Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, and MEAD, JJ.
Concurrence: SILVER, and JABAR, JJ.
MEAD, J.
[¶ 1] Gilbert E. Telford appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Oxford County, Cole, J.) amending the conditions of his probation by adding an additional condition at the request of his probation officer. Telford argues that the plea agreement he entered into with the State on the underlying indictment constituted a contract that the State could not breach by requesting additional probation conditions after the initial entry of judgment. We affirm the judgment amending the conditions of his probation.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] In January 2008, Telford pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with possession of sexually explicit material (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 284(1)(C) (2009). Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to five years imprisonment, with all but six months suspended, and six years of probation. Three special conditions of probation were imposed, forbidding Telford from possessing a personal computer, requiring that he forfeit the computer equipment used in the commission of his crime, and requiring him to comply with sex offender registration requirements. In July 2008, Telford’s probation officer, who was not involved in the plea negotiations, moved to amend the conditions of probation by adding three new conditions: (1) that Telford complete a sex offender evaluation; (2) that he follow its recommendations; and (8) that he submit [10]*10to random searches for sexually explicit material. Telford opposed the motion.1
[¶ 8] The Superior Court held a hearing on the motion in January 2009, almost one year after sentencing. The State acknowledged that at Telford’s sentencing hearing it failed to request the three conditions it now sought, agreed that the proposed new conditions were not part of the original sentence imposed by the court, and advised that Telford had complied with the terms of his probation thus far. Telford acknowledged that there were no specific plea negotiations ruling out the additional conditions. Telford’s probation officer testified that he considered the existing conditions to be inadequate to allow proper supervision because he had no ability to determine the best services for Tel-ford, and no mechanism for verifying that he was not in possession of a personal computer.
[¶ 4] The court concluded that the absence of the conditions sought by the probation officer was an inadvertent omission by the parties and granted the State’s motion in part, ordering only that Telford complete a sex offender evaluation and that he submit to random searches for pornographic materials. It declined to order compliance with recommendations that might result from the evaluation, saying that it preferred to see the results before doing so. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 5] Telford argues that his plea agreement with the State constituted a contract, and because the additional conditions of probation the State later sought were not part of that agreement, the Superior Court erred in imposing them. The State counters that the court’s action was authorized by 17-A M.R.S. § 1202(2) (2009), and was not barred by our decision in State v. Russo, 2008 ME 31, 942 A.2d 694.
[¶ 6] The Legislature has explicitly provided for post-sentencing modification of conditions of probation, and for the early termination of probation altogether:
2. During the period of probation specified in the sentence ... and upon application of a person on probation or the person’s probation officer, or upon its own motion, the court may, after a hearing ... modify the requirements imposed by the court ... add further requirements authorized by section 1204 or relieve the person on probation of any requirement imposed by the court ... that, in its opinion, imposes on the person an unreasonable burden.
3. Once the period of probation has commenced, on motion of the probation officer, or of the person on probation, or on its own motion, the court may terminate at any time a period of probation and discharge the convicted person at any time earlier than that provided in the sentence ... if warranted by the conduct of such person.
17-A M.R.S. § 1202(2), (3) (2009); see State v. Spencer, 2003 ME 112, ¶ 8, 831 A.2d 419, 421 (“A court addressing a motion to modify conditions of probation has three options. It may modify a condition, add a condition, or relieve the defendant from a condition entirely.”).
[¶ 7] We have held that no change in circumstances or triggering action by the probationer is required before a court may add conditions of probation. See [11]*11State v. Collins, 681 A.2d 1168, 1170 (Me.1996). Instead, “[w]hen presented with a request to modify a condition of probation, the trial court must find that the requested condition would advance one of the purposes set forth in [17-A M.R.S. § 1204].” Id. at 1170-71; see 17-A M.R.S. § 1202(2). The court’s findings of fact in support of its decision to modify probation conditions are reviewed for clear error. Spencer, 2003 ME 112, ¶ 6, 831 A.2d at 421.
