State v. Trent

2025 Ohio 1278

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 11, 2025
• Docket: 30281
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Trent, 2025-Ohio-1278.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 30281 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023 CR 01508 : CODY ALAN TRENT : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellee : :

...........

OPINION

Rendered on April 11, 2025

MORGAN T. GALLE, Attorney for Appellant

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee, State of Ohio

ARVIN S. MILLER, Attorney for Appellee, Cody Alan Trent

.............

HANSEMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Victim-appellant, B.M., appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County

Court of Common Pleas that terminated the community control sanctions imposed on

defendant-appellee, Cody Alan Trent. In support of her appeal, B.M. argues that the trial -2-

court violated four of her constitutional rights under Marsy’s Law, a notice requirement

under R.C. 2930.161(A)(1), and her statutory rights to be present and heard at

proceedings under R.C. 2930.09 when it failed to notify her of a review hearing at which

it terminated Trent’s community control sanctions. B.M. claims that the aforementioned

violations warrant vacating the judgment terminating Trent’s community control sanctions,

and that the matter should be remanded to the trial court for a new review hearing. The

State agrees with B.M.’s arguments and concedes error. For the reasons outlined below,

we also agree with B.M.’s arguments. Therefore, we will vacate the judgment terminating

Trent’s community control sanctions and remand the matter to the trial court for a new

community control review hearing that complies with Marsy’s Law and Chapter 2930 of

the Revised Code.

Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} On May 26, 2023, a Montgomery County grand jury returned an indictment

charging Trent with two fifth-degree-felony counts of violating a protection order in

violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1). Following Trent’s indictment, on May 30, 2023, B.M., the

victim associated with the charges, signed and filed a Victims’ Rights Request Form. On

the form, B.M. requested to exercise several of her victims’ rights pursuant to Article I,

Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution. Among the rights B.M. requested was her “right to

reasonable and timely notice of all public proceedings.” Id. B.M. provided her mailing

address and email address on the form and indicated that she wished to be contacted by

email. B.M. also indicated that she wished to be contacted by telephone, but she did not -3-

provide her telephone number on the form.

{¶ 3} Approximately one month after B.M. filed the Victims’ Rights Request Form,

Trent pled guilty to both charges for violating a protection order. The trial court accepted

Trent’s guilty plea and sentenced him to community control sanctions for a period not to

exceed five years. Trent’s community control sanctions included several conditions,

including that Trent have no contact with B.M. and that he abide by all active protection

orders.

{¶ 4} A year after Trent’s sentencing, the State filed a motion alleging that Trent

had violated the conditions of his community control sanctions. The State alleged that, for

approximately one month, Trent had been contacting B.M. by changing the username on

her Netfilx account to phrases such as: “I love you”; “I’m gross though”; “You don’t even

care”; “Yeah it shows when I begged you to drop the order”; “Just hope you have a good

life love you”; “Still no call”; “Guess you’ve moved on”; “Haveagreatmothersday”; and “I’m

still in love with you.” State’s Motion to Impose Jail/Prison Sentence. The State also

alleged that Trent had sent B.M. a check by certified mail in an effort to determine whether

she had moved to a new residence.

{¶ 5} In response to the State’s motion, the trial court held a community control

review hearing on September 3, 2024. B.M. was not present at the review hearing; the

only attendees were Trent, Trent’s counsel, and the State. The review hearing lasted one

minute and was limited to the trial court asking Trent about his current employment, his

marital status, and whether he had custody of his children. The trial court never addressed

the State during the hearing and did not discuss the community control violations alleged -4-

in the State’s motion. Instead, the trial court found that Trent had abided by the conditions

of his community control and ordered the termination of his community control sanctions

as successful. Nothing in the record indicates that B.M. was provided notice of the review

hearing.

{¶ 6} B.M. now appeals from the trial court’s judgment terminating Trent’s

community control sanctions and raises a single assignment of error for review.

Assignment of Error

{¶ 7} Under her sole assignment of error, B.M. claims that the trial court violated

four of her constitutional rights under Marsy’s Law, a notice requirement under R.C.

2930.161(A)(1), and her statutory rights to be present and heard at proceedings under

R.C. 2930.09 when it failed to notify her of the review hearing at which it terminated

Trent’s community control sanctions. As previously discussed, B.M. argues that these

violations warrant vacating the trial court’s order terminating Trent’s community control

sanctions and remanding the matter to the trial court for a new community control review

hearing. We agree.

