State v. Williams

2001 WI 21, 623 N.W.2d 106, 241 Wis. 2d 631, 2001 Wisc. LEXIS 15

• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Decided: March 13, 2001
• Docket: 96-1821-CR
• Status: Published

Opinions

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.

¶1. We review again the court of appeals decision that reversed the conviction of the defendant, Roosevelt Williams, State v. Williams, 214 Wis. 2d 412, 570 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1997). On April 27, 1999, this court issued a decision, State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d 159, 591 N.W.2d 823 (1999), that reversed the court of appeals decision. However, on April 3, 2000, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated (without review) our decision, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000). Williams v. Wisconsin, 529 U.S. 1050, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).

¶ 2. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), relates to the first of the two issues facing this court, whether an anonymous tip containing a contemporaneous report of drug trafficking, combined with independent observations and corroboration of details from the tip justified the investigatory stop of Williams. Judge James Eaton, assigned to Milwaukee County Circuit Court, found that there was reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the police officers did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion based upon the information before them. Now having the benefit of the Supreme Court's guidance in Florida v. J.L., we conclude that, considering the totality of the circumstances, including the indicia of reliability surrounding the anonymous tip and the police officers' additional observations, the officers reasonably suspected that criminal activity was afoot.

¶ 3. The second issue before us is whether there was reasonable suspicion for the police officers' subsequent search of the vehicle. The circuit court found that there was, and the court of appeals did not reach that question. We agree with the circuit court that under the circumstances, the officers reasonably suspected that they were in physical danger, justifying the protective search. We therefore reverse the court of appeals, and approve the decision of the circuit court, which denied Williams' motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search. Accordingly, we uphold the circuit court's judgment of conviction.

HH

¶ 4. Sometime during the afternoon of November 2, 1995, a 9-1-1 telephone call¹ was received from an anonymous caller. The transcript of the call is as follows:

OPERATOR: Milwaukee Emergency Operator Number 62. How may I help you?

CALLER: Yes, I'm calling. . .O.K., I don't want to get involved but there's some activity that's going in. . .going around in the back alley of my house where they're selling drugs and everything and I want to know who I can call to report so they can come around here.

OPERATOR: Are they outside or is (unintelligible). . .already. . .dealing from a house or what?

CALLER: They're in the van and they [are] giving customers, you know, drugs.

OPERATOR: Do you have a description of the van?

CALLER: Um, hold on, I can get [it] for you. OPERATOR: Okay.

CALLER: It's a blue and burgundy Bronco. Hello?

OPERATOR: Okay. A blue and burgundy?

CALLER: Ah hah. Bronco. It's right beside, it's right beside my apartment building.

OPERATOR: Okay. Is it in the alley or is it.. .it

CALLER: It's right in the driveway. Beca. . .ah, I stay at 4261 North Teutonia.

OPERATOR: Um hmm.

CALLER: And we have like this big parking lot on the side of our apartment.

OPERATOR: Okay.

CALLER: And it is right in between the.. .um.. .the parking way and the alley.

OPERATOR: So they're in the driveway?

CALLER: Right. It's a dark blue and burgundy.

OPERATOR: Okay, we'll send someone.

CALLER: Okay. Thank you.

OPERATOR: Thank you. Bye.

¶ 5. The above information was dispatched by radio to Police Officers Johnny Norred and Phillip Hen-schel, who were driving a general patrol squad car;

OPERATOR: Disrestrict (sic) until further notice.

OPERATOR2: 73R.

SQUAD 73R 73R.

OPERATOR2: 73R drug dealing complaint, 4261 North Teutonia and the alley. Somebody's dealing drugs from a blue and burgundy Ford Bronco that's parked in the driveway on the side of the building. Complaint number is 1119.

SQUAD 73R: 10-4.

¶ 6. Four minutes after receiving the dispatch, the officers arrived at 4261 Teutonia. It was daylight. As they drove past the building, they saw a vehicle matching the general description in the dispatch. The vehicle was a Chevy Blazer instead of a Ford Bronco at the rear, instead of the side, of the building.² The Chevy Blazer was parked in an alley or driveway alongside an empty lot behind the building. The officers drove around the block in an attempt to approach the vehicle without being spotted. They conducted no surveillance and observed no drug trafficking.

¶ 7. The officers drove down an alley, and then turned to approach the vehicle so that the front of the police car faced the front of the Blazer. At this point, the officers observed that the Blazer had no license plates.³ Two persons were sitting in the front seat. Williams was seated in the driver's seat and a female was seated in the passenger's seat.

¶ 8. The officers also observed, as they pulled up, that Williams' right hand was out of view, reaching down and behind the passenger front seat. The officers approached the vehicle, drew their weapons, and told the occupants to put their hands where they could see them. Neither of the occupants was holding weapons. Officer Norred opened the driver's car door and ordered them out of the vehicle. The officers conducted a pat-down search of each occupant for weapons.⁴ Finding none, the officers secured Williams and the passenger in the back seat of the squad car.

