IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA23-9
Filed 16 January 2024
Mecklenburg County, Nos. 21 CRS 215042-43, 45
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ANTONIO DEMONT SPRINGS
Appeal by State from Order rendered 23 August 2022 by Judge Jesse B.
Caldwell, IV in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
23 August 2023.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Caden W. Hayes, for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Michele A. Goldman, for Defendant.
HAMPSON, Judge.
Factual and Procedural Background
The State appeals from an orally rendered Order granting a Motion to
Suppress filed by Antonio Demont Springs (Defendant) and suppressing evidence
seized during a traffic stop. The Record before us tends to reflect the following:
On 17 May 2021, an Officer with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police
Department initiated a stop of Defendant’s vehicle on suspicion of a fictitious tag.
When the Officer pulled over Defendant and approached the car, he observed STATE V. SPRINGS
Opinion of the Court
Defendant “fumbling through to get some paperwork” with his hands “shaking,” and
noted Defendant appeared “very nervous.” Defendant was the only person in the car.
Defendant gave the Officer his identification card and the car’s paperwork. The
Officer determined the car was not stolen, but Defendant was driving on a revoked
license. The Officer returned to Defendant’s vehicle and asked him “about the odor
of marijuana in the vehicle.” Defendant denied smoking marijuana in the car,
prompting the following exchange:
Officer: You didn’t have a blunt earlier or anything?
Defendant: No. I just got the car from my homeboy. That’s probably why.
Officer: Is that why it smells like weed in here?
Defendant: Yeah—
Officer: —because he might have smoked a blunt or something earlier?
Defendant: Yeah.
The Officer then asked Defendant to get out of the car. Defendant did so and took
some belongings with him, including a cellphone, cigarettes, and a Crown Royal bag.
The Officer took Defendant’s items and put them in the driver’s seat of the car to pat
down Defendant for weapons. After the search and finding no weapons, the Officer
returned Defendant’s cellphone and cigarettes, but opened and searched the Crown
Royal bag. In the bag, the Officer found a digital scale, a green leafy substance, two
baggies of white powder, and “numerous baggies of colorful pills[.]”
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On 24 May 2021, Defendant was subsequently indicted for Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, Trafficking in Drugs, and Possession with Intent to Sell or Deliver a
Controlled Substance based on this evidence. On 17 August 2022, Defendant filed a
Motion to Suppress the evidence from the Crown Royal bag, arguing the Officer
lacked probable cause to search the car, and consequently, lacked probable cause to
search the bag.
Specifically, at the hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Suppress on 23 August
2022, Defendant contended that because hemp, which Defendant argued is
indistinguishable from marijuana in odor and appearance, is legal in North Carolina,
the odor of marijuana alone was no longer sufficient to establish probable cause for
the ensuing searches. The State argued that binding precedent in this state holds
that marijuana odor alone per se supports a finding of probable cause to support a
search. Further, the State asserted even presuming odor alone was insufficient, the
Officer had additional evidence supporting probable cause, including Defendant’s
“fidgety” behavior, the fact Defendant was driving with a fictitious tag and without a
valid license, and Defendant’s agreement marijuana may have been smoked in the
car earlier, which the trial court characterized as “an acknowledgment, if not an
admission” marijuana had been smoked in the car.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally granted Defendant’s
Motion. In rendering its ruling, the trial court stated: “So I think that the standards
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set forth in Parker1 which is abbreviated odor plus is certainly the appropriate
standard to use here.” The trial court acknowledged “the odor of something that could
be marijuana but might be CBD or hemp or a legal hemp-related product is certainly
an issue or a consideration for law enforcement to make note of when evaluating or
trying to reach probable cause.” The trial court further acknowledged, “[a]nd in this
circumstance arguably there were additional factors to consider” including the traffic
violations and the acknowledgment “that weed, bud, the colloquial for marijuana, was
smoked in the vehicle previously.” The trial court, however, concluded: “I just think
in the totality here and given the new world that we live in, that odor plus is the
standard and we didn’t get the plus here. There was no probable cause.”
The State filed written Notice of Appeal on 29 August 2022. The Notice of
Appeal, however, stated the appeal was from an order “grant[ing] the defendant’s
motion to dismiss[.]” Two days later, on 31 August 2022, the State filed a
Certification, certifying that the appeal was not taken for the purpose of delay and
that the evidence suppressed is essential to the case.
Appellate Jurisdiction
The parties do not address appellate jurisdiction in their briefing to this Court.
However, the State’s Notice of Appeal, the later Certification of its interlocutory
appeal, failure to include a Statement of Grounds for Appellate Review in its brief,
1 State v. Parker, 277 N.C. App. 531, 860 S.E.2d 21, appeal dismissed, review denied, 860 S.E.2d 917
(2021).
