IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA23-337
Filed 7 May 2024
Lincoln County, Nos. 17CRS053125-26
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
RONALD WAYNE VAUGHN, JR.
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 24 November 2021 by Judge R.
Gregory Horne in Lincoln County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23
January 2024.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General John R. Green, Jr., for the State-Appellee.
Anne Bleyman for Defendant-Appellant.
COLLINS, Judge.
Defendant Ronald Vaughn, Jr., appeals from judgments entered upon guilty
verdicts of first-degree murder and possessing a weapon of mass death and
destruction. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his requested
jury instructions on the stand-your-ground provision and defense of habitation as to
the first-degree murder charge, and the defense of justification as to the possession
of a weapon of mass death and destruction charge.
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. McLymore, 380 N.C. 185, STATE V. VAUGHN
Opinion of the Court
868 S.E.2d 67 (2022), we hold that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s
requested jury instruction on the stand-your-ground provision and that Defendant
has met his burden of showing that the error was prejudicial. However, the trial
court did not err by denying Defendant’s requested jury instruction on the defense of
habitation. Defendant is entitled to a new trial for the first-degree murder charge.
Furthermore, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s requested jury
instruction on the defense of justification, and we find no error in Defendant’s
conviction for possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction. Nonetheless,
because Defendant’s pre-trial confinement credit was assigned to the vacated
first-degree murder judgment, we remand the possession of a weapon of mass death
and destruction judgment for resentencing after his new trial so that his credits may
be properly applied.
I. Background
The evidence at trial tended to show the following: Kimberly Ingram was the
owner of a single-wide trailer in Lincolnton. Defendant rented the trailer from
Ingram and lived there with two roommates. Ingram’s son, Gary Somerset, was
friends with Defendant and had been temporarily staying at the trailer for
approximately a month.
On 25 August 2017, Defendant and Somerset were visiting Defendant’s
mother’s residence. During this time, Ingram texted Defendant and asked him to call
her. Ingram told Defendant that her boyfriend had choked her, and Defendant told
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her that she could stay at the trailer. Somerset was very upset and told Defendant’s
mother that “if he found out that . . . guy put his hands on his mama he was going to
kill him.” Defendant and Somerset returned to the trailer to meet Ingram.
Defendant, Somerset, and Ingram were sitting in the living room and “[t]hings just
started escalating”; Ingram said something that made Somerset mad about “an
abusive situation with an ex-boyfriend,” and then “names were being thrown around.”
Defendant, Somerset, and Ingram then left the trailer for approximately
twenty minutes to “calm down in a car ride[.]” During the car ride, Defendant told
Somerset “that no one in his family loved him, that he didn’t have anywhere to stay,
that his own sister wouldn’t let [him] stay with [her], and that ‘Your own mother
doesn’t even care you about [sic].’” Ingram told Defendant that his statements were
not true, that she loved Somerset, and that Somerset could stay anywhere she stayed.
Defendant told Ingram that she should be more appreciative, and Ingram responded,
“What? I don’t think so. Wait a minute. This is getting way out of hand.” Ingram
then stated, “You know what? I think it’s best if you guys move because I’m going to
have to have my house back because I can’t live with you all like this.”
At that point, they pulled into the driveway. Ingram wrote Defendant a notice
to vacate the trailer and handed it to him as he exited the car. Defendant “ripped it
up [and] threw it in the air right in front of [Ingram’s] face.” Defendant stood on the
porch and continued to argue with Ingram and Somerset as they sat in the car.
Defendant “told them to leave multiple times, but they still weren’t leaving.”
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Defendant eventually went inside the trailer and locked and latched the screen
door. Defendant retrieved his iPad from the kitchen and tried to call 911, but his
iPad “would not cooperate with [him.]” Defendant yelled, “Does anyone have a
phone[,]” but “[n]o one answered [him].” Defendant “felt [he] had to grab
something . . . [and] couldn’t find any of the other things that [he] had intentionally
just deliberately left lying around in case[.]” There was a lock-blade knife in the
kitchen and an axe in the living room, but Defendant did not see those “in the panic.”
Defendant walked through the kitchen and living room and into the back bedroom
where his roommate was sitting. The closet in the back bedroom was secured by a
combination lock and contained a Winchester .410 caliber shotgun with a sawed-off
barrel. Defendant attempted to unlock the closet but could not remember the
combination. Defendant’s roommate input the combination, retrieved the shotgun,
and handed it to Defendant.
Defendant walked back through the trailer, unlocked the screen door, and
returned to the porch. Defendant then stated, “You all need to leave. You all should
have done left. You all know you need to leave.” After that, “there was still some
more arguing and screaming about who was the rightful owner of the house and who
needed to get out.” Defendant asked Ingram and Somerset if they could talk and “let
everything be okay[,]” and Ingram responded, “No, . . . it is what it is. I’ve got to have
my house back.” Defendant then said to her, “You’re just a bitch.” Somerset told
Defendant not to disrespect Ingram, and Defendant replied, “She’s a f[**]king bitch.”
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At that point, Somerset exited the car, took his shirt off, yelled, “Let’s end this[,]” and
rushed towards Defendant. When Somerset was approximately five feet away,
Defendant shot him in the chest with the shotgun. Somerset died at the scene.
A search warrant was subsequently issued for the trailer. A Winchester .410
caliber shotgun with a sawed-off barrel was found under a pillow on the bed in the
back bedroom, and Winchester .410 shotgun shells were found on a coffee table in the
living room. The length of the shotgun barrel was 9.87 inches, and the overall length
was 17.22 inches.
Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder and possessing a weapon of
mass death and destruction. The matter came on for trial on 15 November 2021. The
jury returned guilty verdicts of first-degree murder and possessing a weapon of mass
death and destruction. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment
without parole for first-degree murder and a concurrent sentence of 16 to 29 months
of imprisonment for possessing a weapon of mass death and destruction. Defendant
appealed.
II. Discussion
A. Stand-Your-Ground Provision/Defense of Habitation
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his requested jury
instructions on the stand-your-ground provision and the defense of habitation as to
the first-degree murder charge.
“The jury charge is one of the most critical parts of a criminal trial.” State v.
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Walston, 367 N.C. 721, 730, 766 S.E.2d 312, 318 (2014). “It is the duty of the trial
court to instruct the jury on all substantial features of a case raised by the evidence.”
State v. Hamilton, 262 N.C. App. 650, 660, 822 S.E.2d 548, 555 (2018) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “Where competent evidence of self-defense is presented
at trial, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on this defense, as it is a
substantial and essential feature of the case[.]” State v. Lee, 370 N.C. 671, 674, 811
S.E.2d 563, 566 (2018) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). In
determining whether competent evidence sufficient to support a self-defense
instruction has been presented, the evidence is taken as true and considered in the
light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Coley, 375 N.C. 156, 159, 846 S.E.2d
455, 457 (2020). “Where there is evidence that defendant acted in self-defense, the
court must charge on this aspect even though there is contradictory evidence by the
State or discrepancies in defendant’s evidence.” State v. Dooley, 285 N.C. 158, 163,
203 S.E.2d 815, 818 (1974) (citations omitted). “[A] defendant entitled to any
self-defense instruction is entitled to a complete self-defense instruction, which
includes the relevant stand-your-ground provision.” State v. Bass, 371 N.C. 535, 542,
819 S.E.2d 322, 326 (2018).
We review a trial court’s decisions regarding jury instructions de novo. State
v. Osorio, 196 N.C. App. 458, 466, 675 S.E.2d 144, 149 (2009). An error in jury
instructions is prejudicial and requires a new trial if “there is a reasonable possibility
that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been
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reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a)
(2023). The burden to show prejudice is on the defendant. Id.
“[A]fter the General Assembly’s enactment of [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 14-51.3, there
is only one way a criminal defendant can claim perfect self-defense: by invoking the
statutory right to perfect self-defense. Section 14-51.3 supplants the common law on
all aspects of the law of self-defense addressed by its provisions.” State v. McLymore,
380 N.C. 185, 191, 868 S.E.2d 67, 72 (2022). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.4 applies to “[t]he
justification described in . . . [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 14-51.3.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.4
(2023). Accordingly, “when a defendant in a criminal case claims perfect self-defense,
the applicable provisions of [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 14-51.3—and, by extension, the
disqualifications provided under [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 14-51.4—govern.” McLymore,
380 N.C. at 191, 868 S.E.2d at 73.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3, “[a] person is justified in using force, except
deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably
believes that the conduct is necessary to defend himself . . . or another against the
other’s imminent use of unlawful force.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a) (2023). N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3 also codifies the stand-your-ground provision and provides, in
pertinent part, that a person is justified in using deadly force and has no duty to
retreat in any place he has the lawful right to be if: (1) he “reasonably believes that
such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself . . .
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or another[,]” or (2) “[u]nder the circumstances permitted pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat.
§] 14-51.2.” Id.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 codifies the defense of habitation and provides, in
pertinent part, that “the lawful occupant of a home . . . is presumed to have held a
reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm to himself . . . or another
when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm to another if” (1) “[t]he person against whom the defensive force was used was
in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly
entered . . . [the] home[,]” and (2) “[t]he person who uses defensive force knew or had
reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was
occurring or had occurred.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(b) (2023). The relevant
distinction between the two statutes is that a rebuttable presumption arises that the
lawful occupant of a home reasonably fears imminent death or serious bodily harm
when using deadly force at home under the circumstances in section 14-51.2(b) while
this presumption does not arise in section 14-51.3(a)(1). Lee, 370 N.C. at 675, 811
S.E.2d at 566.
However, the justification described in the stand-your-ground provision and
the defense of habitation “is not available to a person who used defensive force and
who . . . [w]as attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of
a felony.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.4(1). In State v. Crump, this Court held that N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-51.4(1) “does not require a causal nexus between the disqualifying
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felony and the circumstances giving rise to the perceived need for the use of force[.]”
259 N.C. App. 144, 145, 815 S.E.2d 415, 417 (2018), rev’d on other grounds, 376 N.C.
375, 851 S.E.2d 904 (2020), and overruled by State v. McLymore, 380 N.C. 185, 868
S.E.2d 67. The Supreme Court reversed Crump on other grounds without addressing
whether a causal nexus between the disqualifying felony and the circumstances
giving rise to the perceived need for the use of force was required. See Crump, 376
N.C. at 393, 851 S.E.2d at 918. Subsequently, however, in McLymore, the Supreme
Court overruled Crump on the causal nexus issue, holding that “in order to disqualify
a defendant from justifying the use of force as self-defense pursuant to [N.C. Gen.
Stat.] § 14-51.4(1), the State must prove the existence of an immediate causal nexus
between the defendant’s disqualifying conduct and the confrontation during which
the defendant used force.” 380 N.C. at 197, 868 S.E.2d at 77. To do so, “[t]he State
must introduce evidence that but for the defendant attempting to commit,
committing, or escaping after the commission of a felony, the confrontation resulting
in injury to the victim would not have occurred.” Id. at 197-98, 868 S.E.2d at 77
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Where the State introduces such evidence,
the existence of a causal nexus is a jury determination and the trial court must
instruct the jury that “the State [is required] to prove an immediate causal nexus
between a defendant’s attempt to commit, commission of, or escape after the
commission of a felony and the circumstances giving rise to the defendant’s perceived
need to use force.” Id. at 187, 868 S.E.2d at 70.
