[Cite as State v. Streeter, 2026-Ohio-1668.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT STARK COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 2025CA00111
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2025CR0634 PRINCE WINSLOW GUY STREETER, Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: May 6, 2026
BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Robert G. Montgomery; Kevin W. Popham, Judges
APPEARANCES: KYLE L. STONE, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney by VICKI L. DE SANTIS, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee; BERNARD HUNT, for Defendant-Appellant.
Montgomery, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Prince Streeter (“Appellant”), appeals from the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the resulting jury verdict finding
Appellant guilty of possession of cocaine and trafficking in cocaine. For the reasons
below, we AFFIRM.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
{¶2} On March 19, 2025, Detective Matthew Kruger, from the Special
Investigation Unit at the Massillon Police Department, was conducting surveillance by
himself in an unmarked cruiser at a known narcotics location. At approximately 1:30
p.m., he observed Appellant riding a bicycle to the house and walking up to the front door, although he did not witness Appellant go into the house. Trial Tr., p. 140. Detective
Kruger later observed Appellant get into the passenger side of a red-colored sedan, which
he began to follow. After a short time, he witnessed the vehicle make a very wide improper
turn that resulted in the vehilce going into oncoming traffic. Trial Tr., p. 142. “This
vehicle actually went into oncoming traffic, so making a very wide tum [sic].” Id.
{¶3} Detective Kruger was in plain clothes so he requested, via dispatch, that
traffic officers conduct a traffic stop. Detective Kruger testified at the suppression hearing
that because he witnessed the traffic violation, he followed the sedan and called for patrol
officers in marked units to make a traffic stop. Detective Kruger also told dispatch he saw
a vehicle leaving a known drug area. Trial Tr., p. 108. Patrolman Nicholas Hillyer was
the officer on duty who initially conducted the stop.
{¶4} Detective Kruger heard Officer Hillyer state that he was waiting to get
probable cause over the radio, so Kruger told him probable cause existed because he saw
an improper turn at 3rd and Arch. Thereafter, Officer Hillyer initiated a traffic stop.
Officer Hillyer testified, “you can actually hear my dash cam, me calling out the traffic
stop, turning on the lights, and then the vehicle pulls over near [a] playground.” Supp.
Tr., p. 22. Officer Hillyer testified that he went to the passenger side of the vehicle and
made contact with Appellant. Id., pp. 16-17, 23. He did not observe any contraband or
weapons in open view and Appellant was not under arrest at that time. However,
Appellant “was a little combative at that point, trying to figure out what the reason they
were stopped for, kept asking things like that.” Id., p. 18.
{¶5} Officers Hunter Anthony and Alyssa Richard were also on routine patrol
when they heard the dispatch call from Detective Kruger requesting a traffic stop. They
arrived on scene to assist Officer Hillyer. As Officer Hillyer ran the driver's license information and began working on a traffic citation, Officers Anthony and Richard
interviewed the occupants of the vehicle. Trial Tr., p. 109. Officer Richard spoke with
Appellant, while Officer Anthony spoke to the driver, Courtney Hill (“Hill”). Trial Tr., p.
109. When Hillyer went back to his cruiser and began preparing a traffic citation, at some
point, Appellant walked over to the cruiser and asked Hillyer "What does this have to do
with me? Why am I still here?” Supp. Tr., p. 19. Hillyer testified that he replied, "I said
. . . ‘You're under traffic stop detainment. You are not free to leave.'" Id., pp. 19-20.
{¶6} Appellant was argumentative and talking over Hill, so Officer Anthony
asked Hill to exit the vehicle, to separate Appellant and Hill. Trial Tr., pp. 109-110. Hill
gave Officer Anthony consent to search her vehicle. Officer Anthony stated that because
the driver consented to a search of the vehicle, he went to the passenger side and asked
Appellant to step out of the vehicle. Supp. Tr., at p. 29. Anthony testified Appellant was
noncompliant at first but did eventually comply. Officer Anthony testified:
Upon getting [Appellant] out, he did give me consent to search his person
and his pockets to make sure he didn't have anything on him, which at that
point in time in his front hoodie, coat zipper pocket, I felt a large object
protruding from the front. [Appellant] at that time didn't revoke consent
for me to search that. However, due to his argumentative and fidgety
behavior, I kind of just wanted to kind of soothe him and not push the issue,
so I had him go step in front of the cruiser of Officer Hillyer * * *.
Supp. Tr., pp. 29-30.
