State v. Taylor

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: July 5, 2023
• Docket: 22-788
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA22-788

Filed 05 July 2023

Vance County, Nos. 18CRS51233-34, 18CRS51262, 18CRS51279, 18CRS703002-003

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

RYAN LEE MATTHEW TAYLOR

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 10 September 2021 by Judge

Cynthia King Sturges in Vance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of

Appeals 24 May 2023.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Jonathan J. Evans, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Patterson Harkavy LLP, by Narendra K. Ghosh, for the defendant-appellant.

TYSON, Judge.

Ryan Lee Matthew Taylor (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments entered upon

a jury’s verdicts. We find no error in part, vacate in part, and remand.

I. Background

Ashira Jefferson, Kasi Thompson, Elijah Brown, and Kaija Richardson were

driving to drop Richardson off at 1:00 a.m. on 5 May 2018 after eating dinner and

attending a movie with friends in Henderson. Jefferson was driving a Honda sedan

with Brown seated in the passenger seat. Richardson was seated in the driver’s side STATE V. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

rear seat, and Thompson was seated in the passenger’s side rear seat.

Drake Branson was also separately leaving the movie theater with his wife.

As Branson was waiting to turn onto Raleigh Road, he noticed a Chevrolet Tahoe

with aftermarket blue tint headlights approaching on Raleigh Road. As the Tahoe

passed his location, Branson noticed the Tahoe make an erratic movement into the

left lane, emit a loud revving sound, and pass the car, which had just pulled out in

front of Branson’s car. Branson pulled onto Raleigh Road and a few minutes later

encountered Jefferson’s Honda sedan off of the roadway and stopped in Richardson’s

yard. Branson pulled over and called 911. The Honda sedan displayed severe damage

to the back of the vehicle and the roof had lifted open. Thompson was laying outside

of the car in a ditch near the roadway. The roadway was littered with debris ejected

from inside the car.

Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) responded to the scene at 1:23 a.m.

Jefferson suffered a broken jaw. Thompson was unconscious and unresponsive with

an open injury to the back of her head. Brown was removed from inside of the Honda

sedan, suffering with seizures, which indicated a “traumatic brain injury.”

Thompson and Brown were transported to Maria Parham Hospital and later

transferred by helicopter to Duke University Hospital in Durham. Thompson died

approximately two hours after the wreck occurred. Brown died four days later.

North Carolina State Highway Patrol Troopers, Michael Wilder and

Christopher Lanham, responded to the scene at approximately 1:25 a.m. The

-2- STATE V. TAYLOR

troopers noticed a Chevrolet Tahoe with blue tint headlights located approximately

fifty yards farther down Raleigh Road. The Chevrolet Tahoe had been driven through

a fence and into the lot of a self-storage facility. The headlights on the Chevrolet

Tahoe were illuminated, but the driver was not inside the vehicle nor at the scene.

The troopers examined the Chevrolet Tahoe and determined no key was in the

ignition and observed a cold six pack of beer in the front passenger side floorboard.

Some of the containers had been opened. The vehicle had incurred severe front-end

damage.

A canine unit was dispatched and a search was initiated for the vehicle’s

driver. The canine tracked a scent approximately one to two hundred yards through

a barbed wire fence until encountering two railroad cars located on the other size of

the U.S. Highway 1 Bypass bridge. Defendant was found lying under one of the

railroad cars. Trooper Lanham ordered him to come out. Defendant was wearing a

dark blue T-shirt and khaki shorts. Trooper Lanham searched Defendant and located

his ID in his pocket, as well as a key that fit into the ignition switch of the Chevrolet

Tahoe, which was registered to Defendant. Defendant’s DNA profile was later

matched to DNA found on the driver and passenger side airbags inside the wrecked

vehicle. Defendant told officers he had been a passenger in the vehicle and had “paid

[a security guard named] Rick $20 to give me a ride from [the] 85 Bar.”

The troopers noted Defendant was uncooperative, combative, and refused to

answer questions. Trooper Lanhan also noted a strong odor of alcohol on Defendant’s

-3- STATE V. TAYLOR

breath, his eyes were red and glassy, and his speech was slurred. Defendant admitted

to consuming alcohol that evening. EMS accessed, treated, and transported

Defendant to Maria Parham Hospital at 2:40 a.m. because of knee pain.