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Here, this Court’s decision in Crump was the controlling precedent on the
causal nexus issue at the time of trial as the Supreme Court’s opinion in McLymore
had not yet been issued. Thus, the trial court and the parties did not have the benefit
of McLymore when this case was tried. The following discussion regarding the
stand-your-ground provision, defense of habitation, and disqualifying felony took
place during the charge conference:
[THE STATE]: But I also think that under 14-51.4 [Defendant] is not allowed to have the stand-your-ground provision or defense of habitation because he was, number one, committing a felony at the time by possessing a weapon of mass death and destruction; and, number two, he provoked the use of force against him or herself by the statements that he made prior to using them. So I think that they get a self-defense instruction, but I don’t think they get the instruction for 51.2 and 51.3 based on the plain language of 14-51.4. THE COURT: [Defense counsel], I’ll hear you on that. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The people on this side do not love the Crump decision obviously. The Crump decision, I think in overbroad language by its terms sounds like it wipes out self-defense entirely. I’m thankful the [c]ourt is not taking that direction. But it does in interpreting 14-51.4 squarely point to 14-51.2 and 14-51.3 and says those justifications are not available . . . . And so if the [c]ourt finds that the evidence in this case in the light most favorable does not support the instruction because of Crump, then that is where it lands. However, we contend that Crump is written overbroadly and the self-defense itself survives. .... THE COURT: . . . . [M]y understanding of Crump is just that, that I believe self-defense survives, but obviously we have the prohibition with regard to those other defenses. Did you wish to be heard further about that, [defense
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counsel]? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I do not. I cannot make an argument interpreting Crump other than it’s blocking 14-51.2 and .3 through 51.4. I want to and I don’t see it.
After taking the matter under advisement overnight and further discussion
the following morning, the trial court declined to give instructions on the
stand-your-ground provision and the defense of habitation.
1. Stand-Your-Ground Provision
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in McLymore, the trial court erred by
concluding that Defendant’s possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction
categorically disqualified him under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.4(1) from a jury
instruction on the stand-your-ground provision and by failing to instruct the jury that
“the State must prove the existence of an immediate causal nexus between the
defendant’s disqualifying conduct and the confrontation during which the defendant
used force.” Id. at 197, 868 S.E.2d at 77.
Furthermore, Defendant has met his burden of showing a reasonable
possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result
would have been reached at trial. First, the State specifically referenced the
stand-your-ground provision during closing arguments and explicitly, yet
erroneously, instructed the jury that it does not apply in this case:
Now, let’s talk about the law for just a minute. You heard during the opening remarks from His Honor about the potential defenses in this case. And I want to be clear before you go back there because you all are citizens, and
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I’m sure you all watch the news. And there’s a lot of things in the headlines right now, especially right now. But this case and the law that you’re going to hear is not -- I repeat not -- stand your ground. And the law you’re going to hear in this case is not -- I repeat not -- the castle doctrine. Under our law in the state of North Carolina, it does not apply in this case, so you’re not going to hear about it. The only law you’re going to hear is the common law defense of self-defense. . . .
Additionally, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Defendant
could have supported a jury determination that Defendant’s use of deadly force was
justified and that there was no causal nexus between the disqualifying felony and his
use of deadly force. The evidence at trial tended to show that Defendant, Somerset,
and Ingram were sitting in the living room and “[t]hings just started escalating[,]”
and then “names were being thrown around.” They left the trailer for approximately
twenty minutes to “calm down in a car ride” but continued to argue in the car. Ingram
told Defendant during the car ride that he needed to move out of the trailer. After
pulling into the driveway, Ingram wrote Defendant a notice to vacate the trailer and
handed it to him as he exited the car. Defendant “ripped it up [and] threw it in the
air right in front of [Ingram’s] face.” Defendant stood on the porch and continued to
argue with Ingram and Somerset as they sat in the car. Defendant “told them to
leave multiple times, but they still weren’t leaving.”
Defendant eventually went inside the trailer and locked and latched the screen
door. Defendant retrieved his iPad from the kitchen and tried to call 911, but his
iPad “would not cooperate with [him.]” Defendant “felt [he] had to grab something . . .
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[and] couldn’t find any of the other things that [he] had intentionally just deliberately
left lying around in case[.]” Defendant retrieved the Winchester .410 caliber shotgun
with a sawed-off barrel from the back bedroom.
