State v. Stade

683 A.2d 164, 1996 Me. LEXIS 197

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: August 16, 1996
• Status: Published

Opinions

CLIFFORD, Justice.

Pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A(1) (1980),¹ the State appeals from an order entered in the District Court (Dover-Fox-croft, Field, J.) granting defendant Harold Stade’s motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol test in the State’s prosecution of Stade for operating an automobile while under the influence of alcohol. 29-A M.R.S.A § 2411(1) (1996) (Class D). The State contends that the court erred when, after initially denying Stade’s motion to suppress, it reversed itself and granted the motion. We disagree and affirm the order.

On April 1, 1995, Stade was arrested in Greenville by Officer William Chandler for operating his automobile while under the influence of alcohol.² Stade told Chandler, who is a friend of Stade’s, that he could not afford to lose his driver’s license because he depended on it for employment purposes. Chandler assured Stade that he should not worry about this because he could obtain a driver’s license for work purposes from the Secretary of State. Stade submitted to a blood-alcohol test that revealed a blood-alcohol content of .15%. Chandler did not read Stade the implied consent information prior to administering the test. 29-A M.R.S.A § 2521(3) (1996).

Following the entry of his plea of not guilty, Stade filed a request for a jury trial and a motion to suppress the evidence derived from the blood-alcohol test. The court denied the motion on June 5,1995, the day of the hearing. On June 7, the court requested that the case file be sent to it for further review. On August 7, without further hearing, the court reversed itself and granted Stade’s motion to suppress. It is from that order that the State appeals.³

We will not disturb the District Court’s decision unless we find errors of law or clearly erroneous findings of fact. State v. Arnheiter, 598 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Me.1991). A ruling on a motion to suppress evidence based on uncontroverted facts involves a legal conclusion that we review independently on appeal. State v. Dube, 655 A.2d 338, 340 (Me.1995); State v. Cloutier, 544 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Me.1988).

The State contends that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its original order denying Stade’s motion to suppress because the court already had made a ruling on the motion to suppress and Stade had requested a jury trial. We are unpersuaded by this contention.

M.R.Crim.P. 22(c) provides in part:

Time of Transfer. When the ease is in order for transfer to the Superior Court, the Clerk shall transmit to the Superior Court the District Court’s entire original file in the case and any bail that has been taken. A case is in order for transfer when the time period for making pretrial motions has expired and judicial action has been completed on all pretrial matters ....

(Emphasis added.)

The District Court had continuing jurisdiction over the case until the case was transferred to the Superior Court. State v. Hayford, 412 A.2d 987, 990 (Me.1980). The original order was not a final judgment and the court was within its discretion to reconsider it. Id. Because the file was in the hands of the District Court, and because not all pretrial motions had been finally resolved, the case was not ready for transfer to the Superior Court. Accordingly, Rule 22(c) did not mandate that the clerk transmit the file to the Superior Court.

The State also contends that the court erred in granting the motion to suppress the evidence of Stade’s blood-alcohol test results because the officer’s actions did not deprive Stade of any statutory or constitutional right. The State is correct that the statute governing the administration of blood-alcohol tests does not in and of itself require exclusion of the test results. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2521(3) requires that before a blood-alcohol test is administered to a person suspected of operating under the influence, the law enforcement officer must inform the person of the consequences of the failure to submit to and complete a test. Section 2521(4), however, provides that the failure of an officer to comply with the notice requirements does not necessarily preclude the admissibility of the test results, provided those results are reliable. See State v. Baker, 502 A.2d 489, 494-95 (Me.1985). Not complying with the implied consent statute, however, was not the only failure of the police officer in this case. The officer, a friend of Stade’s, made affirmative representations to Stade about Stade’s ability to drive to and from work that had an impact on Stade’s decision to submit to the blood-alcohol test. In granting the motion to suppress, the court relied on the fundamental fairness and due process factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

“The Due Process Clause of the Constitution prohibits deprivations of life, liberty, or property without ‘fundamental fairness’ through governmental conduct that offends the community’s sense of justice, decency and fair play.” Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432-34, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-48, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). In determining whether state action violates the due process clause, a court considers: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the government’s action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such an interest through the existing procedure and the probable utility of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest in adhering to the existing procedure, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional procedures might entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903.

The above factors weigh heavily in Stade’s favor. Stade’s loss of his driver’s license is a property interest⁴ worthy of due process protection. State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Me.1995), and as the court determined, the officer’s providing Stade with false information, coupled with the officer’s failure to read the implied consent form, was fundamentally unfair to Stade. Moreover, there is a strong due process justification for requiring law enforcement officials to inform drivers of implied consent information and to refrain from giving drivers assurances that minimize the seriousness of a subsequent loss of license privileges. Maine’s implied consent procedures may, in certain cases such as this, present a substantial risk of an erroneous deprivation of a protected due process interest. Roberts, 48 F.3d at 1294 (allowing defendant to call attorney likely to alleviate risk of deprivation of liberty interest). Finally, although the State’s interest in preventing drunk drivers from operating on our highways is great, the State has no legitimate interest in allowing its law enforcement officers both to ignore the statutory requirements of the implied consent law and to affirmatively mislead citizens about the consequences of taking or failing to take a blood-alcohol test. We agree with the court’s conclusion that the admission of the blood-alcohol test in the circumstances of this case would be fundamentally unfair and, accordingly, we affirm the order of the District Court.

The entry is:

Order affirmed.

1 .15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A(1) (1980) provides that prior to a trial appeals may be taken by the State from the District Court on questions of law in criminal cases. Such appeals are taken directly to this Court.

2 . Stade concedes that probable cause for his arrest existed at the time of the incident.

3 . The State obtained the necessary approval of the Attorney Generally prior to filing this appeal. 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115 — A(5) (Supp.1995).

4 . Although characterized by the trial court in its suppression order as a liberty interest, State’s driver's license is more properly viewed as a property interest See, eg., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 & n. 7, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2617 & n. 7, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979).