[Cite as State v. Tice, 2026-Ohio-2903.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2026-0003
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, JOSEPH W. TICE, Case No. CR2025-0777
Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed but Remanded for Resentencing
Date of Judgment: July 28, 2026
BEFORE: William B. Hoffman, Craig R. Baldwin, and David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Joseph A. Palmer (Muskingum County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney), Zanesville, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Christopher D. Brigdon, Thornville, Ohio, for Defendant-Appellant.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant Joseph Tice argues in this appeal that the trial court erred by
imposing consecutive prison terms on each of the five felony charges to which Tice pled
guilty. As we explain below, we find no error in the trial judge’s consecutive imposition of
those prison terms.
{¶2} We note, though, that the trial judge mistakenly imposed definite — rather than
indefinite — prison terms on four of the five second-degree-felony (F2) charges in the case.
Because R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a) requires that any prison terms on those charges be indefinite
ones, we remand Tice’s case for a resentencing hearing.
The Key Facts {¶3} Tice pled guilty in December 2025 to a bill of information alleging that he had
committed five F2 offenses of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor or
impaired person. In their written plea agreement, the parties jointly recommended that the
trial judge impose a prison term totaling 40 years. Tice signed that written plea agreement
which contained this language: “[t]he parties stipulate to the judicial findings necessary for
the imposition of consecutive sentences.” And when asked by the trial judge, Tice affirmed
orally at the plea hearing that he understood that the joint recommendation called for him to
spend 40 years in prison, and he also orally acknowledged that he had agreed that the facts
necessary to support the imposition of consecutive sentences were present in his case.
{¶4} Tice waived any pre-sentence investigation and requested that a sentence be
imposed immediately after the trial court accepted his guilty pleas. On count one, the trial
judge then imposed an indefinite prison term with a minimum length of eight years. On each
of the remaining four charges, the judge imposed eight-year definite prison terms, and Tice
was ordered to serve all five of his prison terms consecutively. He now appeals.
We Remand Tice’s Case for a New Sentencing Hearing
{¶5} Tice argues on appeal only that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive
prison terms. Although we disagree with Tice’s view that the trial court was required to
provide specific reasons to support its findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), we find that a new
sentencing hearing is required to conform the prison terms to the Reagan Tokes Act.
The Trial Judge Did Not Err by Imposing Consecutive Prison Terms
{¶6} Our review of Tice’s prison terms is guided by R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), which tells
us that a felony defendant may not challenge a sentence on appeal if that sentence is
“authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” To be “authorized by law” within the
meaning of that statutory provision, the sentence “must comport with all applicable
mandatory sentencing provisions.” State v. Sergent, 2016-Ohio-2696, ¶ 29.
{¶7} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) ordinarily requires a judge who is sentencing a defendant
on multiple felony charges to make certain findings before that judge may properly order the
defendant to serve all or some of his or her prison terms consecutively. Sergent at ¶ 17 (“if a
trial judge exercises his or her discretion to impose consecutive sentences, he or she must
make the consecutive-sentence findings set out in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and those findings must
be made at the sentencing hearing and incorporated into the sentencing entry”).
{¶8} The Supreme Court has explained, though, that “in the context of a jointly
recommended sentence that includes nonmandatory consecutive sentences, a trial court is not
required to make the consecutive-sentence findings set out in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).” Sergent at
¶ 43. See also State v. Porterfield, 2005-Ohio-3095, ¶ 25 (“The General Assembly intended a
jointly agreed-upon sentence to be protected from review precisely because the parties agreed
that the sentence is appropriate. Once a defendant stipulates that a particular sentence is
justified, the sentencing judge no longer needs to independently justify the sentence”).
{¶9} The trial judge in Tice’s case imposed the 40-year prison term that Tice and the
State had jointly recommended, and Tice agreed to the required consecutive-sentence findings
in his written plea agreement. We note that, despite the parties’ written agreement about the
findings, the trial judge did in fact state the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings on the record before
imposing the consecutive prison terms. The judge was not required to state any reasons
supporting those findings. State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 37 (a trial court “has no
obligation to state reasons to support its findings” under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)). {¶10} R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) precludes any further review of Tice’s sentence on the
consecutive-sentencing issue that he raises here. As we explain below, though, we remand
Tice’s case for a resentencing hearing because we find that the sentence imposed by the trial
judge does not comport with Ohio law.
Each of Tice’s Five Prison Terms Should Have Been Indefinite Ones
{¶11} Tice’s sentencing hearing must be redone because the definite prison terms that
the judge imposed on four of the five charges are out of step with the mandates of R.C.
