Finley, J.
The defendant was charged, tried, and convicted of the crime of negligent homicide — the weapon was a highpowered sportscar. The defendant is appealing his conviction by a jury. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove the crucial requirements of the crime. [429]*429Furthermore, he contends that the case should never have been sent to the jury.
At this point, the following brief resume of the facts will be helpful. The defendant was the driver of a 1962 Corvette sportscar. He was driving east on 252nd in South King County shortly after 1 a.m., early Sunday morning, June 23, 1963. Two Hundred Fifty-second Street intersects with the “Old Highway 99” which runs between Seattle and Tacoma.
Just before the accident, a Mr. Melvin H. Jangard was driving his 1962 Corvair on the “Old Highway. 99,” with Nancy A. Warren as a passenger in the car. They were headed south in the curb lane, returning to Tacoma after an evening in Seattle.
The defendant entered the intersection at a high rate of speed and hit the Jangard vehicle broadside. The defendant’s car came to rest 31 feet beyond the point of impact, and the Jangard vehicle was propelled all the way across the four-lane highway, some 75 feet to the opposite shoulder, where it came to rest on its side. When the state trooper arrived at the scene, Mr. Jangard was still in the car and was seriously injured; Miss Warren was lying, dead, on top of him. The defendant was in a coma for five days, and his two passengers were also seriously injured.
The trial judge concluded that the state had presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide whether the defendant had violated RCW 46.56.040. He instructed the jury as follows:
To convict the defendant, Allen Dawn Uglem, of Negligent Homicide, as charged in the Information herein, the State must prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1963, the defendant did operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway in King County, Washington;
(2) That the defendant operated said motor vehicle either
[430]*430(a) in a reckless manner,
Or
(b) with disregard for the safety of others,
Or
(c) while under the influence of or affected by the use of intoxicating liquor; and
(3) That as a proximate result of said operation of an automobile, Nancy A. Warren died within one year.
We note that the defendant has not argued that the evidence was insufficient to allow the jury to determine whether the defendant drove his car “with disregard for the safety of others.” However, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence on the issues of reckless driving and driving while under the influence of liquor for the jury to consider those facets or elements of the instructions or charge given by the trial judge to the jury.
First, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he was under the influence of liquor at the time of the accident. The defendant points out that all the witnesses called by the state testified that they thought the defendant was sober at the time of the accident. Also, the defendant stresses the fact that the state trooper who was called to the accident did not testify that he smelled liquor on the defendant.
The state strongly contests the contention of the defendant that the evidence was insufficient to support the charge that the defendant was under the influence of liquor at the time of the collision. The state attempted to use a blood test made possible by a sample of blood taken from the defendant when he was admitted to the hospital. The results of the blood test were excluded by the trial judge. This was a significant victory for the defendant. Consequently, on this appeal he has made no issue about this aspect of the case.
The state contends that even without the blood test there was more than sufficient evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. The state utilized the statement of the defendant and the testimony of his friends to reconstruct the activities of the [431]*431defendant before the accident. In a statement given to Trooper Hall the defendant said that shortly after noon on June 22, 1963, he had gone to the Fireside Inn, a tavern located on the “Old Tacoma Highway.” He had a beer there and left. He then went to Tacoma and visited the White Spot Tavern. There, he may have had two beers before he left. He had some recollection of returning to the Fireside Inn, but he did not remember anything after that until he awoke in the hospital. He did not know he had been involved in an accident until his father told him about it in the hospital.
James Whitcomb, a friend of the defendant, testified that he saw the defendant at the Fireside Inn at about 2:30 p.m.; that defendant drank one beer and left; that he saw him again at the Fireside Inn at about 6 p.m.; that defendant came in and played a game of shuffieboard, and “during this he drank one and maybe two beers.” Again, the defendant left the tavern, and again he later returned to the tavern at 11 or 11:30 p.m. When the tavern was about to be closed shortly before midnight, the defendant left for an after-hours party at a private home with Whitcomb, taking half a case of beer with him. Whitcomb testified that they arrived at the party at about 20 minutes before 1 a.m. Whitcomb stated that he, the defendant, and one Don Celia (later a passenger in the defendant’s car) sat and had one beer. They left the party shortly after 1 a.m. The collision occurred immediately thereafter. The state trooper found five full bottles of beer, several broken bottles, and one empty bottle in the defendant’s car after the collision.