Standard of Review

{¶ 8} R.C. 2929.15(C) governs the trial court’s authority to reduce or terminate

community control sanctions and provides that:

If an offender, for a significant period of time, fulfills the conditions of

a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the -5-

Revised Code in an exemplary manner, the court may reduce the period of

time under the sanction or impose a less restrictive sanction, but the court

shall not permit the offender to violate any law or permit the offender to

leave the state without the permission of the court or the offender’s

probation officer.

R.C. 2929.15(C).

{¶ 9} The language of this statute indicates that “[t]he Ohio Revised Code entrusts

trial courts with discretion to reduce the period of time for a community-control sanction

or even to impose a less restrictive sanction where an offender, for a significant period of

time, fulfills the conditions of a sanction in an exemplary manner.” State v. Aguirre, 2014-

Ohio-4603, ¶ 32 (O’Neill, J., dissenting), citing R.C. 2929.15(C). Given this discretion, an

appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision to terminate a defendant’s community

control for an abuse of discretion. State v. Malfregeot, 2024-Ohio-257, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.),

citing State v. Kusinko, 2023-Ohio-4545, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). Accord State v. Gaiters, 2025-

Ohio-30, ¶ 7 (5th Dist.).

{¶ 10} “The abuse of discretion standard, however, is inappropriate for reviewing

a judgment based upon a question of law[.]” MA Equip. Leasing I, L.L.C. v. Tilton, 2012-

Ohio-4668, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), citing Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 2009-Ohio-2496,

¶ 13. Accord Castlebrook, Ltd. v. Dayton Properties Ltd. Partnership, 78 Ohio App.3d

340, 346 (2d Dist. 1992). “Where the argument addresses an issue of law, such as

whether the judgment is contrary to law or the court made an error of law, this court

reviews that decision de novo, or without deference to the trial court’s decision.” Gateway -6-

Consultants Group, Inc. v. Premier Physicians Ctrs., Inc., 2017-Ohio-1443, ¶ 12 (8th

Dist.). The Supreme Court of Ohio has made it clear that trial courts lack discretion to

make errors of law and that questions of law are reviewed de novo:

[A] court does not have discretion to misapply the law. A court has

discretion to settle factual disputes or to manage its docket, for example,

but it does not have discretion to apply the law incorrectly. That is why courts

apply a de novo standard when reviewing issues of law.

We take this opportunity to make it clear that courts lack the

discretion to make errors of law, particularly when the trial court’s decision

goes against the plain language of a statute or rule.

(Citation omitted.) Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 38-39.

{¶ 11} In this case, we have been asked to review a question of law, i.e., whether

the trial court violated B.M.’s constitutional rights under Marsy’s Law and certain

provisions of Chapter 2930 of the Revised Code when it terminated Trent’s community

control sanctions without notifying B.M. of the review hearing on that matter. Because

B.M. has presented a question of law, we will apply a de novo standard of review.

Marsy’s Law

{¶ 12} Marsy’s Law is an amendment to Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio

Constitution that expanded the rights afforded to victims of crimes. “Marsy’s Law

enumerates ten victims’ rights, ‘which shall be protected in a manner no less vigorous

than the rights afforded to the accused.’ ” State ex rel. Suwalski v. Peeler, 2021-Ohio- -7-

4061, ¶ 14, quoting Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(A), abrogated on other grounds by State v.

Brasher, 2022-Ohio-4703. The first four rights enumerated in Marsy’s Law are as follows:

(1) to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s safety, dignity and

privacy;

(2) upon request, to reasonable and timely notice of all public proceedings

involving the criminal offense or delinquent act against the victim, and to be

present at all such proceedings;

(3) to be heard in any public proceeding involving release, plea, sentencing,

disposition, or parole, or in any public proceeding in which a right of the

victim is implicated; [and]

(4) to reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting on

behalf of the accused[.]

Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(A)(1)-(4).

{¶ 13} “[T]he victim . . . may assert the rights enumerated in [Marsy’s Law] and any

other right afforded to the victim by law” in “any proceeding involving the criminal offense

. . . against the victim or in which the victim’s rights are implicated[.]” Id. at § 10a(B). “If

the relief sought is denied, the victim or the victim’s lawful representative may petition the

court of appeals for the applicable district, which shall promptly consider and decide the

petition.” Id. Therefore, “[w]hen a trial court makes a decision that implicates a victim’s

rights, the victim may petition the court of appeals for review of the decision.” State v.

O’Neill, 2024-Ohio-485, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.), citing Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(B). -8-

Chapter 2930 of the Revised Code

{¶ 14} To implement Marsy’s Law, the Ohio General Assembly enacted new

legislation and amended existing legislation under Chapter 2930 of the Revised Code,

Ohio’s victims’ rights statute. See 2022 Sub.H.B. No. 343. One of the enacted statutes,

R.C. 2930.161(A), requires the trial court to provide certain notifications to the victim of a

crime upon the victim’s request. Specifically, R.C. 2930.161(A)(1) provides that:

(A) On request of a victim or victim’s representative who has

provided a current address or other current contact information, the court

shall notify the victim and victim’s representative, if applicable, of any of the

following:

(1) A probation or community control revocation disposition

proceeding or any proceeding in which the court is asked to terminate the

probation or community control of a person who was convicted of

committing a criminal offense against the victim[.]

{¶ 15} Pursuant to R.C. 2930.06(G):

[A] court that is required to notify a victim or victim’s representative

of hearings, on request, shall attempt a notification and keep a record of

attempted notifications. The record shall indicate the person who was to be

the recipient of the notice, the date on which the attempt was made, the

manner in which the attempt was made, and the person who made the

attempt. The notification shall be provided to the victim using the victim

contact information provided on the victims’ rights request form or otherwise -9-

provided by the victim or victim representative by any reasonable means,

including regular mail, telephone, or electronic mail.

{¶ 16} In addition to the aforementioned notification requirements, R.C. Chap.

2930 codifies a victim’s right to be present and heard during proceedings. For example,

R.C. 2930.09(A)(1) provides that victims “have the right to be present, during any public

proceeding, other than a grand jury proceeding” and “the right to be heard by the court at

any proceeding in which any right of the victim is implicated.” Section (E) of the same

statute also specifically provides that victims “have the right to be present and heard

orally, in writing, or both at any probation or community control revocation disposition

proceeding or any proceeding in which the court is requested to terminate the probation

or community control of the person who is convicted of committing a criminal offense or

delinquent act against the victim.” R.C. 2930.09(E). Section (F) of the statute further

provides that victims “have the right to be heard orally, in writing, or both at any

proceeding in which the court is requested to modify the terms of probation or community

control of a person if the modification will affect the person’s contact with or the safety of

the victim[.]” R.C. 2930.09(F).

{¶ 17} Pursuant to R.C. 2930.09(A)(2)(a)(i)-(iv), if a victim is not present at a court

proceeding in which the right of the victim is at issue, the trial court is required to ask the

prosecutor all the following:

(i) Whether the victim and victim’s representative, if the victim or victim’s

representative requested notifications, were notified of the time, place, and

purpose of the court proceeding; -10-

(ii) To disclose to the court any and all attempts made to give each victim

and victim’s representative, if applicable, notice;

(iii) Whether the victim or victim representative were advised that the victim

and victim's representative had a right to be heard at the court proceeding;

(iv) Whether the victim and victim representative were conferred with

pursuant to section 2930.06 of the Revised Code.

{¶ 18} If the trial court determines that the victim was not given notice of the

proceeding, was not adequately informed of the nature of the proceeding, or was not

conferred with as required by R.C. 2930.06, “the court shall not rule on any substantive

issue that implicates a victim’s right . . . and shall continue the court proceeding for the

time necessary to notify the victim . . . of the time, place, and nature of the court

proceeding.” R.C. 2930.09(A)(2)(b).

Analysis

{¶ 19} B.M. argues that, despite submitting a Victims’ Rights Request Form that

requested notice of all public proceedings, the trial court did not notify her of the

September 3, 2024 review hearing at which it terminated Trent’s community control

sanctions, and that this prevented her from exercising her constitutional and statutory

rights to be present and heard at the hearing. B.M. claims that this failure resulted in the

violation of the first four constitutional rights guaranteed under Marsy’s Law, i.e., Ohio

Const., art. I, § 10a(A)(1)-(4); the notice requirement under R.C. 2930.161(A)(1); and her

statutory rights to be present and heard at proceedings under R.C. 2930.09. -11-

{¶ 20} Ohio’s Eighth and Fifth Appellate Districts have each addressed the issue

of whether a judgment terminating community control sanctions should be vacated as a

result of the trial court’s failure to notify the victim of the termination proceedings.

Malfregeot, 2024-Ohio-257 (8th Dist.); Gaiters, 2025-Ohio-30 (5th Dist.). Both courts

recognized that “although a trial court may reduce the duration of community control [per

its authority under R.C. 2929.15(C)], it may do so only as long as the victim’s rights under

Marsy’s Law are protected.” (Emphasis added). Malfregeot at ¶ 8; Gaiters at ¶ 9. We

agree.

