KONENKAMP, Justice.
[¶ 1.] The defendant was taken into police custody for questioning. During interrogation, the detective threatened that the defendant’s failure to cooperate would be noted in the police report, suggesting that refusal to admit guilt might result in harsher treatment. Because a person cannot be coerced into foregoing a Fifth Amendment right, and because this threat plainly caused the defendant to confess, we conclude under the totality of circumstances that the confession was obtained involuntarily and should be suppressed. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
A.
Background
[¶ 2.] After having several drinks at a party on Monday, October 30, 2000, Thomas John Tuttle and his friend Bereket Emehezian drove to the residence of Tuttle’s grandmother, a mobile home at the Park View Trailer Court, in Sioux Falls, South, Dakota. Soon after arrival, Tuttle and Emehezian got into an argument. A shoving match ensued. Various residents of the trailer court came out to watch. One of them succeeded in separating the two, whereupon Emehezian got into his car and sped away. Tuttle chased him on foot as far as the entrance and then walked back to his grandmother’s home.
[¶ 3.] Shortly afterwards, law enforcement officers arrived on the scene to investigate. Finding nothing unusual, they were preparing to leave when Tuttle’s grandmother approached the officers and requested that they eject some people she did not want in her home. Upon entering her trailer, the officers found Terrance Yellow Earrings, leaning against the kitchen sink, bleeding profusely. There was a recently washed paring knife in the sink. [25]*25In addition to Yellow Earrings and Tuttle’s grandmother, the officers found three other people in the trailer: Tuttle’s mother (the girlfriend of - Yellow Earrings), and Tuttle’s two uncles. Tuttle himself was outside the trailer, leaning up against a vehicle, when the officers arrived. After Yellow Earrings received first aid from the officers, he was taken by ambulance to the hospital. A medical examination revealed that he had sustained eleven stab wounds.
[¶ 4.] None of the people found in the trailer claimed to know who had committed the stabbing. Accordingly, the police took them all, as well as Tuttle, in for questioning. Under interrogation by Detective Thaddeus Openhowski, Tuttle admitted to having stabbed Yellow Earrings three times. Tuttle was charged with aggravated assault in violation of SDCL 22-18-1.1(2). In the jury trial, Yellow Earrings was the only eyewitness who testified on the identity of his assailant. No one else present during the assault appeared as witnesses. During the course of his testimony, it emerged that Yellow Earrings was, at the time of trial, incarcerated on a charge of tampering with a witness involved in this case. The paring knife was admitted into evidence, over defense objection. The jury found Tuttle guilty. The court sentenced him to six years in the penitentiary, noting that this relatively light punishment was appropriate to Tuttle’s age (eighteen) and his prospects of rehabilitation.
[¶ 5.] After sentencing, Tuttle moved for a new trial, arguing that fresh evidence had arisen, namely that Tuttle’s mother, Carol, had assaulted Yellow Earrings and had inflicted stab wounds once before and once after the assault here in question, and that the circumstances surrounding those incidents were sufficiently similar that their admission into evidence would probably have led to Tuttle’s acquittal. The court denied Tuttle’s motion. On appeal, Tuttle raises the following issues: (1) Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence his statements to police? (2) Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence a knife found at the scene of the crime? (3) Did the trial court err in denying his motion for a new trial?
B.
Miranda Waiver
[¶ 6.] Tuttle moved to suppress statements he made during his interrogation on the grounds that (a) he did not waive his Miranda rights, and (b) his admissions were involuntary. The circuit court denied his motion. Tuttle argues that the court committed reversible error in so ruling. We give deference to pure fact findings on such questions as whether the proper warnings were actually given, but we review de novo a trial court’s ruling on the question whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived Miranda rights. State v. Stanga, 2000 SD 129, ¶ 8, 617 N.W.2d 486, 488.
