State v. Tripodo

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 14, 2026
• Docket: 2025CA00138
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Tripodo, 2026-Ohio-2695.]

IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT STARK COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025CA00138

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion and Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Canton Municipal Court, Case No. 2025 TRC 4090 CARRIE ANN TRIPODO Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: July 13, 2026

BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Robert G. Montgomery; Kevin W. Popham, Judges

APPEARANCES: Jason P. Reese, Canton Law Director, Krissy Lockwood, Canton City Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Mark Ziccarelli, for Defendant-Appellant.

Hoffman, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant Carrie Ann Tripodo appeals the September 11, 2025 conviction

entered in the Canton Municipal Court on one count of Operating a Motor Vehicle While

Under the Influence (OVI), R.C. §4511.19(A)(1)(a), following a plea of no contest. Appellee

is the State of Ohio. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On July 10, 2025, Appellant Carrie Ann Tripodo was charged with Operating

a Motor Vehicle Under the Influence (OVI), in violation of R.C. §4511.19(A)(1)(a), and BAC,

in violation of R.C. §4511.19(A)(1)(h), which prohibits alcohol consumption in excess of 0.17,

both first-degree misdemeanors.

{¶3} On July 15, 2025, Appellant entered a plea of not guilty on both charges.

{¶4} On August 5, 2025, Appellant filed a motion to suppress, asserting the State

lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to test her for impairment after a domestic dispute

investigation was completed, and therefore there was no probable cause to arrest her for

operating a vehicle under the influence. On August 26, 2025, the trial court held a hearing

on Appellant's Motion to Suppress. At the hearing, the trial court heard the following

testimony and evidence:

{¶5} On July 9, 2025, around 7:02 p.m., 9-1-1 Dispatcher Kelcey Showalter received

a call from Eric Carnes, reporting an ongoing domestic dispute with his girlfriend, Appellant

Carrie Ann Tripodo. (Supp. T. at 5). Dispatcher Showalter testified she asked the caller to

separate and go into a different room from Appellant. Ms. Showalter stated the caller told her

Appellant was throwing items, struck him with a television and left with his keys. Ms.

Showalter testified the caller informed her Appellant had been drinking and shouldn't be

driving. The caller then told her Appellant left the apartment, got into her Blue Cadillac, and

drove away. (T. at 6-7). The caller informed the dispatcher Appellant was heading down

Hillcrest Avenue. (T. at 6-7).

{¶6} Detective Matthew King of the North Canton Police Department testified he

was on patrol, in uniform and in a marked cruiser, when he responded to the 9-1-1 call. He was on his way to the dispute when he was advised the female was leaving the residence and

was headed westbound toward Portage Street in a blue Cadillac. (T. at 13). Det. King spotted

the blue Cadillac at a roundabout on Portage Street and Hillcrest Avenue and initiated a traffic

stop. (T. at 13). Upon approaching the vehicle, Det. King detected an odor of alcohol coming

from the vehicle. (T. at 14). While speaking with Appellant, Det. King testified she had

bloodshot and glassy eyes but acknowledged she had also been crying. (T. at 36). Det. King

then asked Appellant for her driver's license. (T. at 14). Det. King testified Appellant

overlooked her license twice before he pointed out the license on the third pass in the stack of

credit cards. Id. Det. King also noted Appellant had slurred speech and admitted to having a

drink at the bar. (T. at 18).

{¶7} Detective King stated he was informed by another officer at Carnes' home

Appellant had more drinks than she admitted, and she hit Carnes with a television set before

she left. (T. at 16.) Appellant got out of the vehicle to show officers the television set in the

trunk. (T. at 17). As she was exiting her vehicle, Det. King noticed she was unsteady on her

feet. (T. at 18). Officers asked Appellant if she had Carnes' keys, which she denied. Id. Det.

King eventually discovered Appellant did in fact have two of his keys. (Judgment Entry at 2).

{¶8} While out of the car, Detective King continued to observe the odor of alcohol

coming from Appellant’s person. Id. Upon completion of his domestic dispute investigation,

Det. King began investigating Appellant for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OVI) based

on the observed indications and report of impairment. (T. at 17).

