GARTZKE, P.J.
Richard Webb appeals from a judgment of conviction for first-degree sexual assault. Sec. 940.225(l)(d), Stats. 1985. The victim is Webb's eleven-year-old stepdaughter. The dispositive issue is whether Webb's sixth amendment right1 to a public trial was violated when this preliminary hearing was closed to the public except for two of the victim's "support per[323]*323sons." We conclude that the trial court erred, the error was not harmless, and the conviction must be reversed, subject to reinstatement if defendant does not request a second preliminary or if a second properly conducted preliminary results in findings justifying a bindover for trial.
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the defendant has committed a felony. Sec. 970.03(1), Stats. If the court finds that such probable cause exists, it must bind the defendant over for trial. The court made that finding at defendant's preliminary. He was bound over for trial, tried, and convicted. But at the prosecutor's request and over defendant's objection, defendant's preliminary hearing was closed to the general public except for the victim's mother and a member of the local rape-crisis unit. The court excluded defendant's mother and niece.
Because the facts are undisputed, whether defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial was violated by the closure order is a question of law which we decide without deference to the trial court's decision. Stevens v. Manitowoc Cir. Ct., 141 Wis. 2d 239, 244, 414 N.W.2d 832, 834 (1987).
Relying on Stevens, defendant argues that the trial court erred by excluding the general public and his mother and niece from the preliminary examination under sec. 970.03(4), Stats., which provides:
If the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 940.225 [sexual assault] . . ., the judge shall, at the request of the complaining witness, exclude from the [preliminary] hearing all persons not officers of the court, members of the witness's or defendant's families or others deemed by the court to be supportive of [324]*324them, or otherwise required to attend. The judge may exclude all such persons from the hearing in any case where the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 940.225 ... or a crime against chastity, morality or decency.
The Stevens court held that "a qualified sixth amendment public trial right" applies to preliminary hearings and "must adhere when closure is sought by the complainant under sec. 970.03(4), Stats." Stevens, 141 Wis. 2d at 248-49, 414 N.W.2d at 836. The court said:
[T]he portion of sec. 970.03(4), Stats., which mandates closure of sexual assault preliminary examinations solely upon the request of the complaining witness, does not comport with defendant's public trial right if the defendant objects to closure. We [conclude], however, that the remaining discretionary exclusion provision of sec. 970.03(4) together with the circuit court finding requirements established in Waller [v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984)], and Press-Enterprise [Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II)], sufficiently protects the defendant's public trial right. It provides for sufficient balancing of the parties' interests, as well as upholding the laudable purpose of sec. 970.03(4) in protecting victims of sexual assault from undue emotional pressure or harassment. We therefore adopt and imply the inclusion of the factors established in those cases to create a reasonable basis upon which the discretionary closure provision of the statute is sustained.
Id. at 253-54, 414 N.W.2d at 838.2
[325]*325The Waller Court held:
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure.
Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. The Press-Enterprises II Court said that since a qualified first amendment right of access applies to preliminary hearings in California, such
proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that "closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." If the interest asserted is the right of the accused to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing shall be closed only if specific findings are made demonstrating that, first, there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights.
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-14 (citations omitted).
We conclude on the basis of Stevens that the qualified constitutional right to a public trial, as applied to a preliminary hearing in this state, is satisfied only if both of two conditions exist. First, closure must comply with [326]*326sec. 970.03(4), Stats. Second, the trial court must make the findings required by Waller and Press-Enterprise II.
The closure order in the case before us does not comply with sec. 970.03(4), Stats. Because the prosecutor requested closure, the second sentence of the statute applies. The words "all such persons" in the second sentence of the statute can only refer to the class described in the first sentence: "all persons not officers of the court, members of the witness's or defendant's families or others deemed by the court to be supportive of them." [Emphasis added.] The meaning of the first sentence, and therefore of the second as well, is that the court cannot exclude from the hearing officers of the court, members of the witness's or defendant's families, or others deemed by the court to be supportive of the witness or the defendant. The tried court wrongly excluded at least one member of defendeuit's family, his mother.
Because the tried court's closure order violates sec. 970.03(4), Stats., defendant's qualified constitutional right was violated. Stevens, 141 Wis. 2d at 248-49, 419 N.W.2d at 836. We need not decide whether the court's findings meet the requirements established in Waller eind Press-Enterprise II.
Befendemt's qualified right to a public preliminary examination having been violated, he is entitled to relief. The federal view is that a defendant need not prove specific prejudice to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee. Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 & n.9. In other words, the violation can never be harmless error.
The remaining question is defendant's remedy. While a defendant need not prove specific prejudice stemming from violation of the public-trial guarantee, [327]
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GARTZKE, P.J.
Richard Webb appeals from a judgment of conviction for first-degree sexual assault. Sec. 940.225(l)(d), Stats. 1985. The victim is Webb's eleven-year-old stepdaughter. The dispositive issue is whether Webb's sixth amendment right1 to a public trial was violated when this preliminary hearing was closed to the public except for two of the victim's "support per[323]*323sons." We conclude that the trial court erred, the error was not harmless, and the conviction must be reversed, subject to reinstatement if defendant does not request a second preliminary or if a second properly conducted preliminary results in findings justifying a bindover for trial.