{¶7} Officer Anthony stated there were no drugs or weapons in his actual pants
pockets. Anthony stated the item he felt, “was in like a front hoodie zipper pocket. He was
wearing like a zip-up hoodie that had like a front zipper, and the brick-like object was in his front hoodie pocket.” Id., p. 30. Anthony testified Appellant told him the object was
“his lunch.” Id.
{¶8} A few minutes later, while Anthony and Richard were searching the vehicle,
the Officers noticed Appellant had left the scene and was running down the street. Both
officers yelled for Appellant to stop and then got into their cruiser, and activated the lights
and siren to pursue Appellant as he ran into an alley. The cruiser’s dash camera began
recording as soon as their lights and siren were activated, and was admitted as State’s
Exhibit 2.2. Officer Anthony eventually apprehended Appellant, tackled him, and when
Appellant rolled over onto his back, Officer Anthony noticed that the front pocket of his
hoodie was turned inside out and was empty. Trial Tr., pp. 117, 118. Officer Anthony’s
body camera footage was played at trial and admitted as State’s Exhibit 2.1.1
{¶9} When asked what happened to the contents of his pocket, Appellant claimed
it was his beanie and gloves, rather than his lunch as previously explained. Trial Tr.,
p. 118. Officer Anthony testified that the object in Appellant's pocket did not feel like a
beanie. Id. After the officers placed Appellant into the cruiser, additional officers arrived
on scene and they canvassed the alley where Appellant was seen running. About 5-10
yards into the alley, Detective Franklin spotted a plastic bag, thrown over a fence, that
contained a brick-like object. Detective Kruger recognized the white brick object as
powder cocaine. Id., p. 145. The bag and its contents were sent to the Stark County Crime
Lab for testing. Alexis Kimble, with the Stark County Crime Lab, was qualified as an
expert, performed the testing, and testified at trial. Kimble stated, "It was one Ziploc bag
1 Detective Kruger went back to the house he was surveilling for narcotics but was notified by the
officers on scene that they were going to conduct a vehicle search, so they called for a K-9 unit to assist. Before the K-9 unit arrived, officers notified Detective Kruger that Appellant was fleeing on foot, so he responded back to the scene to assist with the apprehension. containing one tied plastic bag with one Ziploc bag with pressed white material and it was
249.2 grams of Cocaine Schedule II." Id., pp. 158, 162. The approixmate value of the
cocaine was $25,000.00.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
{¶10} Appellant was charged with Trafficking in Cocaine, a felony of the first
degree, and Possession of Cocaine. He pled not guilty. On May 28, 2025, Appellant filed
a motion to suppress, claiming “that there was not a traffic violation that required the
issuance of a traffic citation * * *.” On June 9, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the
motion, and on June 12, 2025, denied Appellant’s motion. In its Judgement Entry
denying Appellant's Motion, the Court stated: “The State contends that the traffic stop
was justified because Detective Kruger actually witnessed (or had a reasonable basis to
believe he had witnessed) the red sedan commit a marked lane violation. This Court finds
his testimony credible, which legally authorizes Officer Hillyer to stop the vehicle.”
Judgment Entry, p. 2.
{¶11} Indeed, the trial court found that the unrefuted testimony of the three
officers was credible. The trial court stated that based upon the totality of the
circumstances, the impetus for the traffic stop was Detective Kruger’s observation of an
improper lane violation, which he then relayed to Officer Hillyer and that sharing of
information legally authorized Officer Hillyer to stop the vehicle.
{¶12} On July 8, 2025, the State filed a superseding indictment, adding major
drug offender ("MDO") specifications to each count. Appellant pled not guilty to the
superseding indictment and filed a motion to dismiss on July 15, 2025, which was denied.
On July 16, 2025, after a one-day trial, a jury found Appellant guilty on both counts as
stated in the indictment. On August 6, 2025, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an indefinite prison term of eleven (11) to sixteen and a half (16.5) years, and merged count
two and the MDO specifications with count one for sentencing purposes. Appellant filed
the instant appeal.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶13} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS/MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.”
{¶14} “II. APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.”
{¶15} “III. APPELLANT'S CONVICTION'S [SIC] WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Suppress
{¶16} Appellant’s first assignment of error claims the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the cocaine evidence found during an unlawful traffic stop. We
disagree.