{¶9} Det. King also testified he has been an officer with North Canton Police

Department since January, 2019, and has been involved in over 500 OVI investigations. He

has forty (40) hours training in OVI detection through the police academy, along with advanced training in Alcohol Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement (ARIDE) and Drug

Recognition Expert (DRE).

{¶10} As a result of his investigation, Detective King arrested Appellant charging her

with OVI and BAC. (T. at 21).

{¶11} The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding there was a sufficient

basis to detain Appellant for an OVI investigation based upon the arresting officer's reasonable

and articulable suspicion Appellant was intoxicated.

{¶12} On September 11, 2025, Appellant entered a plea of no contest to OVI under

R.C. §4511.19(A)(1)(a). Based on her plea, the trial court found Appellant guilty, dismissed

the remaining charge, and sentenced Appellant to 180 days jail with 177 days suspended on

condition she complete a three-day driver intervention program, and serve two years

probation. The trial court granted a stay of sentencing for purposes of appeal.

{¶13} Appellant appeals the September 11, 2025 entry raising the following errors for

review:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE

WAS A BASIS TO CONTINUE THE TRAFFIC STOP AFTER THE

DOMESTIC DISPUTE INVESTIGATION WAS COMPLETED AND

THEREFORE THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF DEFENDANT

VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE 4TH AMENDMENT

TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED

THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN THE

DEFENDANT AFTER THE INITIAL TRAFFIC STOP TO

INVESTIGATE FURTHER.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE

DETECTIVE’S REQUEST TO PERFORM FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS

WAS REASONABLE.

I., II., III.

{¶14} In each of her assignments of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

denying her motion to suppress. We shall therefore address Appellant’s assignments of error

together.

Motion to Suppress

{¶15} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and

fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial

court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact

and to evaluate witness credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 1995-Ohio-243; State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio

St.3d 19, 20 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing court must defer to the trial court's factual

findings if competent, credible evidence exists to support those findings. See Burnside at ¶ 8.

However, once this Court has accepted those facts as true, it must independently determine

as a matter of law whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v.

McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 (4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu,

534 U.S. 266 (2002); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review. Ornelas

at 697. Moreover, due weight should be given "to inferences drawn from those facts by

resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Id. at 698.

{¶16} It is pursuant to this standard we review Appellant's assignments of error.

{¶17} Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding Detective King had reasonable,

articulable suspicion to continue the detention of Appellant and to request she perform field

sobriety tests once his investigation concerning the domestic dispute had concluded.

{¶18} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits

warrantless searches and seizures, rendering them per se unreasonable unless an exception

applies. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). A police stop of a motor vehicle is a

significant intrusion requiring justification as a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).

{¶19} A police officer may stop an automobile for investigation where the officer has

an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile

is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for

violation of law. State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984),

citing Delaware v. Prouse, supra. The investigative stop exception to the Fourth Amendment

warrant requirement permits a police officer to stop an individual provided the officer has the

requisite reasonable suspicion based upon specific, articulable facts that a crime has occurred

or is imminent. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). In evaluating the propriety of an

investigative stop, a reviewing court must examine the totality of the circumstances that

provided the foundation for the officer's suspicion to warrant an inquiry. State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio

St.3d 177, 178 (1988). {¶20} In order to determine whether Detective King had a reasonable suspicion

justifying the stop of Appellant's vehicle, we must determine whether the information

conveyed to the deputies was sufficient to provide a reasonable and articulable suspicion.

{¶21} Det. King stated at the suppression hearing he stopped Appellant's vehicle

based on the 9-1-1 call placed by Mr. Carnes. The Ohio Supreme Court has acknowledged a

tip called in by an informant can serve as the sole basis for an investigative stop if the tip has

sufficient indicia of reliability. Maumee v. Weisner, 1999-Ohio-68. In order to assess the value

of an informant's tip, a court must consider the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of

knowledge. Id. at 299.