Defendant exhibited dangerous behavior at the hospital and was told to leave

the emergency department. Defendant left and walked across the street to a Sheetz

gas station at 3:05 a.m.

At 3:20 a.m., Trooper Wilder arrived at the hospital and discovered Defendant

was no longer there, but located him across the street at the Sheetz gas station.

Trooper Wilder placed Defendant under arrest and transported him to the

magistrate’s office. Defendant refused to provide a breath sample for chemical

analysis. Trooper Wilder obtained a search warrant for Defendant’s blood, which was

drawn at Maria Parham Hospital at 4:56 a.m. The State Crime Laboratory

ascertained Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration to be .15 grams of alcohol per

100 milliliters of blood.

Trooper Wilder obtained a further search warrant for Defendant’s cell phone

on the afternoon of 6 May 2018. While executing that search warrant, Defendant told

Trooper Wilder he would like to speak with him about the collision that had occurred.

Defendant also admitted alcohol was involved in the crash. Defendant asserted the

collision had occurred because “they pulled out in front of me.” Defendant was unsure

if the Chevrolet Tahoe had overturned during the wreck.

Trooper Wilder obtained still photographs from the camera located behind the

-4- STATE V. TAYLOR

self-storage facility. The photographs showed the Chevrolet Tahoe stopping on the

property and Defendant being the only individual depicted on the cameras. The

photographs also showed Defendant attempting to climb a barbed wire fence.

Christopher Wilson, a security guard at Bar 85, testified for the State. Wilson

was working at the bar on the night of the incident. Wilson observed Defendant enter

the bar and saw him leave at approximately 12:04 a.m. Wilson stated Defendant was

agitated about something, which had happened inside of the bar, and was “talking

crazy.” Defendant told Wilson “they won’t let [him] back in, they [had kicked him]

out.” Defendant had a drink in his hand and left through the outdoor smoking section

of the bar.

Defendant entered his Chevrolet Tahoe, backed into another vehicle parked

behind him, and then drove forward. Defendant drove through the grass and a ditch

instead of using the driveway exit onto the roadway from the parking lot.

Wilson also testified he had no knowledge of anyone named “Rick” being

employed at Bar 85. While incarcerated after the accident, Defendant spoke with

family members and discussed the accident, stating “if I wouldn’t have had nothing

to drink it would’ve been chalked up as just a[n] accident.”

Defendant was indicted for two counts of felony death by motor vehicle, felony

hit and run resulting in serious injury or death, reckless driving to endanger, failure

to reduce speed, failure to comply with drivers license restriction, driving while

impaired (“DWI”), and two counts of second-degree murder. A jury convicted

-5- STATE V. TAYLOR

Defendant of all charges.

The trial court arrested judgment on the two convictions of felony death by

motor vehicle due to the convictions for second-degree murder. Defendant was

sentenced in the presumptive range to 180-228 months for each of the second-degree

murders. Defendant’s convictions for felony hit and run, failure to reduce speed,

failure to comply with license restrictions, and reckless driving were consolidated for

judgment and Defendant was sentenced to 19-32 months. Defendant was also

sentenced to six months for the DWI, with all sentences running consecutively.

Defendant appealed.

II. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b) and 15A-

1444(a) (2021).

III. Issues

Defendant argues the trial court: (1) erred by admitting expert testimony on

speed; (2) erred by admitting evidence of an alleged prior DWI; (3) lacked jurisdiction

over the license restriction charge because of a defective indictment; (4) erred by

failing to dismiss the license restriction charge; (5) erred by sentencing him as a prior

record level II offender; and, (6) erred by imposing a Level Three DWI. Defendant

also raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

IV. Expert Testimony

A. Standard of Review

-6- STATE V. TAYLOR

“Trial courts enjoy wide latitude and discretion when making a determination

about the admissibility of [expert] testimony.” State v. King, 366 N.C. 68, 75, 733

S.E.2d 535, 539-40 (2012) (citation omitted). A trial court’s ruling on Rule 702(a) is

reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 893, 787 S.E.2d 1,

11 (2016). “A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon showing

that its ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the

result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Riddick, 315 N.C. 749, 756, 340 S.E.2d 55, 59

(1986) (citations omitted).

When error is asserted that “the trial court’s decision is based on an incorrect

reading and interpretation of the rule governing admissibility of expert testimony,

the standard of review on appeal is de novo.” State v. Parks, 265 N.C. App. 555, 563,

828 S.E.2d 719, 725 (2019) (citations omitted).

B. Analysis

Defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing an expert witness to testify

about the speed of the Chevrolet Tahoe based upon unreliable methodology. North

Carolina Rule of Evidence 702 governs testimony by an expert witness at trial:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if all of the following apply

(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data.

-7- STATE V. TAYLOR

(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods.

(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2021).

The Supreme Court of North Carolina has interpreted Rule 702(a) and

examined Supreme Court of the United States’ precedents interpreting Rule 702(a):

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993);

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1997); and Kumho

Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999). Our Supreme Court

held:

the witness must be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. This portion of the rule focuses on the witness’s competence to testify as an expert in the field of his or her proposed testimony. Expertise can come from practical experience as much as from academic training. Whatever the source of the witness’s knowledge, the question remains the same: Does the witness have enough expertise to be in a better position than the trier of fact to have an opinion on the subject? The rule does not mandate that the witness always have a particular degree or certification, or practice a particular profession. But this does not mean that the trial court cannot screen the evidence based on the expert’s qualifications. In some cases, degrees or certifications may play a role in determining the witness’s qualifications, depending on the content of the witness’s testimony and the field of the witness’s purported expertise. As is true with respect to other aspects of Rule 702(a), the trial court has the discretion to determine whether the witness is sufficiently qualified to testify in that field.

-8- STATE V. TAYLOR

State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 889-90, 787 S.E.2d 1, 9 (2016) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

State Patrol Trooper Roderick Murphy, who was not one of the two

investigating troopers on the night of the wreck, was tendered and admitted as an

expert in crash reconstruction at Defendant’s trial. Trooper Murphy was allowed to

testify over Defendant’s objection that the Chevrolet Tahoe’s speed exceeded the

forty-five-mile-per-hour speed limit on the highway at the time of the crash.

Trooper Murphy also testified he “was unable to use either of the two scientific

tests he had to determine the rate of speed and therefore would not be able to give an

accurate answer.” Trooper Murphy based his opinion on his nineteen years of

experience in law enforcement, specialized training in the fundamentals, tools, and

methods of crash reconstruction, prior experience of over thirty crash reconstruction

conferences he had attended with exercises and demonstrations.

Trooper Murphy analogized the wreck with a comparable exercise wherein a

Dodge Charger had struck a Chevrolet Tahoe. This rear-end collision occurred at a

known speed, which resulted in less damage than the wreck at bar. Defendant argues

this comparable is not substantially similar to meet the reliability requirements of

Daubert and Rule 702(a).

Given the specifics of this accident, which made the two established methods

unreliable to calculate speed, no objective equation was available to calculate the

speed Defendant’s Chevrolet Tahoe was traveling at the time of the crash. Trooper

-9- STATE V. TAYLOR

Murphy did not give a specific speed, but gave an opinion based upon what he had

observed and the speed and force necessary to inflict the extent of the rear end and

roof damage observed to Jefferson’s Honda sedan. Trooper Murphy’s testimony

established the principles and methods he had employed were “applied . . . reliably to

the facts of the case[,]” per Rule 702(a)(3). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a)(3)

(2021). Defendant was fully able to cross-examine and challenge this testimony and

has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion by admitting this opinion

testimony.

V. Rule 404(b)

Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior 2017

DWI incident, as not admissible under Rule 404(b). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule

404(b) (2021).

Our Supreme Court has held:

When the trial court has made findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its 404(b) ruling . . . we look to whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the conclusions. We review de novo the legal conclusions that the evidence is, or is not, within the coverage of Rule 404(b). We then review the trial court’s Rule 403 determination for abuse of discretion.

State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 130, 726 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2012).

Rule 404(b) provides:

- 10 - STATE V. TAYLOR

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such a proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2021).

The trial court admitted, over Defendant’s objection, information about a

pending 2017 DWI charge. The State argues the evidence of Defendant’s prior traffic

offenses is properly admitted under Rule 404(b) to show his intent, knowledge, or

absence of mistake to support malice, an essential element of second-degree murder.

Defendant argues the pending 2017 DWI charge is not “sufficiently similar to the

circumstances at issue.” State v. Locklear, 159 N.C. App. 588, 594, 583 S.E.2d 726,

731 (2003), aff’d per curiam, 359 N.C. 63, 602 S.E.2d 359 (2004).

This Court has allowed pending charges to be admitted to show malice, as long

as the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b). See State v. Grooms, 230 N.C. App.

56, 64, 748 S.E.2d 162, 168 (2013) (“our appellate courts have also upheld the

admission of evidence of a defendant’s pending charge for DWI to show malice when

the circumstances surrounding the pending charge were sufficiently similar to those

surrounding the charged offense.”) (citation omitted).

In State v. Jones, evidence of the defendant’s pending charge of driving while

intoxicated was introduced to establish that the defendant had acted with malice.

Our Supreme Court held the introduction of such evidence demonstrated: “that

- 11 - STATE V. TAYLOR

defendant was aware that his conduct leading up to the collision at issue here was

reckless and inherently dangerous to human life. Thus, such evidence tended to show

malice on the part of defendant was properly admitted under Rule 404(b).” 353 N.C.

159, 172-73, 538 S.E.2d 917, 928 (2000). Defendant’s argument is overruled.

VI. Indictment of License Restriction Charge

Defendant argues, and the State concedes, the indictment for the license

restriction charge and conviction was facially invalid. Defendant’s conviction and

judgment for failure to comply with license restrictions is vacated. Defendant’s

judgment, which consolidated this offense with other valid convictions and sentences

imposed, is also vacated and this cause is remanded for resentencing. Defendant’s

additional arguments, including his assertion of an ineffective assistance of counsel

(“IAC”) claim, relate to the indictment of the license restriction charge, which we are

vacating due to the State’s concession, are dismissed as moot.

VII. Sentencing as Prior Record Level II

Defendant argues, and the State also concedes, the trial court erred by

sentencing him as a prior record level II. The State concedes the trial court should

have sentenced Defendant as a prior record level I. Defendant’s judgments are

vacated and upon remand is to be resentenced at the proper prior record level.

VIII. Level Three DWI Sentence

Defendant argues, and the State further concedes, the trial court erred by

imposing a level three DWI sentence and the court should have imposed a level four

- 12 - STATE V. TAYLOR

DWI sentence. Defendant’s DWI sentence is vacated and remanded to be resentenced

at the proper level.

IX. Conclusion

The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in admitting Trooper

Murphy’s testimony concerning Defendant’s estimated vehicle speed. The trial court

also did not err in admitting evidence of an alleged and pending prior DWI charge to

show malice, knowledge, or absence of mistake under Rules of Evidence 404(b) and

403.

Defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error for his convictions of

two counts of second-degree murder in 18-CRS-05126 and 18-CRS-051279; felony hit

and run resulting in serious injury or death in 18-CRS-051234, DWI in 18-CRS-

051233; reckless driving to endanger in 18-CRS-703002; and, failure to reduce speed

in 18-CRS-703003. The State concedes the license restriction violation indictment

was facially invalid and the trial court did not possess jurisdiction to enter judgment

thereon.

The trial court erred in sentencing Defendant as a prior record level II offender.

The trial court also erred when it sentenced Defendant as a level three DWI offender.

Defendant’s judgments, consolidated with his failure to comply with his license

restrictions violation conviction, are vacated and remanded.

All of Defendant’s judgments are remanded for resentencing. Defendant’s

remaining challenges of error are dismissed as moot or not argued. It is so ordered.

- 13 - STATE V. TAYLOR

NO ERROR IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR

RESENTENCING.

Judges ZACHARY and STADING concur.

- 14 -