Standard of Review
{¶17} “Appellate review of a trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress
involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Durosko, 2020-Ohio-3133, ¶ 15, citing
State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332 (4th Dist. 1998). The trial court assumes the
role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to
evaluate witness credibility. Durosko, ¶ 15, citing State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154
(1996). A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact when
supported by competent, credible evidence. Durosko, ¶ 15, citing State v. Medcalf, 111
Ohio App.3d 142, 145 (4th Dist. 1996). The appellate court must then independently determine as a matter of law, whether the facts meet the applicable legal standard.
Durosko, ¶ 15. Here, Appellant does not dispute the facts but argues that the officer’s
traffic citation, that ultimately led to the discovery of cocaine on Appellant’s person, was
simply a muse to conduct the stop.
1. Fourth Amendment Searches and Seizures
{¶18} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54
(1979). Generally, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by
balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Id. Not every contact between a police
officer and citizen implicates the Fourth Amendment. Id. “Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restricted the liberty of a
citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” State v. Berry, 2018-Ohio-4791,
¶ 91 (citations omitted).
{¶19} Ohio law recognizes different types of police-citizen encounters: consensual
encounters, traffic stops, and formal arrests. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Berry,
¶¶ 21-22, citing State v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 747-49 (1995). Within traffic stops,
the Fifth District recognizes two types, investigatory and non-investigatory. State v.
Chambers, 2020-Ohio-1483, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.); State v. Ellis, 2020-Ohio-3910, ¶ 20 (5th
Dist.). The lawfulness of each type is governed by a different constitutional standard. Id.;
State v. Ewing, 2010-Ohio-1385, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.).
{¶20} Thus, to determine whether a traffic stop was lawful, we must determine the
“impetus” behind the stop and then determine whether the stopping officer was required
to have probable cause or reasonable and articulable suspicion. See State v. Mays, 2008- Ohio-4539. Probable cause is a stricter standard than reasonable and articulable
suspicion, meaning "[t]he former subsumes the latter." Id., citing State v. Evans, 67 Ohio
St.3d 405, 411 (1993); State v. Oliver, 2023-Ohio-1550, ¶¶ 41-46 (10th Dist.).
2. Investigative Traffic Stops – Reasonable and articulable suspicion
{¶21} An officer may perform a brief investigative traffic stop when the officer has
a “reasonable and articulable suspicion” that a crime has occurred, is occurring, or is
imminent, including a minor traffic violation. State v. Mays, 2008-Ohio-4539, syllabus;
City of Bowling Green v. Godwin, 2006-Ohio-3563, ¶ 15 (2006). The officer must have
an objective basis for suspecting the individual has engaged or is engaging in criminal
activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d
3 (1996) (reminding lower courts that whether a traffic stop violates the Fourth
Amendment requires an objective assessment of the officer's actions based on
circumstances known to the officer at the time). In essence, the officer involved “must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”. Berry, ¶ 25.
{¶22} Importantly, reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of circumstances
"viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who
must react to events as they unfold.” State v. Hairston, 2019-Ohio-1622, ¶10, quoting
State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-38 (1991). This allows officers to draw from their
experience and specialized training to make inferences from the cumulative information
available to them that may not alert an average, untrained person. State v. Reece, 2018-
Ohio-150, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.), quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002),
citing Cortez, at 417-418. And, although an officer's reliance on a mere “hunch” is
insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to probable cause for an arrest. Arvizu, at 273; Hairston, ¶ 10 (recognizing that “the reasonable-
suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable-cause standard used when
analyzing an arrest”); State v. Babcock, 2013-Ohio-2366 (6th Dist.) (stating that
reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause).
3. Non-investigatory Traffic Stops - Probable Cause
{¶23} A vehicle may be stopped when an officer witnesses a violation of the traffic
code and then stops a motorist to issue a citation for the violation. Erickson, at 11-12;
Chambers, ¶ 23; Ravenna v. Nethken, 2002-Ohio-3129, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.); Ewing, ¶ 16.
The cause for a non-investigatory traffic stop has been succinctly stated by the Supreme
Court of Ohio: “Where a police officer stops a vehicle based upon probable cause that a
traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable.” Ellis, ¶ 21.
Probable cause is defined in terms of "facts and circumstances 'sufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an
offense.'" Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975), quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,
91 (1964).
