State v. Walton-Kirkendoll

2025 Ohio 1006

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 24, 2025
• Docket: 23CA011947
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Walton-Kirkendoll, 2025-Ohio-1006.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )

STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 23CA011947

Appellee

v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE SHAWN WALTON-KIRKENDOLL COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 21CR105487

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 24, 2025

SUTTON, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Shawn Walton-Kirkendoll appeals the judgment of the Lorain

County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, this Court affirms.

I.

Relevant Background Information

{¶2} Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll was indicted on one count of aggravated burglary in

violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), a felony of the first degree, with an eighteen-month firearm

specification and a fifty-four month firearm specification, as well as a repeat violent offender

(“RVO”) specification; one count of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(2), a felony of the third degree; and one count of gross sexual imposition in violation

of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), a felony of the fourth degree, with an eighteen-month firearm specification

and a fifty-four month firearm specification. He pleaded not guilty to these charges. 2

{¶3} One day prior to his scheduled jury trial, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll pleaded guilty to

an amended indictment. The State amended the eighteen-month firearm specification to count

one, aggravated burglary, to a one-year firearm specification and dismissed the fifty-four month

firearm specification to the same count, dismissed both firearm specifications to count three, gross

sexual imposition, and the parties agreed to a recommended five-year prison sentence.

{¶4} Prior to engaging in a plea colloquy with the trial court, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll

executed a plea form wherein he was provided information about the charges levied against him,

potential maximum penalties, the parties’ agreement regarding the recommended sentence of five

years, and the waiver of his constitutional rights. Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll responded to a question

on the plea form regarding if he had time to talk to his attorney about the case and if he was

satisfied with his attorney’s service and advice as follows: “I had time to talk to him. But no [I’m]

not satisfied with my lawyer’s service.” Further, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll hand-wrote on the form:

“DEF wants to address the court.” In responding to the question regarding whether “anyone used

any force or made any promises to you in order to get you to plead guilty[,]” Mr. Walton-

Kirkendoll answered “no[.]” Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll also answered “no” to the question regarding

whether any other promises or representations had been made to him.

{¶5} During Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy with the trial court, the

following relevant exchange occurred on the record:

THE COURT: Do you understand that a plea of guilty is an admission that you did these offenses and you’re giving up your right to a trial by jury?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Sir, I’m going to have you shown what’s known as a plea of guilty form. Did you sign that form?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 3

THE COURT: Is that your signature on that page?

THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely.

THE COURT: Before you signed that form, did you have an opportunity to review it with [your attorney]?

THE COURT: Did he explain it to you?

THE COURT: Did you understand it?

THE COURT: Did you sign this form voluntarily, of your own free will?

THE COURT: Were any promises made to you that haven’t been discussed on the record?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you in order to get you to plead guilty?

THE COURT: Do you have any objection to a plea of guilty being entered on your behalf at this time?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with [your attorney’s] services?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I am.

THE COURT: Is there anything about this proceeding you don’t understand?

THE COURT: Do you have any questions of me at this point, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 4

THE COURT: Sir, how do you wish to plead to the charges in the amended indictment?

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

...

THE COURT: Mr. [Walton-] Kirkendoll, is there anything you’d like to tell me before I pronounce sentence?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Can you give me a second, please. I ain’t got nothing to say.

{¶6} The trial court sentenced Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll to the parties’ recommended five-

year prison sentence and ran it concurrent with his prior prison sentences. Subsequent to

sentencing, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll filed a motion to withdraw his plea. In so doing, Mr. Walton-

Kirkendoll argued his plea should be withdrawn due to a manifest injustice.

{¶7} In his motion, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll argued he “had every intention to take this

case to trial,” and he further argued his attorney, “failed to fulfill his duties[,]” and “coerced” him

into taking a plea through “intimidation.” Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll attached three exhibits in

support of his motion. Exhibit A, a correspondence from Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll to his attorney

dated August 20, 2022, discussed Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s review of discovery and his opinion

regarding the evidence in this case. Exhibit B, a second correspondence from Mr. Walton-

Kirkendoll to his attorney dated November 3, 2022, listed additional witnesses Mr. Walton-

Kirkendoll wanted “questioned on the stand[,]” and a request for his attorney to seek a restraining

order against the juvenile victim in this case. Exhibit C, a correspondence from Mr. Walton-

Kirkendoll’s attorney to Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll dated November 30, 2022, referenced discussions

between them that had taken place on three separate occasions. According to the correspondence,

Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s attorney was preparing for trial, but was “gravely concerned” about the

outcome of trial due to Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s voluntary interview with the Elyria Police 5

Department and potential testimony of the juvenile victim. Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s attorney also

explained the State’s burden of proving the crimes charged were committed by Mr. Walton-

Kirkendoll beyond a reasonable doubt and the potential maximum prison sentence of 35 years if

Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll is convicted on all counts. Further, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s attorney

relayed a plea deal wherein Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll would receive a five-year prison sentence

running concurrent with his prior prison sentences, and his attorney indicated it was his “strongest

professional suggestion[,]” that Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll not risk the possibility of going to trial and

receiving consecutive sentences up to 35 years.

{¶8} The trial court denied Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s post-sentence motion to withdraw

his guilty plea.

