State v. Sutphin

614 A.2d 792, 159 Vt. 9, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 109

• Court: Supreme Court of Vermont
• Decided: May 22, 1992
• Docket: 90-258
• Status: Published

Opinions

Allen, C.J.

Defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence. She was charged with driving while intoxicated, a violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201. Defendant contends that the “stop” of her vehicle constituted an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We hold that the Fourth Amendment was not violated, and affirm.

On September 24, 1989, at approximately 1:15 a.m., an Addison County Deputy Sheriff came up behind a vehicle “inappropriately” signaling a right turn in an area where there was no right turn. The vehicle was being operated at varying rates of speed as it headed up a hill toward a curve. After traveling around a left-hand curve, the vehicle pulled off to the side of the highway, outside the white line, and came to a stop. The officer pulled up behind the vehicle and activated his blue lights. He then exited his vehicle and requested that defendant produce her operator’s license and registration. As a result of his observations during this interview, the officer processed defendant for DUI.

The trial court found that, under all the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officer to speak to defendant. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that the officer had reasonable grounds for an investigative detention under the circumstances presented. We will not disturb a trial court’s findings unless they are unsupported by the evidence or are clearly erroneous. State v. Zaccaro, 154 Vt. 83, 86, 574 A.2d 1256, 1258 (1990).

The parties disagree over whether the officer’s action constituted an investigatory stop within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but it is unnecessary to resolve this question because there were grounds for a stop, assuming a stop occurred. A “reasonable and articulable suspicion” of wrongdoing is necessary for a police officer to stop a motor vehicle that is being operated on the highway. State v. Emilo, 144 Vt. 477, 481, 479 A.2d 169, 171 (1984). See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).

The question is whether the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect that defendant was engaged in any wrongdoing at the time of the encounter. The level of suspicion required under the Fourth Amendment is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), but it must be more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). An adequate basis for judicial review of the officer’s action exists when the officer gives a reasonably specific statement of the circumstances underlying his action together -with his reaction to the situation with which he was confronted. State v. Carnevale, 598 A.2d 746, 748 (Me. 1991) (citing 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(a), at 428 (2d ed. 1987)).

The officer gave such a statement. He observed a vehicle in the early morning hours traveling at varying rates of speed, signaling to make a right turn at a location where no right turn existed.

* The signaling, which he described as inappropriate, continued for several hundred feet around a left curve after which the vehicle pulled off the highway and came to a stop. These circumstances were sufficient justification for the officer to conclude that criminal activity might be afoot and justified the stop under Terry.

Affirmed.

Defendant argues that the right turn signal was activated to indicate her intention to pull over to let a faster moving car pass. 23 V.S.A. § 1064(e) requires directional signals to be used “to indicate an intention to turn, change lanes, or start from a parked position,” and prohibits their use as a courtesy or “do pass” signal to operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear.