OPINION
LOPEZ, Judge.
Defendant Utter appeals his jury conviction for child abuse resulting in death contrary to § 40A-6-1C, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6, Supp.1975). We affirm.
The defendant presents two points for reversal: (1) a jury instruction allowing the jury to find child abuse resulting in death in six alternative ways deprived Mr. Utter of his right to a unanimous verdict; and (2) the admission of defendant’s confession was error because the police did not comply with Miranda and his statement was not voluntary.
Two other points raised in the defendant’s docketing statement have not been briefed and are deemed to have been abandoned. See State v. Vogenthaler, 89 N.M. 150, 548 P.2d 112 (Ct.App.1976).
In June of 1977, Mr. Utter, his wife and five week-old daughter were living in a motel in Bernalillo County, New Mexico. Defendant and a friend had been drinking wine during the day. About 2:30 a. m. Mr. Utter was awakened by the baby’s crying and found his wife was not home. The evidence regarding what then transpired is conflicting. According to a statement which the defendant signed on June 29, 1977, when he went in to change the baby, he discovered she had breathing problems. He then notified his neighbors at the motel. At that time the defendant could offer no explanation for the baby’s injuries. There is also evidence that the defendant became furious and threw the baby. The baby died a few days later as a result of bodily injuries. Further, on July 8, Mr. Utter gave the arresting officer a second statement in which he incriminated himself. The defendant moved to suppress this statement and the trial court denied the motion. The cause proceeded to trial and the jury found him guilty of child abuse resulting in death. From this conviction, defendant appeals.
Point I
The jury instruction on abuse of a child resulting in death was proper because it was supported by substantial evidence introduced at trial and did not deprive defendant of his right to a unanimous verdict.
Under this point, the defendant challenges Instruction no. 2, claiming that the instruction judicially sanctioned a verdict which was not unanimous. He objected on the grounds that separate instructions should have been prepared and given to the jury for each of the six ways in which the child abuse statute could be violated because the jury could render a verdict of guilty without agreement on which of the six alternative elements defendant had committed. The court’s Instruction no. 2 reads as follows:
For you to find the defendant guilty of Abuse of a Child Resulting in Death, the State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:
1. The Defendant did cruelly punish Jeanette Utter, a child, or did place her in a situation dangerous to her health;
2. That Defendant did this act knowingly, intentionally or negligently;
3. That the act was without justifiable cause;
4. That said act resulted in the death of Jeanette Utter;
5. That this happened in New Mexico on or about the 29th day of June, 1977.
Instruction no. 2 was based on § 40A-6-1C, supra, which reads as follows:
C. Abuse of a child consists of a person knowingly, intentionally or negligently, and without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be:
(1) placed in a situation that may endanger the child’s life or health; or
(2) tortured, cruelly confined or cruelly punished; or
(3) exposed to the inclemency of the weather.
Whoever commits abuse of a child is guilty of a fourth degree felony, unless the abuse results in the child’s death or great bodily harm, in which case he is guilty of a second degree felony.
The defendant offered no instructions on this issue. The State argues that technically, the defendant waived his right to appeal because he failed to preserve the alleged error by offering alternative written instructions. Section 41-23-41b, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6, Supp.1975). We disagree.
Section 41-23-41d, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6, Supp.1975) provides in pertinent part:
objection to any instruction given must be sufficient to alert the mind of the court to the claimed vice therein, or, in the case of failure to instruct on any issue, a correct written instruction must be tendered before the jury is instructed .
The defendant objected ¡properly and timely, and although he did not offer any counter-instruction, the court was aware of his objection to the instruction. Defendant did not waive his right to present this issue on appeal.
Defendant’s argument, however, that Instruction no. 2 sanctioned a verdict which was not unanimous is without merit. The instant case is analogous to State v. Gurule, 90 N.M. 87, 559 P.2d 1214 (Ct.App.1977), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347 (1977). Gurule involved the paying or receiving or causing payment to be made for services not rendered. The defendant in that case challenged the alternative language of the indictment which charged one crime committed in varying ways as not providing him notice of the crime charged in sufficient detail to prepare his defense. This Court held that the charge in the indictment followed the language of the statute, and the charge was not legally deficient just because the indictment charged one crime which could be committed in possibly varying ways. Gurule, supra, at 91, 559 P.2d 1214.