On the basis of the foregoing, we are convinced that the jury properly could have believed and concluded that the defendant had consumed at least seven beers in the 12 hours he spent in and out of taverns immediately preceding the accident. The jury could have made that tally simply by counting the number of beers the defendant admitted he drank, and then adding the number of beers his friends testified that he consumed. In fact, the jury might well have regarded the estimate of seven beers as conservative when they considered the facts that the testimony about the de[432]*432fendant’s drinking came from his friends who themselves had been drinking since early in the day. We also note that the defendant offered no testimony to show that he was elsewhere than at a tavern during the 12 hours before the collision; nor did he offer any proof that he had consumed any food during that period.
The defendant, as stated above, argues that the evidence was not sufficient to send the issue of intoxication to the jury. He relies on a number of cases which he contends support his view. Madill v. Los Angeles Seattle Motor Express Inc., 64 Wn.2d 548, 392 P.2d 821 (1964); White v. Peters, 52 Wn.2d 824, 329 P.2d 471 (1958); Wood v. Myers, 48 Wn.2d 746, 296 P.2d 525 (1956);
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Finley, J.
The defendant was charged, tried, and convicted of the crime of negligent homicide — the weapon was a highpowered sportscar. The defendant is appealing his conviction by a jury. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove the crucial requirements of the crime. [429]*429Furthermore, he contends that the case should never have been sent to the jury.
At this point, the following brief resume of the facts will be helpful. The defendant was the driver of a 1962 Corvette sportscar. He was driving east on 252nd in South King County shortly after 1 a.m., early Sunday morning, June 23, 1963. Two Hundred Fifty-second Street intersects with the “Old Highway 99” which runs between Seattle and Tacoma.
Just before the accident, a Mr. Melvin H. Jangard was driving his 1962 Corvair on the “Old Highway. 99,” with Nancy A. Warren as a passenger in the car. They were headed south in the curb lane, returning to Tacoma after an evening in Seattle.
The defendant entered the intersection at a high rate of speed and hit the Jangard vehicle broadside. The defendant’s car came to rest 31 feet beyond the point of impact, and the Jangard vehicle was propelled all the way across the four-lane highway, some 75 feet to the opposite shoulder, where it came to rest on its side. When the state trooper arrived at the scene, Mr. Jangard was still in the car and was seriously injured; Miss Warren was lying, dead, on top of him. The defendant was in a coma for five days, and his two passengers were also seriously injured.
The trial judge concluded that the state had presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to decide whether the defendant had violated RCW 46.56.040. He instructed the jury as follows:
To convict the defendant, Allen Dawn Uglem, of Negligent Homicide, as charged in the Information herein, the State must prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1963, the defendant did operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway in King County, Washington;
(2) That the defendant operated said motor vehicle either
[430]*430(a) in a reckless manner,
Or
(b) with disregard for the safety of others,
Or
(c) while under the influence of or affected by the use of intoxicating liquor; and
(3) That as a proximate result of said operation of an automobile, Nancy A. Warren died within one year.
We note that the defendant has not argued that the evidence was insufficient to allow the jury to determine whether the defendant drove his car “with disregard for the safety of others.” However, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence on the issues of reckless driving and driving while under the influence of liquor for the jury to consider those facets or elements of the instructions or charge given by the trial judge to the jury.
First, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he was under the influence of liquor at the time of the accident. The defendant points out that all the witnesses called by the state testified that they thought the defendant was sober at the time of the accident. Also, the defendant stresses the fact that the state trooper who was called to the accident did not testify that he smelled liquor on the defendant.
The state strongly contests the contention of the defendant that the evidence was insufficient to support the charge that the defendant was under the influence of liquor at the time of the collision. The state attempted to use a blood test made possible by a sample of blood taken from the defendant when he was admitted to the hospital. The results of the blood test were excluded by the trial judge. This was a significant victory for the defendant. Consequently, on this appeal he has made no issue about this aspect of the case.
The state contends that even without the blood test there was more than sufficient evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. The state utilized the statement of the defendant and the testimony of his friends to reconstruct the activities of the [431]*431defendant before the accident. In a statement given to Trooper Hall the defendant said that shortly after noon on June 22, 1963, he had gone to the Fireside Inn, a tavern located on the “Old Tacoma Highway.” He had a beer there and left. He then went to Tacoma and visited the White Spot Tavern. There, he may have had two beers before he left. He had some recollection of returning to the Fireside Inn, but he did not remember anything after that until he awoke in the hospital. He did not know he had been involved in an accident until his father told him about it in the hospital.