{¶24} It is well settled that traffic stops based upon an officer’s observation of a
traffic violation are constitutionally permissible, and facts sufficient for an actual
conviction on the underlying infraction is not required. State v. Reedy, 2012-Ohio-4899,
¶ 18 (5th Dist.) (stating that the issue we must resolve is whether a police officer may stop
an individual when the officer reasonably but mistakenly believes the conduct is a
violation of the traffic law), citing Erickson, supra, at 11-12; State v. Kay, 2022-0hio-
3538, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.) (“Traffic stops based upon observation of a traffic violation are
constitutionally permissible.”); Godwin, ¶ 15; State v. Garnett, 2010-Ohio-5865, ¶ 13
(10th Dist.) (holding the officer reasonably but mistakenly believed he observed a traffic violation when the appellant failed to use his turn signal); State v. Gunzenhauser, 2010
Ohio 761, ¶ 16 (5th Dist.). The validity of a non-investigatory traffic stop turns on whether
an objectively reasonable police officer would believe a violation occurred based on the
totality of the circumstances. Columbus v. Gullick, 2008-Ohio-3168, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.).
{¶25} In accordance with the above, “any traffic violation, even a de minimis
violation, may form a sufficient basis upon which to stop a vehicle.” Kay, ¶ 17. An officer's
observation of a traffic violation gives the officer not only a reasonable and articulable
suspicion to stop the vehicle, but also probable cause to make the stop. Mays, ¶¶ 23-24.
This is true “even if the officer had some ulterior motive for making the stop, such as a
suspicion that the violator was engaging in more nefarious criminal activity.” Erickson,
supra, at paragraph one of the syllabus; see also State v. Hopkins, 2021-0hio-2662, ¶ 31
(5th Dist.); Mays, syllabus (despite possible defenses, a traffic stop is constitutionally
valid when a law-enforcement officer witnesses a motorist drift over the lane markings,
even without further evidence of unsafe driving)2; Taylor, at 749; State v. Fips, 2023-
Ohio-2295, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.) (noting the officer’s traffic stop was legal because the driver
had one headlight out).
4. Probable Cause Existed to Conduct the Traffic Stop
{¶26} Here, Detective Kruger testified he witnessed the vehicle, wherein Appellant
was a passenger, make a northbound turn onto a street and go directly into the oncoming
2 In Mays, the officer pulled over an individual who left his lane of travel, a possible traffic
violation under R.C. 4511.33. The Court noted that R.C. 4511.33 requires a driver to drive a vehicle entirely within a single lane of traffic. When an officer observes a vehicle drifting back-and-forth across an edge line, the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver has violated R.C. 4511.33. Mays, at 409. That Appellant may have a possible defense was irrelevant to the analysis of whether an officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Id. lane of traffic. Because he witnessed the traffic violation, he followed the vehicle and
called for patrol officers in the area to make a traffic stop. Supp. Tr., pp. 9, 12. Detective
Kruger described the vehicle, and that Courtney Hill was the owner. Id., p. 12. Officer
Hillyer, on traffic duty that day, began to follow the sedan. Detective Kruger heard Officer
Hillyer state that he was waiting to get probable cause over the radio, so Detective Kruger
told him "he already had probable cause: that he saw an improper turn at 3rd and Arch.”
Id., p. 17. Officer Hillyer proceeded to make the stop.
{¶27} Appellant claims the stop was unlawful because the officers who conducted
it did not observe the traffic violation. However, "[u]nder the collective knowledge
doctrine, 'knowledge of law enforcement officers is imputed to other officers."' State v.
Hayes, 2025-0hio-2238, ¶ 52 (10th Dist.). The collective knowledge doctrine permits
police officers to rely on information provided by other officers to establish probable
cause or reasonable suspicion when there is reliable communication between the officer
supplying the information and the officer acting on that information. State v. Hammer,
2023-Ohio-1307 (2d Dist.), see also State v. Muldrow, 2016-0hio-4774, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.)
(holding that information communicated to a trooper by a task force following a vehicle,
creates reasonable suspicion and justification to effectuate a Terry stop); Hayes, at ¶ 45;
State v. Johnson, 2017-Ohio-5527, 92 N.E.3d 1256 (10th Dist.) (undercover officer
personally observed traffic violation and communicated information to patrol officer);
State v. Brown, 2007-0hio-464, ¶ 34 (11th Dist.) ("it is the collective knowledge of the
law-enforcement officers that allows the arresting officer to rely upon those facts to effect
an arrest").
{¶28} As such, Appellant's argument is meritless. Detective Kruger personally
witnessed the traffic violation and relayed that information to Officer Hillyer, therefore Officer Hillyer had probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop. “[E]ffective law
enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on directions and
information transmitted by one officer to another and that officers, who must often act
swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for
the transmitted information.” Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999).
