HASELTON, P. J.
Defendant, who was convicted of multiple crimes in six consolidated cases,
challenges the sentencing court’s imposition of consecutive sentences on three of his convictions for first-degree burglary, ORS 164.225, arguing that he was entitled under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to a jury determination of facts to support the imposition of consecutive sentences.
See Blakely v. Washington,
542 US 296, 124 S Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004);
Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000);
State v. Ice,
343 Or 248,170 P3d 1049 (2007),
cert
granted,_US_, 128 S Ct 1657 (2008). As explained below, we conclude that defendant admitted the facts necessary to justify the consecutive sentences. Accordingly, we affirm.
The three sentences challenged on appeal all arose from one of the consolidated cases. In that case, defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of first-degree burglary as well as other offenses not at issue on appeal. The counts on which the consecutive sentences were imposed were pleaded as follows:
“COUNT 4
“The defendant, on or about November 30,2004, in Lane County, Oregon, in a transaction and occurrence separate and distinct from that alleged in Count 1 through 3, did unlawfully and knowingly enter or remain in an occupied dwelling located at 3388 St. Croix Street, Eugene, Oregon, with intent to commit the crime of theft therein; contrary to statute and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon;
* * * *
“COUNT 6
“The defendant, on or about November 30,2004, in Lane County, Oregon, in a transaction and occurrence separate and distinct from that alleged in Count 1 through 5, did unlawfully and knowingly enter or remain in an occupied dwelling located at 2601 Erin Way, Eugene, Oregon, with intent to commit the crime of theft therein; contrary to statute and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon;
“COUNT 7
“The defendant, on or about November 30,2004, in Lane County, Oregon, in a transaction and occurrence separate and distinct from that alleged in Count 1 through 6, did unlawfully and knowingly enter or remain in a dwelling located at 2790 St. Lucia Street, Eugene, Oregon, with intent to commit the crime of theft therein; contrary to statute and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon.”
In his plea petition, defendant acknowledged that “I committed these crimes as set out in these two indictments,” with an exception that did not involve the case at issue in this appeal. The court verified that defendant understood the rights he was giving up, confirmed that defendant had signed the plea petition, and then accepted defendant’s guilty plea.
At sentencing, the prosecutor described Count 4 as involving the home of an elderly couple, the Mocks, who lived on St. Croix Street and who were at home during the burglary but were not aware at the time that defendant had broken in and taken jewelry and other items. The prosecutor described Count 6 as involving the home of Mr. Singer, who lived on Erin Way, and who was home when defendant broke in. Finally, the prosecutor described Count 7 as a burglary of the Sherrys’ residence located on St. Lucia Street, where a neighbor witnessed defendant entering the garage. The prosecutor asserted that the sentences for those crimes should be consecutive to each other.
Defense counsel responded that, under the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in
Blakely
and
Apprendi,
the court could not impose those sentences consecutively,
because imposition of consecutive sentences would require judicial factfinding pursuant to ORS 137.123. The court imposed the sentences consecutively, apparently relying, at least in part, on Article I, section 44(l)(b), of the Oregon Constitution, which provides that “[n]o law shall limit a court’s authority to sentence a criminal defendant consecutively for crimes against different victims.”
Defendant then further objected, noting that any determination that the crimes involved separate victims would require factfinding, and, consequently, would run afoul of the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in
Blakely
and
Apprendi.
The trial court, in response, ultimately specified that it was finding that “the transactions and occurrences took place as laid out in the state’s recommended sentencing structure.”
On appeal, defendant asserts that, although the sentencing court’s determination that the crimes were committed against different victims satisfies the criteria of ORS 137.123(5)(b),
that determination represents impermissible judicial factfinding under the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted by the Oregon Supreme Court in
Ice. See Ice,
343 Or 248 (judicial factfinding in support of consecutive sentences made under ORS 137.123(2) and (5) violates the Sixth Amendment).
The state makes two responses. First, the state argues that the sentencing court correctly relied on Article I, section 44(l)(b), and determined that ORS 137.123 cannot “limit a court’s authority to sentence a criminal defendant
consecutively for crimes against different victims.” Second, the state argues that consecutive sentences were permissible because there is an exception to the rule established by
Blakely
and
Apprendi
for facts “admitted by the defendant.”
Blakely,
542 US at 303.
With respect to the latter argument, the state contends that, because defendant admitted to the charges in the indictment as set forth above, defendant admitted the facts necessary to support a consecutive sentence pursuant to ORS 137.123(2).
In particular, the state asserts that, by pleading to counts that were described in the indictment as “separate and distinct from” each other, defendant acknowledged that the offenses did not arise from “the same continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct” for purposes of ORS 137.123(2).
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HASELTON, P. J.
Defendant, who was convicted of multiple crimes in six consolidated cases,
challenges the sentencing court’s imposition of consecutive sentences on three of his convictions for first-degree burglary, ORS 164.225, arguing that he was entitled under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to a jury determination of facts to support the imposition of consecutive sentences.
See Blakely v. Washington,
542 US 296, 124 S Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004);
Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000);
State v. Ice,
343 Or 248,170 P3d 1049 (2007),
cert
granted,_US_, 128 S Ct 1657 (2008). As explained below, we conclude that defendant admitted the facts necessary to justify the consecutive sentences. Accordingly, we affirm.
