[Cite as State v. Stevens, 2023-Ohio-362.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAWRENCE COUNTY
State of Ohio, : Case No. 22CA11
Plaintiff-Appellee, : DECISION AND v. : JUDGMENT ENTRY
Robert A. Stevens, :
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 2/03/2023
______________________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES:
R. Jessica Manungo, Assistant State Public Defender, Office of the Ohio Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.
Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecutor, and Steven K. Nord, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for appellee. ______________________________________________________________________ Hess, J.
{¶1} Robert A. Stevens appeals from a judgment of the Lawrence County Court
of Common Pleas convicting him, following a jury trial, of tampering with evidence in
violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). In his sole assignment of error, Stevens contends that
the trial court erred when it denied his Crim.R. 29(A) motion for judgment of acquittal
because there is insufficient evidence to support all the essential elements of that offense.
However, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the
offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we overrule the assignment of
error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 2
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} On January 27, 2021, Stevens was indicted in Case No. 20-CR-460 on one
count of aggravated possession of drugs, one count of improper handling of a firearm in
a motor vehicle, and one count of having weapons while under disability, all alleged to
have occurred on or about December 11, 2020.1 On June 1, 2021, Stevens was indicted
in Case No. 21-CR-182 on one count of tampering with evidence and one count of
escape, both alleged to have occurred on or about February 8, 2021. The trial court
consolidated the cases for purposes of trial.
{¶3} During the jury trial, Trooper Jeffrey Martin of the Ohio State Highway Patrol
testified about events underlying the indictment in Case No. 20-CR-460, i.e., a December
11, 2020 traffic stop which resulted in him arresting Stevens and charging him with
possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia, improper handling of a firearm in a motor
vehicle, and having weapons while under disability. Captain Lynn Stewart of the
Lawrence County Adult Probation Department testified about events underlying the
indictment in Case No. 21-CR-182. On December 23, 2020, Stevens secured a $15,000
“O.R.,” i.e., own recognizance bond.2 He had to wear an ankle monitor which was “a very
thick device” containing a global positioning satellite or “GPS” component to track his
location and a cell phone which the probation department could use to communicate with
him. Captain Stewart testified that when someone is released on an ankle monitor, the
probation department takes a photograph of the bottom of the monitor so it knows which
1 Some information about Case No. 20-CR-460, which is not the subject of this appeal, is taken from our decision in State v. Stevens, 4th Dist. Lawrence Nos. 21CA15, 21CA16, 2022-Ohio-2518. 2 Evidently the trial court made the decision to release Stevens on bond during his arraignment hearing in
a third case before it, Case No. 20-CR-424, involving an attempted burglary charge which the jury heard no evidence about and was later dismissed. Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 3
one it gave the individual, and the individual must sign a Participant Conditions
Agreement which sets forth conditions they must “abide by.”
{¶4} Captain Stewart testified that there are restrictions on where individuals
required to wear an ankle monitor are allowed to go but did not testify to specific
restrictions on Stevens. She also testified that Stevens had to keep the ankle monitor
charged, that the monitor “can be charged for twenty-four hour increments,” and that it
must be charged “three hours every evening.” She testified that when a monitor powers
down, it “goes into like a sleep mode. There is an internal…an internal, so much it’ll store
internally as well, but after it powers down, it has no electrical device, and then we can
no longer supervise that offender.” In addition, she testified that Stevens had to report to
the probation department in person every Monday so a “test call” could be done on the
monitor to ensure it was “charging well.”