[¶ 8] Here the Superior Court ordered that Telford submit to a sex offender evaluation and to random searches for pornographic material after finding that “[t]his is a serious situation and I want to make sure that his rights are protected, but also that the public is protected.” The court’s concern was supported by information presented by the State at the original sentencing hearing and at the motion hearing that Telford’s collection of child pornography was described by the Computer Crimes Task Force as the largest collection of child pornography it had encountered, consisting of some 7500 images and videos. The Legislature has specified that a court’s broad sentencing authority includes the discretion to impose as a condition of probation “any ... condition[ ] reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the convicted person or the public safety or security.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1204(2-A)(M) (2009). On this record, the court did not err in finding that the additional conditions sought by the State satisfied the statute.
[¶ 9] Telford does not dispute that the additional conditions added by the court are reasonably related to the purposes of his probation. He contends, instead, that they could not be imposed because they were not part of his plea agreement with the State. Because the additional conditions advanced one of the purposes set forth in section 1204, the court’s decision to add them was authorized by section 1202(2). 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1202(2), 1204(2-A)(M). Accordingly, the court’s judgment will stand unless Telford is correct in asserting that contract analysis both trumps the statute and favors his position. Neither assertion is true.
[¶ 10] In State v. Russo, we reiterated that “[p]lea agreements are contracts and contract principles apply when interpreting them,” before holding that on the facts of that case, the State’s conduct constituted a “substantial breach” of the plea agreement. 2008 ME 31, ¶¶ 9, 14, 17, 942 A.2d at 697, 698, 699 (quotation marks omitted). In this case, the plea agreement is not implicated. Unlike the defendant in Russo,
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Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, and MEAD, JJ.
Concurrence: SILVER, and JABAR, JJ.
MEAD, J.
[¶ 1] Gilbert E. Telford appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Oxford County, Cole, J.) amending the conditions of his probation by adding an additional condition at the request of his probation officer. Telford argues that the plea agreement he entered into with the State on the underlying indictment constituted a contract that the State could not breach by requesting additional probation conditions after the initial entry of judgment. We affirm the judgment amending the conditions of his probation.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] In January 2008, Telford pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with possession of sexually explicit material (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 284(1)(C) (2009). Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to five years imprisonment, with all but six months suspended, and six years of probation. Three special conditions of probation were imposed, forbidding Telford from possessing a personal computer, requiring that he forfeit the computer equipment used in the commission of his crime, and requiring him to comply with sex offender registration requirements. In July 2008, Telford’s probation officer, who was not involved in the plea negotiations, moved to amend the conditions of probation by adding three new conditions: (1) that Telford complete a sex offender evaluation; (2) that he follow its recommendations; and (8) that he submit [10]*10to random searches for sexually explicit material. Telford opposed the motion.1
[¶ 8] The Superior Court held a hearing on the motion in January 2009, almost one year after sentencing. The State acknowledged that at Telford’s sentencing hearing it failed to request the three conditions it now sought, agreed that the proposed new conditions were not part of the original sentence imposed by the court, and advised that Telford had complied with the terms of his probation thus far. Telford acknowledged that there were no specific plea negotiations ruling out the additional conditions. Telford’s probation officer testified that he considered the existing conditions to be inadequate to allow proper supervision because he had no ability to determine the best services for Tel-ford, and no mechanism for verifying that he was not in possession of a personal computer.
[¶ 4] The court concluded that the absence of the conditions sought by the probation officer was an inadvertent omission by the parties and granted the State’s motion in part, ordering only that Telford complete a sex offender evaluation and that he submit to random searches for pornographic materials. It declined to order compliance with recommendations that might result from the evaluation, saying that it preferred to see the results before doing so. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 5] Telford argues that his plea agreement with the State constituted a contract, and because the additional conditions of probation the State later sought were not part of that agreement, the Superior Court erred in imposing them. The State counters that the court’s action was authorized by 17-A M.R.S. § 1202(2) (2009), and was not barred by our decision in State v. Russo, 2008 ME 31, 942 A.2d 694.
[¶ 6] The Legislature has explicitly provided for post-sentencing modification of conditions of probation, and for the early termination of probation altogether:
2. During the period of probation specified in the sentence ... and upon application of a person on probation or the person’s probation officer, or upon its own motion, the court may, after a hearing ... modify the requirements imposed by the court ... add further requirements authorized by section 1204 or relieve the person on probation of any requirement imposed by the court ... that, in its opinion, imposes on the person an unreasonable burden.