The three sentences challenged on appeal all arose from one of the consolidated cases. In that case, defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of first-degree burglary as well as other offenses not at issue on appeal. The counts on which the consecutive sentences were imposed were pleaded as follows:
“COUNT 4
“The defendant, on or about November 30,2004, in Lane County, Oregon, in a transaction and occurrence separate and distinct from that alleged in Count 1 through 3, did unlawfully and knowingly enter or remain in an occupied dwelling located at 3388 St. Croix Street, Eugene, Oregon, with intent to commit the crime of theft therein; contrary to statute and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon;
* * * *
“COUNT 6
“The defendant, on or about November 30,2004, in Lane County, Oregon, in a transaction and occurrence separate and distinct from that alleged in Count 1 through 5, did unlawfully and knowingly enter or remain in an occupied dwelling located at 2601 Erin Way, Eugene, Oregon, with intent to commit the crime of theft therein; contrary to statute and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon;
“COUNT 7
“The defendant, on or about November 30,2004, in Lane County, Oregon, in a transaction and occurrence separate and distinct from that alleged in Count 1 through 6, did unlawfully and knowingly enter or remain in a dwelling located at 2790 St. Lucia Street, Eugene, Oregon, with intent to commit the crime of theft therein; contrary to statute and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon.”
In his plea petition, defendant acknowledged that “I committed these crimes as set out in these two indictments,” with an exception that did not involve the case at issue in this appeal. The court verified that defendant understood the rights he was giving up, confirmed that defendant had signed the plea petition, and then accepted defendant’s guilty plea.
At sentencing, the prosecutor described Count 4 as involving the home of an elderly couple, the Mocks, who lived on St. Croix Street and who were at home during the burglary but were not aware at the time that defendant had broken in and taken jewelry and other items. The prosecutor described Count 6 as involving the home of Mr. Singer, who lived on Erin Way, and who was home when defendant broke in. Finally, the prosecutor described Count 7 as a burglary of the Sherrys’ residence located on St. Lucia Street, where a neighbor witnessed defendant entering the garage. The prosecutor asserted that the sentences for those crimes should be consecutive to each other.
Defense counsel responded that, under the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in
Blakely
and
Apprendi,
the court could not impose those sentences consecutively,
because imposition of consecutive sentences would require judicial factfinding pursuant to ORS 137.123. The court imposed the sentences consecutively, apparently relying, at least in part, on Article I, section 44(l)(b), of the Oregon Constitution, which provides that “[n]o law shall limit a court’s authority to sentence a criminal defendant consecutively for crimes against different victims.”
Defendant then further objected, noting that any determination that the crimes involved separate victims would require factfinding, and, consequently, would run afoul of the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in
Blakely
and
Apprendi.
The trial court, in response, ultimately specified that it was finding that “the transactions and occurrences took place as laid out in the state’s recommended sentencing structure.”
On appeal, defendant asserts that, although the sentencing court’s determination that the crimes were committed against different victims satisfies the criteria of ORS 137.123(5)(b),
that determination represents impermissible judicial factfinding under the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted by the Oregon Supreme Court in
Ice. See Ice,
343 Or 248 (judicial factfinding in support of consecutive sentences made under ORS 137.123(2) and (5) violates the Sixth Amendment).
The state makes two responses. First, the state argues that the sentencing court correctly relied on Article I, section 44(l)(b), and determined that ORS 137.123 cannot “limit a court’s authority to sentence a criminal defendant
consecutively for crimes against different victims.” Second, the state argues that consecutive sentences were permissible because there is an exception to the rule established by
Blakely
and
Apprendi
for facts “admitted by the defendant.”
Blakely,
542 US at 303.
With respect to the latter argument, the state contends that, because defendant admitted to the charges in the indictment as set forth above, defendant admitted the facts necessary to support a consecutive sentence pursuant to ORS 137.123(2).
In particular, the state asserts that, by pleading to counts that were described in the indictment as “separate and distinct from” each other, defendant acknowledged that the offenses did not arise from “the same continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct” for purposes of ORS 137.123(2). Finally, the state posits that, because the sentencing court specified that the transactions and occurrences took place as set forth in the state’s sentencing document,
see
221 Or App at 437 n 3, the court, in imposing sentence, made a finding sufficient under ORS 137.123(2) that Counts 4, 6, and 7 did not arise from the “same continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct.”
We agree with the state’s second argument, and, consequently, need not address its first argument. Although the language in the indictment to which defendant admitted — that the crimes occurred during transactions or occurrences that were “separate and distinct” from one another— is not identical to the “continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct” language in ORS 137.123(2), we have held in the past that such language in an indictment does, in fact, satisfy ORS 137.123(2).
See State v. Gordian,
209 Or App 600, 149 P3d 190 (2006);
State v. Yarbor,
133 Or App 360, 891 P2d 703,
rev den,
321 Or 513 (1995).
In
Yarbor,
the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. 133 Or App at 362. At sentencing, the defendant argued that the court could not impose consecutive sentences, because there was no evidence that the crimes were not part of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct for purposes of ORS 137.123.
Id.
at 363. We rejected that argument, noting that “[t]he indictment, to which defendant pled guilty, specifically alleged that each crime was ‘part of a separate act and transaction.’ ”
Id. See also Gordian,
209 Or App at 601 (imposition of consecutive sentences was not erroneous under
Blakely
where the crimes to which the defendant pleaded guilty were alleged in the indictment to have occurred during “separate criminal episodes”: “[T]o the extent that
Blakely
is implicated by consecutive sentencing, we conclude that the sentences in this case fall within the exception enunciated in
Blakely
for sentences based on facts admitted by a defendant.”).
Given those holdings, the above-quoted indictment language, and the contents of defendant’s plea agreement, we conclude that the sentencing court properly imposed consecutive sentences on Counts 4, 6, and 7 pursuant to ORS 137.123(2), because the sentence was permissible in light of the facts admitted by defendant.
Affirmed.