[¶ 7.] When a defendant moves to suppress statements taken during a custodial interrogation, the trial court must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury, preferably before trial. SDCL 19-9-9. In this hearing, the prosecution must show that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 (1966). For a waiver determination, a court should consider a defendant’s age, experience, intelligence, and background, including familiarity with the criminal justice system, as' well as physical and mental condition.1 Fare v. [26]*26Michael G, 442 U.S. 707, 724-25, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571-72, 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979).
[¶ 8.] The State must prove a waiver of Miranda rights only by a preponderance of the evidence. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 485 (1986) (reversing Colorado’s higher standard of clear and convincing evidence). It is resolved now, under the recent decision in Dickerson v. United States, that Miranda is a federal constitutional requirement, reviewable under federal standards. 530 U.S. 428, 432, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2329, 147 L.Ed.2d 405, 411 (2000). Therefore, we will no longer hold the State to a higher burden of proof under the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Faehnrich, 359 N.W.2d 895, 898 (S.D.1984) (imposing beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard).
[¶ 9.] An express waiver is not necessary, but a waiver cannot be presumed from a defendant’s silence or confession alone. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724. Explicitness of a waiver is a factor for consideration. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gupta, 183 F.3d 615, 618 (7thCir.l999) (valid waiver because defendant signed written waiver and repeated his statement twice after Miranda rights were given); Derrick v. Reterson, 924 F.2d 813, 815-16, 821 (9thCir.1990) (valid waiver because written waiver signed after Miranda rights were explained three or four times even though defendant was sixteen years old with a low I.Q.); U.S. v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 866 (10thCir.l986) (valid waiver when each defendant signed two different Miranda waivers because express waiver is “usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver”). In addition, a suspect may partially waive Miranda rights. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529-30, 107 S.Ct. 828, 832, 93 L.Ed.2d 920, 928 (1987). To prove a valid waiver, the State must show that (1) the relinquishment of the defendant’s rights was voluntary and (2) the defendant was fully aware that those rights were being waived and of the consequences of waiving them. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 421 (1986).
[¶ 10.] On the question whether Tuttle knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, we quote the crucial passage in the initial part of his interview:
Detective (D): [Having read Tuttle the Miranda warnings from a card, asks] Do you understand these rights?
Tuttle (T): Yeah.
[27]*27D: Do you wish to waive these rights and talk to me at this time?
T. No.
D: No, what? You don’t want to talk to me?
T: I don’t want to waive the rights.
D: You want to waive the rights?
T: No. You said you want to talk; let’s talk.
D: OK. Well, let me, let me, OK, cuz, yeah, I understand that, you understand your rights, correct?
T: Yeah.
D: Do you wish to waive these rights and talk to me at this time?
T: No, no.
D: You don’t want to talk to me?
T: Nah, I don’t want to waive my rights. I want to talk to you so I can get the hell out of here.
D: OK. We are getting confused here, OK? In other words, if you don’t want to talk to me, then say, “I don’t want to talk to you.” But if you want to waive your rights, which means, “yes, I understand all that, but I do want to talk to you,” then you have to say, “yes, I want to talk with you.”
T: How do I say, “I want to talk to you so I can get the hell out of here”?
D: OK. So you, do you wish to waive these rights and do you want to talk to me at this time?
T: Yeah.
D: There you go, that’s what you’re, you’re sure that’s what you want to do?
T: I just want to get the hell out of here.
D: So you can' get the hell out of here. OK; let me go put this card away.
In this colloquy, Tuttle states that he does not want to waive his rights, but he does wish to talk with the detective. Thus, at that point, it was unclear whether Tuttle’s refusal to waive Miranda rights amounted to an unequivocal invocation of those rights.