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the defendant has committed a felony. Sec. 970.03(1), Stats. If the court finds that such probable cause exists, it must bind the defendant over for trial. The court made that finding at defendant's preliminary. He was bound over for trial, tried, and convicted. But at the prosecutor's request and over defendant's objection, defendant's preliminary hearing was closed to the general public except for the victim's mother and a member of the local rape-crisis unit. The court excluded defendant's mother and niece.
Because the facts are undisputed, whether defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial was violated by the closure order is a question of law which we decide without deference to the trial court's decision. Stevens v. Manitowoc Cir. Ct., 141 Wis. 2d 239, 244, 414 N.W.2d 832, 834 (1987).
Relying on Stevens, defendant argues that the trial court erred by excluding the general public and his mother and niece from the preliminary examination under sec. 970.03(4), Stats., which provides:
If the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 940.225 [sexual assault] . . ., the judge shall, at the request of the complaining witness, exclude from the [preliminary] hearing all persons not officers of the court, members of the witness's or defendant's families or others deemed by the court to be supportive of [324]*324them, or otherwise required to attend. The judge may exclude all such persons from the hearing in any case where the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 940.225 ... or a crime against chastity, morality or decency.
The Stevens court held that "a qualified sixth amendment public trial right" applies to preliminary hearings and "must adhere when closure is sought by the complainant under sec. 970.03(4), Stats." Stevens, 141 Wis. 2d at 248-49, 414 N.W.2d at 836. The court said:
[T]he portion of sec. 970.03(4), Stats., which mandates closure of sexual assault preliminary examinations solely upon the request of the complaining witness, does not comport with defendant's public trial right if the defendant objects to closure. We [conclude], however, that the remaining discretionary exclusion provision of sec. 970.03(4) together with the circuit court finding requirements established in Waller [v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984)], and Press-Enterprise [Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II)], sufficiently protects the defendant's public trial right. It provides for sufficient balancing of the parties' interests, as well as upholding the laudable purpose of sec. 970.03(4) in protecting victims of sexual assault from undue emotional pressure or harassment. We therefore adopt and imply the inclusion of the factors established in those cases to create a reasonable basis upon which the discretionary closure provision of the statute is sustained.
Id. at 253-54, 414 N.W.2d at 838.2
[325]*325The Waller Court held:
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure.
Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. The Press-Enterprises II Court said that since a qualified first amendment right of access applies to preliminary hearings in California, such
proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that "closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." If the interest asserted is the right of the accused to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing shall be closed only if specific findings are made demonstrating that, first, there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights.
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-14 (citations omitted).
We conclude on the basis of Stevens that the qualified constitutional right to a public trial, as applied to a preliminary hearing in this state, is satisfied only if both of two conditions exist. First, closure must comply with [326]*326sec. 970.03(4), Stats. Second, the trial court must make the findings required by Waller and Press-Enterprise II.
The closure order in the case before us does not comply with sec. 970.03(4), Stats. Because the prosecutor requested closure, the second sentence of the statute applies. The words "all such persons" in the second sentence of the statute can only refer to the class described in the first sentence: "all persons not officers of the court, members of the witness's or defendant's families or others deemed by the court to be supportive of them." [Emphasis added.] The meaning of the first sentence, and therefore of the second as well, is that the court cannot exclude from the hearing officers of the court, members of the witness's or defendant's families, or others deemed by the court to be supportive of the witness or the defendant. The tried court wrongly excluded at least one member of defendeuit's family, his mother.
Because the tried court's closure order violates sec. 970.03(4), Stats., defendant's qualified constitutional right was violated. Stevens, 141 Wis. 2d at 248-49, 419 N.W.2d at 836. We need not decide whether the court's findings meet the requirements established in Waller eind Press-Enterprise II.
Befendemt's qualified right to a public preliminary examination having been violated, he is entitled to relief. The federal view is that a defendant need not prove specific prejudice to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee. Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 & n.9. In other words, the violation can never be harmless error.
The remaining question is defendant's remedy. While a defendant need not prove specific prejudice stemming from violation of the public-trial guarantee, [327]*327the remedy must be appropriate to the violation. Id. at 49-50. In Waller, the public-trial guarantee was violated at a suppression hearing. The Waller Court remanded the case for a new, public suppression hearing, and for a new trial only if the results of that hearing differed substantially from the results of the improperly conducted hearing. Id. at 50.
In this case, the constitutional violation occurred at a preliminary hearing. A defendant is entitled to appellate review of the validity of the bindover for trial even after trial and conviction. State v. Olson, 75 Wis. 2d 575, 584, 250 N.W.2d 12, 17 (1977); State v. Sorenson, 135 Wis. 2d 468, 471, 400 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Ct. App. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 421 N.W.2d 77 (1988); State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Shanks, 124 Wis. 2d 216, 224, 369 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Ct. App. 1985).
However, an unqualified reversal is inappropriate in this case in view of the remedy the Waller Court granted for violation of the right to a public trial in a suppression hearing. By analogy to the Waller remedy., we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand to the trial court to conduct a second preliminary hearing, if the defendant so requests. The hearing must satisfy the qualified constitutional right to a public trial and otherwise comply with the law. If the evidence at that hearing satisfies the court that probable cause exists to believe a felony was committed by the defendant, then the judgment of conviction should be reinstated. The judgment should also be reinstated if defendant fails within 21 days after remittitur to request a second preliminary hearing.
By the Court. — Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.