State v. Valley Development Company

268 N.E.2d 73, 256 Ind. 278, 1971 Ind. LEXIS 625

• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Decided: April 6, 1971
• Docket: 668S97
• Status: Published

Opinions

DeBruler, J.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Marion Superior Court wherein that court granted appellee’s motion for new trial.

Pursuant to I.C. 1971, 32-11-1-1 and 8-11-1-5, being Burns §§ 3-1701 and 36-3105, the appellant, State of Indiana, brought a condemnation action to appropriate a 16Y2 acre portion of a 77 acre tract of real estate owned by appellee for purpose of interstate highway construction. Court appointed appraisers reported total damages to appellee to be $165,480.00. Appellant and appellee both filed exceptions to the report of the appraisers. At the request of appellee this cause was submitted to trial by jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the appellee in the sum of $70,000.00 plus interest. Appellee then filed a motion for new trial citing fifteen specifications of alleged error. The trial court granted appellee’s motion for new trial citing as its grounds specifications 1 and 14 of the motion for new trial which read as follows:

“1. Error of law occurring at the trial, as follows:

a. The Court erred in overruling the objection propounded by the defendant to a question asked of the defendant, by the plaintiff, in Cross-Examination, said question asked, the objection made, argument of counsel, the Court’s ruling and the defendant’s answer are as follows:

‘Q. How much did you pay for the property?

OBJECTION BY MR. WEAVER: We’re going to object to that your honor. This was purchased in 1956, I believe your honor. I believe it’s too far away from the date of February 1,1964 and therefore is irrelevant and immaterial.

MR. MAGNUSON: I believe that goes to the weight of the evidence, your honor, rather than the admissability. It certainly is a comparable since it is the same subject.

MR. WEAVER: Well, I know, your honor, but to be a comparable it must be more closely related to the taking date which by agreement is February 1, 1964. It was purchased back in 1956 regardless whether it goes to the weight or anything else. It is clearly not admissible.

MR. MAGNUSON: It goes to the weight rather than- the admissability.

THE COURT: Objection over-ruled. You may answer.

Q. How much did you pay for the property, Mr. Yalinet?

A. $125,000.’ ”

“14. Error of law occurring at the trial, as follows:

a. The Court erred in giving to the Jury, at the request of the plaintiff, plaintiff’s instruction number 9, said instruction being objected to by the defendant within the proper time which objections were made part of the record, said instruction and the objections thereto being as follows:

‘Evidence has been received as to the purchase price of the subject property when acquired by the defendant. Purchase of the land by the defendant constitutes one transaction in the vicinity which you may consider, along with the other evidence. In arriving at your conclusion as to the fair market value of the property at the time of taking.’

The defendant objected to the giving of this instruction and the defendant’s objections were as follows:

‘Defendant excepts and objects to the giving of Plaintiff’s Tendered Final Instruction Number Nine (9) for the following reasons:

We objected in the course of the trial to the question as originally asked to which the Court allowed the answer to go in, that the purchase price for this property was $125,000.

The purchase of the subject property was seven years and two months prior to the take. This is too remote in time to the take. The instruction number nine (9) places too much emphasis on this transaction by pointing the Jury’s attention to the fact that the Defendant paid $125,-000 for the property and the evidence is that they have been damaged in the sum of $305,000 now.’

The instruction is prejudicial because of these reasons:

‘Defendant further excepts to the Court’s giving Instruction Number Nine (9) for the further reason that it places undue emphasis on this one purchase and singles it out from the many other transactions which occurred more closely in time and there are in the record more than the one here in question.

Defendant further takes exception to the giving of Plaintiff’s Tendered Final Instruction Number Nine (9) on the grounds that it places too much emphasis on only one factor in determining damages which should be awarded to the Defendant for the State’s taking.

Defendant further takes exception to the giving of Plaintiff’s Final Instruction Number Nine (9) for the reason that all the elements of damages are adequately covered elsewhere in the Court’s instructions.’ ”

The issue before us for decision is: Is the purchase price, paid for the subject property, by the defendant-landowner, seven years and two months before the taking, inadmissible on the ground of remoteness? Generally, such evidence is admissible as tending to prove the value of the land on the day of the take. Indianapolis and Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Shepherd (1905), 35 Ind. App. 601, 74 N. E. 904. The general rule appears in 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, § 351 at p. 955 as follows:

.“When a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain it is competent, as evidence of its market value, to show the price at which it was bought, and not so remote in time as to have no hearing upon the question of the present value.” (Emphasis added.)

Appellee does not contend here that the sale of the subject property was not a voluntary, arms-length transaction, or that it was precluded at the trial in any way from explaining the nature of the transaction. Neither does it contend that it was limited in any manner at the trial from demonstrating changing conditions, on or off its land, occurring during this seven year period which might have had a bearing on the value of its property. The appellee’s claim is unaccompanied and unsupported by any other claim or argument. We hold that this evidence of the price paid for the subject property by the defendant-landowner, seven years and two months prior to the take was not rendered inadmissible solely upon the grounds of the passage of that period of time. That' evidence did bear upon the value of the subject property on the date of the take.

The ruling of the trial court at the trial, overruling appellee’s- objection on the sole ground of remoteness, could not have been error warranting the granting of a new trial. Neither do we find merit in appellee’s objections to the trial court’s giving of plaintiff’s tendered instruction number 9.

The trial court, therefore, erred in granting appellee a new trial on specifications 1 and 14 of the motion for new trial.

The trial court is ordered to set aside its order granting appellee’s motion for a new trial, and is ordered to deny same.

Arterburn, C.J., Givan and Hunter, JJ., concur ; Prentice, J., dissents with opinion.