State v. Villarreal

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: October 1, 2024
• Docket: 23-186
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-186

Filed 1 October 2024

Yadkin County, Nos. 21CRS87–88, 21CRS91, 22CRS73

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

DARRICK FOSTER VILLARREAL

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 21 April 2022 by Judge Michael

B. Duncan in Yadkin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31

October 2023.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Torrey D. Dixon, for the State.

Law Offices of Bill Ward & Kirby Smith, P.A., by Kirby H. Smith, III, for defendant-appellant.

STADING, Judge.

Darrick Foster Villarreal (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments entered upon

his convictions of accessory after the fact to robbery with a dangerous weapon,

accessory after the fact to felonious breaking or entering, and felonious possession of

stolen goods, and upon his plea of guilty to attaining habitual felon status. Defendant

argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges of accessory

after the fact to robbery with a dangerous weapon and accessory after the fact to STATE V. VILLARREAL

Opinion of the Court

breaking or entering. For the reasons below, we hold the trial court did not err in

denying his motion to dismiss. Defendant also petitions this Court for a writ of

certiorari to obtain a review of the trial court’s award of restitution. We allow the

petition to issue the writ of certiorari, vacate the restitution order, and remand to the

trial court for a new hearing to determine the appropriate amount of restitution.

I. Background

On 26 April 2021, Defendant was indicted for aiding and abetting robbery with

a dangerous weapon, accessory after the fact to robbery with a dangerous weapon,

accessory after the fact to felony breaking or entering, accessory after the fact to

felony second-degree kidnapping, and attaining habitual felon status. On 25 March

2022, Defendant was charged by information with possession of stolen goods. On 13

April 2022, the State dismissed the aiding and abetting robbery with a dangerous

weapon charge.

Defendant’s trial commenced on the 18 April 2022 criminal session of Wilkes

County Superior Court. The State’s evidence tended to show that in the afternoon of

6 July 2020, Defendant picked up Brandon Stacy (“Stacy”), Christopher Caudill

(“Caudill”), and Heaven Smith (“Smith”) by the side of the road in Yadkinville after

the vehicle they were driving broke down. The group stopped at a convenience store

and then went to Caudill and Smith’s residence. Caudill and Smith lived in a small

outbuilding behind Caudill’s grandparents’ home (“the Strickland home”).

Once all four were inside the outbuilding, Stacy and Caudill discussed plans to

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rob Stephen and Ashley Peachey (collectively “the Peacheys”). Either Stacy or

Caudill spray painted a plastic gun black, and Stacy put on a black sweatshirt and

covered his face with a blue bandana. Smith helped Stacy pull his hair back.

Defendant then left the outbuilding and told the group he would see them later.

Around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m., Stacy left the outbuilding and headed towards the

Peacheys’ home, which was located less than 100 feet from the Peacheys’ business,

The Dutch Kettle. Stacy entered through the front door of the Peacheys’ home,

walked over to the Peacheys’ eight-year-old daughter who was standing in the

kitchen, and demanded that she take him to her mother, Mrs. Peachey. Mrs. Peachey

was in the basement of their home with her one-year-old daughter. Unbeknownst to

Stacy, Mrs. Peachey’s oldest daughter, who was in an adjoining room, saw Stacy and

called Mr. Peachey, who was at The Dutch Kettle, to tell him that there was an

intruder in the home. Mr. Peachey ran towards his home after receiving the call.

Meanwhile, the eight-year-old led Stacy to the basement, and Stacy pointed a

black gun at Mrs. Peachey. He also had a knife hanging from a sheath. He told Mrs.

Peachey that if she did not give him all her money, gold, and silver, he would shoot

her. Stacy demanded that Mrs. Peachey open her safe and cut the phone line to the

house. Stacy then directed Mrs. Peachey to find her eight-year-old daughter and led

Mrs. Peachey and her one-year-old upstairs. As Mrs. Peachey was going up the stairs,

he poked his gun in her back and told her to hurry.

When they arrived upstairs, Mrs. Peachey’s eight-year-old daughter and her

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oldest daughter were there. Displaying his gun, Stacy told everyone to head back

down to the basement. Stacy directed Mrs. Peachey and her daughters into the room

where the safe was located and demanded that Mrs. Peachey open the safe. At that

point, Mr. Peachey arrived at his residence and ran down to the basement. Stacy

pointed his gun at Mr. Peachey and told him that he was going to “blow [his] head

off” if he did not open the safe for him. Mr. Peachey opened the safe, which stored

Mr. Peachey and his father’s gold and silver coin collection. Stacy had brought a

yellow and gray backpack, and Mr. Peachey filled the backpack up with his coins.

