[Cite as State v. Ward, 2026-Ohio-305.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NO. CA2025-04-034 Appellee, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 2/2/2026 ADAM TRISTAN WARD, :
Appellant. :
:
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CR2024-02-0263
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Greer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Michele Temmel, for appellant.
____________ OPINION
SIEBERT, J.
{¶ 1} Adam Tristan Ward appeals his convictions for strangulation, abduction,
and rape. He argues his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and were
against the manifest weight of the evidence due to conflicts in witness testimonies that Butler CA2025-04-034
undermine the credibility of the State's witnesses. His arguments, in large part, rely on his
own trial testimony and what he asserts did and did not occur. Put simply, no purported
conflict in the evidentiary record or credibility issue that Ward identifies comes close to
fulfilling the high standard of review in this case. His arguments on appeal represent
nothing more than an attempt to relitigate his guilt. Ultimately, we conclude Ward's
"conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of
fact believed the testimony and evidence presented by the [S]tate." State v. Nelson, 2024-
Ohio-5750, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Lunsford, 2011-Ohio-6529, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.).
Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} The victim in this case, Alice1, was Ward's fiancé, and they shared a home
at the time of Ward's offenses. Alice testified that after coming home from work, Ward
attempted to make her a drink and show her a guitar he worked on for her that day. But
at the same time, Alice's daughter called, interrupting Ward's proffer of the drink and
guitar. Alice took the call, which displeased Ward. After finishing the call, Ward accused
Alice of being disrespectful. Alice and Ward's testimony as to the series of events that
occurred after that phone call, while consistent in some details, conflict in many other
respects. We summarize both Alice's and Ward's trial testimony and any other relevant
testimony or admitted evidence.
Alice's Testimony
{¶ 3} Alice testified that during their subsequent argument, Ward put his right arm
around the front of Alice's neck and lifted her in the air. Alice heard "cracking" in her neck
and saw "stars" before losing consciousness multiple times. Alice also claims to have
heard Ward say he "was going to have to hide the body" before the first time she did so.
1. "Alice" is a pseudonym adopted for this opinion for the purposes of privacy and readability. See State v. Cansler, 2025-Ohio-2558, ¶ 1, fn. 1 (12th Dist.); Supreme Court of Ohio Writing Manual 115 (3rd Ed. 2024). -2- Butler CA2025-04-034
Upon regaining consciousness, Alice found Ward attempting to give her CPR. Alice had
a severe headache, was choking on blood, had urinated on herself, and could not see
out of her swollen left eye. Alice repeatedly asked Ward throughout the night to let her go
to the hospital, but Ward told her that her injuries were not severe, that she would be fine,
and that he needed to figure out how to get her medical care without hospital staff and
law enforcement assuming he assaulted her.
{¶ 4} Ward proceeded to retrieve a revolver from underneath their bed and pulled
the trigger multiple times, but Alice only heard the pistol's hammer "click" and no shot was
fired. Ward then walked over to her, showed her a bullet in the revolver's cylinder and
pressed their heads together. Ward again pulled the gun's trigger multiple times, but the
gun's hammer again only "clicked." After unsuccessfully attempting to dial 911 before
Ward took and broke her phone, Alice separated herself from Ward and sent an
emergency text to her mother from the bathroom using a smart watch.
{¶ 5} Upon returning to the bedroom, Alice found Ward attempting to asphyxiate
himself with a belt and later a cord, but Alice cut the cord to prevent this. Alice then went
to her car and attempted to drive away, but Ward wrestled her out of the car and threw
her onto the snow-covered ground. He then took her back inside their home. Alice testified
that Ward subsequently took off her clothes, and vaginally raped her with his penis, a
sexual aid device, and via oral sex. Alice repeatedly told Ward to stop and take her to the
hospital.
{¶ 6} By the time Ward took Alice to the hospital, approximately nine hours had
transpired since Alice took her daughter's call.
Ward's Testimony
{¶ 7} Ward testified he injured Alice by accident. According to him, after Alice's
phone call with her daughter, he and Alice were "spooning" on the bed when he attempted
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to pull her head up to kiss her ear and neck. At that point, Alice started making a choking
sound, prompting Ward to stop and have her stand up to make sure she was okay. Ward,
it should be noted, worked as a surgical nurse. Upon standing up, however, Alice
crumpled to the hardwood floor. At that point, Ward panicked, retrieved his revolver, and
contemplated suicide. Ward testified, however, that he never loaded the gun. When Alice
woke up, Ward went over to her and used the gun—pointed vertically at the ceiling—to
test her eyesight by seeing if she could follow the barrel of the gun. Ward asserted he
never held his and Alice's heads together and pulled the trigger. Ward also asserted he
never attempted to give Alice CPR because she never stopped breathing.