{¶22} The category into which an informant is classified is relevant in determining

his veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge. Id. at 300. Ohio courts have recognized three

basic types of informants: (1) the anonymous informant; (2) the identified citizen informant;

and (3) the known informant (an actor in the criminal world who has previously provided

reliable tips to law enforcement authorities). Id.

{¶23} In Weisner, the Ohio Supreme Court discussed the credibility to be given to an

identified citizen tipster:

The [United States Supreme Court] has further suggested that an

identified citizen informant may be highly reliable and, therefore, a strong

showing as to the other indicia of reliability may be unnecessary: '[l]f an

unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity-

which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability-we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary.' Illinois v. Gates,

462 U.S. at 233-234, 103 S.Ct. at 2329-2330, 76 L.Ed.2d at 545.

In light of these principles, federal courts have routinely credited the

identified citizen informant with greater reliability. In United States v. Pasquarille

(C.A. 6, 1994), 20 F .3d 682, 689, for instance, the Sixth Circuit presumed the

report of a citizen informant to be reliable because it was based on firsthand

observations as opposed to " 'idle rumor or irresponsible conjecture," ' quoting

United States v. Phillips (C.A.5, 1984), 727 F.2d 392, 397. Likewise, the Tenth

Circuit has held that the statement of an ordinary citizen witness is entitled to

more credence than that of a known informant." ' Courts are much more

concerned with veracity when the source of the information is an informant

from the criminal milieu rather than an average citizen * * * in the position of

a crime * * * witness." ' Easton v. Boulder (C.A.10, 1985), 776 F.2d 1441, 1449,

quoting LaFave, Search and Seizure (1978) 586-587. See, also, Edwards v. Cabrera

(C.A.7, 1995), 58 F.3d 290, 294.

Many Ohio appellate courts have also accorded the identified citizen

witness higher credibility ... In State v. Loop (Mar. 14, 1994), Scioto App. No.

93CA2153, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1126, 1994 WL 88041 ... the court held a

telephone call from a citizen stating a motorist might be having a seizure was

sufficient to justify an investigative stop that produced evidence of drunken

driving. The court reasoned " '[i]nformation from an ordinary citizen who has

personally observed what appears to be criminal conduct carries with it indicia

of reliability and is presumed to be reliable." ' Id. at 5, quoting State v. Carstensen (Dec. 18, 1991), Miami App. No. 91-CA-13, *301 at *4, 1991 Ohio App.

LEXIS 6116, 1991 WL 270665 .... See, also, Fairborn v. Adamson (Nov. 17,

1987), Greene App. No. 87-CA-13, at 4-5, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 9664, 1987

WL 20264; State v. Jackson (Mar. 4, 1999), Montgomery App. No. 17226, at *5,

1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 847, 1999 WL 115010, observing generally " 'a tip from

an identified citizen informant who is a victim or witnesses a crime is presumed

reliable, particularly if the citizen relates his or her basis of knowledge,'" quoting

Centerville v. Gress (June 19, 1998), Montgomery App. No. 16899, at *4-5, 1998

Ohio App. LEXIS 2694, 1998 WL 321014."

{¶24} Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d at 300-301.

{¶25} As stated above, Detective King was responding to a 9-1-1 call alleging a

domestic dispute between Appellant and her boyfriend, the caller. The boyfriend alleged

Appellant had struck him, left the apartment with his keys and drove away. He also informed

dispatch Appellant had been drinking. Det. King observed a vehicle matching the make,

model and color description and initiated an investigatory stop.

{¶26} Based on the above information, we find Detective King had reasonable cause

to stop Appellant.

{¶27} Once stopped, Det. King noticed an odor of alcohol coming from Appellant

and she admitted to consuming alcohol earlier in the evening.

Impaired Driving Detention and Field Sobriety Tests

{¶28} A request made of a validly detained motorist to perform field sobriety tests is

generally outside the scope of the original stop and must be separately justified by other specific and articulable facts showing a reasonable basis for the request. State v. Albaugh, 2015-

Ohio-3536, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Anez, 108 Ohio Misc.2d 18, 26-27, (2000).