[¶ 11.] The detective later testified on this exchange: “During the reading of the Miranda warnings [Tuttle] was saying ‘no,’ but I think he wanted to talk. He was not understanding the exact questioning.” The trial court found that “[a]t all times the defendant expressed a willingness, even a desire, to talk to the police about what had happened.” But Tuttle’s willingness or desire to talk is not equivalent to an understanding that talking to the detective was tantamount to renouncing his Fifth Amendment rights. On this aspect, the detective testified: “Certainly, if I had any indication that I didn’t think he wanted to talk, I certainly would not have interviewed him.” Whether Tuttle wanted to talk is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for waiver: waiver must be made knowingly and intelligently.2
[¶ 12.] If the invocation of Miranda rights is ambiguous or equivocal, the United States Supreme Court has held that further questioning is permissible. See Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362, 371 (1994) (clarity of invocation of Miranda rights is an objective determination). In Davis, the [28]*28Court considered whether the statement “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer” was sufficient to invoke a suspect’s right to counsel, when uttered approximately an hour and a half into interrogation. Before questioning, the suspect had been read the Miranda warnings and indicated that he understood those rights and agreed to talk. The Court held that an equivocal request for counsel is insufficient to invoke the right to counsel and does not require the interrogators to cease questioning or limit further questions to those seeking clarification. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d at 371-72.
[¶ 13.] To provide a “bright line” standard necessary for effective law enforcement and to avoid transforming procedural safeguards into “wholly irrational obstacles” to police investigations, a person subjected to custodial interrogation must invoke the right to counsel “sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Id., 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d at 371. The Court added that, although not required, “it will often be good police practice” for officers to clarify a suspect’s ambiguous statement. Id. at 461, 114 S.Ct. at 2356, 129 L.Ed.2d at 373.
[¶ 14.] The Davis holding obviously applies to instances where suspects attempt to invoke Miranda rights after a knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights. Davis, in sum, applies to an equivocal post-waiver invocation of rights. For an initial waiver, however, the State still bears “a heavy burden to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived” Miranda rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724. As the Utah Supreme Court recognized, “[t]he questions of waiver of Miranda rights and of postwaiver invocation of those rights are entirely separate.”
State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997) (citing Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98, 105 S.Ct. 490, 494, 83 L.Ed.2d 488, 495-96 (1984)). The Leyva Court wrote that with an ambiguous waiver in the initial advisement:
After an officer has informed a suspect of his Miranda rights and has determined that the suspect understands those rights, the officer must then determine if the suspect is willing to waive those rights and answer questions. If the suspect responds ambiguously or equivocally, the officer must then focus on clarifying the suspect’s intent.
* * *
“A simple, straightforward effort to clarify the request is appropriate.” If the officer has properly attempted to clarify the suspect’s response and the suspect continues to respond ambiguously or equivocally, a valid implied waiver may still be found after a review of the totality of the circumstances.
Id. at 744 (internal citation omitted). We find persuasive the Leyva Court’s distinction between an equivocal response to an initial Miranda advisement and an equivocal postwaiver invocation. Accordingly, when an officer receives an equivocal response to the reading of Miranda rights, the officer must limit questioning to clarifying the subject’s response.
[¶ 15.] Did the detective here properly clarify Tuttle’s response? When Tuttle said, “I don’t want to waive my rights. I want to talk to you so I can get the hell out of here,” the detective responded:
D: OK. We are getting confused here, OK? In other words, if you don’t want to talk to me, then say, “I don’t want to talk to you.” But if you want to waive your rights, which means, “yes, I understand all that, but I do want to talk to you,” [29]*29then yon have to say, “yes, I want to talk with you.”
T: How do I say, “I want to talk to you so I can get the hell out of here”?
D: OK. So you, do you wish to waive these rights and do you want to talk to me at this time?
T: Yeah.
[¶ 16.] There is no prescribed ritual for waiving or invoking Fifth Amendment rights. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286, 292 (1979). A Miranda waiver may be inferred from the defendant’s understanding of the rights coupled with a course of conduct reflecting a desire to give up those rights. Id., 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d at 292. See also State v. Rhines, 1996 SD 55, ¶ 35, 548 N.W.2d 415, 429 (citing United States v. Betts, 16 F.3d 748, 763 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Fare, 442 U.S. at 724-25, 99 S.Ct. at 2571-72, 61 L.Ed.2d at 212 (1979); Butler, 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d at 292)). A defendant’s understanding of Miranda rights is an essential component to inferring waiver. “The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is ... fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. at 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d at 725.