2929.14(A)(2)(a).
{¶12} For crimes committed in Ohio on and after the March 22, 2019 effective date
of the Reagan Tokes Act, any prison term for most first-degree-felony and second-degree-
felony offenses must be, according to R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (A)(2)(a), “an indefinite
prison term.” And of course when sentencing a defendant on multiple counts that each
require an indefinite prison term, a trial judge is required to “consider each offense
individually and impose a separate sentence for each offense.” State v. Saxon, 2006-Ohio-
1245, ¶ 9.
{¶13} In those circumstances, the sentencing judge must first “select, for each offense,
a stated minimum term from the appropriate statutory range” in R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) (for
first-degree felonies) or R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a) (for second-degree felonies) unless the statutory
provision that criminalizes the conduct specifies a different minimum term or penalty for the
offense. State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-3669, ¶ 68 (8th Dist.). Then, after any prison terms for
each offense have been imposed, the judge may consider whether the defendant should serve
those prison terms concurrently or consecutively. Saxon at ¶ 9. {¶14} Finally, the judge should then turn to R.C. 2929.144(B) to calculate the
defendant’s maximum prison term in the case. See State v. Jenkins, 2025-Ohio-2143, ¶ 62 (8th
Dist.) (Sean C. Gallagher, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that the maximum prison
term in a case is “the aggregate of all stated minimum and definite terms imposed” in the
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[Cite as State v. Tice, 2026-Ohio-2903.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2026-0003
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, JOSEPH W. TICE, Case No. CR2025-0777
Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed but Remanded for Resentencing
Date of Judgment: July 28, 2026
BEFORE: William B. Hoffman, Craig R. Baldwin, and David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Joseph A. Palmer (Muskingum County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney), Zanesville, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Christopher D. Brigdon, Thornville, Ohio, for Defendant-Appellant.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant Joseph Tice argues in this appeal that the trial court erred by
imposing consecutive prison terms on each of the five felony charges to which Tice pled
guilty. As we explain below, we find no error in the trial judge’s consecutive imposition of
those prison terms.
{¶2} We note, though, that the trial judge mistakenly imposed definite — rather than
indefinite — prison terms on four of the five second-degree-felony (F2) charges in the case.
Because R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a) requires that any prison terms on those charges be indefinite
ones, we remand Tice’s case for a resentencing hearing.
The Key Facts {¶3} Tice pled guilty in December 2025 to a bill of information alleging that he had
committed five F2 offenses of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor or
impaired person. In their written plea agreement, the parties jointly recommended that the
trial judge impose a prison term totaling 40 years. Tice signed that written plea agreement
which contained this language: “[t]he parties stipulate to the judicial findings necessary for
the imposition of consecutive sentences.” And when asked by the trial judge, Tice affirmed
orally at the plea hearing that he understood that the joint recommendation called for him to
spend 40 years in prison, and he also orally acknowledged that he had agreed that the facts
necessary to support the imposition of consecutive sentences were present in his case.
{¶4} Tice waived any pre-sentence investigation and requested that a sentence be
imposed immediately after the trial court accepted his guilty pleas. On count one, the trial
judge then imposed an indefinite prison term with a minimum length of eight years. On each
of the remaining four charges, the judge imposed eight-year definite prison terms, and Tice
was ordered to serve all five of his prison terms consecutively. He now appeals.
We Remand Tice’s Case for a New Sentencing Hearing
{¶5} Tice argues on appeal only that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive
prison terms. Although we disagree with Tice’s view that the trial court was required to
provide specific reasons to support its findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), we find that a new
sentencing hearing is required to conform the prison terms to the Reagan Tokes Act.
The Trial Judge Did Not Err by Imposing Consecutive Prison Terms
{¶6} Our review of Tice’s prison terms is guided by R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), which tells
us that a felony defendant may not challenge a sentence on appeal if that sentence is
“authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” To be “authorized by law” within the
meaning of that statutory provision, the sentence “must comport with all applicable
mandatory sentencing provisions.” State v. Sergent, 2016-Ohio-2696, ¶ 29.
{¶7} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) ordinarily requires a judge who is sentencing a defendant
on multiple felony charges to make certain findings before that judge may properly order the
defendant to serve all or some of his or her prison terms consecutively. Sergent at ¶ 17 (“if a
trial judge exercises his or her discretion to impose consecutive sentences, he or she must
make the consecutive-sentence findings set out in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and those findings must
be made at the sentencing hearing and incorporated into the sentencing entry”).
