State v. Stephens

Ohio Court of Appeals

State v. Stephens

387 N.E.2d 252, 57 Ohio App. 2d 229, 11 Ohio Op. 3d 301, 1978 Ohio App. LEXIS 7562

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedJuly 26, 1978

DocketC-77640

StatusPublished

Cited by25 cases

This text of 387 N.E.2d 252 (State v. Stephens) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Stephens, 387 N.E.2d 252, 57 Ohio App. 2d 229, 11 Ohio Op. 3d 301, 1978 Ohio App. LEXIS 7562 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from appellant’s conviction for a violation of R. C. 2921.31(A) which provides:

“No person, without privilege to do so and with, purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within his official capacity, shall do any act which hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of his lawful duties.” (Emphasis added.)

Appellant assigns as error that her conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support thereof she argues that the record is devoid of any evidence that any act of hers in fact impeded or hampered the police in the performance of their duties. We agree.

The relevant facts are that several police officers saw a vehicle belonging to one John Hannah, for whom they had several outstanding traffic warrants, parked in front of appellant’s house and walked up the steps to the front porch of the house. In the words of the arresting officer the following then transpired:

“At that time we asked if we could speak to John Han *230 nah, we had a warrant for him and Miss Stephens (appellant) said she didn’t know him, she had never seen him before. However, at the time when I stopped Mr. Hannah for the delinquent tags, Miss Stephens was in the auto.

“At that time Patrolman Johnson advised me'over the radio that he saw John Hannah in the basement — He stated that he saw John Hannah hiding in the basement and at that time we went in and arrested him.”

This sequence of events was confirmed by a second officer.

We concur with the committee comment on the statute that to sustain a conviction the act must in fact “hamper” or “impede” the official in the performance of his lawful duties. Webster’s New International Dictionary (1959) states that the word “hamper” comes from Middle English— hampren: to come to a standstill. The definition given is to put a hamper or fetter on; to shackle; entangle; hence, to impede; embarrass; encumber. “Impede” comes from the Latin — impediré: to entangle the feet. Its definition is to stop in progress; to obstruct; hinder. Both of these definitions make clear that there must be some substantial stoppage of the officer’s progress before one can say he was hampered or impeded. There was none here. Whatever appellant said * in no way interrupted the officers’ progress toward their objective. The assignment of error is well taken'. The judgment is reversed and the appellant is discharged.

Judgment reversed.

Bettman, P. J., Castle and Black, JJ., concur.

*

There may be serious question whether appellant’s oral statement, assuming .it to. be false, constitutes a violation of law in view of the decision of the. Ohio Supreme Court in Columbus v. Fisher (1978), 53 Ohio, St. 2d 25. In a per curiam opinion interpreting R. C. 2921.-13(A)(3) — Falsification—the court stated:

“We" do not believe that either the municipal - or state law-making bodies * * * ever intended to make the utterance of unsworn oral misstatements, ;in. response to inquiries initiated by law enforcement officials, punishable conduct.” (Page 29.)

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Per Curiam.

This is an appeal from appellant’s conviction for a violation of R. C. 2921.31(A) which provides:

“No person, without privilege to do so and with, purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within his official capacity, shall do any act which hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of his lawful duties.” (Emphasis added.)

Appellant assigns as error that her conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support thereof she argues that the record is devoid of any evidence that any act of hers in fact impeded or hampered the police in the performance of their duties. We agree.

The relevant facts are that several police officers saw a vehicle belonging to one John Hannah, for whom they had several outstanding traffic warrants, parked in front of appellant’s house and walked up the steps to the front porch of the house. In the words of the arresting officer the following then transpired:

“At that time we asked if we could speak to John Han *230 nah, we had a warrant for him and Miss Stephens (appellant) said she didn’t know him, she had never seen him before. However, at the time when I stopped Mr. Hannah for the delinquent tags, Miss Stephens was in the auto.

“At that time Patrolman Johnson advised me'over the radio that he saw John Hannah in the basement — He stated that he saw John Hannah hiding in the basement and at that time we went in and arrested him.”

This sequence of events was confirmed by a second officer.

We concur with the committee comment on the statute that to sustain a conviction the act must in fact “hamper” or “impede” the official in the performance of his lawful duties. Webster’s New International Dictionary (1959) states that the word “hamper” comes from Middle English— hampren: to come to a standstill. The definition given is to put a hamper or fetter on; to shackle; entangle; hence, to impede; embarrass; encumber. “Impede” comes from the Latin — impediré: to entangle the feet. Its definition is to stop in progress; to obstruct; hinder. Both of these definitions make clear that there must be some substantial stoppage of the officer’s progress before one can say he was hampered or impeded. There was none here. Whatever appellant said * in no way interrupted the officers’ progress toward their objective. The assignment of error is well taken'. The judgment is reversed and the appellant is discharged.

Judgment reversed.

Bettman, P. J., Castle and Black, JJ., concur.

*

There may be serious question whether appellant’s oral statement, assuming .it to. be false, constitutes a violation of law in view of the decision of the. Ohio Supreme Court in Columbus v. Fisher (1978), 53 Ohio, St. 2d 25. In a per curiam opinion interpreting R. C. 2921.-13(A)(3) — Falsification—the court stated:

“We" do not believe that either the municipal - or state law-making bodies * * * ever intended to make the utterance of unsworn oral misstatements, ;in. response to inquiries initiated by law enforcement officials, punishable conduct.” (Page 29.)

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387 N.E.2d 252, 57 Ohio App. 2d 229, 11 Ohio Op. 3d 301, 1978 Ohio App. LEXIS 7562, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-stephens-ohioctapp-1978.

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