State v. . Williams

Supreme Court of North Carolina

State v. . Williams

49 S.E.2d 617, 229 N.C. 348, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 473

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedOctober 13, 1948

StatusPublished

Cited by25 cases

This text of 49 S.E.2d 617 (State v. . Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. . Williams, 49 S.E.2d 617, 229 N.C. 348, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 473 (N.C. 1948).

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Opinion

ErvtN, J.

When the State prosecutes one upon the charge of being an accessory after the fact to the felony of murder, it assumes the burden of proving the three essential elements of the offense, namely: (1) that the principal felon had actually committed the felony of murder; (2) that the accused knew that such felony had been committed by the principal felon; and (3) that the accused received, relieved, comforted, or assisted the principal felon in some way in order to help him escape, or to hinder his arrest, trial, or punishment. S. v. Potter, 221 N. C., 153, 19 S. E. (2d), 257; Wren v. Commonwealth, 26 Gratt. (67 Va.), 952.

In the nature of things, one cannot become an accessory after the fact to a felony until such felony has become an accomplished fact. Consequently, it is well established in law that “one cannot be convicted as an accessory after the fact unless the felony be completed, and, until such felony has been consummated, any aid or assistance rendered to a party in order to enable him to escape the consequences of his crime will not make the person affording the assistance an accessory after the fact.” 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, section 95. See, also, 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, section 102; Brill: Cyclopedia of Criminal Law, section 245.

Thus, it is held that a person cannot be convicted as an accessory after the fact to a murder because he aided the murderer to escape, when the aid was rendered after the mortal wound was given, but before death ensued, as a murder is not complete until the death results. Harrel v. State. 39 Miss., 702, 80 Am. Dec., 95; Burdick: The Law of Crime, section 224.

Such is the instant case. The evidence disclosed that the assistance, which ivas alleged to have been rendered by the appellant, Annie Williams, with intent to enable the principal felon, Bud Hicks, to escape, was given after Thompson Hooker had been mortally wounded, but before he died. Hence, the testimony showed that the felony of murder *350 was not an accomplished fact when the assistance was given, and the Court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit. G. S., 15-173.

The statute provides for punishment for any person becoming an accessory after the fact to any felony, “whether the same be a felony at common law or by virtue of any statute made, or to be made.” G. S., 14-7. Since no such charge is laid in the present indictment, we refrain from expressing any opinion as to whether the evidence made out a case for the jury against the appellant as an accessory after the fact to the statutory felony of a secret assault under G. S., 14-31, or the statutory felony of an assault with intent to kill under G. S., 14-32. But it is noted that there are at least two interesting decisions in other states in which similar problems are considered. People v. Haskins, 337 Ill., 131, 169 N. E., 18; Harrel v. State, supra.

For the reasons stated, the judgment pronounced against the appellant, Annie Williams, in the court below is

Reversed.

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ErvtN, J.

When the State prosecutes one upon the charge of being an accessory after the fact to the felony of murder, it assumes the burden of proving the three essential elements of the offense, namely: (1) that the principal felon had actually committed the felony of murder; (2) that the accused knew that such felony had been committed by the principal felon; and (3) that the accused received, relieved, comforted, or assisted the principal felon in some way in order to help him escape, or to hinder his arrest, trial, or punishment. S. v. Potter, 221 N. C., 153, 19 S. E. (2d), 257; Wren v. Commonwealth, 26 Gratt. (67 Va.), 952.

In the nature of things, one cannot become an accessory after the fact to a felony until such felony has become an accomplished fact. Consequently, it is well established in law that “one cannot be convicted as an accessory after the fact unless the felony be completed, and, until such felony has been consummated, any aid or assistance rendered to a party in order to enable him to escape the consequences of his crime will not make the person affording the assistance an accessory after the fact.” 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, section 95. See, also, 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, section 102; Brill: Cyclopedia of Criminal Law, section 245.

Thus, it is held that a person cannot be convicted as an accessory after the fact to a murder because he aided the murderer to escape, when the aid was rendered after the mortal wound was given, but before death ensued, as a murder is not complete until the death results. Harrel v. State. 39 Miss., 702, 80 Am. Dec., 95; Burdick: The Law of Crime, section 224.

Such is the instant case. The evidence disclosed that the assistance, which ivas alleged to have been rendered by the appellant, Annie Williams, with intent to enable the principal felon, Bud Hicks, to escape, was given after Thompson Hooker had been mortally wounded, but before he died. Hence, the testimony showed that the felony of murder *350 was not an accomplished fact when the assistance was given, and the Court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit. G. S., 15-173.

The statute provides for punishment for any person becoming an accessory after the fact to any felony, “whether the same be a felony at common law or by virtue of any statute made, or to be made.” G. S., 14-7. Since no such charge is laid in the present indictment, we refrain from expressing any opinion as to whether the evidence made out a case for the jury against the appellant as an accessory after the fact to the statutory felony of a secret assault under G. S., 14-31, or the statutory felony of an assault with intent to kill under G. S., 14-32. But it is noted that there are at least two interesting decisions in other states in which similar problems are considered. People v. Haskins, 337 Ill., 131, 169 N. E., 18; Harrel v. State, supra.

For the reasons stated, the judgment pronounced against the appellant, Annie Williams, in the court below is

Reversed.

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49 S.E.2d 617, 229 N.C. 348, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 473, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-williams-nc-1948.

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