{¶8} The Supreme Court has explained, though, that “in the context of a jointly
recommended sentence that includes nonmandatory consecutive sentences, a trial court is not
required to make the consecutive-sentence findings set out in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).” Sergent at
¶ 43. See also State v. Porterfield, 2005-Ohio-3095, ¶ 25 (“The General Assembly intended a
jointly agreed-upon sentence to be protected from review precisely because the parties agreed
that the sentence is appropriate. Once a defendant stipulates that a particular sentence is
justified, the sentencing judge no longer needs to independently justify the sentence”).
{¶9} The trial judge in Tice’s case imposed the 40-year prison term that Tice and the
State had jointly recommended, and Tice agreed to the required consecutive-sentence findings
in his written plea agreement. We note that, despite the parties’ written agreement about the
findings, the trial judge did in fact state the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings on the record before
imposing the consecutive prison terms. The judge was not required to state any reasons
supporting those findings. State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 37 (a trial court “has no
obligation to state reasons to support its findings” under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)). {¶10} R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) precludes any further review of Tice’s sentence on the
consecutive-sentencing issue that he raises here. As we explain below, though, we remand
Tice’s case for a resentencing hearing because we find that the sentence imposed by the trial
judge does not comport with Ohio law.
Each of Tice’s Five Prison Terms Should Have Been Indefinite Ones
{¶11} Tice’s sentencing hearing must be redone because the definite prison terms that
the judge imposed on four of the five charges are out of step with the mandates of R.C.
2929.14(A)(2)(a).
{¶12} For crimes committed in Ohio on and after the March 22, 2019 effective date
of the Reagan Tokes Act, any prison term for most first-degree-felony and second-degree-
felony offenses must be, according to R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (A)(2)(a), “an indefinite
prison term.” And of course when sentencing a defendant on multiple counts that each
require an indefinite prison term, a trial judge is required to “consider each offense
individually and impose a separate sentence for each offense.” State v. Saxon, 2006-Ohio-
1245, ¶ 9.
{¶13} In those circumstances, the sentencing judge must first “select, for each offense,
a stated minimum term from the appropriate statutory range” in R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) (for
first-degree felonies) or R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a) (for second-degree felonies) unless the statutory
provision that criminalizes the conduct specifies a different minimum term or penalty for the
offense. State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-3669, ¶ 68 (8th Dist.). Then, after any prison terms for
each offense have been imposed, the judge may consider whether the defendant should serve
those prison terms concurrently or consecutively. Saxon at ¶ 9. {¶14} Finally, the judge should then turn to R.C. 2929.144(B) to calculate the
defendant’s maximum prison term in the case. See State v. Jenkins, 2025-Ohio-2143, ¶ 62 (8th
Dist.) (Sean C. Gallagher, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that the maximum prison
term in a case is “the aggregate of all stated minimum and definite terms imposed” in the
case, plus the so-called “tail, as calculated under R.C. 2929.144(B)(1), (B)(2), and (B)(3)”);
State v. Tornstrom, 2023-Ohio-763, ¶ 72 (11th Dist.) (“only one maximum term is calculated”),
quoting State v. Searls, 2022-Ohio-858, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.).
{¶15} R.C. 2907.322(C) tells us that the five R.C. 2907.322(A)(1) charges to which
Tice pled guilty are F2 offenses. Tice was sentenced on count one to an indefinite prison term
with a minimum length of eight years and a maximum length of 12 years. On each of the
other four counts, the judge imposed definite prison terms of eight years. The judge then
ordered Tice to serve those five prison terms consecutively.
{¶16} Under R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a), any prison terms for these F2 offenses were
required to be indefinite prison terms. See Searls at ¶ 33 (“where the trial court is imposing
prison sentences on multiple counts under the Reagan Tokes Act, the trial court’s sentence
for each individual count should make clear that the prison term is a stated minimum
sentence, as opposed to a definite sentence”). Only after selecting each of the five individual
minimum terms should the judge have turned to R.C. 2929.144(B) to calculate the maximum
term in the case. See State v. Flow, 2022-Ohio-4416, ¶ 54 (6th Dist.) (“Pursuant to R.C.
2929.144(B)(2), a sentencing court must first add all of the consecutively imposed terms, in
order to determine the aggregate minimum term, and then it must compute the maximum
aggregate term”). {¶17} Because Tice’s prison sentence does not comport with Ohio law, we remand
the case for a resentencing hearing.
By: Gormley, J.;
Hoffman, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur.