State v. Villegas

863 P.2d 560, 72 Wash. App. 34, 1993 Wash. App. LEXIS 448
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedDecember 13, 1993
Docket31188-3-I
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 863 P.2d 560 (State v. Villegas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Villegas, 863 P.2d 560, 72 Wash. App. 34, 1993 Wash. App. LEXIS 448 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

Pekelis, A.C.J.

The State of Washington appeals Guadalupe Villegas' sentence contending that the sentencing court erroneously failed to include a federal felony conviction with no comparable Washington offense in the calculation of the offender score. We affirm.

Villegas pleaded guilty to a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (VUCSA) (RCW 69.50). At the sentencing hearing, the parties disputed whether Villegas' federal felony conviction for reentry of a deported alien should be included in the calculation of the offender score under RCW 9.94A.360(3).

The sentencing court declined to include the federal felony conviction because the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA) did not expressly authorize including noncomparable federal offenses. The court reasoned "that all penal statutes have to be construed strictly in favor of the defendant, thus giving rise to an application of the rule of lenity." The court then imposed a 14-month standard range sentence.

*36 In this case of first impression we decide whether the SRA authorizes the inclusion of a federal conviction that has no comparable Washington offense in the offender score. We hold that it does not.

The offender score is based on prior criminal history, RCW 9.94A.030(12), and is calculated pursuant to RCW 9.94A-.360. Initially, the number and nature of past convictions which may be included in the offender score must be determined. RCW 9.94A.360(1). Both Washington and non-Washington past convictions must be listed. RCW 9.94A.360(3), the subsection at issue, addresses how to classify non-Washington past convictions: "Out-of-state convictions for offenses shall be classified according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided by Washington law." (Italics ours.) Once the number and nature of past convictions are known, then the score or weight to be given to each conviction must be determined.

On its face, RCW 9.94A.360(3) appears to limit the use of non-Washington convictions to those with comparable Washington offenses. The State contends, however, that RCW 9.94A.360(3) does not apply to federal convictions. According to the State, "federal convictions" differ from "out-of-state convictions" and, therefore, federal convictions should be included in the offender score even when there is no comparable Washington offense.

In support of this contention, the State points out that two separate terms are used in the offense definitions found in RCW 9.94A.030 — "out-of-state convictions" and "federal convictions". From this, the State reasons that if the Legislature had intended federal convictions to fall within RCW 9.94A.360(3), it would have specifically used the term "federal convictions" as it did in the definitions section. Moreover, because the definition of "[d]rug offense", RCW 9.94A-.030(16), includes federal drug offenses that are not com *37 parable to Washington drug offenses, 1 the State claims that the Legislature was aware that federal offenses may not have state counterparts. Hence, the omission of "federal convictions" from RCW 9.94A.360(3) was a conscious decision by the Legislature.

We decline to adopt the State's interpretation and, instead, hold that the term "out-of-state" convictions, as used in RCW 9.94A.360(3), encompasses all non-Washington convictions, including federal convictions. As a result, a federal conviction can be counted in the offender score only when there is a comparable Washington offense.

When construing statutes, our paramount duty is to give effect to legislative intent. State v. Johnson, 119 Wn.2d 167, 172, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992). If statutory language is susceptible to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous. Johnson, at 172. Because RCW 9.94A.360(3) could be interpreted to mean only convictions from other states or could be interpreted to mean all non-Washington convictions, including out-of-state, federal, and foreign convictions, the term "out-of-state convictions" is ambiguous.

To fulfill the Legislature's intent we must construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to all of the language, considering all provisions in relation to each other, and harmonizing them whenever possible. State v. Smith, 65 Wn. App. 887, 892, 830 P.2d 379 (1992). The State's , interpretation would create disharmony because if federal convictions are not included in the offender score pursuant to RCW *38 9.94A.360(3), then no federal convictions will be included in the offender score. Clearly, the Legislature did not intend this result. The definition of criminal history, which serves as the basis of the offender score, directs that all prior convictions, including federal convictions, be listed. 2 RCW 9.94A.030(12)(a). If federal convictions were excluded from RCW 9.94A.360(3), then this directive would be meaningless.

The State agrees that the Legislature did not intend to exclude all federal convictions from the offender score calculation. The State's solution is to score federal convictions pursuant to RCW 9.94A.360(2), the "washout" scoring provision.

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Bluebook (online)
863 P.2d 560, 72 Wash. App. 34, 1993 Wash. App. LEXIS 448, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-villegas-washctapp-1993.