State v. Vasquez-Marquez

2009 UT App 14, 204 P.3d 178, 622 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2009 Utah App. LEXIS 16, 2009 WL 153272

Opinions

OPINION

DAVIS, Judge:

11 A jury convicted David Vasquez-Marquez (Vasquez) of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-87-8(1)(a)-(b), (4) (Supp. 2008). Vasquez appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence found during a search of his home. We agree and reverse.

BACKGROUND

T 2 On September 14, 2006, Sergeant Trox-el of the Provo Police Department prepared a search warrant for Vasquez's home, where Vasquez lived with his wife and children. In the affidavit supporting the search warrant, Sergeant Troxel included the following facts: a reliable confidential informant (the CI) "had personal knowledge that [Vasquez] was dealing cocaine"; the CI also knew where Vasquez lived; Vasquez's vehicles were registered to this same address; the CI and Sergeant Troxel conducted five controlled buys from Vasquez, the last being within seventy-two hours of the warrant request;² Vasquez drove to his home after two of the five controlled buys; within minutes of each call to request drugs, Vasquez or an unidentified Hispanic male would meet the CI at the predetermined location; on three occasions Vasquez and the Hispanic male arrived together, with Vasquez driving a vehicle registered in his name; Vasquez had an extensive criminal history, which included convictions for illegal possession or use of controlled substances; and, finally, Vasquez's home is half a block from Orem Junior High School. The search warrant was issued, and its exe-ecution uncovered the large amount of cocaine that formed the basis for the possession with intent to distribute charge filed against Valdez.³

"[ 3 Prior to trial, Vasquez filed a motion to suppress the evidence, alleging that the affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to provide probable cause that illegal drugs would be found at his home. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Sergeant Troxel's affidavit provided "a sufficient nexus" between Vasquez's cocaine distribution and his home "to support the issuance of the search warrant." Vasquez now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1 4 The only issue on appeal is whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause. "In reviewing the magistrate's [probable cause] decision, we assess whether the magistrate had 'a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed." State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, ¶14, 48 P.3d 872 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1998)). The magistrate's decision is afforded " 'great deference," and we consider the affidavit " 'in its entirety and in a common|{ Jsense fashion."" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1260).

ANALYSIS

T5 In order for a search warrant of a residence to be lawful, it must be supported by probable cause. "'Probable cause. undoubtedly requires a nexus between suspected criminal activity and the place to be searched." State v. Dable, 2003 UT App 389, ¶5, 81 P.3d 783 (quoting United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1006 (10th Cir. 2000). "The affidavit [Justifying a search warrant] must support the magistrate's decision that there is a 'fair probability' that evidence of the crime will be found in the place or places named in the warrant." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1260. The question before us is whether the facts stated in Sergeant Troxel's affidavit provided probable cause to issue the search warrant for Vasquez's home. | '

T6 Vasquez relies on United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir.1998), for the proposition that "[plrobable cause to search a person's residence does not arise based solely upon probable cause that the person is guilty of a crime. Instead, there must be additional evidence linking the person's home to the suspected eriminal activity" Id. at 1204 (emphasis added). We agree. Affidavits may not be "purely conclu-sory" but must detail the " 'underlying circumstances'" in order to support a determination that probable cause exists. United States v. Ventrescea, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). Of course, in determining whether there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched, the magistrate may draw "reasonable inferences" from the information given in the search warrant application. Illinois v. (Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Such inferences, however, must be based on specific facts and cannot be the result of broad - generalizations⁴ - Thus, "(allthough common sense and experience inform the inferences reasonably to be drawn from the facts, broad generalizations do not alone establish probable cause.... [GJeneralizations do not substitute for facts and investigation." State v. Thein, 138 Wash.2d 133, 977 P.2d 582, 589-90 (1999). In sum, an affidavit that details only the facts showing that the accused had been involved in selling drugs will never allow a reasonable inference that those drugs are stored at the accused's residence.

[Ap] affidavit [that] provide[s] no basis to either limit the possible sites or suggest that [the suspect's] home was more likely than the otherwise endless possibilities . is insufficient to provide a substantial basis for concluding there was probable cause to believe the contraband would be in [the suspect's] home at the time the search was to take place.

Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1205. Any other rule would erode Fourth Amendment protections because where " 'there is nothing to connect the illegal activities with the arrested person's [residence], to issue a warrant based solely on the agent's expert opinion would be to license virtually automatic searches of residences of persons arrested for narcotics offenses.'" Sowers v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 588, 643 S.E.2d 506, 511 (2007) (quoting United States v. Gomes, 652 F.Supp. 461, 463 (E.D.N.Y.1987)).⁵

T7 The State argues that such generalizations are sufficient, citing to several cases that it claims have determined that a sus-

pect's status as a drug dealer is, by itself, a sufficient basis for probable cause to search his or her residence. Seq, eg., State v. Nazario, 38 Conn.App. 588, 662 A.2d 1313, 1318 (1995) ("In the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live." (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Perez, 92 Wash.App. 1, 963 P.2d 881, 884 (1998) (" '[A] nexus is established between a suspect and a residence if the affidavit provides probable cause to believe the suspect is involved in drug dealing and the suspect is living there ....'" (quoting State v. O'Neil, 74 Wash.App. 820, 879 P.2d 950, 953 (1994), overruled by State v. Thein, 138 Wash.2d 138, 977 P.2d 582 (1999))).⁶ Yet in nearly all of the cases that the State cites, probable cause was not simply based on generalizations about drug dealers but, rather, each affiant had additional facts that supported the reasonable inference that the drugs were at the suspect's residence instead of somewhere else. See United States v. McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir.1999) ("'[The informant]. had seen [the suspect] back-up his pick-up truck to a storage facility, located at the residence ... and unload bundles of marijuana into the storage facility' . ..."); United States v. Reddrick, 90 F.3d 1276, 1279 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting testimony that the informant had very recently been in the residence and had seen several kilos of drugs there); United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.1986) (stating that citizen informants had reported that the suspect was selling drugs out of his residence); Nazario, 662 A.2d at 1816-17 (indicating that the police verified that the residence was the location of the suspect's phone number and followed the suspect from the residence to other places where what appeared to be quick drug transactions occurred); People v. Lyons, 373 Ill.App.3d 1124, 313 IIl.Dec. 410, 872 N.E.2d 393, 395 (2007) (stating that a police surveillance team observed the suspect, shortly after receiving a phone call requesting drugs, leave his resi-denee and drive to the specified location for the transaction); Commonwealth v. Luthy, 69 Mass.App.Ct. 102, 866 N.E.2d 930, 934 (2007) ("[Slurveillance revealed that the black GMC Envoy, used in. both controlled buy transactions, was parked at the ... residence prior to, and immediately following, the second buy." (emphasis added)); Perez, 963 P.2d at 884 (discussing police observations of the suspect driving directly to the residence after receiving a page requesting drugs). But see United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 85 (lst Cir.1999) (reciting as support for the search of the residence only the affi-ant's experience that "where ... an individual is demonstrated to be trafficklng in drugs, it is not uncommon for there to be evidence of their drug trafficlnng activities ... kept at the trafficker's residence"); ⁷ United States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 480, 481 (4th Cir.1992) (relating that the only fact supporting the search of the suspect's hotel room was that the suspect was a drug dealer wanted on a fugitive warrant from another state where he had used his prior residence as a drug processing plant). Thus, we remain unconvinced that a broad generalization about drug dealers, unsupported by any underlying factual civreumstances that would connect drugs to the drug dealer's home, is alone sufficient to support a finding of probable cause that the drugs are at the drug dealer's home.

18 Here, Vasquez and the unidentified Hispanic male, presumably an accomplice, were involved in five controlled buys, three times using a vehicle registered to Vasquez. Although the police sometimes observed Vasquez returning to his home after the controlled buys, this only connects the home to Vasquez and does not connect the home to the drugs. The only other fact in the affidavit that could support an inference that the drugs were in Vasquez's home is the speed with which drugs were supplied in response to the CI's telephone requests. The State argues that "[the speed with which [Vasquez] was able to regularly supply cocaine on short notice further supports the inference that [Vasquez] kept his cocaine in a readily accessible but secure location, such as his home." (Emphasis added.) But as the State's brief indirectly admits, it is equally as likely that the drugs were stored at the accomplice's home-or any other location for that matter-as it was that the drugs were stored at Vasquez's home, notwithstanding the short time lapse between when the orders were placed and when delivery occurred. Had the fact of the quick responses been coupled with the fact that the phone number called was the phone at Vasquez's home or that the police had followed Vasquez from his house to a buy, this would have supported a reasonable inference that the drugs were stored at Vasquez's home. But the affidavit here had no such information showing a nexus between the drugs and Vasquez's home; instead, the affidavit ultimately relied only on a generalization about where drug dealers keep their drugs, and such a generalization, as we discussed above, is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. While the police in this matter "guessed" correctly, the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment does not permit the State to search and seize evidence based solely on hunches, even when those intuitions are based on training and experience. See State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, ¶¶14-16, 89 P.3d 185 (concluding that an arresting officer's suspicions based on his training and experience were insufficient to establish probable cause where the officer did not validate his suspicions).