[¶ 17.] In State v. Pilcher, the defendant stated at the outset of interrogation that he thought he should have an attorney. 472 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Minn.1991). In response, the officers told him that they could not speak with him if he wanted an attorney. Pilcher protested that he wished to tell his side of the story, but the officers repeated that they could not speak with him if he wished to speak with an attorney. Upon Pilcher’s further insistence that he be allowed to tell his side of the story, the officers responded that they could talk only if he agreed to waive his Fifth Amendment rights. At that point, Pilcher agreed to waive his rights and make a statement. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that Pilcher had thereby waived the right to counsel that he had invoked just before.
[¶ 18.] The situation in our case is similar to that in Pilcher,3 Although the detective presented Tuttle with a compound question, to which Tuttle’s one-word answer might seem necessarily ambiguous, the detective’s question encapsulated the essence of waiving the right to remain silent: by agreeing to answer questions, Tuttle was effectively waiving his Miranda rights. The circuit court found that Tuttle “did not express any confusion about his rights. He indicated he understood those rights.” In our experience as judges, we cannot be unmindful of the prospect that Tuttle, recently released from jail on another charge of aggravated assault, wanted to manipulate the Miranda advisement process to suit his own purpose, i.e., to get out of jail. Our viewing of the taped interview reveals that Tuttle was not perplexed about his rights, and we conclude that a reasonable officer, in light of the circumstances, would have understood that by [30]*30agreeing to answer questions, Tuttle knew he was waiving his Miranda rights.
[¶ 19.] On the whole, we think the detective adequately clarified Tuttle’s intent. Tuttle thereafter voluntarily and willingly agreed to waive his Miranda rights after indicating an understanding of those rights. To hold police officers to some higher requirement of providing an exhaustive explanation of the Miranda warnings would impose an unrealistic burden. State v. Norfolk, 221 Neb. 810, 381 N.W.2d 120, 127 (1986). During the interview, furthermore, Tuttle’s responses to the detective’s questions indicate that Tuttle well knew that any admission would be incriminating. Considering the totality of circumstances and applying the State’s burden of showing waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence, we uphold the circuit court’s conclusion that Tuttle knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
C.
Voluntariness of Confession
[¶ 20.] We turn to the question whether the confession itself was voluntary, keeping in mind that the validity of a Miranda waiver of rights and the volun-tariness of an admission are separate but parallel inquiries.4 Stanga, 2000 SD 129 at ¶ 8, 617 N.W.2d at 488 (citation omitted). Although there are often subsidiary factual questions deserving deference, the voluntariness of a confession is ultimately a legal question. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116, 106 S.Ct. 445, 452-53, 88 L.Ed.2d 405, 414-15 (1985). On appeal, we “examine the entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness.” Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1617, 48 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 (1976) (quoting Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741-42, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 1764, 16 L.Ed.2d 895, 898 (1966)). The voluntariness of a confession depends on the absence of police overreaching. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170, 107 S.Ct. at 523, 93 L.Ed.2d at 486. Confessions are not deemed voluntary if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement officers have overborne the defendant’s will. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1343, 10 L.Ed.2d 513, 520-21 (1963). See also State v. Frazier, 2001 SD 19, ¶ 20, 622 N.W.2d 246, 255 (citing State v. Smith, 1999 SD 83, ¶ 36, 599 N.W.2d 344, 352).
[¶ 21.] The burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession is the same as the burden for showing the volun-tariness of a Miranda waiver. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169-70, 107 S.Ct. at 523, 93 L.Ed.2d at 486. The State must establish the voluntariness of a confessant’s admission by a preponderance of the evidence. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, n.5, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, n.5, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 387-88, n.5 (1984); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242, n.14, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 996, 39 L.Ed.2d 242, n.14, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242, 253, n.14 (1974) (“[T]he controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evi[31]*31dence.... ”); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488, 92 S.Ct. 619, 626, 30 L.Ed.2d 618, 627 (1972). We now expressly abandon our prior standard holding the State to a higher burden in suppression hearings.5 As the United States Supreme Court said in Lego:
[Exclusionary rules are very much aimed at deterring lawless conduct by police and prosecution, and it is very doubtful that escalating the prosecution’s burden of proof in ... suppression hearings would be sufficiently productive in this respect to outweigh the public interest in placing probative evidence before juries for the purpose of arriving at truthful decisions about guilt or innocence.
404 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 626, 30 L.Ed.2d at 627. Voluntariness determinations have “nothing to do with the reliability of jury verdicts; rather, [they are] designed to determine the presence of police coercion.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168, 107 S.Ct. at 522, 93 L.Ed.2d at 485.
[¶22.] Once suspects in custody are properly advised of, and agree to waive, their Miranda rights, they may be freely questioned as long as interrogators do not obtain a confession through coercion. With coercive police conduct as a “necessary predicate” to finding a defendant’s admission involuntary, we look at the totality of the circumstances under which the coercion was used. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 107 S.Ct. at 522, 93 L.Ed.2d at 484. The factual inquiry centers on (1) the conduct of law enforcement officials in creating pressure and (2) the suspect’s capacity to resist that pressure. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 399-401, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2417-18, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 304-306 (1978). On the latter factor, we examine such concerns as the defendant’s age; level of education and intelligence; the presence or absence of any advice to the defendant on constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the use of psychological pressure or physical punishment, such as deprivation of food or sleep; and the defendant’s prior experience with law enforcement officers and the courts. Finally, “[deception or misrepresentation by the officer receiving the statement may also be factors for the trial court to consider; however, the police may use some psychological tactics in interrogating a suspect.” State v. Darby, 1996 SD 127, ¶ 31, 556 N.W.2d 311, 320.
[¶ 23.] A confession is “obtained” involuntarily if police overreaching is the actual moving cause for the confession. Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30, 97 S.Ct. 202, 203, 50 L.Ed.2d 194, 197 (1976). It must be more than a “but for” type causation, for “causation in that sense has never been the test of voluntariness.”6 Id., 429 U.S. at 30, 97 S.Ct. at 203, 50 L.Ed.2d at 197. Put from another perspective, even with police coercion, a confession cannot be held to have been obtained by the exertion of such improper influence, unless it is the direct cause for the confession.7
[32]*32[¶ 24.] The initial focus of Tuttle’s appeal on voluntariness is the effect of the detective’s lies in telling him that his mother and grandmother were then “across the hall” and that both had stated that he had stabbed Yellow Earrings. Tuttle advances the novel theory that these lies amounted to a “biological lie-detector test”: precisely because his mother and his grandmother, of all the people in the world, were the ones he could always count on to stand by him and to tell him the truth, the detective’s representations were equivalent to the — per State v. Falter — “psychological rubber hose” that a polygraphed person faces.8 88 S.D. 685, 688, 227 N.W.2d 433, 435 (1975). However, Tuttle cites no authority for this theory; therefore, the issue of voluntariness, insofar as his claim depends on that theory, is deemed waived under SDCL 15-26A-60(6). See State v. Pellegrino, 1998 SD 39, ¶ 22, 577 N.W.2d 590, 599. Aside from the lack of authority, our review of the videotape reveals that these false statements made little difference in the face of Tuttle’s insistence that he did not commit the stabbing. In fact, he maintained repeatedly that because his mother was the victim’s girlfriend, he would expect that she would side with the victim.
[¶ 25.] Tuttle also argues that his confession was involuntary for an entirely different reason, namely, his receiving an explicit threat that his'failure to cooperate would be used against him. In particular, the detective told Tuttle that his report could be written to make things look good for Tuttle or that “I’m gonna have to write it up that you’re not cooperating, you’re being a real jerk about it.” In this context, it is well to remember that an admission is not voluntary unless it is “ ‘the product of a rational intellect and a free will.’” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208, 80 S.Ct. 274, 280, 4 L.Ed.2d 242, 249 (1960).