Officers Anthony and Richards arrived just after Officer Hillyer had conducted the traffic
stop. Officer Anthony further confirmed that Detective Kruger requested officers to make
the traffic stop, and had witnessed the vehicle make a traffic violation after leaving a
known drug house area. Supp. Tr., p. 26. The fact that Detective Kruger mentioned that
the vehicle picked up Appellant near a known drug house does not make the stop
unlawful. A traffic stop is reasonable when it is based on probable cause, “and it is
irrelevant what else the officer knew or suspected about the traffic violator at the time of
the stop.” State v. Johnson, 2008-0hio-1169, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.).
{¶29} The trial court found Detective Kruger's testimony credible, and that it was
Detective Kruger's knowledge as the requesting officer that determined if the stop was
lawful. Thus, we conclude that probable cause existed to conduct the traffic stop. The
trial court properly overruled Appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant’s first
assignment of error is overruled.
B. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶30} In the second assignment of error, Appellant argues his convictions were
not supported by legally sufficient evidence and Appellant’s third assignment of error
claims the convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree with
Appellant and address these assignments of error together. 1. Standard of Review
{¶31} The test for sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by
constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d
89, 102 (1997), fn. 4; State v. Worley, 2021-Ohio-2207, ¶57. A sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge asks whether the evidence is “legally sufficient to support the jury
verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Lang, 2011-Ohio-4215, ¶ 219.
{¶32} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997); State v. Williams, 2003-Ohio-4396,
¶ 83. When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court as against the manifest
weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with
the fact finder's resolution of conflicting testimony. State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800;
Thompkins, at 387; Williams, ¶ 60. The reviewing court must determine whether the jury
clearly “lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice” that the conviction
cannot stand, and a new trial must be ordered. Id., quoting State v. Group, 2002-Ohio-
7247, ¶ 77 (citations omitted). Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight
of the evidence and ordering a new trial should be reserved for only the exceptional case
in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. State v. Dotson, 2017-Ohio-
5565, ¶ 1 (5th Dist.).
{¶33} In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of
the presumption in favor of the finder of fact. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21;
In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 14. “The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the [trier of fact] is best able to
view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use
these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal
Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). In determining whether a witness is
credible, the trier of fact is in the best position to consider inconsistencies in testimony,
as well as the witnesses' demeanor and manner of testifying. Dotson, ¶ 50. A defendant
is not entitled to a reversal on manifest weight grounds simply because there was
inconsistent evidence presented at trial. Id.; State v. Raver, 2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21 (10th
Dist). If the evidence is susceptible to one or more interpretations, a reviewing court must
interpret it in a manner consistent with the verdict. Dotson, ¶ 49.
{¶34} Circumstantial evidence has the same probative value as direct evidence,
and a conviction can be sustained based on circumstantial evidence alone. State v.
Mahone, 2014-Ohio-1251, ¶ 48 (10th Dist.). It is within the province of the jury to
consider the probative value of the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, and to
draw reasonable inferences from the facts and testimony in evidence. Id., ¶ 49.
{¶35} “Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts,
manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding
that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes
a finding of sufficiency.” State v. McCrary, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), citing State
v. Braxton, 2005-Ohio-2198, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.) (noting that “a determination that a
conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue
of sufficiency”) (other citation omitted); State v. Winbush, 2017-Ohio-696, ¶ 58 (2d Dist.).
As a result, a determination that a judgment is supported by the weight of the evidence
will also be dispositive of sufficiency. State v. Farra, 2022-Ohio-1421, ¶ 50 (2d Dist.). 2. Possession of Cocaine
{¶36} Appellant was convicted of first-degree felony possession of cocaine in
violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), which provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly obtain,
possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.” R.C. 2925.01(K)
defines “[p]ossess or possession” as “having control over a thing or substance, but may
not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or
occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.” Possession can
be actual or constructive. State v. Greene, 2012-Ohio-5624, ¶ 47 (5th Dist.), citing State
v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87 (1982), at syllabus.3
{¶37} Appellant argues there were no fingerprints or DNA evidence to show he
possessed the brick of cocaine. However, such evidence is not necessary to prove
possession. State v. Kelley, 2008-0hio-6598, ¶ 62 (7th Dist.). “Although forensic
evidence of the defendant's fingerprints or DNA on the bag would be direct evidence that
the defendant touched the bag,” the state can present other circumstantial evidence
“sufficient for the jury to establish that [the defendant] possessed the cocaine.” State v.