{¶ 8} When Alice fully regained consciousness, Ward put the gun away and
attempted to help Alice clean up from the incident. Ward testified that he (1) took Alice's
phone when she attempted to call 911; (2) accidentally broke the phone after taking it
from Alice and tossing it aside; (3) attempted to asphyxiate himself with a belt and later a
cord; (4) wrote a suicide note; (5) removed Alice from her car when Alice attempted to
drive away; and (6) took Alice back to the bedroom, performed vaginal and oral sex on
her, and proffered to use a sexual aid device on her (which she refused). Ward testified
their sexual activity stopped when Alice asked to go to the bathroom, and she did not ask
him to stop at any other point.
{¶ 9} The prosecution pressed Ward on the notion that many of his purported
actions throughout the evening were not consistent with accidentally hurting Alice. In
response, Ward repeatedly asserted he has PTSD and "freak[ed] out" after Alice went
unconscious. Despite her apparent injuries, Ward did not believe Alice needed an
ambulance and immediate hospital care that would not only be expensive, but inevitably
"turn [the night's events] into a bigger thing." Ward worried about the ramifications the
incident could have on his life and nursing license but asserted those were not reasons
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he initially refused to take Alice to the hospital. Ward repeatedly testified that he and Alice
needed to "calm down" before taking her to the hospital. When asked why Ward thought
Alice would be receptive to his sexual advances under these circumstances, Ward stated
that while Alice was "still kind of irritated . . . her mood had changed. She wasn't crying."
However, Ward admitted that he was "not making the best decisions at this point."
Other Testimony and Evidence
{¶ 10} Photos taken during the subsequent criminal investigation showed multiple
drops of blood on the house floors, a more substantial amount of blood on Alice and
Ward's bedroom carpet, and bloodied towels and rags in the bathroom trash. Pictures
also showed blood on Alice's and Ward's clothes.
{¶ 11} Ward's suicide note—which did not mention Alice—stated that he "was
always trying to be better, but unfortunately, it [was] not something [he] was able to do"
and that he had "known that [he was a] failure as a father for a while." The letter also
stated, "This is not anyone's doing but my own." The note ended with "Goodbye, Adam
[Ward]. I am the real monster."
{¶ 12} Lindsay Krammes, a physician's assistant at the University of Cincinnati's
Emergency Department, treated Alice at the hospital on the night of the offense. She
testified Alice had a facial fracture and bruising which caused her left eye to swell shut.
Although Alice had no bruises on the front of her neck consistent with strangulation when
she treated Alice, Krammes did identify bruising to Alice's forearms and to the right side
of the neck near her upper chest—displayed in photos taken within a couple days of her
leaving the hospital.
{¶ 13} Shannon Parker, the sexual assault nurse who examined Alice, testified that
Alice had lacerations in her vagina but could not say when they occurred or whether the
lacerations were caused by consensual or nonconsensual penetration. Phillip Irion, a
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forensic scientist with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation, testified that DNA testing
on swab samples showed Ward's DNA on Alice's vagina, underwear, and neck. However,
Irion asserted such testing could not show when or how Ward's DNA got there.
{¶ 14} Finally, Detective Nick Hornback, who investigated the offense, testified at
trial. Hornback interviewed Ward multiple times after the incident. At trial, Hornback
testified that Ward never told him he was trying to "scooch" Alice up towards him in the
bed. Instead, Ward told Hornback he used a "rear naked choke" on Alice as "part of what
he called breath play, which is choking that is sexual in nature." Hornback also testified
that despite not writing it in his report, Ward admitted that Alice repeatedly told him to stop
while Ward performed sexual acts on her.
Standards of Review
{¶ 15} Ward asserts his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence or
were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We note that "although the legal
concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively
and qualitatively different, '[a] determination that a conviction is supported by the manifest
weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.'" State v.
Billingsley, 2020-Ohio-2673, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-150, ¶
19 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 16} "When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a conviction, an
appellate court examines the evidence to determine whether such evidence, if believed,
would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
State v. Madden, 2024-Ohio-2851, ¶ 31 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Paul, 2012-Ohio-3205,
¶ 9 (12th Dist.). Therefore, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in
a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61
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Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 17} Meanwhile, "[a] manifest weight of the evidence challenge examines the
'inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one
side of the issue rather than the other."' Madden at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Barnett, 2012-
Ohio-2372, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.). To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest
weight of the evidence, the reviewing court must look at the entire record, weigh the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and
determine whether in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed, and a new trial ordered. State v. Graham, 2009-Ohio-2814, ¶ 66 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 18} In reviewing the evidence, an appellate court must be mindful that the
original trier of fact was in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses and
determine the weight to be given to the evidence. State v. Blankenburg, 2012-Ohio-1289,
¶ 114 (12th Dist.). "[I]nconsistencies in the evidence alone do not mean that a decision is
against the manifest weight of the evidence." State v. Deck, 2021-Ohio-3145, ¶ 21 (12th
Dist.). An appellate court will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the
evidence only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction. State v. Zitney, 2021-Ohio-466, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.).