Stacy then grabbed Mr. Peachey’s camouflage backpack, hanging on a nearby hook

and began filling it with more coins. Stacy took both backpacks and told Mr. Peachey

to show him “the way out of here.” Stacy said that if the cops were called, “[w]e’re

going to come back and eat you up.” He then exited through the basement door. Mr.

Peachey saw Stacy run through the woods towards the Strickland home. He then

called the police.

After leaving the Peacheys’ residence, Stacy hid both backpacks in the woods.

He returned to the outbuilding and told Caudill and Smith that the police were

coming and that they needed to call Defendant. Smith called Defendant, but he did

not answer. Stacy left, and Caudill and Smith went into the Strickland home, where

police were waiting. Police apprehended Stacy in a nearby cornfield and questioned

Caudill and Smith. Later that night, around 11:00 p.m., Caudill and Smith called

Defendant again. Caudill and Smith began walking up the road, away from the

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Strickland home, and Defendant picked them up. The three went to Winston-Salem

to buy heroin. Caudill, Smith, and Defendant returned to Defendant’s home and

discussed where Stacy had hidden the backpacks.

Defendant searched the woods for the backpacks but could not locate them.

Julio Chavez (“Chavez”), Defendant’s friend, stood as a “lookout” while Defendant

entered the woods. Later that day, Defendant returned to the woods and found both

backpacks. Defendant put both backpacks in his car and drove Caudill and Smith to

the home he shared with his mother. The backpacks contained silver and bags of

coins. Defendant took the backpacks from his car and hid them at his mother’s home.

The three then drove to Winston-Salem to buy more heroin. Next, they then went to

Greensboro and traded a silver bar from the backpacks for heroin. Thereafter,

Defendant and Caudill dropped Smith off at the outbuilding, and Defendant and

Smith returned to Defendant’s home to retrieve the backpacks. When Defendant and

Caudill returned to the outbuilding, Defendant threw the backpacks out of the car

and left. Caudill and Smith put the contents of one of the backpacks into the other,

put the backpacks in a suitcase, and hid the suitcase in a carport located between the

Strickland home and the outbuilding.

On 10 July 2020, police searched the carport and found a suitcase which

contained one of the backpacks. The backpack had containers filled with coins.

During a subsequent search of the Strickland home, police located the second

backpack in the attic of the Strickland home and several coins throughout the

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residence. Police also located a silver coin at Defendant’s residence, consistent with

the coins missing from the Peacheys’ residence.

At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss all the charges

against him. The trial court denied this motion. Defendant testified in his own

defense. Following the close of all the evidence, Defendant again moved to dismiss

all the charges, which the trial court denied.

On 21 April 2022, a jury found Defendant guilty of accessory after the fact to

robbery with a dangerous weapon, accessory after the fact to breaking or entering,

and possession of stolen goods. Defendant pleaded guilty to attaining habitual felon

status. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an active term of 84 to 113 months for

accessory after the fact to robbery with a dangerous weapon and a consecutive active

sentence of 72 to 99 months for possession of stolen goods. The trial court arrested

judgment on the accessory after the fact to breaking or entering offense. Defendant

was ordered to pay $12,264.70 in restitution. Defendant appeals.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s appeal under N.C. Gen.

Stat. §§ 7A-27(b)(1) and 15A-1444(a) (2023).

III. Analysis

Defendant presents two issues for our consideration: (1) whether the trial court

erred by denying his motion to dismiss the accessory after the fact charges, and (2)

whether the trial court erred by awarding restitution unsupported by competent

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evidence. We consider each issue below.

A. Motion to Dismiss

On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion

to dismiss the charges of accessory after the fact to robbery with a dangerous weapon

and accessory after the fact to breaking or entering. We disagree.

“We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.” State v.

Sanders, 208 N.C. App. 142, 144, 701 S.E.2d 380, 382 (2010).

