State v. Steele-Ponds

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kansas
• Decided: July 18, 2025
• Docket: 128246
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 128,246

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,

v.

SHARRONE DONTREZ STEELE-PONDS, Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; TYLER ROUSH, judge. Opinion filed July 18, 2025. Affirmed.

Submitted by the parties for summary disposition under K.S.A. 21-6820(g) and (h).

Before WARNER, C.J., BRUNS and BOLTON FLEMING, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Sharrone Dontrez Steele-Ponds appeals the district court's use of his prior conviction for aggravated robbery to increase his criminal history score from D to B. This court granted Steele-Ponds' request for summary disposition of his appeal under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 48). Finding no error, we affirm.

In January 2024, Steele-Ponds pled guilty to distribution of a controlled substance, a severity level 3 felony, and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, severity level 8 felonies. Steele-Ponds' amended presentence investigation (PSI) report indicated he had a criminal history score of B due to his prior criminal convictions, including a 2017 conviction for aggravated robbery. 1 At Steel-Ponds' sentencing hearing, his attorney informed the district court that she had reviewed his amended PSI report and did not object to his criminal history score of B. Steele-Ponds also confirmed to the district court that his prior convictions were correct in the amended PSI report. The district court heard the parties' recommendations for sentencing and Steele-Ponds' motion for a dispositional departure.

For reasons irrelevant to this appeal, the district court denied Steel-Ponds' request for a departure and ordered the aggravated sentences from the sentencing grid box for each crime. The district court established Count 1, distribution of a controlled substance, as the primary count used to establish the base sentence. Applying a criminal history score of B for Count 1, the district court sentenced Steele-Ponds to 77 months in the Kansas Department of Corrections. For each of the two remaining counts (criminal possession of a weapon by a convicted felon), the district court applied a criminal history score of I and sentenced Steele-Ponds to 9 months on each count in the Kansas Department of Corrections. The district court then ordered each sentence to be served consecutively for a total 95-month underlying sentence in the case. The district court also ordered 25 days of jail credit.

On appeal, Steele-Ponds contends the district court illegally sentenced him based on an improper criminal history score. Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Mitchell, 315 Kan. 156, 158, 505 P.3d 739 (2022). An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time. See K.S.A. 22- 3504(a).

Steele-Ponds maintains this court should vacate his sentence and remand with directions for him to be resentenced based on the correct criminal history score. Because Steele-Ponds did not object to his criminal history score at his sentencing, he bears the burden of establishing prejudicial error. See K.S.A. 21-6814(d).

2 When determining a defendant's criminal history score, all prior convictions must be counted unless the convictions constitute an element of the present crime, enhance the severity level, or elevate the classification from a misdemeanor to a felony. K.S.A. 21- 6810(d)(10). Under this statute, Steele-Ponds argues that his prior aggravated robbery conviction constitutes an element of two present crimes: his convictions for criminal possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Steele-Ponds concludes that by using his prior conviction for aggravated robbery to increase his criminal history score from D to B, the district court's sentence did not comply with the provisions of K.S.A. 21- 6810(d)(10).

Steele-Ponds' argument fails because this is a multiple-conviction case. In multiple-conviction cases, the phrase "present crime of conviction" in K.S.A. 21- 6810(d)(10) refers to the primary crime of conviction that establishes the base sentence. State v. Fowler, 311 Kan. 136, 150-52, 457 P.3d 927 (2020). Here, Steele-Ponds does not dispute that his primary crime of conviction was distribution of a controlled substance under K.S.A. 21-5705(a)(1), (d)(4)(B). The district court correctly applied a criminal history score of B to Steele-Ponds' primary crime of conviction, and a criminal history score of I to his remaining convictions. See K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 21-6819; Fowler, 311 Kan. at 143 (criminal history score of I used to determine nonbase sentences). Steele- Ponds' sentences for criminal possession of a weapon by a convicted felon were therefore unaffected by his 2017 aggravated robbery conviction, and Steele-Ponds makes no argument that the aggravated robbery conviction was an element of his distribution conviction. Thus, Steele-Ponds has not met his burden to demonstrate how the district court's sentence failed to comply with the statutory requirements of K.S.A. 21- 6810(d)(10).

Affirmed.