{¶ 21} Both Malfregeot and Gaiters found that: “[u]nder the plain language of R.C.

2930.161(A) and R.C. 2930.161(B), victims are guaranteed notice and an opportunity to

be heard whenever a court considers early termination of a defendant’s community-

control sanctions.” Malfregeot at ¶ 10; Gaiters at ¶ 11. Both courts also found that a trial

court “abuses its discretion when it terminates a defendant’s community-control sanctions

without giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. Because the victim

in each case was not provided notice of the community control termination proceedings

or an opportunity to be heard on the matter, both courts found that the trial court’s

judgment terminating the defendant’s community control sanctions was an abuse of

discretion and thus vacated or reversed the judgment and remanded the matter to the

trial court. Malfregeot at ¶ 2 and ¶ 13; Gaiters at ¶ 14.

{¶ 22} Trent argues that we should not rely on Malfregeot and Gaiters because the

language in those cases incorrectly suggests that R.C. 2930.161(A)(1) guarantees

victims notice of community control termination proceedings as opposed to notice being -12-

required “on request.” We agree with Trent’s claim that said notice is not mandatory, as

R.C. 2930.161(A) only requires notice to be given “[o]n request of a victim . . . who has

provided a current address or other current contact information[.]” However, despite this

discrepancy, and despite Malfregeot and Gaiters reviewing a question of law for abuse of

discretion, the fact remains that, at least in Gaiters, the record established that the victim

had filed a Victims’ Rights Request Form1 and yet was not given notice of the defendant’s

community control termination proceedings as required by R.C. 2930.161(A)(1).

Accordingly, we agree with the overall outcome of Gaiters. The Eighth District in

Malfregeot, on the other hand, did not indicate whether the victim in that case had filed a

Victims’ Rights Request Form or otherwise requested notice of the proceedings.

Accordingly, the question of whether the victim in Malfregeot was entitled to notice of the

community control termination proceedings is unclear.

{¶ 23} In this case, Trent acknowledges that B.M. filed a Victims’ Rights Request

Form on May 30, 2023. As previously discussed, the form in question indicated that B.M.

wished to be notified of all public proceedings. The form also included B.M.’s mailing

address and email address and indicated that B.M. wished to be contacted by email or

telephone. Despite this, Trent argues that B.M. did not request notice of the proceedings

as required by R.C. 2930.161(A)(1) because she did not file an updated Victims’ Rights

Request Form after he was convicted. Trent, however, fails to point to any authority

supporting the proposition that a new form is required after conviction.

{¶ 24} The Victims’ Rights Request Form submitted by B.M. stated that the victim

1 Although not specifically mentioned in Gaiters, we presume the Victims’ Rights Request

Form submitted by the victim requested notice of all public proceedings. -13-

“must complete a new form and return it . . . to the prosecutor” if the victim “change[d]

[her] mind” about requesting or waiving the rights listed in the form. There is no mention

of a new form being required after conviction. Moreover, there is nothing in the record

indicating that B.M. had changed her mind about exercising her victims’ rights. The record

also does not indicate that any of the contact information B.M. provided on the form

needed to be updated. Therefore, we see no reason why B.M. would have been required

to submit an additional form as argued by Trent.

{¶ 25} Because the record establishes that B.M. submitted a Victims’ Rights

Request Form that requested to exercise her right to notice of all public proceedings, and

because the request form included her current contact information, B.M. satisfied the

requirements under R.C. 2930.161(A)(1). Accordingly, the trial court was required by that

statute to notify B.M. of the September 3, 2024 community control review hearing at which

the court terminated Trent’s community control sanctions. Trent’s argument to the

contrary lacks merit.

{¶ 26} Trent next argues that B.M.’s appeal is not properly before this court

because she failed to raise the alleged violations of Marsy’s Law and Chapter 2930 of the

Revised Code in the trial court. Trent claims that B.M.’s failure to take any action in the

trial court bars her from raising the claimed violations on appeal because “ ‘an appellate

court will not consider any error which counsel for a party complaining of the trial court’s

judgment could have called but did not call to the trial court’s attention at a time when

such error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court.’ ” State v. McGrady,

2010-Ohio-3243, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122 (1986). -14-

{¶ 27} On the authority of Brasher, 2022-Ohio-4703, we disagree with Trent’s

argument. In Brasher, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that under Marsy’s Law, “when a

victim of a crime seeks enforcement of his or her constitutional rights by submitting a

request to the trial court, the victim has standing to file a direct appeal.” Id. at ¶ 22. More

specifically, the court found that when the victims in Brasher “requested enforcement of

their constitutional rights by submitting their restitution request and the trial court denied

that relief, they . . . had clear standing to appeal the restitution portion of Brasher’s

sentence.” Id. at ¶ 23.

