State v. Tate

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 5, 2026
• Docket: CT2025-0108
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Tate, 2026-Ohio-1636.]

IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO Case No. CT2025-0108

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2025-0504 JASON TATE Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: May 5, 2026

BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; Craig R. Baldwin, Judges

APPEARANCES: JOSEPH A. PALMER, for Plaintiff-Appellee; CHRIS BRIGDON, for Defendant-Appellant.

King, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Jason Tate appeals the October 3, 2025 decision of

conviction and sentence of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-

Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Detective Matt Wilhite of the Muskingum County Sheriff's Department is

assigned to the Central Ohio Drug Enforcement Task Force (CODE). In early April of

2025, a confidential informant (CI) advised Wilhite that Tate sold large quantities of

cocaine and that they could obtain cocaine from Tate. Based on information provided by

the CI, and Wilhite's prior knowledge of Tate, on April 17, 2025 Wilhite had the CI

perform a controlled buy. The CI was fitted with audio and video recording devices and a GPS tracker was placed on their car. Before proceeding to Tate's home, in Wilhite's

presence the CI negotiated a deal with Tate via Snapchat messaging to purchase $2600

worth of cocaine. Wilhite took photos of the conversation. The CI remained under

surveillance during the buy. After making the buy, the CI returned to Detective Wilhite

and Wilhite took possession of the drugs. The CI identified Tate in the video of the cocaine

purchase by the unique clothing Tate was wearing.

{¶ 3} On May 12, 2025, based on the controlled buy, Wihite requested and

executed a search warrant for Tate's home. The warrant sought cell phones, memory

cards, cash, evidence of occupancy, financial records, tax records, clothing matching what

Tate was wearing during the controlled buy, and digital media stored in Tate's security

cameras.

{¶ 4} Tate was present when CODE officers arrived and was removed from the

home before the search. Officers located a large amount of cash in a Crown Royal bag

hidden in a heat register beside the chair Tate was sitting in during the controlled buy and

documents connecting Tate to the property. In another heat register officers found a large

amount of cocaine. The search was immediately stopped while Wilhite obtained a second

search warrant for drugs and Tate's vehicle. Additional drugs and weapons were

discovered. A later search warrant was obtained and executed for Tate's phone.

{¶ 5} On May 22, 2025, the Muskingum County Grand Jury returned an

indictment charging Tate with two counts of trafficking in cocaine and two counts of

possession of cocaine, felonies of the first degree. Each count contained major drug

offender and firearm specifications. Tate was additionally charged with one count each

of possession and trafficking in methamphetamine, felonies of the first degree, with

attendant firearm specifications. Tate was further charged with five counts of having weapons under disability, a felony of the third degree, and one count of receiving stolen

property, a felony of the fourth degree.

{¶ 6} In early July, the State extended a plea offer with an agreement to a 20-year

sentence. Because counsel for Tate had not yet received full discovery, she did not feel she

could intelligently discuss the plea offer with Tate. On July 31, 2025, the State withdrew

the offer and filed a superseding indictment again charging Tate with all of the foregoing,

but adding an additional count of trafficking in cocaine, a felony of the first degree for the

controlled buy. The count also included a major drug offender specification and a firearm

specification.

{¶ 7} Counsel for Tate requested discovery. The State provided some discovery,

but filed a certification of nondisclosure pursuant to Crim.R. 16(D) which listed photos, a

statement, three videos, the CI packet, and the search warrants and supporting

documents in their entirety as items it would not disclose until 7 days before trial as

provided by the rule. Counsel for Tate therefore filed motions to suppress without first

seeing the search warrants in their entirety, the search warrant affidavits, or knowledge

of the identity of the CI. Counsel received full discovery 5 days before the suppression

hearing held on September 24, 2025.

{¶ 8} During the suppression hearing, counsel for Tate argued the search warrant

was stale and lacked particularity, asserted a Franks challenge alleging insufficient

information in the supporting affidavit, argued officers exceeded the scope of the search

warrant, and that the State's nondisclosure of evidence until seven days before trial

created constitutional violations. Counsel additionally argued that the State withdrew its

20-year offer and filed a superseding indictment because she continued to request

discovery materials that the State had declared protected pursuant to Crim.R. 16(D). After hearing testimony from Wilhite and argument from both parties, the trial court

denied the motion to suppress.

{¶ 9} The same day, Tate entered pleas of no contest to two counts of trafficking

in cocaine, felonies of the first degree with attendant major drug offender specifications

and forfeiture specifications; one count of trafficking in methamphetamine, a felony of

the first degree with attendant firearm and forfeiture specifications, and five counts of

having weapons under disability, felonies of the third degree. The State dismissed the

balance of the indictment. On October 1, 2025, the trial court sentenced Tate to an

indefinite sentence of 23 to 28.5 years of incarceration.

{¶ 10} Tate filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for

consideration. He raises one assignment of error as follows:

I

{¶ 11} "TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY

PURSUING MERITLESS SUPPRESSION LITIGATION, MISAPPLYING CRIM.R.

16(D)(3), AND FAILING TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT TO ACCEPT A FAVORABLE

PLEA OFFER, RESULTING IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF A TWENTY-YEAR

AGREEMENT AND THE IMPOSTION OF A SUBSTANTIALLY HARSHER SENTENCE."

{¶ 12} In his sole assignment of error, Tate argues his counsel rendered ineffective

assistance. We disagree.

Applicable Law

{¶ 13} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

demonstrate: (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., that counsel's performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) that counsel's errors

prejudiced the defendant, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687-688 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraphs two and three of

the syllabus. "Reasonable probability" is "probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome." Strickland at 694.

Suppression Claims

{¶ 14} Tate first faults his trial counsel for filing a suppression motion that "lacked

any legal or factual foundation." Brief of Appellant at 9. Tate attacks counsel's arguments

that the May 9, 2024 warrant was "stale" because the controlled buy had taken place three

weeks earlier, that areas searched by law enforcement were not reasonably within the

boundaries of the warrant, and that counsel did not advance any allegation of falsehood

in the warrant affidavit to support a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.

154.

{¶ 15} Tate does not suggest any suppression avenue that may have had a

reasonable chance of success, nor does he cite to any authority that would lead us to a

conclusion that filing a motion to suppress that is ultimately unsuccessful constitutes

ineffective assistance. It is well settled that tactical or strategic trial decisions, even if

unsuccessful, do not generally constitute ineffective assistance. State v. Carter, 72 Ohio

St.3d 545, 558 (1995). Rather, the errors complained of must amount to a substantial

violation of counsel's essential duties to his or her client. See State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio

St.3d 136, 141-42 (1989), citing State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396 (1976).

{¶ 16} Under the facts of this case, we note counsel for Tate was faced with

overwhelming evidence against her client yet appears to have explored every available avenue to diligently represent her client. We therefore find no fault in counsel's decision

to file a motion to suppress that was ultimately unsuccessful.

Discovery and Plea Offer

{¶ 17} Tate next faults his counsel for misunderstanding discovery rules which

according to Tate resulted in the State's withdrawal of the 20-year plea offer, Tate argues

that but for counsel's misunderstanding there is a reasonable probability he would have

accepted the State's plea offer.

{¶ 18} In support of his argument, Tate cites Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156. As

noted by the State, in Lafler, the parties stipulated to counsel's deficient performance.

Thus, the Lafler court examined only the prejudice prong of the Strickland rule. In the

context of a plea offer, the Court set forth the following requirement:

In these circumstances a defendant must show that but for the

ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the

plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the

defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would

not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the

court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or

sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less

severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were

imposed.

{¶ 19} Id., 164. {¶ 20} Even if we were to assume arguendo that counsel's performance fell below

an objective standard of reasonable representation, Tate has not demonstrated the

outcome would have been different. During the sentencing hearing counsel again argued

that discovery was not provided to the defense in time for either counsel or Tate to make

an educated decision regarding the State's plea offer before the State withdrew the offer.

The trial court responded:

I do understand, [Counsel for the Defense], the situation you were in

with discovery, and I assure you there is no penalty for waiting to the

end for the plea. And I understand the State's argument also, but I

just want to assure you.

{¶ 21} Transcript of Sentencing (TS), October 1, 2025 at 16.

{¶ 22} The trial court then went on to discuss Tate's considerable prior criminal

history involving drug and weapons charges, the fact that the instant matter involved

additional drug and weapons charges, and the danger that Tate presented to the

community before sentencing Tate to a period of incarceration three years greater than

that originally offered by the State. TS 17-19. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record

that the trial court would have accepted the terms of the plea agreement, nor that it would

have imposed a more lenient sentence. Moreover, when asked, Tate stated he was

satisfied with the advice and assistance of counsel. Transcript of plea hearing at 15.

{¶ 23} Having found no ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we deny Tate's sole

assignment of error. {¶ 24} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the

Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

{¶ 25} Costs to Appellant.

By: King, P.J.

Hoffman, J. and

Baldwin, J. concur.