WUEST, Acting Justice.
David Wayne Tiger (appellant) was found guilty of third-degree burglary and was sentenced to the South Dakota State Penitentiary. We affirm.
On December 28, 1983, at approximately 10:00 p.m., appellant, who had been drinking, left a party located at a house one mile from the Oahe Veterinary Hospital and Clinic (the clinic), near Mobridge, South Dakota. At approximately 10:15 p.m., Dr. Gene Monfore (Monfore) went to the clinic. Dr. Monfore had been there two hours earlier and had locked the building upon leaving it. When he re-entered the clinic, Monfore heard an unfamiliar noise coming from an unlighted area. He investigated, discovering appellant, who explained that the front door had been open, and that he had entered in order to warm himself and use the telephone. Appellant also stated, albeit falsely, that two people were with him. Dr. Monfore noticed a broken window in the rear of the building and a crow[856]*856bar and chisel lying on the desk where appellant had been standing. The tools were not Monfore’s property, and he had never seen them before.
Dr. Monfore gave appellant permission to use the telephone and while appellant was placing a call Monfore went to his pickup and returned with a rifle. He called the police and held the rifle on appellant until they arrived, at which time appellant was arrested. Dr. Monfore and Officer Johnson (Johnson) made a complete check of the outside of the building, noting that all of the doors were locked except for the front door, which had previously been unlocked by Monfore. While outside the building, Monfore and Johnson noticed footprints in the snow directly below the broken window. These tracks matched with footprints made by appellant’s shoes. Footprints were also observed coming from the direction of the city. These tracks also resembled those made by appellant’s shoes. An inspection of the inside of the building, including the pop machine and safe, revealed nothing missing or damaged. While appellant appeared sober shortly after his arrest, an intoxilyzer test administered at appellant’s request showed his blood alcohol content to be .12.
At trial, State introduced evidence through the testimony of Kelly Sandmeier (Sandmeier) that on or about November 11, 1981, Sandmeier and appellant had entered the clinic by breaking a rear window, and had stolen approximately one hundred dollars from the pop machine located in the building’s lobby. On cross-examination, Sandmeier testified that on the prior date he had been the leader and had broken the window and coin box; however, he and appellant split the money they obtained. Appellant was charged with this prior. crime, but in return for a guilty plea to another burglary the charge against him was dismissed. Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted this evidence of a prior crime. Before admitting the evidence, the trial court found it relevant and that its probative value substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” SDCL 19-12-5. In State v. Means, 363 N.W.2d 565, 568 (S.D.1985), we stated:
In ruling on the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, a trial court must first determine relevancy. [State v. Wedemann, 339 N.W.2d 112 (S.D.1983).] ‘Any fact that tends to connect an accused with the commission of a crime is relevant and has probative value.’ State v. Dace, 333 N.W.2d 812, 816 (S.D.1983), quoting from State v. Johnson, 316 N.W.2d 652 (S.D.1982). ‘Such other incidents are material if they show a plan or system of criminal action and acts constituting continuous offenses.’ Id. If the trial court determines the evidence is relevant, it must then decide whether the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. If, although relevant, the court decides its admission will produce unfair prejudice to the defendant, it cannot be admitted. Dace, supra; Wedeman, supra; State v. Iron Shell, 336 N.W.2d 372 (S.D.1983); State v. Brown, 285 N.W.2d 843 (S.D.1979); State v. Houghton, 272 N.W.2d 788 (S.D.1978); SDCL 19-12-3. This delicate balancing process is within the trial court’s sound discretion. Dace, supra; State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302 (S.D.1982); Wede-mann, supra; Houghton, supra. The question on review is whether the trial court abused that discretion. Wede-mann, supra; Houghton, supra; Brown, supra, (emphasis in original)
Here, the evidence of the prior crime is not some collateral matter offered solely for prejudicial purposes. The evidence is directed to the vital issue of whether appellant intended to commit theft while in the clinic. This issue was seriously disputed at trial. Through his witnesses, appellant maintained that he was too intoxicated to have the prerequisite intent. The jury had to determine what appellant was doing there. The evidence indicated [857]*857that appellant, from prior experience, knew that he could break into this particular clinic with relative ease and that easy-money awaited him. This evidence, when considered with the other facts; namely, that appellant left a presumably warm house, walked directly to the clinic on an extremely cold night, broke a window to gain access, and was found hiding in a darkened portion of the building in the presence of a crowbar and chisel, tends to indicate that appellant was there to commit theft rather than use the telephone. The State “is not precluded from introducing evidence relevant to establishing an element of an offense merely because of the existence of other evidence relevant to that element.” State v. Pedde, 334 N.W.2d 41, 42 (S.D.1983) (citations omitted). We are unable to say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony of Sandmeier.
Appellant claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, an issue first raised by appellant at the time of his sentencing.
This is another case in which appellant was caught “in the act” and now turns on his trial counsel because he was convicted. See special concurring opinion of Wuest, Acting Justice, in State v. Hammond, 357 N.W.2d 278, 279 (S.D.1984).
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WUEST, Acting Justice.
David Wayne Tiger (appellant) was found guilty of third-degree burglary and was sentenced to the South Dakota State Penitentiary. We affirm.
On December 28, 1983, at approximately 10:00 p.m., appellant, who had been drinking, left a party located at a house one mile from the Oahe Veterinary Hospital and Clinic (the clinic), near Mobridge, South Dakota. At approximately 10:15 p.m., Dr. Gene Monfore (Monfore) went to the clinic. Dr. Monfore had been there two hours earlier and had locked the building upon leaving it. When he re-entered the clinic, Monfore heard an unfamiliar noise coming from an unlighted area. He investigated, discovering appellant, who explained that the front door had been open, and that he had entered in order to warm himself and use the telephone. Appellant also stated, albeit falsely, that two people were with him. Dr. Monfore noticed a broken window in the rear of the building and a crow[856]*856bar and chisel lying on the desk where appellant had been standing. The tools were not Monfore’s property, and he had never seen them before.
Dr. Monfore gave appellant permission to use the telephone and while appellant was placing a call Monfore went to his pickup and returned with a rifle. He called the police and held the rifle on appellant until they arrived, at which time appellant was arrested. Dr. Monfore and Officer Johnson (Johnson) made a complete check of the outside of the building, noting that all of the doors were locked except for the front door, which had previously been unlocked by Monfore. While outside the building, Monfore and Johnson noticed footprints in the snow directly below the broken window. These tracks matched with footprints made by appellant’s shoes. Footprints were also observed coming from the direction of the city. These tracks also resembled those made by appellant’s shoes. An inspection of the inside of the building, including the pop machine and safe, revealed nothing missing or damaged. While appellant appeared sober shortly after his arrest, an intoxilyzer test administered at appellant’s request showed his blood alcohol content to be .12.
At trial, State introduced evidence through the testimony of Kelly Sandmeier (Sandmeier) that on or about November 11, 1981, Sandmeier and appellant had entered the clinic by breaking a rear window, and had stolen approximately one hundred dollars from the pop machine located in the building’s lobby. On cross-examination, Sandmeier testified that on the prior date he had been the leader and had broken the window and coin box; however, he and appellant split the money they obtained. Appellant was charged with this prior. crime, but in return for a guilty plea to another burglary the charge against him was dismissed. Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted this evidence of a prior crime. Before admitting the evidence, the trial court found it relevant and that its probative value substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” SDCL 19-12-5. In State v. Means, 363 N.W.2d 565, 568 (S.D.1985), we stated:
In ruling on the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, a trial court must first determine relevancy. [State v. Wedemann, 339 N.W.2d 112 (S.D.1983).] ‘Any fact that tends to connect an accused with the commission of a crime is relevant and has probative value.’ State v. Dace, 333 N.W.2d 812, 816 (S.D.1983), quoting from State v. Johnson, 316 N.W.2d 652 (S.D.1982). ‘Such other incidents are material if they show a plan or system of criminal action and acts constituting continuous offenses.’ Id. If the trial court determines the evidence is relevant, it must then decide whether the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. If, although relevant, the court decides its admission will produce unfair prejudice to the defendant, it cannot be admitted. Dace, supra; Wedeman, supra; State v. Iron Shell, 336 N.W.2d 372 (S.D.1983); State v. Brown, 285 N.W.2d 843 (S.D.1979); State v. Houghton, 272 N.W.2d 788 (S.D.1978); SDCL 19-12-3. This delicate balancing process is within the trial court’s sound discretion. Dace, supra; State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302 (S.D.1982); Wede-mann, supra; Houghton, supra. The question on review is whether the trial court abused that discretion. Wede-mann, supra; Houghton, supra; Brown, supra, (emphasis in original)
