used in the commission of crime will find its way back into the hands of the criminal or into the hands of his or her associates who may likewise be inclined to criminal activity.
The procedure followed in this case satisfied Williams’ due process rights.3 Section 968.20(lm)(b), [859] Stats., notified him that his right to possession and ownership of a firearm would be forfeited if the firearm was used in the commission of a crime. He had an opportunity to be heard as to his innocence in the criminal proceedings and to be heard as to his right to ownership and possession of the firearm, in the criminal proceedings and under sec. 968.20(1).
By the Court. — Decision affirmed.