In the instant case the court’s Instruction no. 2 was based on the child abuse statute. We see no difference between an indictment in the alternative, in which the charge follows the language of the statute, and the giving of an instruction which includes alternative intent requirements based on the language of the statute. If the alternative charging in Gurule, supra, could not be legally deficient, we do not see how the instruction in the instant case would be legally deficient.
The defendant’s sole authority on the issue of unanimity of a verdict is United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.1977). Gipson, is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Gipson the defendant was involved in a stolen car operation. The statute read alternatively, “Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells or disposes of any motor vehicle . . .” The jury instruction given in Gipson, supra, was also given in the alternative. The jury asked the trial court whether they had to agree on which of the six acts the defendant committed, or if it was sufficient if they unanimously concluded he committed any of the six acts.
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OPINION
LOPEZ, Judge.
Defendant Utter appeals his jury conviction for child abuse resulting in death contrary to § 40A-6-1C, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6, Supp.1975). We affirm.
The defendant presents two points for reversal: (1) a jury instruction allowing the jury to find child abuse resulting in death in six alternative ways deprived Mr. Utter of his right to a unanimous verdict; and (2) the admission of defendant’s confession was error because the police did not comply with Miranda and his statement was not voluntary.
Two other points raised in the defendant’s docketing statement have not been briefed and are deemed to have been abandoned. See State v. Vogenthaler, 89 N.M. 150, 548 P.2d 112 (Ct.App.1976).
In June of 1977, Mr. Utter, his wife and five week-old daughter were living in a motel in Bernalillo County, New Mexico. Defendant and a friend had been drinking wine during the day. About 2:30 a. m. Mr. Utter was awakened by the baby’s crying and found his wife was not home. The evidence regarding what then transpired is conflicting. According to a statement which the defendant signed on June 29, 1977, when he went in to change the baby, he discovered she had breathing problems. He then notified his neighbors at the motel. At that time the defendant could offer no explanation for the baby’s injuries. There is also evidence that the defendant became furious and threw the baby. The baby died a few days later as a result of bodily injuries. Further, on July 8, Mr. Utter gave the arresting officer a second statement in which he incriminated himself. The defendant moved to suppress this statement and the trial court denied the motion. The cause proceeded to trial and the jury found him guilty of child abuse resulting in death. From this conviction, defendant appeals.
Point I
The jury instruction on abuse of a child resulting in death was proper because it was supported by substantial evidence introduced at trial and did not deprive defendant of his right to a unanimous verdict.
Under this point, the defendant challenges Instruction no. 2, claiming that the instruction judicially sanctioned a verdict which was not unanimous. He objected on the grounds that separate instructions should have been prepared and given to the jury for each of the six ways in which the child abuse statute could be violated because the jury could render a verdict of guilty without agreement on which of the six alternative elements defendant had committed. The court’s Instruction no. 2 reads as follows:
For you to find the defendant guilty of Abuse of a Child Resulting in Death, the State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:
1. The Defendant did cruelly punish Jeanette Utter, a child, or did place her in a situation dangerous to her health;
2. That Defendant did this act knowingly, intentionally or negligently;
3. That the act was without justifiable cause;
4. That said act resulted in the death of Jeanette Utter;
5. That this happened in New Mexico on or about the 29th day of June, 1977.
Instruction no. 2 was based on § 40A-6-1C, supra, which reads as follows:
C. Abuse of a child consists of a person knowingly, intentionally or negligently, and without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be:
(1) placed in a situation that may endanger the child’s life or health; or
(2) tortured, cruelly confined or cruelly punished; or
(3) exposed to the inclemency of the weather.
Whoever commits abuse of a child is guilty of a fourth degree felony, unless the abuse results in the child’s death or great bodily harm, in which case he is guilty of a second degree felony.