{¶5} On Friday, February 5, 2021, Stevens came to the probation department
and submitted a “doctor’s excuse” for a recent hospital stay and a request to change his
address. He was wearing the ankle monitor at that time. A monitoring company notifies
the probation department if an individual wearing an ankle monitor is “out of area” or “if
their batteries are low.” That evening, the probation department received notice that the
ankle monitor “was not taking a charge.” Captain Stewart testified that “for some reason
[Stevens] was not able to either secure it in a good outlet, which sometimes that happens,
but it…it was…it wasn’t charging. He wasn’t charging it.” She spoke with Stevens on his
personal cell phone “many times” that evening. She told him that the battery in the ankle
monitor needed charged. Stevens “advised the device would start to turn green, but then
turn red,” and Captain Stewart “advised him to keep charge on it to see if that worked.” Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 4
She “told him that the device had an internal charge for such purposes, that he still needed
to charge it * * *.” In addition, he told her “there were bedbugs at the address change that
he had put in for earlier in the day” and asked to go back to the address he stayed at the
previous night. She gave him permission to go to his previous address and told him to
check in with the probation department on Monday. He told her that he would bring in
$100 dollars then “for two address changes.” At 10:01 p.m., the probation department
lost communication with the ankle monitor and could no longer track Stevens’s
whereabouts.
{¶6} On Monday, February 8, 2021, Stevens failed to report to the probation
department. Captain Stewart unsuccessfully tried to reach Stevens on his personal cell
phone and on his girlfriend’s phone. She also had no communications with him on the
other two phone numbers he had previously given the probation department. On
February 9, 2021, Captain Stewart made a request to revoke Stevens’s bond. A capias
or warrant was issued for his arrest. Stevens did not report for any other Monday
meetings at the probation department. He was arrested in May 2021 while not wearing
the ankle monitor. Captain Stewart did not know what happened to the device and
testified that there was an “open investigation” with respect to it.
{¶7} In Case No. 20-CR-460, the state moved to enter a nolle prosequi as to the
having weapons while under disability charge. The trial court orally granted the motion
and later memorialized that decision in an entry. The jury found Stevens guilty of
aggravated possession of drugs and improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle.
On October 18, 2021, the court issued a judgment entry sentencing Stevens on those
counts, which he appealed. Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 5
{¶8} In Case No. 21-CR-182, the trial court orally granted the state’s motion to
enter a nolle prosequi as to the escape charge but did not memorialize that decision in
an entry. The jury found Stevens guilty of tampering with evidence. On October 18, 2021,
the court issued a judgment entry sentencing Stevens for that offense, which he
appealed.
{¶9} In Lawrence App. No. 21CA15, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment in
Case No. 20-CR-460. State v. Stevens, 4th Dist. Lawrence Nos. 21CA15, 21CA16, 2022-
Ohio-2518, ¶ 1. In Lawrence App. No. 21CA16, we dismissed the appeal from the trial
court’s judgment in Case No. 21-CR-182 for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court
failed to resolve the escape charge via journal entry, so the judgment appealed from in
that case was not a final appealable order. Id. at ¶ 2. Subsequently, the trial court issued
an entry memorializing its decision to grant the state’s motion to enter a nolle prosequi on
the escape charge. This appeal followed.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶10} Stevens presents one assignment of error: “The trial court erred by denying
Mr. Stevens’ Criminal Rule 29 motion in the absence of sufficient evidence to support all
the essential elements of a tampering with evidence charge.”
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶11} In his sole assignment of error, Stevens contends that the trial court erred
when it denied his Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on the tampering with
evidence charge because there is insufficient evidence to support all the essential
elements of the offense. Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 6
{¶12} Crim.R. 29(A) provides: “The court on motion of a defendant * * * after the
evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one
or more offenses charged in the indictment * * * if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction of such offense or offenses.” “A motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is
governed by the same standard as the one for determining whether a verdict is supported
by sufficient evidence.” State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, 847
N.E.2d 386, ¶ 37. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction, “[t]he
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492
(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by constitutional amendment on other
grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), fn. 4,
and following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
{¶13} “A sufficiency assignment of error challenges the legal adequacy of the
state’s prima facie case, not its rational persuasiveness.” State v. Anderson, 4th Dist.
Highland No. 18CA14, 2019-Ohio-395, ¶ 13. “That limited review does not intrude on the
jury’s role ‘to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’ ” Musacchio v. United States,
577 U.S. 237, 243, 136 S.Ct. 709, 193 L.Ed.2d 639 (2016), quoting Jackson at 319. A
reviewing court will not overturn a conviction based on insufficient evidence “ ‘unless
reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion that the trier of fact did.’ ” State v. Cook,
4th Dist. Gallia No. 18CA11, 2019-Ohio-4745, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Bradshaw, 4th Dist.
Scioto No. 17CA3803, 2018-Ohio-1105, ¶ 15. Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 7
{¶14} R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) states: “No person, knowing that an official proceeding
or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall * * * [a]lter,
destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing, with purpose to impair its
value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation[.]” “There are three
elements of this offense: (1) the knowledge of an official proceeding or investigation in
progress or likely to be instituted, (2) the alteration, destruction, concealment, or removal
of the potential evidence, (3) the purpose of impairing the potential evidence’s availability
or value in such proceeding or investigation.” State v. Straley, 139 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-
Ohio-2139, 11 N.E.3d 1175, ¶ 11.
A. Alteration, Destruction, Concealment, or Removal
{¶15} Initially, we address the alteration, destruction, concealment, or removal of
the potential evidence element. Although the parties’ appellate briefs sometimes refer to
Stevens destroying or removing the ankle monitor, the indictment alleged that Stevens
“did alter or conceal a thing.” The trial court instructed the jury accordingly.
{¶16} R.C. 1.42 provides that words in the Ohio Revised Code “shall be read in
context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” If a
statutory term is not defined, “ ‘it should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning.’ “
State ex rel. Data Trace Information Servs., L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Fiscal Officer, 131
Ohio St.3d 255, 2012-Ohio-753, 963 N.E.2d 1288, ¶ 49, quoting Rhodes v. New
Philadelphia, 129 Ohio St.3d 304, 2011-Ohio-3279, 951 N.E.2d 782, ¶ 17. “ ‘Courts have
used dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutory
term.’ “ Denuit v. Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy, 2013-Ohio-2484, 994 N.E.2d 15, ¶ 30 (4th
Dist.), quoting State v. Jackson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-06-096, 2012-Ohio-4219, Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 8
¶ 34. Merriam-Webster defines “alter” to mean, inter alia, “to make different without
changing into something else,” and defines “conceal” to mean (1) “to prevent disclosure
or recognition of,” and (2) “to place out of sight.” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/alter and https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conceal
(accessed February 1, 2023).
{¶17} In his appellate brief, Stevens makes the statement that the state failed to
present sufficient evidence that he “concealed or destroyed potential evidence.”
However, his brief does not elaborate on this statement and instead focuses on the other
two elements of the offense. And in his reply brief, Stevens states that the state presented
insufficient evidence of “two out of the three elements” of the offense and focuses on the
knowledge and purpose elements.
{¶18} Even though Stevens appears to concede in his reply brief that the state
presented sufficient evidence that he altered and concealed the ankle monitor, we must
determine when those events occurred in order to address the next element of the
offense—whether Stevens knew an official proceeding or investigation was in progress
or about to be or likely to be instituted when he altered or concealed the ankle monitor.
The state presented evidence that the conditions of Stevens’s bond required that he wear
an ankle monitor, keep the monitor charged, not go to unapproved locations, and report
to the probation department in person every Monday for monitor testing. The state also
presented evidence that Stevens was wearing the ankle monitor on Friday, February 5,
2021, when he met with Captain Stewart, that he knew the monitor was powering down
that evening, and that the probation department lost communication with the device at
10:01 p.m. After the ankle monitor powered down, Stevens did not report to or otherwise Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 9
communicate with the probation department, and he was not wearing the device at the
time of his arrest in May 2021.