{¶9} Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll now appeals raising one assignment of error for our review.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING [MR. WALTON-KIRKENDOLL] THE OPPORTUNITY [TO] WITHDRAW HIS PLEA[.]

{¶10} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll argues the trial court abused

its discretion in denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, Mr.

Walton-Kirkendoll argues his trial counsel was ineffective for coercing him into taking the plea

deal and not adequately preparing for trial.

{¶11} “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . may be made only before sentence is

imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of

conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” State v. Moton, 2022-Ohio-780,

¶ 5 (9th Dist.), quoting Crim.R. 32.1. “Post-sentence relief under Crim.R. 32.1 is only available in 6

extraordinary cases characterized by ‘a fundamental flaw in the plea proceedings resulting in a

miscarriage of justice.’” Moton at ¶ 5, quoting State v. Straley, 2019-Ohio-5206, ¶ 14. Further,

“[a] defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of sentence has the

burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice.” State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261

(1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. “The term ‘manifest injustice’ has been described as a ‘clear

or openly unjust act.’” State v. Sibert, 2020-Ohio-3786, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Ruby, 2007-

Ohio-244, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208

(1998). “[T]he decision whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests within the sound

discretion of the trial court.” State v. Pippert, 2016-Ohio-1352, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.).

{¶12} “A defendant who argues that a guilty plea should be withdrawn because of

ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was actually

deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by it.” State v. Young, 2015-Ohio-4973, ¶ 6 (9th

Dist.), citing State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 (1992). “With respect to the deficient

performance of counsel, the defendant must establish deficiency in the performance of counsel ‘so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.’” Id. quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “The defendant

must also demonstrate prejudice in connection with the guilty plea itself.” Id., citing Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). “In other words, in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement,

the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id., quoting Lockhart at

59. “The cornerstone of the analysis is whether counsel’s deficient performance precluded the

defendant from entering a guilty plea that was knowing and voluntary.” Id., citing State v. Atkinson,

2006-Ohio-5806, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.). 7

{¶13} Here, a review of the record indicates several reasons Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s

arguments fail. First, there is no evidence of coercion in the record. In his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll points to the November 30, 2022 correspondence from his

attorney wherein his attorney advised Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll about the stark reality of his charges,

the maximum amount of time he could be imprisoned if the trial court sentenced him to consecutive

sentences, and the negative impact his voluntary police interview and the testimony of the juvenile

victim may have at a jury trial. Indeed, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s attorney was rightly providing

his professional opinion about the best and worst possible outcomes for Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll

given the circumstances of the case. See State v. Williams, 2016-Ohio-5655, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.)

(“Based on our review of the transcript, defense counsel did no more than what any good attorney

would do. Defense counsel strongly believed that [his client] would be convicted and that

accepting the plea deal was in his client’s best interest. Defense counsel conveyed these opinions

to [his client] and encouraged him to accept the State’s offer.”).

{¶14} The November 30, 2022 correspondence also indicated Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s

attorney was preparing for trial, and would continue doing so if Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll chose not

to take the plea deal. Further, the record demonstrates Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s attorney requested

discovery, shared it with Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll, and discussed the case with Mr. Walton-

Kirkendoll on multiple occasions. The fact that no defense witnesses were subpoenaed is not, in

and of itself, indicative of whether Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s attorney prepared for trial as this

could be sound trial strategy. “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any

given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the

same way.” State v. Sarvabui, 2020-Ohio-1429, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.), quoting Strickland at 689. 8

{¶15} Finally, the plea form and transcript of the plea hearing support that Mr. Walton-

Kirkendoll’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and there was not “a fundamental flaw

in the plea proceedings resulting in a miscarriage of justice.’” Moton, 2022-Ohio-780, at ¶ 5,

quoting Straley, 2019-Ohio-5206, at ¶ 14. Specifically, on the plea form, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll

indicated he received no additional promises or representations, and no one used force to compel

him to plead guilty. Additionally, during the plea colloquy, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll reiterated he

voluntarily signed the plea form after his attorney explained it to him, and no threats or promises

were made to compel him to sign the plea form. Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll further indicated he was

satisfied with his attorney’s performance and wanted to plead guilty to the charges in the amended

indictment. When given a chance to ask questions or address the trial court, Mr. Walton-

Kirkendoll declined. Similar to State v. Finkbine, 2006-Ohio-1788, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.), the plea form

and transcript in this matter reflects Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll discussed the details of the plea

agreement with his attorney to his satisfaction and the trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11.

As such, the record contradicts Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s arguments and reflects a knowing,

voluntary and intelligent plea made in open court.

{¶16} Thus, because Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll did not meet his burden of proof regarding

the existence of manifest injustice in the plea proceedings or show that his counsel’s alleged

deficient performance precluded him from entering a guilty plea that was knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty

plea. See Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 at paragraph one of the syllabus; see also Atkinson, 2006-

Ohio-5806, at ¶ 14.

{¶17} Accordingly, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 9

III.

{¶18} For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Walton-Kirkendoll’s assignment of error is

overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

BETTY SUTTON FOR THE COURT

STEVENSON, P. J. CARR, J. CONCUR. 10

APPEARANCES:

WESLEY A. JOHNSTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

TONY CILLO, Prosecuting Attorney, and LINDSEY C. POPROCKI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.