State v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC.

718 P.2d 189, 149 Ariz. 287, 1985 Ariz. App. LEXIS 826
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
DecidedJuly 25, 1985
Docket2 CA-SA 0254
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 718 P.2d 189 (State v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC., 718 P.2d 189, 149 Ariz. 287, 1985 Ariz. App. LEXIS 826 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

HOWARD, Judge.

This special action concerns the use by law enforcement personnel of a field sobriety test called horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN). Since considerable public funds are about to be spent by the Governor’s Office of Highway Safety, Arizona Department of Transportation, for the training of law enforcement officers throughout the state in the use of the HGN test, special action is appropriate. We hold that the trial court erred in deciding that the HGN test could not be used to determine probable cause and in dismissing the prosecution.

In the early morning hours of March 18, 1985, the real party in interest, Fredrick Blake, was driving an automobile on State Route 92 south of Sierra Vista, Arizona. He was stopped by Officer Hohn of the Arizona Highway Patrol who suspected him of driving while under the influence of alcohol. The officer had Blake perform a series of field sobriety tests and he also had Blake perform the HGN test, which involves requesting a person at the time of the stop to concentrate on an object (usually a pen) held by the officer slightly above the driver’s eye level. The object is held initially directly ahead of the driver’s eyeball while it is centered and looking straight forward in relation to the head. The object is then moved toward the outside of the driver’s field of vision, toward the ear and away from the nose. The officer then observes the onset of an involuntary oscillation of the eyeball and measures the angle of the onset of this oscillation in relation to the center point. The officer then calculates the blood alcohol level based upon the angle of the onset of the oscillation.

Blake's performance of the standard field sobriety test was fair, but when the HGN test was administered, the officer had no doubt that Blake had a blood alcohol content (BAG) of more than .10 per cent. In fact, he estimated that from the result of the HGN test Blake had a BAC of .17 per cent. Blake was arrested and an intoxilyzer was subsequently administered which showed that Blake had a BAC of .163 per cent. Blake was charged, inter alia, with driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of A.R.S. § 28-692(B), which makes it unlawful to drive with .10 per cent or more of alcohol in the blood.

Blake made two motions in the trial court: to dismiss the prosecution for lack of probable cause to arrest and in limine to preclude the admission of the HGN test and its results at trial. At the hearing on the motions, Officer Hohn stated that without utilizing the results of the HGN, he did not believe that he had probable cause to arrest Blake.

The trial court concluded that the HGN test failed to meet the test of reliability under Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), and thus could not be used to form probable cause. The court then dismissed the prosecution.

The trial court was incorrect in deciding that the HGN test had to meet the Frye test before it could be used to determine probable cause to arrest. The Frye test, as adopted in Arizona, is as follows: “To be accepted by a court as fact, a scientific principle must have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Scales v. City Court, 122 Ariz. 231, 594 P.2d 97 (1979). See State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 700 P.2d 1312 (1984). The Frye test governs the admissibility of scientific evidence at trial. However, such evidence need not meet the Frye test in order to be utilized to determine probable cause to arrest. Probable cause to arrest exists where the arresting officer has reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. State v. Nelson, 129 Ariz. 582, 633 P.2d 391 (1981) . Only the probability and not a prima facie showing of criminal activity is the standard for probable cause to arrest. State v. Emery, 131 Ariz. 493, 642 P.2d 838 (1982). When assessing whether probable *289 cause exists, police officers are entitled to rely upon information not admissible at trial. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1897 (1949) (in a prosecution for importing intoxicating liquor into Oklahoma from Missouri in violation of the federal statutes, testimony by an investigator of the Alcohol Tax Unit that he had arrested Brinegar several months earlier for illegal transportation of liquor and that the resulting indictment was pending in another court at the time of the trial of this case was admissible at a hearing on the motion to suppress where the issue was not guilt but probable cause). In Brinegar, the court remarked:

“The court’s rulings, one admitting, the other excluding the identical testimony, were neither inconsistent nor improper. They illustrate the difference in standards and latitude allowed in passing upon the distinct issues of probable cause and guilt. Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.
However, if those standards were to be made applicable in determining probable cause for an arrest or for search and seizure, more especially in cases such as this involving moving vehicles used in the commission of crime, few indeed would be the situations in which an officer, charged with protecting the public interest by enforcing the law, could take effective action toward that end. Those standards have seldom been so applied.” 69 S.Ct. at 1310.

Four witnesses testified for the state on the motion to dismiss and motion in limine. Marcelline Burns has a Ph.D. from the University of California at Irvine and is a research psychologist. She is also the director of the Southern California Research Institute. The Institute is a non-profit organization incorporated by a group of researchers from UCLA, including Dr. Bums. In 1975 the United States Department of Transportation, the National Highway Safety Administration, awarded a research contract to the Southern California Research Institute to investigate and to develop the best possible field sobriety tests. Dr. Bums was the project director and conducted the research. As a result of the research the Institute recommended a three-test battery, one of which was the HGN test. Their research found a correlation between blood alcohol content and HGN and they developed the following formula: Fifty degrees minus the angle of the gaze of the onset of eye oscillation equals the BAC. This formula was validated in the field as a result of 450 administrations of the test.

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Related

State v. Superior Court
718 P.2d 171 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
718 P.2d 189, 149 Ariz. 287, 1985 Ariz. App. LEXIS 826, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-superior-court-etc-arizctapp-1985.