Here, the evidence of the prior crime is not some collateral matter offered solely for prejudicial purposes. The evidence is directed to the vital issue of whether appellant intended to commit theft while in the clinic. This issue was seriously disputed at trial. Through his witnesses, appellant maintained that he was too intoxicated to have the prerequisite intent. The jury had to determine what appellant was doing there. The evidence indicated [857]*857that appellant, from prior experience, knew that he could break into this particular clinic with relative ease and that easy-money awaited him. This evidence, when considered with the other facts; namely, that appellant left a presumably warm house, walked directly to the clinic on an extremely cold night, broke a window to gain access, and was found hiding in a darkened portion of the building in the presence of a crowbar and chisel, tends to indicate that appellant was there to commit theft rather than use the telephone. The State “is not precluded from introducing evidence relevant to establishing an element of an offense merely because of the existence of other evidence relevant to that element.” State v. Pedde, 334 N.W.2d 41, 42 (S.D.1983) (citations omitted). We are unable to say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony of Sandmeier.
Appellant claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, an issue first raised by appellant at the time of his sentencing.
This is another case in which appellant was caught “in the act” and now turns on his trial counsel because he was convicted. See special concurring opinion of Wuest, Acting Justice, in State v. Hammond, 357 N.W.2d 278, 279 (S.D.1984).
Appellant began preparation of his defense within one hour of his arrest by requesting an intoxilyzer test. His primary defense at trial was lack of intent because of intoxication. Appellant called his sister to establish his intoxication. Appellant also called an alcohol counselor, suggesting he may have had an alcoholic blackout. As stated in appellant’s brief, “the strategy apparently was to infer that the defendant might have suffered from one of the blackouts described by Mr. Haug.” Unfortunately for appellant, the jury did not accept this defense. Appellant’s complaints against defense counsel may be largely attributed to trial tactics. In Jones v. State, 353 N.W.2d 781, 784 (S.D.1984), we stated:
This court’s function is not to second-guess the tactical decisions of the trial attorney, nor will we substitute our own theoretical judgment for that of defense counsel; but this court should not hesitate to reverse a conviction if the record reveals that a defendant was not afforded effective assistance of counsel.
As stated in Hammond, 357 N.W.2d at 280 (Wuest, Acting Justice, concurring specially):
As stated in the majority’s opinion, generally, this court will not review an appeal on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel unless trial counsel’s actions amount to plain error. Under either the standard set by the United States Supreme Court in [Strickland v. Washington, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ], or the standard enunciated by this court in previous cases, regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the facts do not indicate such error.
The complaints of appellant fail to establish “plain error.”
Finally, appellant claims that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for acquittal at the close of State’s case. In ruling on this motion, the trial court “had to resolve all conflicts in the evidence and inferences that could be drawn from the evidence in favor of the State at the end of its case-in-chief.” State v. Esslinger, 357 N.W.2d 525, 530 (S.D.1984). See also State v. Bult, 351 N.W.2d 731 (S.D.1984); State v. Decker, 317 N.W.2d 138 (S.D.1982); State v. Gallegos, 316 N.W.2d 634 (S.D.1982); State v. Vogel, 315 N.W.2d 321 (S.D.1982).
[858]*858The evidence showed (1) footprints; (2) a broken rear window; (8) appellant in the clinic near a chisel and crowbar; (4) familiarity with the premises from a previous break-in; and (5) appellant’s statement to Dr. Monfore that he went into the building to get warm and use the telephone, though he had just left his sister’s warm home where a party was in progress.
We believe the trial court did not err in denying the motion for acquittal and affirm the conviction.
FOSHEIM, C.J., and MORGAN, J., concur.
WOLLMAN and HENDERSON, JJ., concur in result.
Appellant was not unfamiliar with criminal procedure, having been sentenced to thirteen years as an habitual criminal upon admitting four prior felony convictions at sentencing.