Defendant returned to the porch and said, “You all need to leave. You all
should have done left. You all know you need to leave.” After that, “there was still
some more arguing and screaming about who was the rightful owner of the house and
who needed to get out.” Defendant asked Ingram and Somerset if they could talk and
“let everything be okay[,]” and Ingram responded, “No, . . . it is what it is. I’ve got to
have my house back.” Defendant then said to her, “You’re just a bitch.” Somerset
told Defendant not to disrespect Ingram, and Defendant replied, “She’s a f[**]king
bitch.” At that point, Somerset exited the car, took his shirt off, yelled, “Let’s end
this[,]” and rushed towards Defendant. When Somerset was approximately five feet
away, Defendant shot him in the chest with the shotgun. Somerset died of a shotgun
wound to the chest.
In light of this evidence, there is a reasonable possibility that, had the trial
court instructed the jury on the stand-your-ground provision and causal nexus
requirement, the jury would have determined that Defendant’s use of deadly force
was justified because he reasonably believed that such force was necessary to prevent
imminent death to himself and that there was no causal nexus between Defendant’s
felonious possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction and his use of force.
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Accordingly, the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury on
the stand-your-ground provision and the causal nexus requirement. Defendant is
thus entitled to a new trial for the first-degree murder charge.
2. Defense of Habitation
As with the stand-your-ground provision, in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in McLymore, the trial court erred by concluding that Defendant’s possession
of a weapon of mass death and destruction categorically disqualified him under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-51.4(1) from a jury instruction on the defense of habitation.
Nonetheless, the trial court did not err by failing to give the requested defense of
habitation instruction because the evidence did not support the instruction. See State
v. Hancock, 248 N.C. App. 744, 748, 789 S.E.2d 522, 525 (2016) (“[A] trial court’s
ruling must be upheld if it is correct upon any theory of law, and thus it should not
be set aside merely because the court gives a wrong or insufficient reason for it.”
(quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 codifies the defense of habitation and provides, in
pertinent part, that “the lawful occupant of a home . . . is presumed to have held a
reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm to himself or another when
using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm
to another if” (1) “[t]he person against whom the defensive force was used was in the
process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly
entered . . . [the] home[,]” and (2) “[t]he person who uses defensive force knew or had
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reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was
occurring or had occurred.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(b). “Home” is defined “to
include its curtilage,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(a)(1) (2023), which includes the porch.
State v. Blue, 356 N.C. 79, 89, 565 S.E.2d 133, 139 (2002).
Under the statute’s plain language, the lawful occupant of a home is presumed
to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily injury when using
deadly force only if the person against whom the deadly force was used was in the
process of unlawfully and forcefully entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered
the occupant’s home, including the curtilage of the home, and the occupant of the
home knew or had reason to believe that the unlawful and forceful entry was
occurring or had occurred. See State v. Beck, 359 N.C. 611, 614, 614 S.E.2d 274, 277
(2005) (“If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court eschews
statutory construction in favor of giving the words their plain and definite meaning.”
(citation omitted)). Accordingly, if the person against whom the deadly force was used
was entering or had entered the occupant’s home lawfully and without force, the
presumption afforded by the defense of habitation does not apply.
The statute’s plain language comports with the historic understanding and
justification for the defense. In State v. Miller, our Supreme Court explained:
When a trespasser enters upon a man’s premises, makes an assault upon his dwelling, and attempts to force an entrance into his house in a manner such as would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that the intruder intends to commit a felony or to inflict some serious
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personal injury upon the inmates, a lawful occupant of the dwelling may legally prevent the entry, even by the taking of the life of the intruder. Under those circumstances, the law does not require such householder to flee or to remain in his house until his assailant is upon him, but he may open his door and shoot his assailant, if such course is apparently necessary for the protection of himself or family. . . . But the jury must be the judge of the reasonableness of defendant’s apprehension.
267 N.C. 409, 411, 148 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1966) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). Ten years later, our Supreme Court further explained that
one of the most compelling justifications for the rules governing defense of habitation is the desire to afford protection to the occupants of a home under circumstances which might not allow them an opportunity to see their assailant or ascertain his purpose, other than to speculate from his attempt to gain entry by force that he poses a grave danger to them.
State v. McCombs, 297 N.C. 151, 157, 253 S.E.2d 906, 910 (1979) (citation omitted).