When reviewing a defendant’s motion to dismiss a charge on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court determines whether the State presented substantial evidence in support of each element of the charged offense. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate, or would consider necessary to support a particular conclusion. In this determination, all evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State receives the benefit of every reasonable inference supported by that evidence. The defendant’s evidence, unless favorable to the State, is not to be taken into consideration, except when it is inconsistent with the State’s evidence, the defendant’s evidence may be used to explain or clarify that offered by the State. Additionally, a substantial evidence inquiry examines the sufficiency of the evidence presented but not its weight, which is a matter for the jury. Thus, if there is substantial evidence—whether direct, circumstantial, or both—to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.

State v. Hunt, 365 N.C. 432, 436, 722 S.E.2d 484, 488 (2012) (citations and emphasis

omitted).

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To survive a motion to dismiss a charge of accessory after the fact to robbery

with a dangerous weapon and accessory after the fact to breaking and entering, the

State must present sufficient evidence that “(1) the felony has been committed by the

principal; (2) the alleged accessory gave personal assistance to that principal to aid

in his escaping detention, arrest, or punishment; and (2) the alleged accessory knew

the principal committed the felony.” State v. Brewington, 179 N.C. App. 772, 776, 635

S.E.2d 512, 516 (2006). “The essential elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon

are (1) the unlawful taking or attempted taking of personal property from a person

or in his presence (2) by use or threatened use of any firearms or other dangerous

weapon, implement or means (3) whereby the life of a person is endangered or

threatened.” State v. James, 321 N.C. 676, 686–87, 365 S.E.2d 579, 586 (1988). “The

essential elements of felonious breaking or entering are (1) the breaking or entering

(2) of any building (3) with the intent to commit a felony or larceny therein.” State v.

Cox, 375 N.C. 165, 172, 846 S.E.2d 482, 488 (2020) (citation omitted).

Defendant first argues that the State failed to present any evidence that

Defendant personally assisted Stacy, the principal, in escaping or attempting to

escape detection, arrest, or punishment. Defendant contends that it was impossible

for him to have personally assisted Stacy because he was not present when Stacy

robbed the Peacheys and he had no contact with Stacy after the crimes were

committed. We are not convinced.

Smith testified that after Stacy hid the backpacks in the woods, Smith

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discussed the location of those backpacks with Caudill and Defendant. Defendant

then went into the woods on two occasions in search of the backpacks, once with the

help of Chavez and once alone. After successfully locating them during his second

search, Defendant put the backpacks in his car, drove them to the home he shared

with his mother, and hid them there for some time before handing them off to Smith

and Caudill. Smith and Caudill then hid both backpacks. They were later found in

the attic of the Strickland home and in a carport between the Strickland home and

outbuilding. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there was

substantial evidence that after Stacy robbed the Peacheys and hid the backpacks

containing coins and silver, Defendant aided Stacy by locating those backpacks,

moving them, and concealing them. See State v. Brewington, 179 N.C. App. 772, 776,

635 S.E.2d 512, 516 (2006) (stating that “personal assistance in any manner so as to

aid a felon in escaping arrest or punishment is sufficient to support a conviction as

an accessory.”).

Next, Defendant asserts that the State failed to present any evidence that he

knew Stacy had committed the offenses of robbery with a dangerous weapon or

breaking and entering at the time he possessed coins stolen from the Peacheys’ home.

He relies on his own testimony that he did not know that Stacy intended to rob the

Peachey family or to enter into their home. We are not persuaded.

The State presented evidence that Defendant was present in the same small

outbuilding where Stacy and Caudill discussed plans to rob the Peacheys. After Stacy

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had entered the Peacheys’ home and robbed them, Defendant picked up Smith and

Caudill and the three discussed the bookbags Stacy had obtained and hidden. Smith

testified that she told Defendant that Stacy had “went over the fence and left [the

bookbags] under the brush in the woods.” Smith, Caudill, and Defendant then

discussed locating those bookbags. In addition, Detective Arthur C. Shores, III, who

was with the Yadkin County Sheriff’s Office in July 2020, testified that during an

interview with Defendant on 13 July 2020, Defendant admitted “to being there[,]

overhearing them talking about the robbery the day of the robbery.” This evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to the State, demonstrates that Defendant knew

Stacy had committed robbery and breaking or entering.

