State v. Todd

549 S.E.2d 821, 250 Ga. App. 265, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 1967, 2001 Ga. App. LEXIS 643

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: June 5, 2001
• Docket: A01A0179
• Status: Published

Opinions

Johnson, Presiding Judge.

Michael Todd was indicted for rape, two counts of attempted aggravated sodomy, and false imprisonment of his wife. Todd moved the trial court to suppress his videotaped statement on the ground that police officers had improperly given him the hope of benefit and thereby induced him into giving the statement. The trial court granted the motion. The state appeals from the trial court’s suppression order. Because the trial court erred in concluding that the officers had induced Todd’s statement by holding out some hope of benefit, we reverse the trial court’s suppression order.

Police officers arrested Todd at his and his wife’s house, where Detective J. L. Bright informed Todd of his Miranda1 rights. A uniformed officer took Todd to police headquarters, while Detective Bright and Investigator Michael Bean remained at the house. Todd’s wife joined them there and consented to a search of the house.

She took Bright into the bedroom where the rape allegedly had occurred and showed him the towel that she said she had used to wipe Todd’s semen off her face. She pointed out clothing which she said Todd had ripped from her during the attack. She also located a roll of film that contained photographs of her nude and crying, which she said Todd had taken immediately after the rape.

In the meantime, the uniformed officer arrived with Todd at police headquarters and placed him in an interview room which contained a videocamera. Eventually, Detective Bright and Investigator Bean entered the room. Bright removed Todd’s handcuffs and told him that the Miranda rights read to him at the house still applied.

Todd asked if he was under arrest and going to jail no matter what happened. Detective Bright told Todd that he was under arrest and was going to jail. Todd then asked if there was anything he could say or do. And Bright replied: “I won’t say that. A judge has issued a warrant, but if after we talk to you, we believe that probable cause doesn’t exist, we are certainly not going to keep you arrested.” Todd then told Bright and Bean what occurred between him and his wife.

Based on this conversation, the trial court suppressed Todd’s videotaped statement. The trial court found that Detective Bright’s replies to Todd’s questions offered Todd the hope that he would be released if he discussed the matter with the police. In reviewing the trial court’s decision to suppress the statement, we must accept the court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but the court’s application of the law to those facts is subject to a de novo review.² Here, the trial court’s application of the law to the facts was erroneous.

To be admissible, a statement must be made voluntarily, without being induced by the slightest hope of benefit.³ The “slightest hope of benefit” means the hope of a lighter sentence.⁴ In the instant case, the police officers did not provide Todd with any hope that he would receive a lighter sentence by speaking to them. In fact, there was no discussion of the length of any sentence at all.

Rather, Detective Bright’s responses to Todd’s unsolicited questions were mere truisms. Bright first correctly told Todd that he was under arrest. And then he simply made a correct statement of the law, i.e., if there was no probable cause, then the officers would have no basis for keeping Todd under arrest.⁵ This sort of mere truism, mere explanations of Todd’s arrest and of the law, does not constitute an improper offer of some hope of benefit.⁶

Because the officers did not act improperly — did not induce Todd into giving his statement — the trial court’s ruling to the contrary is erroneous as a matter of law. The trial court’s order suppressing Todd’s statement is thus reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Pope, P. J., Smith, P. J., Barnes and Ellington, JJ., concur. Ruffin and Phipps, JJ., dissent.

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

2 State v. Ray, 272 Ga. 450 (2) (531 SE2d 705) (2000).

3 OCGA § 24-3-50.

4 Ray, supra.

5 See OCGA § 17-4-20.

6 See Davis v. State, 245 Ga. App. 508, 509 (538 SE2d 159) (2000) (officer’s statement to defendant that he was in trouble was a mere truism, and statement regarding possible 20-year sentence simply informed defendant of potential legal consequences). See also Copeland v. State, 162 Ga. App. 398, 400 (3) (291 SE2d 560) (1982) (officer’s statement to defendant that his wife could also be charged with a crime was a mere truism).