Although N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 expanded the defense of habitation to allow deadly
force not only to prevent an unlawful entry but also to terminate an unlawful entry,
the justification for protecting the occupants from an intruder’s unlawful entry has
remained.
Here, the evidence at trial showed that Defendant, Somerset, and Ingram were
sitting in the living room when “[t]hings just started escalating[.]” Defendant,
Somerset, and Ingram then left the trailer for approximately twenty minutes to “calm
down in a car ride[.]” During the car ride, the parties continued arguing. Ingram
then stated, “You know what? I think it’s best if you guys move because I’m going to
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have to have my house back because I can’t live with you all like this.” They then
pulled back into the driveway. Ingram wrote Defendant a notice to vacate the trailer
and handed it to him as he exited the car. At that point, Somerset had lawfully
entered Defendant’s home and thus the justification for the presumption afforded by
the defense of habitation did not apply.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s requested jury
instruction on the defense of habitation.
B. Defense of Justification
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying his requested jury
instruction on the defense of justification as to the possession of a weapon of mass
death and destruction charge.
Our Supreme Court held in State v. Mercer that “in narrow and extraordinary
circumstances,” justification may be available as a defense to a charge of possession
of a firearm by a felon under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1. 373 N.C. 459, 463, 838 S.E.2d
359, 362 (2020). Under Mercer, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the
defense of justification to the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon only where
each of the following four factors is supported by evidence taken in the light most
favorable to the defendant: (1) “the defendant was under unlawful and present,
imminent, and impending threat of death or serious bodily injury”; (2) “the defendant
did not negligently or recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced
to engage in criminal conduct”; (3) “the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative
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to violating the law”; and (4) “there was a direct causal relationship between the
criminal action and the avoidance of the threatened harm.” Id. at 464, 838 S.E.2d at
363.
Here, Defendant was charged with possessing a weapon of mass death and
destruction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.8, not with possession of a firearm by a
felon under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1. Thus, under Mercer, Defendant was not
entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of justification. We need not decide
whether to extend Mercer’s holding to a charge of possession of a weapon of mass
death and destruction because here, even if the defense were available, there is no
record evidence, when taken in the light most favorable to Defendant, to support all
of the four factors set forth in Mercer.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s requested jury
instruction on the defense of justification as to the possession of a weapon of mass
III. Conclusion
The trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury on the
stand-your-ground provision and causal nexus requirement as to the first-degree
murder charge. However, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s
requested jury instruction on the defense of habitation. Defendant is entitled to a
new trial for the first-degree murder charge.
Furthermore, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s requested jury
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instruction on the defense of justification as to the possession of a weapon of mass
death and destruction charge, and we find no error in Defendant’s conviction for that
charge. Nonetheless, because Defendant’s pre-trial confinement credit was assigned
to the vacated first-degree murder judgment, we remand the possession of a weapon
of mass death and destruction judgment for resentencing after his new trial so that
his credits may be properly applied.
NEW TRIAL IN PART; NO ERROR IN PART; REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING IN PART.
Judge MURPHY concurs.
Judge ZACHARY concurs by separate opinion.
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ZACHARY, Judge, concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion. The defense of habitation, as set forth in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2, is limited except as provided in that statute. Defendant is not
entitled pursuant to the plain language of the statute to the requested jury
I write separately to emphasize that this Court “is an error-correcting body,
not a policy-making or law-making one.” Fagundes v. Ammons Dev. Grp., Inc., 251
N.C. App. 735, 739, 796 S.E.2d 529, 533 (2017) (cleaned up). Whether it was the intent
of the General Assembly to foreclose the defense of habitation from cases such as that
before us—in which the curtilage was lawfully entered—is beyond judicial inquiry.
“It is the province of the lawmaking power to change or modify the statute, not ours.
What the General Assembly has written it has written, and if it be not satisfied with
its present writing it can write again.” State v. Whitehurst, 212 N.C. 300, 305, 193
S.E. 657, 661 (1937) (cleaned up).