Here, the State presented sufficient evidence of the elements of accessory after

the fact to robbery with a dangerous weapon and accessory after the fact to breaking

or entering to withstand a motion to dismiss. Defendant’s argument that the trial

court erred in denying his motion to dismiss is overruled.

B. Restitution

Defendant challenges the trial court’s award of restitution, arguing that it was

not supported by competent evidence. However, Defendant acknowledges that he did

not file a written notice of appeal from the restitution order and petitions for a writ

of certiorari so that this Court can address the merits of his argument.

Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that this

Court may grant certiorari “when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by

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failure to take timely action[.]” N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1). “A petition for the writ must

show merit or that error was probably committed below.” State v. Grundler, 251 N.C.

177, 189, 111 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1959) (citations omitted). “Certiorari is a discretionary writ,

to be issued only for good and sufficient cause shown.” State v. Gantt, 271 N.C. App.

472, 474, 844 S.E.2d 344, 346 (2020) (citation omitted). We hereby grant Defendant’s

petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the merits of his challenge to the restitution

order.

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.34, the trial court may order restitution “for

any injuries or damages arising directly and proximately out of the offense committed

by the defendant.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.34(c). “We review the trial court’s

imposition of restitution de novo[.]” State v. Hussain, 291 N.C. App. 253, 261, 895

S.E.2d 447, 453 (2023) (citation omitted). “[T]he amount of restitution recommended

by the trial court must be supported by evidence adduced at trial or at sentencing.”

State v. Wilson, 340 N.C. 720, 726, 459 S.E.2d 192, 196 (1995) (citation omitted).

“[T]he award does not have to be supported by specific findings of fact or conclusions

of law, and the quantum of evidence needed to support the award is not high.” State

v. Hillard, 258 N.C. App. 94, 97, 811 S.E.2d 702, 704 (2018).

“Prior case law reveals two general approaches: (1) when there is no evidence,

documentary or testimonial, to support the award, the award will be vacated, and (2)

when there is specific testimony or documentation to support the award, the award

will not be disturbed.” State v. Moore, 365 N.C. 283, 285, 715 S.E.2d 847, 849 (2011).

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In Moore, our Supreme Court identified a third approach for cases that “fall in

between.” Id. If there is “some evidence” to support an award of restitution, but “the

evidence was not specific enough to support the award[,]” the “appropriate course

here is to remand for the trial court to determine the amount of damage proximately

caused by [the] defendant’s conduct and to calculate the correct amount of

restitution.” Id. at 286, 715 S.E.2d at 849–50.

In the present case, the State’s restitution worksheet shows the amount

requested as $12,264.70. The worksheet is not itemized. The restitution order

provides that Defendant is jointly and severally liable, with Stacy, Caudill, Smith,

and “E Strickland,” to the Peacheys in the amount of $12,264.70.

Mr. Peachey testified that his safe contained silver bars, as well as the

following: “So most of them were Morgan dollars. There were some what they call

Peace silver dollars from a wide range of years. There were some Liberty and

Franklin half dollars. . . . And then there were also some American eagles.” He did

not testify as to the number of coins or silver bars that were taken from his home, but

he testified that the value of each silver bar was about $250.00 and that the coins

ranged in value from $12.00 to $50.00 each. Detective Shores testified that “based

on the fluctuation of [the] price of silver and the value, ups and downs of different

years and distinctness of those coins[ ] [s]ometimes they’re worth more.” Mr. Peachy

believed the minimum value of the bars and coins taken from his house was $20,000.

That said, Mr. Peachey also testified that he managed to recover $7,000 worth of coins

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in a box that he found in his yard and “at least $10,000 to $12,000” worth of loose

coins in the road.

As in Moore, there is “some evidence” in the instant case to support an award

of restitution, but the evidence is not specific enough to support the amount included

in the State’s restitution worksheet or the trial court’s award for the damage

proximately caused by Defendant. Accordingly, we vacate the restitution award and

remand to the trial court for a new hearing to determine the appropriate amount of

restitution. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 260 N.C. App. 616, 624, 818 S.E.2d 616,

709–10 (2018).

IV. Conclusion

Since there was substantial evidence of Defendant’s accessory after the fact

crimes, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss.

However, because the evidence was not specific enough to support the amount of

restitution awarded, we vacate the trial court’s restitution order and remand solely

on the issue of restitution.

NO ERROR IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.

Judges ZACHARY and THOMPSON concur.

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