[¶ 26.] The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const, amend. V. Involuntary confessions can encompass a broad range, including not only the familiar types of coerced statements obtained by actual or threatened violence, but also confessions extracted by psychological ploys or improper interrogation techniques deemed inconsistent with the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. In some instances, however, “direct promises that officers would tell the prosecutor [whether] defendant cooperated are permissible, but promises that officers would see to it that a defendant would go to prison if he failed to cooperate are not.” State v. Tapia, 159 Ariz. 284, 767 P.2d 5, 11 (1988) (citing United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1336, n.n.4-5 (9th Cir.1981)). In People v. Brommel, the po[33]*33lice told the suspect that unless he changed his story (he had denied injuring his daughter) they would write “liar” on their report to the judge. 56 Cal.2d 629, 633-34, 364 P.2d 845, 15 Cal.Rptr. 909 (1961) (overruled on other grounds by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal.4th 478, 494, 853 P.2d 1037, 1048, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 593 (1993)) (Cahill I). The court found that this conduct was both a threat and an implied promise of leniency, rendering the confession inadmissible.9 Other decisions have held likewise. In U.S. v. Harrison, 34 F.3d 886 (9th Cir.1994), the court wrote that “there are no circumstances in which law enforcement officers may suggest that a suspect’s exercise of the right to remain silent may result in harsher treatment by a court or prosecutor.” Applying this same principle, the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Matthews, held that the following comments to a suspect were coercive threats: “You know there’s two ways to go about things, either you go about it and you don’t cooperate and the judge knows that you didn’t and the district attorney knows you didn’t or you turn around and you did cooperate, you know.... I can go back and tell the district attorney, [defendant] cooperated with me or I can go back and tell the district attorney that [defendant] did not cooperate with me.” 601 So.2d 52, 52-53 (Ala. 1992).
[¶ 27.] In Tingle, the court explained the distinction between encouraging cooperation and threatening for failure to cooperate:
Although it is permissible for an interrogating officer to represent, under some circumstances that the fact that the defendant cooperates will be communicated to the proper authorities, the same cannot be said of a representation that a defendant’s failure to cooperate will be communicated to a prosecutor. Refusal to cooperate is every defendant’s right under the fifth amendment. Under our adversary system of criminal justice, a defendant may not be made to suffer for his silence. Because there is no legitimate purpose for the statement that failure to cooperate will be reported and because its only apparent objective is to coerce, we disapprove the making of such representations.
658 F.2d at 1336, n.5. Law enforcement agents told Tingle that if she refused to cooperate, they would inform the prosecutor that she was “stubborn” and “hard headed.” 10 We acknowledge, though, that the threats in Tingle were far more egregious than the one here. There, government agents preyed on “the maternal instinct and inculcate[d] fear in a [young] mother that she would not see her children in order to elicit cooperation.” Id. at 1336. From the totality of the circumstances, the [34]*34court concluded that the threats were “patently coercive,” causing “Tingle to fear that, if she failed to cooperate, she would not see her young child for a long time.” Id.
[¶ 28.] The line between making threats and simply informing suspects what the natural consequences of their acts are likely to be can sometimes be narrow, but that line must remain distinct. Merely telling suspects that they should think about the consequences of obstructing the investigation, or saying that if they do not cooperate the prosecutor will look upon their cases differently, or even suggesting that, unless they cooperate, the child victims of their sexual assaults would be forced to testify and would suffer great trauma, is not coercive. State v. Deets, 187 Wis.2d 630, 523 N.W.2d 180, 182, 183 (1994). These remarks are reasonable predictions, not coercive conduct. Id. at 183. Moreover, receiving threats from an interrogator should be distinguished from having a subjective fear that failure to confess will have adverse consequences. See State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 703 A.2d 901, 916 (1997). A subjectively created state of mind is not dispositive of the question whether the will was overborne and the capacity for self-determination was critically impaired. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 862 (1973).
[¶ 29.] In our case, the circuit court did not address the question of the voluntariness of Tuttle’s statements in response to the detective’s threat; rather, in conclusory fashion, the court ruled from the bench at the suppression hearing that Tuttle’s statements were voluntary.11 Yet, [35]*35the factual circumstances surrounding Tuttle’s statements to the detective are not in dispute. Only the legal question of voluntariness is before us. Exactly what was the threat that the detective made? To quote again from the interview, the detective’s second alternative was: “I’m gonna have to write it up that you’re not cooperating, you’re being a real jerk about it.” The unmistakable message was, if Tuttle refused to confess, then the report to the authorities would be written to discourage any leniency, meaning Tuttle would likely suffer more severely for not confessing. This was coercive. The videotape of the interview reveals, without doubt, that the detective’s threat occasioned Tuttle’s admission of guilt: Tuttle, already weeping at that point, responded to it with these words: “OK. I stabbed him. Whatever. Shit.”
[¶ 30.] As we have said, it is not enough to show that threats were made to induce a confession. It must also be shown in the totality of circumstances that the suspect’s will was overborne and that the overreaching police conduct was causally related to the confession. A suspect’s will is overborne if the confession is not the product of a free and unconstrained choice. Tuttle’s demeanor and response as we viewed it on" the tape demonstrated that the threat found its mark. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1057-58 (1961). The message was clear: if Tuttle faded to cooperate he would pay the consequences; he would be treated less favorably. Concededly, this was not the worst threat imaginable, but our Supreme Court has “held inadmissible even a confession secured by so mild a whip as the refusal, under certain circumstances, to allow a suspect to call his wife until he confessed.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 659 (1964) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963)).
[¶ 31.] Reviewing the relevant facts, we conclude that the following weigh in favor of adjudging Tuttle’s statement voluntary: there was no evidence that Tuttle lacked sufficient education or intelligence to understand the alternatives open to him; the length of his detention was less than an hour; the questioning, though somewhat repetitious, was not prolonged through several sessions; he did not suffer physical punishment or deprivation. On the other hand, we find that the following factors weigh against finding his statement voluntary: he was in custody and interrogated in a holding cell at 2:30 a.m.; he was under the influence of alcohol; he was eighteen at the time; he was deceived about statements of eyewitnesses; and, as explained earlier, he was subjected to an implied threat of more serious consequences if he refused to admit guilt. Weighing all these elements, the scale tilts toward holding the confession involuntary.
[¶ 32.] We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Tuttle’s statement was given voluntarily and, thus, we rule that, under the totality of circumstances in this case, the statement is inad[36]*36missible in evidence. Police may legitimately tell a suspect that cooperation will be passed on to the authorities and may increase the likelihood of leniency, but threatening to inform the prosecutor or the judge of a suspect’s refusal to cooperate violates the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. We must never forget that the reason courts suppress involuntary confessions is that
the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial, and not an inquisitorial, system — a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not, by coercion, prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth.
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541, 81 S.Ct. 735, 739-40, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961).
[¶ 33.] Admission of unlawfully obtained, even coerced, confessions can sometimes be harmless error. Stanga, 2000 SD 129 at ¶ 1, 617 N.W.2d at 487 (citation omitted). An erroneously admitted involuntary confession will not mandate reversal if there is sufficient untainted evidence of guilt to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296, 306-12, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1257-58, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 322-23 (1991). The admission of Tuttle’s statement here was not harmless error because the other evidence, including testimony from the victim, was not overwhelming, and cannot, given the issues of credibility for the jury, be said to prove Tuttle’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of law. Cf. Stanga, 2000 SD 129 at ¶ 20, 617 N.W.2d at 491 (citation omitted).
[¶ 34.] Since we conclude that the State has not met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Tuttle’s confession was voluntary, and the admission of his confession at trial was not harmless, we reverse and remand for a new trial. We need not reach the second and third appeal issues.
[¶ 35.] Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
[¶ 36.] AMUNDSON, Justice, concurs.
[¶ 37.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS and ZINTER, Justice, concur in part and dissent in part.