¶ 9. Officer Norred returned to the Blazer and searched the area behind the passenger seat where he had observed Williams' hand hidden earlier. Having noted that Williams had long arms, the officer searched wherever Williams could have reached. The officer also searched the area within reach of the passenger's arm.

¶ 10. Within the area that he-searched, Officer Norred found a green leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana, a container with 26 rocks he suspected to be cocaine base and another small bag of marijuana. At this point, Williams was placed under arrest.

¶ 11. Williams was charged with knowing possession, with intent to deliver, five grams or less of cocaine, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 161.16(2)(b)(l) and 161.41(lm)(cm)(l) (1995-96). Williams moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search, asserting that the officers did not have a search warrant and the circumstances leading up to the search did not provide an exception to the search warrant requirement. On January 10, 1996, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion. The parties stipulated to the admission into evidence of the transcript of the 9-1-1 call and the subsequent dispatch.

¶ 12. In addition, Officer Norred testified that even though he and Officer Henschel took a "concealed route" in approaching the Chevy Blazer, he did not know if Williams had seen them or if Williams had a gun in his hand. This prospect made him fear for his safety. Officer Henschel testified that he, too, feared for his safety.

¶ 13. Officer Norred testified that the purpose of his search of the Blazer was to secure his and Officer Henschel's safety. He stated that Williams "may have had a gun in his hands, and he possibly may have dropped it [behind the seat]." Officer Norred explained that "drug dealers have been known to carry guns — and my life is on the line. I don't know if he has a weapon there or not, and I certainly would — felt there was a possibility of danger to myself." He also testified that he would have released Williams and the passenger to return to the vehicle had he not found what appeared to be cocaine base and marijuana.

¶ 14. The circuit court denied the suppression motion, finding that the officers reasonably relied upon the anonymous tip and verified the readily observable information contained in the tip. The circuit court also found that the defendant's hand was behind the passenger seat as the officers approached the vehicle. The court ruled that together, these considerations supported the officers' reasonable suspicion in making the stop and the subsequent protective, search of the occupants and the Blazer.

¶ 15. Williams pled guilty. The circuit court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Williams to 30 months in state prison.⁵ Williams appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's ruling. The court of appeals held that the officers could not have had reasonable suspicion in these circumstances where the anonymous tip "provide[d] only readily observable information, and they themselves observe[d] no suspicious behavior." State v. Williams, 214 Wis. 2d at 423. Because the court of appeals concluded that the initial stop was unlawful, it did not reach the issue of whether the subsequent search was lawful. Id. at 418, n.6.

¶ 16. We granted review and reversed the court of appeals. We found that the court of appeals focused only upon the anonymous tip, rather than the totality of the circumstances facing the officers at the time of the stop. State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d at 180. Considering both the quality and quantity of the information known to the officers, and the surrounding circumstances, we held that the officers had the necessary reasonable suspicion for both the investigatory stop and the protective search. Id. at 180-81.

¶ 17. As noted above, Williams appealed our decision to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certio-rari, vacated our decision and remanded for further consideration in light of Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000). Williams v. Wisconsin, 529 U.S. 1050, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).

h — I I — I

¶ 18. Whether there is reasonable suspicion that justifies a warrantless search implicates the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.⁶ State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶ 21, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552. Accordingly, the determination of reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop and subsequent protective search is a question of constitutional fact. Id. at ¶ 19 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). We apply a two-step standard of review to questions of constitutional fact. First, we review the circuit court's findings of historical fact, and uphold them unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at ¶ 19. Second, we review the determination of reasonable suspicion de novo. Id. Accordingly, we apply the two-step standard of review to both of the determinations of reasonable suspicion at issue here: first, whether there was reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop, and then, whether there was reasonable suspicion for the protective search.

A

¶ 19. In support of its determination that there was reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Williams and his companion, the circuit court made a number of findings of fact. According to the circuit court, the caller was a citizen complaining of overt drug dealing in broad daylight. She was observing a crime in progress.⁷ The caller responded to 9-1-1 operator's request for a description of the vehicle with "hold on, I can get it for you" and indicated that the vehicle was right beside the caller's apartment building. The court found that the police officers then confirmed the information from the telephone call. The vehicle's description and location matched the information given by the caller. The officers, in uniform, in a marked police car, in broad daylight, approached the vehicle, and saw that Williams' hand was reaching behind the passenger seat. The court did not, however, find that Williams' gesture was furtive. The circuit court also found the officers' testimony to be credible, including their testimony that they feared for their physical safety upon approaching the vehicle and seeing that Williams' hand was concealed. The court also imputed to them the information in the 9-1-1 call. State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 625-26, 213 N.W.2d 545 (1974).

¶ 20. We do not find the circuit court's findings to be clearly erroneous. The findings are supported by the record, as it was developed at the evidentiary hearing on Williams' motion to suppress.

¶ 21. We next determine, upon de novo review of the record before us, whether there was reasonable suspicion. A law enforcement officer may lawfully stop an individual if, based upon the officer's experience, she or he reasonably suspects "that criminal activity maybe afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Wisconsin codified the Terry stop standard in Wis. Stat. § 968.24.⁸ We determine whether a stop was lawful in light of Terry and the cases following it. State v. Waldner, 205 Wis. 2d 51, 55, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996).

¶ 22. In determining whether the police have lawfully conducted a Terry stop, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990). "Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors — quantity and quality — are considered in the 'totality of the circumstances — the whole picture,'. . . ." Id. at 330, quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). The totality-of-the-circumstances approach views the quantity and the quality of the information as inversely proportional to each other. "Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable." Id. Conversely, if the tip contains a number of components indicating its reliability, then the police need not have as much additional information to establish reasonable suspicion.

¶ 23. In considering the totality of the circumstances, however, our focus is upon the reasonableness of the officers' actions in the situation facing them. "The essential question is whether the action of the law enforcement officer was reasonable under all the facts and circumstances present." State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 139-40, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).

¶ 24. Here, the circumstances include ah anonymous tip, which brings to bear the latest of Terry's progeny, Florida v. J.L.

¶ 25. In Florida v. J.L.,

[A]n anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. So far as the record reveals, there is no audio recording of the tip, and nothing is known about the informant. Sometime after the police received the tip — the record does not say how long — two officers were instructed to respond. They arrived at the bus stop about six minutes later and saw three black males "just hanging out [there]." One of the three, respondent J.L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see a firearm, and J.L. made no threatening or otherwise unusual movements. One of the officers approached J.L., told him to put his hands up on the bus stop, frisked him, and seized a gun from J.L.'s pocket.

120 S. Ct. at 1377 (citations to the Petitioner's Appendix omitted).

¶ 26. J.L., who was nearly 16 years old at the time, was charged with carrying a concealed weapon without a license and possessing a firearm while under the age of 18. Id. J.L. moved to suppress the gun, and the trial court granted the motion. Id. The court of appeals reversed, but the Florida Supreme Court quashed that decision, finding that the anonymous tip had no "qualifying indicia of reliability." Id. at 1377-78. The Florida Supreme Court also held that no "firearm exception" existed to justify a stop and frisk based upon a "bare-boned anonymous tip[]." Id. at 1378. '

¶ 27. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "an anonymous tip that a person carrying a gun is, without more, [in]sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person." Id. at 1377. The Court concluded that the tip lacked "the indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in Adams [v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)] and White." Id. at 1380.

¶ 28. The indicia of reliability in White related to the predictions contained in the anonymous tip. In White, an anonymous call relayed that Vanessa White would be leaving a specific address at a particular time, and would be going to a named motel, carrying cocaine located in a brown attache case. 496 U.S. at 327. The call also provided a detailed description of the car White would be driving. Id. Within the timeframe given by the caller, White departed, without an attach case, and headed towards the motel, where the police stopped her and found the case in her car pursuant to a consensual search. The case contained marijuana; later, the police found that White's purse contained the cocaine. The Court concluded that independent corroboration of the anonymous tipster's predictions indicated that the tip was reliable. "When significant aspects of the caller's predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the stop." Id. at 332.

¶ 29. In Adams, the tip contained no predictive information, but merely relayed that "an individual seated in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist." 407 U.S. at 145. However, the tipster was a known informant who personally delivered the tip, and thus could be held accountable if the tip proved false. Id. at 146-47.

¶ 30. Comparing the tip before the Court in Florida v. J.L., the Court found none of the indicia of reliability that had existed in either White or Adams. The tip was from "an unknown, unaccountable informant." Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1379. Indeed, the tip contained only information readily observable by passersby, J.L.'s location — a bus stop, and a very general description — a young black man wearing a plaid shirt. Id. at 1377.

¶ 31. However, "there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits 'sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.'" Id. at 1378 (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 327). Florida v. J.L. requires us to examine the indicia of reliability surrounding the tip to determine the quality of the information provided to the police. There are myriad distinctions between the anonymous tip before us and the tip in Florida v. J.L., all indicating that the tip here was reliable.

¶ 32. The tip in Florida v. J.L. was a "bare-boned" tip about a gun. "All the police had to go on. . .was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L." Id. at 1379. Because the tip contained only identifying information that was readily observable, the tip could not, standing alone, establish reasonable suspicion.⁹

¶ 33. In contrast, here, the anonymous tipster explains exactly how she knows about the criminal activity she is reporting: she is observing it. She says, "there's some activity that's going in.. .going around in the back alley of my house. . . . They're selling drugs," and "they [are] giving customers, you know, drugs." She then steps away from the phone momentarily to obtain a description of the vehicle. Quite simply, in contrast to the tipster in Florida v. J.L., the tipster here has made plain that she is an eyewitness.