{¶ 28} In this case, B.M. submitted a Victims’ Rights Request Form that requested

enforcement of her constitutional right “to reasonable and timely notice of all public

proceedings.” The trial court denied B.M. that relief when it held a community control

review hearing and terminated Trent’s community control sanctions without affording B.M.

any notice of the proceedings. Accordingly, we find that B.M. was permitted to file the

instant appeal based on her request to enforce her constitutional right to notice of all

public proceedings and by having that request denied by the trial court.

{¶ 29} Trent’s claim that B.M. should have first raised her arguments in the trial

court also fails because it is well established that “a trial court lacks authority to reconsider

its own valid final judgment in a criminal case.” State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-648, ¶ 106 (2d

Dist.), citing State v. Raber, 2012-Ohio-5636, ¶ 20 and State ex rel. Dobson v. Handwork,

2020-Ohio-1069, ¶ 16. “[I]n a criminal context, there is no authority for the filing of a motion

for reconsideration of a final judgment, [as] such a motion is generally considered a legal

nullity[.]” Billman v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-1358, ¶ 1 (4th Dist.). Accord State v. Carr, 2019- -15-

Ohio-3802, ¶ 39 (2d Dist.) (“if the decision that is the subject of an appeal was an

appealable order, then any subsequent trial court ruling on a motion for reconsideration

of that appealable order would be a nullity”). Therefore, had B.M. filed a motion asking

the trial court to reconsider its final judgment terminating Trent’s community control

sanctions based on the violation of her victims’ rights, such a motion would have been

unfruitful given that the trial court lacked authority to rule on it. Such a motion was also

wholly unnecessary given that B.M. had already fully asserted her rights in the trial court

by submitting the Victims’ Rights Request Form.

{¶ 30} Trent also argues that we cannot assume from a silent record that the trial

court ignored the notification requirement in R.C. 2930.161(A)(1). Trent claims that we

should instead presume that the trial court determined B.M. did not meet the requirements

for notice under R.C. 2930.161(A)(1). This argument is inapposite because even if we

were to make the presumption argued by Trent, the fact remains that the record

establishes B.M. did meet the requirements for notice under R.C. 2930.161(A)(1), and

that the trial court’s failure to provide such notice violated that statute and B.M.’s

constitutional rights under Marsy’s Law. We further note that the silent record Trent

complains of is, at least in part, due to the trial court’s failure to make the notice inquiries

required under R.C. 2930.09(A)(2)(a) at the community control review hearing. In

addition, the trial court did not record any attempts to notify the victim of the proceeding

as required by R.C. 2930.06(G), which supports the conclusion that the trial court did not

provide B.M. notice of the community control review hearing.

{¶ 31} Trent suggests the notice inquiries required under R.C. 2930.09(A)(2)(a) did -16-

not apply to his community control review hearing because the hearing was not a

“proceeding in which the right of the victim is at issue.” R.C. 2930.09(A)(2)(a). We,

however, disagree. The review hearing concerned the termination of Trent’s community

control sanctions—sanctions which required Trent to have no contact with B.M. and to

abide by all active protection orders. The termination of those sanctions affected B.M.’s

constitutional rights to be treated with respect for her safety, dignity, and privacy, and to

reasonable protection from Trent. Accordingly, the review hearing did involve B.M.’s

rights.

{¶ 32} Having considered all the aforementioned arguments, we find that the trial

court’s failure to notify B.M. of Trent’s September 3, 2024 community control review

hearing violated R.C. 2930.161(A)(1) and B.M.’s constitutional rights set forth in

§ 10a(A)(1)-(4) of Marsy’s Law. The notice failure also violated B.M.’s statutory rights to

be present and heard at the review hearing as set forth in R.C. 2930.09. Given these

errors, B.M.’s sole assignment of error is sustained.

Conclusion

{¶ 33} Having sustained B.M.’s sole assignment of error, the judgment of the trial

court terminating Trent’s community control sanctions is vacated, and the matter is

remanded to the trial court for a new community control review hearing that complies with

Marsy’s Law and Chapter 2930 of the Revised Code.

............. -17-

TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.