State v. . Williams

13 S.E.2d 617, 219 N.C. 365, 1941 N.C. LEXIS 327

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: March 26, 1941
• Status: Published

Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

Tbe record discloses that Elliott’s cotton seed began to disappear from bis ginbouse on 23 November and continued to disappear from time to time for several weeks thereafter. Tart made a number of purchases of cotton seed from the defendant during this period. Elliott identified four of the sacks of seed which the defendant sold to Tart as belonging to him. This is some evidence tending to connect the defendant with the theft and permitting the inference that he participated therein as a principal. S. v. Williams, 187 N. C., 492, 122 S. E., 13; S. v. Hullen, 133 N. C., 656, 45 S. E., 513; S. v. McRae, 120 N. C., 608, 27 S. E., 78.

It is very generally held that the recent possession of stolen property is a circumstance tending to show the larceny thereof by the possessor (S. v. Best, 202 N. C., 9, 161 S. E., 535), or that it raises a presumption of fact (S. v. Anderson, 162 N. C., 571, 77 S. E., 238), or a presumption of law (S. v. Graves, 72 N. C., 482) of such guilt. S. v. Jones, 20 N. C., 120; S. v. Turner, 65 N. C., 592; S. v. Patterson, 78 N. C., 470; S. v. Rights, 82 N. C., 675. The case put by Hale, where a horse thief was pursued, finding himself pressed, got down, desiring a man in the road to hold his horse till he returned, and the innocent man was taken with the horse, illustrates the necessity of using caution in convictions founded on presumptive evidence. S. v. Adams, 2 N. C., 463. See S. v. Cannon, 218 N. C., 466. This was explained to the jury, the court stating that the strength of the presumption would depend upon the circumstances of the case and the length of time intervening between the larceny of the goods and their discovery in the possession of the defendant. “Ordinarily, it is stronger or weaker in proportion to the period intervening between the stealing and the finding in possession of the accused; and after the lapse of a considerable time before a possession is shown in the accused, the law does not infer his guilt, but leaves that question to the jury under the consideration of all the circumstances”— Ashe, J., in S. v. Rights, supra.

The following excerpt from the charge also forms the basis of one of defendant’s exceptive assignments of error: “If you are satisfied from the testimony and beyond a reasonable doubt that the seed found by Elliott in the possession of Tart were in fact the seed of Elliott, and that they were taken and stolen by the defendant from his gin on or about the 12th or 10th day of December, whichever date it was, it would become your duty to find the defendant guilty.”

The defendant objects to this instruction on the ground (1) that the dates specified therein are not supported by the evidence, and (2) that it fails to define what is meant by “taken and stolen.” The exact dates are not regarded as capitally important, S. v. Overcash, 182 N. C., 889, 109 S. E., 626; S. v. Pate, 121 N. C., 659, 28 S. E., 354; and the court had previously given the jury the constituent elements of larceny. S. v. Martin, 82 N. C., 672. The charge is to be considered contextually. S. v. Lee, 192 N. C., 225, 134 S. E., 458. The exception is not sustained.

The trial of the case is apparently accordant with the decisions on the subject. No sufficient reason has been discovered for disturbing the result. Hence, the verdict and judgment will be upheld.

No error.