{¶19} One can reasonably infer that Stevens had to alter the monitor, i.e., make it
different in some way without changing it into something else, in order to take it off without
authorization and that he concealed the monitor, i.e., placed it out of sight, by taking it
from the location it was supposed to be—his ankle—and placing it somewhere unknown
to the probation department.3 The precise moment when this conduct occurred is
unknown. However, there is no evidence it occurred before the monitor powered down,4
and the jury could reasonably conclude that as alleged in the indictment, Stevens
engaged in this conduct on or about February 8, 2021, i.e., around the time he failed to
report to the probation department and began to flee from justice.
B. Knowledge of an Official Proceeding or Investigation
{¶20} Next, we address the knowledge of an official proceeding or investigation in
progress or likely to be instituted element. “The likelihood of an investigation is measured
at the time of the alleged tampering.” State v. Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 470, 2017-Ohio-
7556, 90 N.E.3d 857, ¶ 110.
{¶21} R.C. 2901.22(B) states:
A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a
3 The state does not appear to assert that Stevens altered or concealed the ankle monitor by failing to charge it when he had a duty to do so, and we find it unnecessary to address whether such an omission could constitute a violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) in order to resolve this appeal. 4 While one might expect the ankle monitor to have had the ability, when charged, to alert authorities to
removal attempts, Captain Stewart did not testify to that fact. Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 10
high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
{¶22} “Notably, this definition does not encompass knowledge that a reasonably
diligent person should, but does not, have. Rather, the statute requires the accused to
be aware that conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain
nature or that circumstances probably exist.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Barry, 145 Ohio
St.3d 354, 2015-Ohio-5449, 49 N.E.3d 1248, ¶ 24. Consequently, “constructive
knowledge is insufficient to prove that [an accused] knew that an investigation was
ongoing or likely to be commenced * * *.” Id. at ¶ 25. “Ohio law does not impute
constructive knowledge of an impending investigation based solely on the commission of
an offense, and therefore, the fact that an act was unmistakably a crime does not, by
itself, establish that the accused knew of an investigation into that crime or that such an
investigation was likely to be instituted.” Id. at ¶ 2. However, “knowledge of a likely
investigation may be inferred when the defendant commits a crime that is likely to be
reported.” (Emphasis sic.) Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 470, 2017-Ohio-7556, 90 N.E.3d 857,
at ¶ 118.
{¶23} Stevens maintains that there is no evidence that he had the requisite
knowledge. He asserts that “[a]t the time of the conduct resulting in the tampering with
evidence charge—February 5, 2021—[he] had been indicted for attempted burglary, drug
possession, and weapons charges, and he was out on an O.R. bond,” and “[t]he only
likely investigation or proceeding would have been into those charges.” He asserts that
there was “no other criminal activity that would have resulted in an investigation or
proceeding involving the ankle monitor and his whereabouts.” Stevens claims the ankle
monitor “was merely part of an administrative process” while he was on bond “to ensure Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 11
that he showed up to pretrial hearings and the jury trial,” and the ankle monitor data “was
not relevant to any of his criminal behavior or the charges he was facing or would likely
face.” Therefore, “it is impossible” for him “to have had knowledge of an official proceeding
or investigation in progress or likely to be instituted.” Stevens asserts that prior to
Monday, February 8, 2021, he “had not violated any bond requirements and had
remained in contact with the probation department.” He asserts that the probation
department’s loss of contact with the ankle monitor “clearly did not trigger any proceeding
or investigation” and “[r]emoving the monitor did not, by itself, establish that” he “knew an
investigation was likely to be instituted.” He “did not know and could not have known that
an investigation into the later removal or concealment of the monitor would likely be
instituted, given the last conversation he had with Captain Stewart and that the monitor
itself had powered down.”
{¶24} After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found that when Stevens altered and
concealed the ankle monitor on or about February 8, 2021, he knew that an official
proceeding or investigation was in progress or was about to be or likely to be instituted.
The state presented evidence that Stevens was arrested and charged with possession of
drugs and drug paraphernalia and weapons offenses on December 11, 2020, and he was
released on bond on December 23, 2020. The conditions of his bond included restrictions
on the locations he was allowed to go (the specifics of which are not in evidence), wearing
an ankle monitor to track his whereabouts, charging the ankle monitor each night, and
reporting to the probation department in person every Monday for monitor testing.
Stevens knew the monitor was powering down the evening of February 5, 2021, and the Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 12
probation department lost communication with it at 10:01 p.m. Although Stevens
indicated to Captain Stewart that he was trying to charge the device but unable to do so,
the Monday after the device powered down, he did not report to the probation department
to resolve the issue. He did not report for any other Monday meeting or otherwise
communicate with the probation department again, and he was not wearing the ankle
monitor at the time of his arrest in May 2021.
{¶25} Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably find that when Stevens
altered and concealed the ankle monitor, he knew that an official investigation was in
progress and that an official proceeding was likely to occur in connection with the events
of December 11, 2020. See generally R.C. 2921.01(D) (“ ‘Official proceeding’ means any
proceeding before a * * * judicial * * * agency or official authorized to take evidence under
oath * * *”). The jury could also reasonably find that when Stevens altered and concealed
the ankle monitor, he was planning to or had already failed to report to the probation
department. And the jury could reasonably find that Stevens knew his absence would be
noticed and that the probation department was likely to institute an official investigation
into his violation of the conditions of his bond requiring him to charge the ankle monitor
and report to the probation department and into his whereabouts. In reaching this
conclusion, we observe that some of Stevens’s arguments about the knowledge element
focus on whether the ankle monitor was relevant to any official proceeding or investigation
in progress or about to be or likely to be instituted. However, that is a separate issue we
will address in the next section.
C. Purpose to Impair Value or Availability as Evidence Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 13
{¶26} Finally, we address the purpose of impairing the potential evidence's
availability or value in such proceeding or investigation element. Here, the indictment
alleged that Stevens acted with purpose to impair a thing’s availability as evidence, not
its value. The trial court instructed the jury accordingly.
{¶27} “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause
a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain
nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s
specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “ ‘The intent of
an accused person dwells in his mind’ ” and “ ‘can never be proved by the direct testimony
of a third person.’ ” State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 38, 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978),
quoting State v. Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27, 1 N.E.2d 313 (1936), paragraph four of the
syllabus. “ ‘It must be gathered from the surrounding facts and circumstances under
proper instructions from the court.’ ” Id., quoting Huffman at paragraph four of the
syllabus. For the “purpose” element to be met, “the act that constitutes tampering must
be a separate act from those that make up the crime itself.” State v. Crocker, 2015-Ohio-
2528, 38 N.E.3d 369, ¶ 37 (4th Dist.)
{¶28} R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) “requires proof that the defendant intended to impair the
value or availability of evidence that related to an existing or likely official investigation or
proceeding.” Straley, 139 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-Ohio-2139, 11 N.E.3d 1175, at syllabus.
“[T]he evidence tampered with must have some relevance to an ongoing or likely
investigation to support a tampering charge.” Id. at ¶ 16. Relevant evidence is “[e]vidence
tending to prove or disprove a matter in issue.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed.2019).
See generally Evid.R. 401 (for purposes of the Ohio Rules of Evidence, defining relevant Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 14
evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence”). Direct or circumstantial evidence can be used to prove
an item’s relevance. See Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 470, 2017-Ohio-7556, 90 N.E.3d 857,
at ¶ 112-114.