James Whitcomb, a friend of the defendant, testified that he saw the defendant at the Fireside Inn at about 2:30 p.m.; that defendant drank one beer and left; that he saw him again at the Fireside Inn at about 6 p.m.; that defendant came in and played a game of shuffieboard, and “during this he drank one and maybe two beers.” Again, the defendant left the tavern, and again he later returned to the tavern at 11 or 11:30 p.m. When the tavern was about to be closed shortly before midnight, the defendant left for an after-hours party at a private home with Whitcomb, taking half a case of beer with him. Whitcomb testified that they arrived at the party at about 20 minutes before 1 a.m. Whitcomb stated that he, the defendant, and one Don Celia (later a passenger in the defendant’s car) sat and had one beer. They left the party shortly after 1 a.m. The collision occurred immediately thereafter. The state trooper found five full bottles of beer, several broken bottles, and one empty bottle in the defendant’s car after the collision.
On the basis of the foregoing, we are convinced that the jury properly could have believed and concluded that the defendant had consumed at least seven beers in the 12 hours he spent in and out of taverns immediately preceding the accident. The jury could have made that tally simply by counting the number of beers the defendant admitted he drank, and then adding the number of beers his friends testified that he consumed. In fact, the jury might well have regarded the estimate of seven beers as conservative when they considered the facts that the testimony about the de[432]*432fendant’s drinking came from his friends who themselves had been drinking since early in the day. We also note that the defendant offered no testimony to show that he was elsewhere than at a tavern during the 12 hours before the collision; nor did he offer any proof that he had consumed any food during that period.
The defendant, as stated above, argues that the evidence was not sufficient to send the issue of intoxication to the jury. He relies on a number of cases which he contends support his view. Madill v. Los Angeles Seattle Motor Express Inc., 64 Wn.2d 548, 392 P.2d 821 (1964); White v. Peters, 52 Wn.2d 824, 329 P.2d 471 (1958); Wood v. Myers, 48 Wn.2d 746, 296 P.2d 525 (1956); Schalow v. Oakley, 18 Wn.2d 347, 139 P.2d 296 (1943).
Before discussing the above cases, we shall risk elaborating the obvious by mentioning that each case largely turns or depends on its own facts as to any claim that the evidence was not sufficient for the case to have gone to the jury. The legal rules are clearly stated in State v. Reynolds, 51 Wn.2d 830, 833, 322 P.2d 356 (1958):
“ ‘A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence or a motion having that effect admits the truth of the evidence of the party against whom the challenge or motion is made and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from such evidence, and requires that the evidence be interpreted most strongly against the challenger or mov-ant party and in the light most favorable to the opposing party. . . . ’ ” (Quoting from State v. Lutes, 38 Wn.2d 475, 481, 230 P.2d 786, (1951).)
State v. Reynolds also held:
Whether the evidence is sufficient to submit the issue to the jury is a question of law for the court, and no element of discretion is involved. . . . Where there is any evidence, however slight, and the evidence is conflicting or is such that reasonable minds may draw different conclusions therefrom, the question is for the jury. (p. 834.)
Turning to the cases cited by the defendant, we find that all are distinguishable on their facts. In Madill v. Los Angeles Seattle Motor Express, Inc., supra, it was held to [433]*433be error to instruct that the plaintiff could be guilty of contributory negligence because she rode in a car where the driver was under the influence of liquor. The court held there was insufficient evidence on which to allow the jury to consider the intoxication of the driver because under the evidence in the case it would be “mere speculation” to say that the driver had more than one bottle of beer. In the instant case there is considerably more evidence of drinking than a “one beer” situation.
In White v. Peters, supra, the driver had one cocktail with his lunch at noon. Then he went “window shopping” with his wife and returned to the lounge of the lodge hall, where he slept until about 4 p.m. They then had a large banquet-style dinner and one whisky highball. The accident occurred 2% hours later. The court held it was error to submit the issue of contributory negligence — i.e., driving under the influence of liquor — to the jury under these facts. In the case at bar there is no evidence that the drinking was limited to two drinks or that the defendant ate while or after drinking.