CONCLUSION

T9 Given the absence of evidence in the affidavit tying the drugs Vasquez sold to his home, the magistrate lacked a substantial basis to determine that probable cause existed that drugs would be found at Vasquez's home. Accordingly, we reverse.

10 I CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge.

Footnotes

2

. Vasquez does not claim that the warrant was stale, see generally State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993) (explaining staleness issues); therefore, we do not address staleness.

3

. The only charge in this case was possession with intent to distribute; this case does not involve any charges based on the controlled buys described in Sergeant Troxel's affidavit.

4

. The "inferences" relied upon by the dissent amount to unsupported speculation. First, the fact that Vasquez's vehicle was registered to his home address does not support an inference that he would store his drug trafficking items there. Second, there is nothing in Sergeant Troxel's affidavit indicating that any cash was involved in the described transactions, let alone enough that "would require a secure place to store any cash obtained from the controlled buys," see infra 113. And third, the fact that after two of the five buys Vasquez drove to his home does not "limit the possible sites or suggest that [Vasquez's] home was more likely than the otherwise endless possibilities" where drugs would be stored, see United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1205 (10th Cir.1998).

5

. The State cites Sowers v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 588, 643 S.E.2d 506 (2007), in support of its position, quoting the observation contained therein that, unlike an individual involved in a single drug transaction, [alu individual engaging in multiple drug sales is far more likely to possess and store.the typical 'tools of the trade' [in his or her residence]," id. at 511. But the Sowers court also discussed the danger of relymg on mere generalizations:

While a magistrate may consider a police officer's statement of experience, it is not sufficient by itself to provide a basis for probable cause. The officer's statements of experience set forth generalizations about the behavior of drug users and distributors, rather than specific facts. A factual nexus must connect the illegal activity to the place to be searched; otherwise police would have unfettered discretion to avow that criminals often keep contraband at home and then search the home of every suspect.

Id. at 510. The Sowers court determmed that a sufficient nexus had not been established but ultimately affirmed under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, see id. at 514; see generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 LEd.2d 677 (1984) (recognizing the good faith exception), which exception has not been argued in the instant case.

6

. The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Thein, 138 Wash.2d 133, 977 P.2d 582 (1999), recognized that jurisdictions are in conflict over this issue, see id. at 587, but that most courts "require that a nexus between the items to be seized and the place to be searched must be established by specific facts; an officer's general conclusions are not enough," id. at 588. The Thein court chose to embrace the majority view. See id. In so doing, it specifically overruled the case from which originated the language the.

State relies on here. See id. at 589. The Thein court explained:

[Olur precedent requires probable cause be based on more than conclusory predictions. Blanket inferences, of this kind substitute generalities for the required showing of reasonably specific "underlying circumstances" that establish evidence of illegal activity will likely be found in the place to be searched in any particular case. We reiterate that "[pJrobable cause to believe that a man has committed a crime . does not necessarily give rise to probable cause to search his home."

Id. (second alteration and omission in original).

7

. ' The State quotes this case for the proposition that

[tlhe nexus between the objects to be seized and the premises searched need not, and often W111 not, rest on direct observatlon, but rather "can be inferred from the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the extent of an opportunity for concealment and normal inferences as to where a criminal would hide [evidence of a crime]."

United States v. Feliz 182 F.3d 82, 88 (Ist Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015, 1017 (1st Cir.1979)). The quoted language is taken from a case addressing a warrant to search a defendant's residence for a gun used in a murder. See Charest, 602 F.2d at 1015. In the underlying case, the First Circuit, although recognizing that a nexus may be shown by reasonable inferences, see id. at 1017, mentioned that "[clommon sense tells us that it is unlikely that a murderer would hide in his own home a gun used to shoot someone," id., and ultimately determined that the search warrant was not valid because there was a "total lack of nexus between the gun and [the] defendant's home," id. at 1018. Indeed, in its consideration of cases from multiple jurisdictions, the court observed,

We have been unable to find any case in which a search warrant was issued for a person's home on the sole basis that a handgun had been used by that person in the commission of the type of crime where the bullets used could be traced to the gun.

Id. at 1017.