3. Once the period of probation has commenced, on motion of the probation officer, or of the person on probation, or on its own motion, the court may terminate at any time a period of probation and discharge the convicted person at any time earlier than that provided in the sentence ... if warranted by the conduct of such person.
17-A M.R.S. § 1202(2), (3) (2009); see State v. Spencer, 2003 ME 112, ¶ 8, 831 A.2d 419, 421 (“A court addressing a motion to modify conditions of probation has three options. It may modify a condition, add a condition, or relieve the defendant from a condition entirely.”).
[¶ 7] We have held that no change in circumstances or triggering action by the probationer is required before a court may add conditions of probation. See [11]*11State v. Collins, 681 A.2d 1168, 1170 (Me.1996). Instead, “[w]hen presented with a request to modify a condition of probation, the trial court must find that the requested condition would advance one of the purposes set forth in [17-A M.R.S. § 1204].” Id. at 1170-71; see 17-A M.R.S. § 1202(2). The court’s findings of fact in support of its decision to modify probation conditions are reviewed for clear error. Spencer, 2003 ME 112, ¶ 6, 831 A.2d at 421.
[¶ 8] Here the Superior Court ordered that Telford submit to a sex offender evaluation and to random searches for pornographic material after finding that “[t]his is a serious situation and I want to make sure that his rights are protected, but also that the public is protected.” The court’s concern was supported by information presented by the State at the original sentencing hearing and at the motion hearing that Telford’s collection of child pornography was described by the Computer Crimes Task Force as the largest collection of child pornography it had encountered, consisting of some 7500 images and videos. The Legislature has specified that a court’s broad sentencing authority includes the discretion to impose as a condition of probation “any ... condition[ ] reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the convicted person or the public safety or security.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1204(2-A)(M) (2009). On this record, the court did not err in finding that the additional conditions sought by the State satisfied the statute.
[¶ 9] Telford does not dispute that the additional conditions added by the court are reasonably related to the purposes of his probation. He contends, instead, that they could not be imposed because they were not part of his plea agreement with the State. Because the additional conditions advanced one of the purposes set forth in section 1204, the court’s decision to add them was authorized by section 1202(2). 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1202(2), 1204(2-A)(M). Accordingly, the court’s judgment will stand unless Telford is correct in asserting that contract analysis both trumps the statute and favors his position. Neither assertion is true.
[¶ 10] In State v. Russo, we reiterated that “[p]lea agreements are contracts and contract principles apply when interpreting them,” before holding that on the facts of that case, the State’s conduct constituted a “substantial breach” of the plea agreement. 2008 ME 31, ¶¶ 9, 14, 17, 942 A.2d at 697, 698, 699 (quotation marks omitted). In this case, the plea agreement is not implicated. Unlike the defendant in Russo, who was indicted after he bargained to avoid being indicted, Telford received precisely what he bargained for when he was sentenced, and the State has not sought to alter the original judgment.
[¶ 11] Section 1202(2) embodies a legislative determination that the State and the defendant in a criminal case both face the possibility that the terms or length of a probationary period may be changed after sentencing. Conditions of probation may be modified, added, or eliminated, or a court may terminate probation altogether. Spencer, 2003 ME 112, ¶8, 831 A.2d at 421; 17-A M.R.S. § 1202(3). Almost from the time of statehood, we have said that a party to a contract is bound by the terms of the law that govern the subject matter of the contract, regardless of whether the contract expressly refers to them.2
[12]*12[¶ 12] In this instance, Telford is presumed to have been aware when he entered into his plea agreement of the possibility that by operation of statute additional conditions could be added to his original conditions of probation, just as the State is presumed to have known that the original conditions could be deleted or Telford’s probation terminated before it fully ran.3 In contract terms, those possibilities were part of the bargain. Neither party can be heard to complain that one of the possibilities came to pass, so long as the Superior Court acted in accordance with section 1202(2). Because the court did act in accordance with the statute, Telford’s argument that the imposition of additional conditions was barred because that action constituted a breach of the plea agreement fails.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.