McClain, 2020-Ohio-1436, ¶ 49 (3d Dist.) See State v. Hastings, 2003-Ohio-1251 (5th
Dist.).
{¶38} Here, the evidence demonstrates that Appellant had actual and/or
constructive possession of the cocaine brick. Appellant was first seen on his bike
approaching a known drug house and was later picked up near the drug house by a female
3 Constructive possession can be established where the evidence proves “the defendant
was able to exercise dominion and control over the contraband.” Greene, ¶ 47. “Dominion and control may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone.” Id., quoting State v. Trembly, 137 Ohio App.3d 134, 141 (8th Dist.). Here, even if Appellant did not have actual possession, the evidence supports that he had constructive possession. driver. Once stopped, an officer conducted a pat down of Appellant and felt a “brick-like”
object in Appellant's hoodie. Officer Anthony described it as a “big rectangular shape
* * * I could feel plastic. Based on my training and experience of dealing with narcotics in
my career, I could feel plastic. Not a hard, but like, kind of like a softer shape, a softer
texture to it. Just a smaller brick-like object[.]” Trial Tr., p. 114. Appellant told the officer
it was his lunch.
{¶39} During the stop and while officers were distracted, Appellant took off and
ran away from the officers into a nearby alley. Upon capture, Appellant no longer had the
brick-like object in his hoodie, and his hoodie pocket was turned inside out. Once officers
canvassed the area where Appellant ran, they found a brick of cocaine tossed over a fence
that felt just like the object the officer felt in Appellant’s hoodie. The brick of cocaine was
valued at $25,000.00. The State’s circumstantial evidence of actual possession is
significant. Thus, the jury did not clearly lose its way in finding Appellant guilty of
possession of cocaine and his conviction is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Because it is not against the manifest weight, it is necessarily supported by
legally sufficient evidence.
3. Trafficking in Cocaine
{¶40} Appellant was also convicted of trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C.
2925.03(A)(2), which provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly do any of the following:
(2) Prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for distribution, or distribute a
controlled substance or a controlled substance analog, when the offender knows or has
reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance or a controlled substance analog
is intended for sale or resale by the offender or another person.” Appellant argues that the State presented no evidence that he trafficked in cocaine other than presenting the
amount of cocaine. Again, Appellant’s argument is without merit.
{¶41} The intent to distribute a controlled substance may be inferred from the
possession of a large quantity of the substance. See State v. Moon, 2009-Ohio-4830 (4th
Dist.) (“[i]ntent must often * * * be inferred from the act itself and the surrounding
circumstances.”); State v. Johnson, 2025-Ohio-1009, ¶ 42 (3d Dist.) (a jury may
reasonably infer from the State's evidence that a large quantity of cocaine were intended
for sale or distribution); State v. Crowell, 2020-Ohio-923, ¶ 10 (police officers often
testify to the nature and amount of drugs as it relates to drug trafficking).
{¶42} Kruger explained that, “people generally buy anywhere from a gram to
[what is] called a ball, which would be 3.5 grams. [That is] our typical user amount of
drugs * * * what users are typically buying to then consume themselves, and then this
came back as 249 grams of cocaine, so obviously much larger than what the typical user
would purchase.” Trial Tr., p. 148. Here, the value was worth approximately $25,000.00.
Kruger testified that users generally do not have such a large amount of cocaine on them,
which “could clearly keep somebody under the influence of cocaine for a long amount of
time." Trial Tr., p. 150. Users typically have one to 3.5 grams, but “this is a significant
amount cocaine, and it appeared at this house that we were already watching in reference
to drug trafficking.” Trial Tr., pp. 150-151. Detective Kruger further testified that the
packaging "is a telltale sign of trafficking in cocaine * * * this is not just a bag * * * it was
pressed down for the actual transport” so people can abuse it. Trial Tr., p. 147.
{¶43} The jury reached the only reasonable conclusion supported by the evidence,
which resulted in finding Appellant guilty as to both counts. There was no conflicting
evidence, and the jury determined that the State’s witnesses were credible. It is within the province of the jury to consider the probative value of the evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts and testimony in
evidence. Mahone, at ¶ 49. The jury did not clearly lose its way or create such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the convictions cannot stand. Because the conviction for
trafficking is not against the manifest weight, it is necessarily supported by legally
sufficient evidence. Accordingly, Appellant’s second and third assignments of
error are overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶44} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the
Stark County Court of Common Pleas is Affirmed.
{¶45} Costs to Appellant.
By: Montgomery, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Popham, J. concur.