¶ 34. Also in stark contrast to Florida v. J.L., where nothing was known about the informant — the tip was "from an unknown location by an unknown caller" — the informant here identified her location, 4261 North Teutonia. And, more than merely identifying her location, she repeatedly identified it as her home: "my house," "my apartment building," "our apartment." She also described the immediate surroundings: the alley, the parking lot on the side of her apartment building. Even though the caller did not identify herself, she did provide self-identifying information, that is, her address.

¶ 35. Although the caller said that she did not "want to get involved," by providing self-identifying information, she risked that her identity would be discovered. Consequently, the 9-1-1 caller put her anonymity at risk, contrary to Williams' contention. We agree with the concurrence in Florida v. J.L. that if "an informant places his [or her] anonymity at risk, a court can consider this factor in weighing the reliability of the tip." Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1381 (Kennedy, J., concurring).¹⁰ Risking one's identification intimates «that, more likely than not, the informant is a genuinely concerned citizen as opposed to a fallacious prankster.¹¹

¶ 36. In fact, the circuit court found that the caller here was a citizen informant. We have recognized the importance of citizen informants, and, accordingly, apply a relaxed test of reliability, that "shifts from a question of personal reliability to 'observational' reliability." State v. Boggess, 110 Wis. 2d 309, 316, 328 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing State v. Doyle, 96 Wis. 2d 272, 287, 291 N.W.2d 545 (1980), overruled on other grounds by State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991)).¹² In particular, we view citizens who purport to have witnessed a crime as reliable, and allow the police to act accordingly, even though other indicia of reliability have not yet been established. See Doyle, 96 Wis. 2d at 287.

¶ 37. There are still other distinctions between the tip at hand and in Florida v. J.L. In Florida v. J.L., there was no audio recording of the tip. 120 S. Ct. at 1377. Here, there was an audio recording, a transcript of which was admitted at the suppression hearing. The recording adds to the reliability of the tip in a number of ways. It provides a record of the tip and its specific content. It provides an opportunity for review, albeit somewhat limited, of the tipster's veracity, not only based upon content, but also based upon its tone and delivery. The recording would also aid in the event that the police need to find the anonymous caller. "Voice recording of telephone tips might, in appropriate cases, be used by police to locate the caller. .. .[T]he ability of the police to trace the identity of anonymous telephone informants may be a factor which lends reliability to what, years earlier, might have been considered unreliable anonymous tips." Id. at 1381 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

¶ 38. We note that the call came in on the 9-1-1 emergency services line to a Milwaukee Emergency Operator. According to Wis. Stat. § 146.70(2)(e), Milwaukee may have developed a "sophisticated" emergency phone system.¹³ A "sophisticated system" refers to a system with "automatic location identification and automatic number identification." § 146.70(l)(i). The record does not indicate that the ' caller called into the sophisticated 9-1-1 system, or that, if she did, it was fully operational at the time she called. It is noteworthy, however, that the operator did not ask the caller for her address. Instead, the caller volunteered that information.¹⁴ Regardless of whether the caller called into a basic or sophisticated system, she exposed herself to prosecution and penalties for making a false report. § I46.70(l0)(a).¹⁵ Potentially, the caller could "be held responsible if her allegations turn[ed] out to [have been] fabricated." Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1378.

¶ 39. The reliability of the anonymous tip here was furthered bolstered by the police corroboration of innocent, although significant, details of the tip. The police, who arrived within four minutes of the dispatch, found the scene much as the 9-1-1 caller described it. The caller correctly identified that there was more than one person in the vehicle. She also accurately described the location of the vehicle, the general description of the vehicle, and the relative layout of the surroundings, the alley/driveway and adjacent empty lot.

¶ 40. We have found previously that "the corroboration by police of innocent details of an anonymous tip" lends credibility to that tip. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 142.¹⁶ In addition to asserting criminal activity, the tips in Richardson, White and Adams all relayed details about apparently innocent activities. The police subsequently independently observed these activities, and thus found corroboration for the information contained in the tips. The corroboration also lent reliability to the tips. Consequently, in Richardson, for example, we concluded that "when significant aspects of an anonymous tip are independently corroborated by the police, the inference arises that the anonymous informant is telling the truth about the allegations of criminal activity." Id. Here, also, there arises an inference that the anonymous caller was telling the truth about the alleged drug trafficking based upon the corroboration of significant details of the tip.¹⁷

¶ 41. Williams contends, however, that the corroboration of significant aspects of the 9-1-1 call here is not enough. Instead, he argues, the police needed to corroborate the tip's asserted illegal activity to reasonably rely upon the tip. We have specifically rejected a similar argument made in Richardson, "that verified details of an anonymous tip must carry with them a degree of articulable, suspicious conduct." 156 Wis. 2d . There we held that "[t]he corroborated actions of the suspect, as viewed by police acting on an anonymous tip, need not be inherently suspicious or criminal in and of themselves." Id. at 142. Also, requiring independent corroboration of the alleged criminal conduct is another way of saying that "reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer's personal observation, rather than on information supplied by another person." Adams, 407 U.S. at 147. The Supreme Court specifically rejected this argument in Adams. Id. The police officers need not have corroborated the tip's assertion that there was drug dealing here, even, as suggested, by conducting surveillance.¹⁸

¶ 42. Williams also contends that Florida v. J.L. requires that an anonymous tip contain predictive information in order to be reliable. The tips in both White and Richardson contained predictions; however, it was not the predictions in and of themselves that lent reliability to the tips. Rather, predictions, if they are or are not verified, facilitate an evaluation of the quality of the tip. In Florida v. J.L., the Court indicated that predictions provide one "means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility." 120 S. Ct. at 1379. However, the Court did not mandate that predictions provided the only means to test a tip's reliability. Indeed, "there are many indicia of reliability respecting anonymous tips that we have yet to explore in our cases." Id. at 1380-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Where other indi-cia of reliability exist, predictive information is not necessary to test an anonymous tipster's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowledge." White, 496 U.S. at 328 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)).¹⁹

¶ 43. There is yet another distinction between this case and Florida v. J.L., that relates to the reliability of the anonymous tip here and the totality of circumstances that gave rise to the officers' reasonable suspicion. In Florida v. J.L., the Court noted that there was no visible reason to suspect J.L. or his companions of illegal conduct apart from the tip. Id. at 1377. Here, arguably, there are two facts, apart from the anonymous tip, that gave the officers reason to suspect that criminal activity was afoot. First, as the officers approached the Blazer, they observed Williams' hand extended behind the passenger seat. The gesture, though not furtive, may have indicated that Williams was either reaching for a weapon or concealing evidence as he saw the officers' approach.

¶ 44. The dissent's suggestion at ¶ 121 that because Williams' action was not furtive it was unreasonable for the officers to conclude he was reaching for a weapon or concealing evidence, is, in itself, unreasonable. We agree with the circuit court's conclusion that, given what the officers observed and could have been facing, the officers acted reasonably:

It's broad daylight. The officers are dressed in police uniforms operating a marked car. Nothing surreptitious about that. They're approaching from the bow of the defendant's vehicle. They're within easy observation.

Who can tell, given those facts, when Mr. Williams began his reach.

But, in any case, there was a reach. His arm was extended. We don't know precisely when he extended it, but his arm was extended behind the passenger van or the passenger seat. ...

I will tell counsel and I'll tell the appellate court that, recently, the court had an opportunity to see just how acute an officer's fear can be about having themselves put upon or their life taken. I think, when I balance the officers' concern for their safety against the possibility that they're going to suffer bodily harm, grievous bodily harm or death, if they guess wrong, or if they determine wrongly, that it's better to — to be thorough.

(R. at 22:59-60.)

¶ 45. Second, the Blazer had no license plates. Although the lack of plates was not specifically developed or relied upon by the circuit court, we consider instead whether the officers relied upon that fact.²⁰ As noted above, the record is unclear on this point. Accordingly, we do not solely rely upon the absence of the plates to justify the stop.²¹ See State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶ 15 n.2, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795.

¶ 46. Williams contends that the police could not reasonably rely upon either the outstretched arm or the lack of license plates because innocent explanations exist. Nonetheless,

[P]olice officers are not required to rule out the possibility of innocent behavior before initiating a brief stop. . . . [I]f any reasonable inference of wrongful conduct can be objectively discerned, notwithstanding the existence of other innocent inferences that could be drawn, the officers have the right to temporarily detain the individual for the purpose of inquiry.

State v. Griffin, 183 Wis. 2d 327, 333, 515 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990)).

¶ 47. In Florida v. J.L., the Supreme Court held that "an anonymous tip that a person carrying a gun is, without more, [insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person." 120 S. Ct. at 1377 (emphasis added). Here, there is plainly so much more than a "bare-boned" tip. Id. at 1380. The .information upon which the police proceeded was substantial in both quality and quantity. The anonymous tip was supported by a wide array of indicia of reliability — contemporaneous eyewitness account accompanied by details promptly verified by the police. A reliable tip, such as this one, provided information of substantial quality. Added to that was information of not insignificant quantity — a vehicle parked in an alleyway in broad daylight with no plates, containing two persons, one of whom was reaching behind the passenger's seat upon the police's arrival. Accordingly, consideration of the totality of circumstances compels the conclusion that the officers' acted reasonably in deciding to detain Williams. We have here the necessary "cumulative detail, along with reasonable inferences and deductions which a reasonable officer could glean therefrom, [that] is sufficient to supply the reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot and to justify the stop." Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 142.²² We therefore conclude that the State has met its burden of showing that the investigatory stop of Williams was justified — that there was reasonable suspicion.²³

B

¶ 48. We next determine whether the protective search of the Chevy Blazer that followed the stop was justified. The Supreme Court noted in Florida v. J.L. that its holding "in no way diminishes a police officer's prerogative, in accord with Terry, to conduct a protective search of a person who has already been legitimately stopped." 120 S. Ct. at 1380. The circuit court found that the officers feared for their physical safety based upon the circumstances at hand, and so testified credibly. These findings are supported by the record and thus, are not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we view those facts de novo to determine whether there was reasonable suspicion for the protective search. Martwick, 2000 WI 5 at ¶ 19.

¶ 49. Wisconsin has codified the Terry standard for protective searches in Wis. Stat. § 968.25, and, as with the Terry stop standard, we follow those cases interpreting Terry. Section 968.25 provides in pertinent part:

When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for temporary questioning pursuant to s. 968.24 and reasonably suspects that he or she or another is in danger of physical injury, the law enforcement officer may search such person for weapons or any instrument or article or substance readily capable of causing physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law abiding persons.

¶ 50. In State v. Moretto, 144 Wis. 2d 171, 174, 423 N.W.2d 841 (1988), we held that Wis. Stat. § 968.25 "permits an officer to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons where the individual who recently occupied the vehicle is stopped for temporary questioning under sec. 968.24, and the officer 'reasonably suspects that he or another is in danger of physical injury.'" Such a search is justified as a preventive measure to ensure that there are no weapons that could be used against the police officers once those detained are allowed to reenter their vehicle. Id. at 187.

¶ 51. Here, the officers approached the vehicle, and observed that Williams had his arm extended and his right hand behind the passenger car seat. It was broad daylight, the officers arrived in a marked squad car, in full uniform. In addition, as Officer Norred testified, "drug dealers have been known to carry guns." Both officers testified that they feared for their safety. After finding no weapon on Williams, Officer Norred suspected that Williams had dropped or hid a weapon while his hand was concealed. Consequently, he searched the passenger compartment, having noted that Williams had long arms.

¶ 52. The concern that Williams may have dropped or hid a weapon is significant because the officers intended to release Williams and the passenger to return to the Blazer after the investigatory detention. The two vehicles were apparently nose to nose in an alley, or alley-like driveway. Had Williams and his companion been released to return to the Chevy Blazer, the officers would have been in the vulnerable position of having to back out of the alley from whence they came. Indeed, the entire situation rendered the officers particularly vulnerable. Because "a Terry investigation.. .involves a police investigation 'at close range,'.. .when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, and the officer must make a 'quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger. . . .'" Moretto, 144 Wis. 2d at 180 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050-1052 (1983).

¶ 53. Contrary to Williams' contention, the scope of the Terry search here was " 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)). The justifying circumstances here are not, as Williams argues and the dissent suggests, drug dealing per se. Instead, the pertinent circumstance is that the officers intended to release Williams and the passenger to reenter the vehicle. Consequently, in order to protect themselves — especially in light of the fact that Williams' hand had been extended behind the passenger seat when they arrived — there was a search of the passenger compartment.

¶ 54. These same circumstances rebut Williams' contention that, by finding there was reasonable suspicion here, we will create a categorical exception to the warrant requirement based upon a connection between drugs and weapons. Williams relies upon the Supreme Court's statement in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997), that "while drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer safety. . .not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree." However, that the officers were responding to a drug complaint is not the only reason to justify the protective search here. The more compelling reason is that Williams' hand was concealed from view when the officers approached. This alone distinguishes this case from Richards.24

¶ 55. In view of the particularly vulnerable situation facing the officers here, we conclude that the officers acted reasonably. The officers reasonably suspected that they were in danger of physical injury and the circumstances warranted their search of the vehicle. Accordingly, the State has met its burden of showing that the protective search was justified.

I — I hH ! — i

¶ 56. We hold that the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain Williams in consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Those circumstances include the anonymous tip, viewed in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision, Florida v. J.L., and the police officers' additional observations of Williams' hand extended behind the passenger seat upon the officers arrival, and the absence of license plates on the suspects' vehicle.

¶ 57. We further hold that the subsequent protective search was valid. The officers were reasonable in fearing for their safety and executed a limited search of the vehicle to quell that fear. We therefore reverse the court of appeals and uphold the judgment of conviction.

By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.

1 The term "9-1-1" refers to emergency assistance telephone number. See Wis. Stat. § 146.70 (1995 — 96). All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated.

2 Williams does not argue that these minor discrepancies impact the determination of whether there was a lawful stop and search.

3 The testimony from the evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion indicates that there were "no plates." Even though the context of the questioning involves the officers' initial approach to the vehicle, it is unclear from the record at what point the officers observed that the vehicle had no license plates.

4 Officer Henschel conducted a "look" pat-down search of the female passenger occupant, asking her to remove any objects from her pockets and looked at her waistband to check for bulges.

5 Judge James Eaton presided over the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress and Williams' plea hearing. He also entered the judgment of conviction. Judge Maxine A. White presided over the sentencing hearing.

6 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:

[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

We ordinarily interpret Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 195, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).

7 The gender of the anonymous caller was not specifically identified in the record, however, the caller was referred to as a "she" by defense counsel who had listened to the tape recording of the call.

8 Section 968.24 provides as follows:

After having identified himself or herself as a law enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, is about to commit or has committed a crime, and may demand the name and address of the person and am explanation of the person's conduct. Such detention and temporary questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where the person was stopped.

9 The tip was particularly insufficient in Florida v. J.L. because it alleged concealed criminal activity, carrying a concealed weapon, and yet provided no basis for determining how the tipster knew about the concealed crime. "Such a tip. . .does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,120 S. Ct. 1375, 1379 (2000).

10 The dissent seems to suggest at ¶ 115 that a tipster is reliable only if he or she knowingly or intentionally risks his or her anonymity. There is no authority for such a contention. Where a tipster has reliable and accurate information about ongoing criminal activity he or she observes in a neighborhood, we want to encourage contemporaneous reporting of that activity. Such a person need not intentionally or knowingly put himself or herself at risk by personal identification. We dare not speculate what a caller risks when he or she reports criminal activity observed, but it may be much more than anonymity.

Moreover, it would be difficult, if not impossible, in many instances, for a court to determine whether a tipster has knowingly or intentionally put at risk his or her anonymity by calling a police station and giving identifying information, but not specifically identifying himself or herself.

11 All indications here point to the conclusion that the 9-1-1 caller was not a prankster. Originally, she had identified the vehicle as a van, but then, after leaving the phone to get a better description, she describes the vehicle as a Ford Bronco. Actually, it was a Chevy Blazer, although, as the officers testified, the two vehicles are similar in appearance. That the caller mis-, identified the vehicle as well as left the phone to obtain a moré detailed description indicates that clearly the call was not likely rehearsed.

12 The dissent suggests that a tip from a citizen who contemporaneously witnesses and reports an on-going crime is not entitled to any "relaxed test of reliability" since the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (upon which State v. Doyle, 96 Wis. 2d 272, 291 N.W.2d 545 (1980) relies), in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). (Dissent at ¶ 111). This runs counter to the reason that the Court abandoned Aguilar's two-pronged test for determining probable cause (and reasonable suspicion) in favor of a totality of circumstances test we use today. "We rejected it as hypertechnical and divorced from 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732 (1984) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). Under the totality of the circumstances, the fact that the tip here came from an obviously concerned citizen who was witnessing a crime as she reported it, must be considered. It would be hypertechnical and impractical of us to do otherwise, and, notably, the dissent offers no authority for the proposition that the Court's abrogation of Aguilar requires this court to view citizen-witness complaints with a greater degree of suspicion than we have in the past.

13 Section 146.70(2)(e) provides:

If a public agency or group of public agencies combined to establish an emergency phone system under par. (d) has a population of 250,000 or more, such agency or group of agencies shall establish a sophisticated system.

14 There is further support for the inference that the caller's address was automatically identified for the emergency operator in the transcript of the 9-1 — 1 call. In response to the caller volunteering her address, the operator responded with a confirming "urn hmm."

While we applaud the efforts of the concurrence to bolster the majority's opinion, we again note that the record does not clearly establish that there was an operational 9-1 — 1 system here. Hence, while we wish we could adopt the concurrence's position that this is not an anonymous informant case, there is nothing in the record, and nothing of which we can take judicial notice, which would establish that a sophisticated 9-1 — 1 system was operating at the time the call came in to the Milwaukee Emergency Operator. See Wis. Stat. § 902.01(2): "A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (a) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (b) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Moreover, neither the court nor the parties requested that the court take judicial notice that a sophisticated 9-1-1 system was in operation at the time of the call here. We have established that where a court or a party desires to take judicial notice of a fact, notice should be given to the parties or the adversary, "so as to afford them an opportunity of consulting the same sources or of producing others." State v. Barnes, 52 Wis. 2d 82, 88, 187 N.W.2d 845 (1971) (quoting Fringer v. Venema, 26 Wis. 2d 366, 373, 132 N.W.2d 565, 133 N.W.2d 809 (1965)).

Nonetheless, we emphasize the content of the 9-1 — 1 call. The content of that call indicates that the caller volunteered identifying information, such as her address, and the relative location of her apartment at that address by describing her view. The caller clearly risked that the police might identify her.

15 Wisconsin Stat. § 146.70(10)(a) provides:

Any person who intentionally dials the telephone number "911" to report an emergency, knowing that the fact situation which he or she reports does not exist, shall be fined not less than $50 nor more than $300 or imprisoned not more than 90 days or both for the first offense and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years or both for any other offense committed within 4 years after the first offense.

16 In Richardson, an anonymous caller from a public telephone booth informed the police that the defendant would be travelling from Viroqua to La Crosse to sell cocaine. State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 133, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990). The caller indicated that he had been with the defendant that day and seen the cocaine, and gave a detailed description of the two men involved, including the defendant, the car they would be using, and their expected route. Id. The police had not observed any suspicious activity and corroborated only the "innocent details" of the anonymous tip. Id. at 135-36.

17 It is also noteworthy that the officers arrived at the scene four minutes after the dispatch. Consequently, they were able to, nearly contemporaneously, verify details of the anonymous tip. The proximity of the dispatch and the police arrival makes it much less likely that the tip was a prank or otherwise unreliable. The timing here also makes it less likely that there would be an improvident detention.

18 The record reflects that surveillance may not have been feasible under the circumstances facing the officers. The officers arrived at the scene during daylight hours. They circled the block to avoid being seen by the individuals in the Chevy Blazer, and to approach it from a concealed route. Simply, the officers likely could not see without also being seen. Consequently, they acted reasonably by not conducting surveillance.

19 A rule that requires an anonymous tip to include predictive information would have the untoward effect of undermining citizen complaints. As the White Court found, predictive information indicates that the caller has inside information with the alleged criminal's affairs. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990). If predictive information were required, only insiders, as opposed to concerned eyewitness citizens, would have their tips heeded. Such a rule would hardly be conducive to encouraging citizen and police cooperation.

20 One of the officers noted that the Blazer had "no plates," and so testified at the suppression hearing. The issue came up during questioning about the officers' approach of the vehicle.

21 The absence of license plates alone can reasonably justify a stop because, without investigation, the police are unable to determine whether the vehicle is stolen or otherwise properly registered. See State v. Griffin, 183 Wis. 2d 327, 329, 515 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Wis. Stat. § 341.04 (prohibits operation of a motor vehicle without registration or pending application for registration); §341.15(3) (requires display of registration plates).

Nonetheless, we do not suggest, as the dissent contends (at ¶ 123), that the officers here were investigating a traffic violation.

22 However,

"we do not attempt to assign a definitive number of details or list the types of detail that would give rise to reasonable suspicion under these circumstances. The analysis of reasonableness of an officer's reliance upon the corroborated, innocent details of an anonymous tip is necessarily governed by the unique facts and circumstances of the given case."

Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 143 n.5.

We also reject the dissent's suggestion at ¶¶ 115-117 that the only reliable tips are from persons who are "intimate with the suspect's affairs." (Dissent at ¶ 117.) If that were the case, only those who associate with alleged criminals, rather than citizen informants, could provide reliable tips.

23 Because we conclude that the anonymous tip here has sufficient indicia of reliability, and that, combined with the officers' other observations, gave rise to reasonable suspicion, we need not consider whether there was imminent danger due to drug dealing, akin to firearm possession, to otherwise support a finding of reasonable suspicion as we considered in our previous decision. State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d 159, 178-80, 591 N.W.2d 823 (1999). In Florida v. J.L., the Supreme Court directed us not to pursue such a path, insofar as the Court refused to create a "firearm exception;" that is,, where the tip alleged the possession of a firearm and otherwise lacked the requisite indicia of reliability, that allegation alone would justify an investigatory stop and protective search.

If police officers may properly conduct Terry frisks on the basis of bare-boned tips about guns, it would be reasonable to maintain. . .that the police should similarly have discretion to frisk based on bare-boned tips about narcotics. As we clarified when we made indicia of reliability critical in Adams and White, the Fourth Amendment is not so easily satisfied. Cf. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393-94. . .(1997) (rejecting a per se exception to the "knock and announce" rule for narcotics cases partly because "the reasons for creating an exception in one category [of Fourth Amendment cases] can, relatively easily, be applied to others," thus allowing the exception to swallow the rule).

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1379-80 (2000). Accordingly, we no longer rely upon United States v. Clipper, 297 U.S. App. D.C. 372, 973 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1070 (1993), and other similar cases which suggested a per se rule, and note, as the Supreme Court did, that these cases directly conflict with the Florida Supreme Court's decision that the United States Supreme Court affirmed in Florida v. J.L. 120 S. Ct. at 1378.

24 We have appropriately applied Richards where appropriate. See State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998).