The defendant offered no instructions on this issue. The State argues that technically, the defendant waived his right to appeal because he failed to preserve the alleged error by offering alternative written instructions. Section 41-23-41b, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6, Supp.1975). We disagree.
Section 41-23-41d, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6, Supp.1975) provides in pertinent part:
objection to any instruction given must be sufficient to alert the mind of the court to the claimed vice therein, or, in the case of failure to instruct on any issue, a correct written instruction must be tendered before the jury is instructed .
The defendant objected ¡properly and timely, and although he did not offer any counter-instruction, the court was aware of his objection to the instruction. Defendant did not waive his right to present this issue on appeal.
Defendant’s argument, however, that Instruction no. 2 sanctioned a verdict which was not unanimous is without merit. The instant case is analogous to State v. Gurule, 90 N.M. 87, 559 P.2d 1214 (Ct.App.1977), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347 (1977). Gurule involved the paying or receiving or causing payment to be made for services not rendered. The defendant in that case challenged the alternative language of the indictment which charged one crime committed in varying ways as not providing him notice of the crime charged in sufficient detail to prepare his defense. This Court held that the charge in the indictment followed the language of the statute, and the charge was not legally deficient just because the indictment charged one crime which could be committed in possibly varying ways. Gurule, supra, at 91, 559 P.2d 1214.
In the instant case the court’s Instruction no. 2 was based on the child abuse statute. We see no difference between an indictment in the alternative, in which the charge follows the language of the statute, and the giving of an instruction which includes alternative intent requirements based on the language of the statute. If the alternative charging in Gurule, supra, could not be legally deficient, we do not see how the instruction in the instant case would be legally deficient.
The defendant’s sole authority on the issue of unanimity of a verdict is United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.1977). Gipson, is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Gipson the defendant was involved in a stolen car operation. The statute read alternatively, “Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells or disposes of any motor vehicle . . .” The jury instruction given in Gipson, supra, was also given in the alternative. The jury asked the trial court whether they had to agree on which of the six acts the defendant committed, or if it was sufficient if they unanimously concluded he committed any of the six acts. The trial court instructed the jury that it was sufficient if they found that the defendant had committed any of the six acts. As explained in United States v. Bolts, 558 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1977):
Gipson involved a situation where the court expressly sanctioned a non-unanimous verdict; the jurors were told that they could disagree as to what particular acts were committed, as long as each juror found that one of the acts had been done. [Emphasis added].
In the instant case, the fact that the instruction was in the alternative does not mean that the jury reached a non-unanimous verdict. There is no evidence to this effect. The trial court expressly instructed the jury in Instruction no. 1 that the verdict must be unanimous. When the jury rendered the verdict, they were asked by the trial court if their verdict was unanimous; they indicated it was. This Court has no reason to assume that an inconsistent or alleged compromise verdict is not unanimous, and no justification exists for inquiring into the logic behind a jury verdict. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1931).
Further, to determine whether the instruction was properly given, we look at whether the instruction given conformed to the evidence at trial. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the record contains substantial evidence to support the giving of Instruction no. 2.
The verdict reached did not violate any right of the defendant to a unanimous jury verdict under either our state or federal constitution.
Point II
Defendant was advised of and knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights prior to making his voluntarily given statement.
At the pre-trial hearing on the motion to suppress there was conflicting evidence regarding whether defendant effectively invoked his right to counsel, and whether he was informed of his Miranda rights and knowingly and intelligently waived them.
There is substantial evidence that defendant was advised of his constitutional rights before making a statement and that he made his statement voluntarily. State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43 (Ct.App.1976). Further, it is for the trial court to resolve the conflicts in the evidence at the suppression hearing, and this Court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. State v. Ramirez, supra; State v. Burk, 82 N.M. 466, 483 P.2d 940 (Ct.App.1971).
The alleged errors claimed by defendant have no basis, and the judgment should be affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
HERNANDEZ, J., concurs. SUTIN, J., dissenting.