First Assignment of Error – Strangulation
{¶ 19} In his first assignment of error, Ward argues his conviction for strangulation
is against the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence does not show he
"knowingly" strangled Alice. Ward points to his testimony that he and Alice were merely
"cuddling and spooning" before he reached down to bring Alice closer to him so he could
kiss her neck and stopped when she began making a choking noise. Ward also claims
there is no "direct evidence" of Alice suffering any serious physical harm such as bruising
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at the neck or medical scans. Ward's arguments are meritless.
Applicable Law
{¶ 20} Strangulation occurs when one knowingly "cause[s] serious physical harm
to another by means of strangulation or suffocation." R.C. 2903.18(B)(1). "A person acts
knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct
will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has
knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably
exist." R.C. 2901.22(B). "[W]hether a person acts knowingly can . . . be determined from
all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself." State v.
Hilton, 2015-Ohio-5198, ¶ 20 (12th Dist.). In turn, "strangulation or suffocation" is defined
as "any act that impedes the normal breathing or circulation of the blood by applying
pressure to the throat or neck, or by covering the nose and mouth." R.C. 2903.18(A)(1).
Analysis
{¶ 21} As apparent from the summaries above, Alice's testimony differed greatly
from Ward's. She testified Ward put his arm around her neck and lifted her in the air after
arguing. Ward's trial testimony also differed from that of Detective Hornback, who stated
that Ward initially admitted to choking Alice as part of sexual activity. Moreover, both Alice
and Ward testified that when Ward put his arm around Alice's neck (regardless of how or
for what reason), Alice began to make a choking sound before losing consciousness,
sustaining a head injury, and urinating herself. Being rendered unconscious, standing
alone, is enough to constitute serious physical harm. State v. Barron, 2022-Ohio-102, ¶
91 (12th Dist.) (affirming defendant's conviction for various offenses, including felonious
assault).
{¶ 22} If the jury believed Alice's testimony regarding the series of events leading
to her losing consciousness, the jury needed no more evidence, direct or otherwise, to
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conclude that Ward impeded Alice's normal breathing by applying pressure to her throat
or neck. And, if the jury believed Alice, it could certainly conclude that Ward did so
knowingly. He was aware that putting his arm around her neck and lifting her in the air by
her neck, especially in the heat of an argument, would probably cause the exact result it
did—impeding Alice's breathing to the point she choked and lost consciousness. The
jury's conclusion that Ward acted "knowingly" would only be boosted by the fact Ward's
own testimony confirmed he was a surgical nurse with a working knowledge of physical
anatomy.
{¶ 23} To reiterate the introduction of this opinion, Ward's "conviction is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of fact believed the testimony
and evidence presented by the [S]tate." Nelson, 2024-Ohio-5750, at ¶ 23, citing Lunsford,
2011-Ohio-6529, at ¶ 17. "Even though this court may consider the credibility of the
witnesses in conducting our manifest-weight analysis," Ward's conflicting testimony, by
itself, does not give us "any justifiable reason to second-guess the credibility
determinations" of the jury's verdict, especially after considering the other evidence in this
case. Id.
{¶ 24} We overrule Ward's first assignment of error.
Second Assignment of Error – Abduction
{¶ 25} Ward asserts his conviction for abduction with a firearm specification is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, he argues the State did not
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he "knowingly restrained the liberty of [Alice] by
means which create a risk of physical harm, namely with an operable firearm." In support,
he again cites to his own testimony and argues he "never used a firearm to restrain the
liberty of [Alice because] [i]t was not capable of firing because it was unloaded." He also
claims that Alice's injuries combined with the "stressful situation . . . could have easily [led
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Alice to] believe[] the gun was loaded when in fact it was not." (Emphasis added.) We
easily reject Ward's assertions as meritless.
{¶ 26} Abduction occurs when one knowingly, "[b]y force or threat, restrain[s] the
liberty of another person under circumstances that create a risk of physical harm to the
victim or place[s] the other person in fear." R.C. 2905.02(A)(2). The requirement that
Ward acted "knowingly" for this charge is the same as discussed in Ward's assignment
of error for his strangulation conviction. See R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶ 27} Ward's indictment for abduction included a firearm specification which
asserted Ward "had a firearm on or about [his] person or under [his] control" when he
committed the offense. R.C. 2941.145. "Firearm" is statutorily defined as "any deadly
weapon capable of expelling or propelling one or more projectiles . . . [and] includes an
unloaded firearm . . . [or one that] can readily be rendered operable." R.C. 2923.11(B)(1).
{¶ 28} If the jury believed Ward walked over to Alice, showed her a bullet in the
revolver's cylinder, pressed their heads together, and then pulled the gun's trigger multiple
times, while pointing the gun at their heads, that would indeed be a stressful situation.
But it would not be a stressful situation that would lead to Ward's acquittal. Instead,
hearing and believing such testimony would virtually assure that the jury would find the
State met its burden to prove Ward knowingly abducted her with a firearm. After all, the
jury could conclude, based on Alice's testimony that when Ward held Alice's head against
his, while pointing a gun at their joined heads, he was probably aware that action and
those circumstances caused him to restrain her liberty by force. Likewise, the jury could
conclude Ward was probably aware such a restraint created a risk of physical harm, or at
the very least, placed Alice in fear. And he used a gun to do so.
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{¶ 29} Whether the gun was actually loaded or in working order mattered not one
jot. The plain language of Ohio law for the firearm specification makes the gun's "loaded"
or "unloaded" status irrelevant. Alice's testimony, if believed, supports the firearm
specification because Alice testified Ward had a firearm on his person or under his control
during this "stressful situation."
{¶ 30} As a result, none of Ward's arguments hold any legal weight. Ward's
abduction conviction was not "a manifest miscarriage of justice," much less one so grave
that it must be reversed. Once again, the jury chose to believe Alice's testimony and the
corroborating evidence of the State. Ward's arguments categorically fail to meet the
"exceptional" circumstances our standard of review requires.
{¶ 31} Ward's second assignment of error is overruled.
Third Assignment of Error - Rape
{¶ 32} Once again, Ward argues the evidence presented at trial precluded the jury
from determining that he raped Alice. Ward summarizes his argument on appeal as
follows: "[Alice] said she was raped. Mr. Ward said she never said no and he stopped
when she asked him to. Besides [Alice's] testimony, there is no other evidence [Alice] was
raped. No confession. No physical evidence. No corroborating evidence." And once
again, Ward's arguments are meritless.
{¶ 33} Rape occurs when an offender "engage[s] in sexual conduct with another.
. . [and] the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of
force." R.C. 2907.02(A)(2).2 "Purposely" is defined as a person's "specific intention to
2. "Sexual conduct" is defined as "vaginal intercourse between a male and female . . . cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal opening of another." R.C. 2907.01(A). - 11 - Butler CA2025-04-034
cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of
a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the
offender's specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature." R.C. 2901.22(A). "This
bifurcated definition of 'purpose' is intended to encompass both those crimes where the
result must be intended, such as causing death, in the crime of murder, and those
offenses where the act itself is all that must be intended, such as engaging in sexual
conduct in the crime of rape." State v. Wilkins, 64 Ohio St.2d 382, 386 (1980).
{¶ 34} Ward's arguments regarding his rape conviction—similar to those made
regarding his strangulation and abduction convictions—fly in the face of the evidentiary
record and Ohio precedent. Ward does not contest that he engaged in sexual activity with
Alice by vaginal intercourse with his penis and by oral sex. Ward's intent to engage in
sexual conduct with Alice satisfies that he acted "purposely." Moreover, the record is
replete with evidence that Ward compelled such sexual activity with force or threat of
force: (1) Alice testified that she repeatedly told him to stop; (2) Alice had bruising on her
forearms (consistent with being forcibly held down); (3) Hornback testified that Ward
acknowledged Alice repeatedly asked him to stop; (4) Ward handled a firearm in front of
Alice that evening (regardless of whether it was loaded); (5) Ward contemplated shooting
at least himself that night; (6) Ward forcibly removed Alice from her vehicle after she
repeatedly asked to go to the hospital; and (7) Ward admitted he was "not making the
best decisions" when he chose to engage in sexual activity with Alice that evening. The
list could go on.
{¶ 35} Ward's final assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 36} Ward's arguments throughout this appeal essentially assert his convictions
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were against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was no definitive proof
that he committed these crimes against Alice. But such proof was not required for the jury
to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because Ohio law recognizes that
"everything relating to human affairs or depending on moral evidence is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt." R.C. 2901.05(E). Upon review, Ward's conviction and his
arguments on appeal present no grounds for us to second guess the jury's determination
that Ward strangled, abducted, and raped Alice.
{¶ 37} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignments of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge
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