{¶29} Stevens maintains that the “ankle monitor was not itself evidence relevant
to an ongoing or likely investigation.” He asserts that the “sole purpose of the ankle
monitor was to provide real-time GPS data about [his] precise location.” This data was
“uploaded from the GPS unit to a computer system managed and monitored by a
company that reported to the probation department,” which “means the probation
department possessed the stored data about [his] historical movements.” Stevens
asserts that there is no evidence that he “tampered with the data that had previously been
generated” by the ankle monitor and even if he had, that data “would not be relevant to
an ongoing or likely investigation or proceeding.” According to Stevens, “[a]lthough a
GPS monitor could be used to locate [him] and determine his whereabouts at any given
time,” “the monitor itself and the data it produces are not evidence of a crime,” so the
“removal or alteration” of the monitor “cannot constitute tampering with evidence.”
{¶30} Stevens also maintains that there is no evidence that he took the ankle
monitor off with the purpose of impairing its value or availability as evidence in an
investigation or proceeding. Stevens asserts that “[w]hile his removal of the ankle monitor
coincided with his failure to appear, it was not done to impair the monitor’s value or
availability as evidence in an investigation” because the “monitor and the data associated
with it were not evidence of a crime that would be used in a criminal investigation or Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 15
proceeding.” Stevens asserts that “as Captain Stewart acknowledged during trial, at the
likely time of its removal, the ankle monitor could not sustain a charge and had powered
down.” “[T]he ankle monitor itself could not have been of any evidentiary value to the
probation department or the court if the device was not charged, and so its removal or
destruction did not impair its value.” And his “purpose could not have been to impair the
value of a nonworking device or a device that was no longer transmitting anything.”
Stevens further asserts that “the act that the state has labeled ‘tampering’ was not a
separate act from those that make up a crime” and that the state “most likely conflated
tampering with or alteration of the monitor with tampering with evidence.” According to
Stevens, most tampering cases “involve an act in which a person alters, destroys,
conceals, or removes evidence with the intent of interfering with an investigation or
proceeding,” and typically “the defendant intends to cover up a crime.” But here, “the
monitor and its associated data at the time the monitor was removed would not have been
evidence supporting a conviction.” Stevens asserts that removing the monitor “may have
itself been a crime of criminal damaging or a bond violation,” but he ”did not tamper with
evidence that would be relevant to any criminal inquiries that were taking place or would
take place.”
{¶31} The ankle monitor had no relevance to the official investigation and likely
official proceeding regarding the events of December 11, 2020. However, the ankle
monitor did have relevance to the likely official investigation into the bond violation for
failing to charge the ankle monitor. If the probation department had recovered the device,
it could have been tested to determine whether it was capable of being charged. If it was,
that would tend to prove that Stevens intentionally failed to charge the device in violation Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 16
of the conditions of his bond. In addition, even though there is no evidence that the ankle
monitor was working when Stevens took it off or that Stevens thought it might be, the
device still had relevance to the likely investigation into his whereabouts. If Stevens had
continued to wear the “very thick” device on his ankle, the device would have drawn
attention to him. The device would have alerted third parties to the fact that he was an
individual subject to supervision, would have aroused suspicions if he was at a location
one would not expect such an individual to be allowed, and could have been compared
to the probation department’s photograph of the device assigned to him. Thus, the ankle
monitor could have been used to spot him, prove his identity, and thereby prove his
{¶32} Making the ankle monitor unavailable for purposes of a bond violation
investigation for failure to charge the device may not have been at the forefront of
Stevens’s mind when he altered and concealed it. At that time he would have been fleeing
from justice—not trying to avoid revocation of his bond. However, the jury could
reasonably conclude Stevens altered and concealed the ankle monitor with purpose to
impair its availability as evidence in the likely investigation into his whereabouts.
D. Conclusion
{¶33} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the state presented sufficient
evidence to support the conviction for tampering with evidence in violation of R.C.
2921.12(A)(1). Therefore, the trial court did not err when it overruled the Crim.R. 29
motion for judgment of acquittal regarding that offense. We overrule the sole assignment
of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Lawrence App. No. 22CA11 17
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________ Michael D. Hess, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.