{¶29} "Reasonable suspicion is "* * * something more than an inchoate or un-

particularized suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for probable

cause." State v. Shepherd, 122 Ohio App.3d 358 (2nd Dist. 1997). "A court will analyze the

reasonableness of the request based on the totality of the circumstances, viewed through the

eyes of a reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they

unfold." State v. Farey, 2018-Ohio-1466, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.), citing Village of Kirtland Hills v. Strogin,

2006-Ohio-1450, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.) (internal citation omitted).

{¶30} In analyzing the facts presented, we are guided by the Supreme Court of Ohio

in State v. Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, paragraph two of the syllabus:

"The 'reasonable and articulable' standard applied to a prolonged traffic

stop encompasses the totality of the circumstances, and a court may not

evaluate in isolation each articulated reason for the stop."

{¶31} The intrusion on the drivers' liberty resulting from a field sobriety test is minor,

and the officer therefore need only have reasonable suspicion the driver is under the influence

of alcohol in order to conduct a field sobriety test. State v. Pierce, 2024-Ohio-1560, ¶ 25 (5th

Dist.); State v. Toure, 2023-Ohio-2559, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.); State v. Knox, 2006-Ohio-3039 (2nd

Dist.). See also State v. Bright, 2010-Ohio-1111 (5th Dist.).

{¶32} Appellant argues Detective King did not observe the commission of any traffic

violations. She further argues information relied upon by Detective King “was not based upon facts that amounted to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity” because she informed the

other officer on the scene she had only consumed one margarita, no criminal activity had

taken place, and her boyfriend just wanted his keys to his apartment back. (Appellant’s brief

at 10-11).

{¶33} In finding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed for the impaired driving

detention and field sobriety testing, the trial court found:

Det [sic] King testified, based on all of his observations, that the

defendant was impaired. Det. King testified that he immediately detected an

odor of alcoholic beverage on his initial interaction with the defendant and then

he continued to smell it once the defendant exited the vehicle. He observed that

the defendant was upset, crying and had blood shot, glassy eyes. He asked the

defendant for her driver's license as the defendant explained that the parties

were arguing. Det. King asked if the defendant had been drinking, and the

defendant admitted to having a drink at dinner. Det [sic] King asked to see the

defendant's license, and while looking for it, the defendant passed over her

license two times. Det. King pointed out the license to the defendant on the

third pass by the license in her stack of credit cards. Det. King testified that this

showed impairment as she struggled with divided attention of trying to retrieve

her license.

Det. King stated that he did not indicate for reasons of impairment that

the defendant had bloodshot, glassy eyes because she was upset and crying, and

it could have also been from crying. He also testified that he does not use strong or weak odor of alcohol as it is a subjective standard just indicating that he

immediately smelled alcohol. Det King stated that she was unsteady on her feet

and her words were slurred.

Det. King stated that she was swaying, and he could understand the

defendant but that some of her speech was slurred. Det. King's testimony was

very honest, and he did not bolster his testimony that was evident by the above

answers.

The Court finds that there was sufficient basis to detain the defendant

for an OVI investigation based on Det. King’s reasonable and articulable

suspicion that the defendant was intoxicated based on the above reasons.

{¶34} (Sept. 11, 2025, Judgment Entry at 3).

{¶35} Here, as set forth above in more detail, Detective King observed the odor of

alcohol coming from Appellant, she admitted to alcohol consumption, she had difficulty

finding her driver’s license, she was unsteady on her feet, was swaying, and was slurring her

words. We find, viewing the totality of the circumstances through the eyes of a reasonable

and prudent police officer, Det. King had a reasonable suspicion Appellant was driving under

the influence and was justified in conducting standardized field sobriety tests. {¶36} Based upon the foregoing, Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled.

{¶37} The judgment of the Canton Municipal Court is affirmed.

{¶38} Costs to Appellant.

By: Hoffman, P.J.

Montgomery, J. and

Popham, J. concur.