In Wood v. Myers, supra, the driver had two beers after lunch, one beer about 11 p.m., and he split a “jumbo” of beer with a friend shortly before the accident at 3 a.m. In addition to lunch, the driver had eaten a complete wedding dinner and also a sandwich about midnight. Seattle Police Captain Coming also testified that, based on the above facts, the plaintiff could not have been under the influence of intoxicants at the time of the accident. The court held that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the issue of whether the plaintiff was under the influence of intoxicants. Again, the extensive evidence as to the plaintiff’s activities in Wood v. Myers respecting the activities of the wedding day and his food consumption are in striking contrast to the present case.
The last case cited by defendant herein is Schalow v. Oakley, supra. There, the court upheld the refusal of the trial court to allow the jury in a damage action to consider the intoxication of the defendant where the evidence showed that the driver had a pint of beer at 10 a.m., 1 or [434]*4341% pints with his lunch, and a “stubby” of beer at about 2:30. The defendant there had nothing more to drink prior to the accident which happened some 7 hours later. In the instant case the testimony shows that the defendant was still drinking shortly before the collision.
Since all of the cases cited by defendant are distinguishable on their facts, we do not think they are controlling when we apply the rules of State v. Reynolds, supra. We believe there was sufficient evidence to send the issue to the jury. The state cites the following cases to support this conclusion. Hannaford v. Hornby, 53 Wn.2d 565, 335 P.2d 473 (1959); Crown v. Miller, 199 Wash. 354, 91 P.2d 713 (1939); Burget v. Saginaw Logging Co., 197 Wash. 318, 85 P.2d 271 (1938); Garcia v. Moran, 194 Wash. 328, 77 P.2d 988 (1938).
The defendant next asserts that there was insufficient evidence to send the issue of reckless driving to the jury. Again the defendant relies on the testimony of his friends who were called by the prosecution. They testified that they did not notice anything unusual about the defendant’s driving just before the accident. The defendant also relies on the fact that there were no eye witnesses to the accident. (All of the survivors are unable to remember what happened.) The defendant argues that this lack of evidence means that there was insufficient evidence on which to send the issue to the jury.
However, it is difficult to believe that the defendant seriously relies on this ground for reversal when consideration is accorded to the evidence adduced by the state. The defendant was driving east on 252nd Street in a 25 m.p.h. speed zone. There is a stop sign on 252nd at the intersection with the highway. A block and a half before the fatal intersection, the defendant was observed by a witness, Robert Long. The witness was visiting a friend. They were sitting in the front room listening to music over the stereo, talking and looking out the picture window. The witness gave the following testimony:
A We heard a car shift down or shift up and it sounded like a Corvette, and then we saw it come up past the house [435]*435going towards the highway. Q You say it sounded like a Corvette. How could you determine this? A I just know what a Corvette sounds like. They all sound about the same. Q Have you had much experience with vehicles? A Well, I work as a parttime mechanic in a wrecking yard. Q Do you follow the races? A Yes.
. . . Q Were there any other vehicles in the area at that time? A Not at the time, no. Q Do you know what type of Corvette it was? A I know. It was a black ’62. Q From your observation, can you give a reasonably accurate estimate as to how fast it was going? A Well, I mean I can’t judge the exact speed it was duing, but it was doing over 25. It seemed like maybe twice that much, but I couldn’t be sure.
The jury was also presented with photographs of the demolished cars, taken shortly after the collision. These pictures vividly portray the magnitude of the impact. The jury also could consider the fact that the defendant’s car continued 31 feet nearly straight ahead after the impact, ending up on a traffic island, after hitting the Jangard vehicle broadside. The jury also could have considered the speed and force necessary to knock the Jangard vehicle 75 feet out of its path of travel by right angles, leaving it on its side on the opposite side of a 4-lane highway, divided by concrete traffic islands. Thus, viewing all of the evidence adduced as true, and according to it the favorable inferences required by the rules, it is possible to conclude that the defendant was accelerating rapidly on 252nd Street, and that he crashed into Highway 99, one of the busiest highways in the state, totally ignoring the stop sign and traveling at a speed of 50, 60, or possibly more, miles per hour. It certainly was not improper to let the jury determine whether this was reckless driving within the prohibition of RCW 46.56.040.
The judgment of conviction should be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Hill, Donworth, Ott, Hunter, and Hamilton, JJ., concur.