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failure to address our authority to review an orally-rendered order granting a Motion
to Suppress, and overall failure to provide this Court with any jurisdictional basis to
review this matter requires this Court examine the basis for our appellate
jurisdiction. See State v. Webber, 190 N.C. App. 649, 650, 660 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2008)
(“It is well-established that the issue of a court’s jurisdiction over a matter may be
raised at any time, even . . . by a court sua sponte.”).
First, “when a [party] has not properly given notice of appeal, this Court is
without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” State v. McCoy, 171 N.C. App. 636, 638, 615
S.E.2d 319, 320 (2005). Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure
sets out the requirements for a notice of appeal in criminal cases. See N.C.R. App. P.
4 (2023). Relevant to this case, Rule 4(b) provides the requisite contents of a written
notice of appeal:
The notice of appeal required to be filed and served . . . shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order from which appeal is taken and the court to which appeal is taken; and shall be signed by counsel of record for the party or parties taking the appeal, or by any such party not represented by counsel of record.
N.C.R. App. P 4(b) (emphasis added). “Our Supreme Court has said that a
jurisdictional default, such as a failure to comply with Rule 4, ‘precludes the appellate
court from acting in any manner other than to dismiss the appeal.’ ” State v.
Hammonds, 218 N.C. App. 158, 162, 720 S.E.2d 820, 823 (2012) (quoting Dogwood
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Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 197, 657 S.E.2d 361, 365
(2008)).
Here, the State’s Notice of Appeal indicates it is from an order granting “the
defendant’s motion to dismiss[.]” No such order appears in the Record. Rather, the
State’s arguments focus entirely on the grant of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. We
acknowledge, however, “ ‘a mistake in designating the judgment . . . should not result
in loss of the appeal as long as the intent to appeal from a specific judgment can be
fairly inferred from the notice and the appeal is not misled by the mistake[.]’ ”
Stephenson v. Bartlett, 177 N.C. App. 239, 241, 628 S.E.2d 442, 443 (2006) (quoting
Von Ramm v. Von Ramm, 99 N.C. App. 153, 156-57, 392 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1990)).
Our Court has observed that granting a motion to suppress—even of evidence
which is essential to the State’s case—is not synonymous with dismissal of the case.
See State v. Romano, 268 N.C. App. 440, 447, 836 S.E.2d 760, 768 (2019) (affirming
denial of a motion to dismiss at trial because “[e]ven though this Court and our
Supreme Court agreed the trial court properly suppressed the evidence, that did not
impede the State from proceeding to trial without the suppressed evidence since our
appellate courts’ decisions on the motion to suppress were made prior to trial.”); see
also State v. Fowler, 197 N.C. App. 1, 28-29, 676 S.E.2d 523, 545 (2009) (“A trial
court’s decision to grant a pretrial motion to suppress evidence ‘does not mandate a
pretrial dismissal of the underlying indictments’ because ‘[t]he district attorney may
elect to dismiss or proceed to trial without the suppressed evidence and attempt to
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establish a prima facie case.’ ” (quoting State v. Edwards, 185 N.C. App. 701, 706, 649
S.E.2d 646, 650 (2007))).
Indeed, this highlights a second jurisdictional issue: the State’s appeal is from
an interlocutory order. See Romano, 268 N.C. App. at 445, 836 S.E.2d at 767 (an
order granting a motion to suppress is an interlocutory—not final—decision). N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(c) provides the State a statutory right of appeal from an Order
denying a motion to suppress prior to trial “upon certificate by the prosecutor to the
judge who granted the motion that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay
and that the evidence is essential to the case.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(c) (2021).
This Court has recognized Section 15A-979(c) “not only requires the State to raise its
right to appeal according to the statutory mandate, but also places the burden on the
State to demonstrate that it had done so.” State v. Dobson, 51 N.C. App. 445, 447,
276 S.E.2d 480, 482 (1981). Similarly, Rule 28(b)(4) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires: “An appellant’s brief shall contain . . . [a] statement of the
grounds for appellate review. Such statement shall include citation of the statute or
statutes permitting appellate review.” N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4) (2023).
Crucially, “when an appeal is interlocutory, Rule 28(b)(4) is not a
‘nonjurisdictional’ rule. Rather, the only way an appellant may establish appellate
jurisdiction in an interlocutory case . . . is by showing grounds for appellate review[.]”
Larsen v. Black Diamond French Truffles, Inc., 241 N.C. App. 74, 77-78, 772 S.E.2d
93, 96 (2015) (emphasis in original); see also Coates v. Durham Cnty., 266 N.C. App.
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271, 273-74, 831 S.E.2d 392, 394 (2019) (“Our Court has noted that in the context of
interlocutory appeals, a violation of Rule 28(b)(4) is jurisdictional and requires
dismissal.”). This burden rests solely with the appellant. Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks
Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994).
Here, in violation of N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4), the State wholly failed to include
any statement of grounds for appellate review. The State’s brief offers no discussion
of its defective Notice of Appeal or the timeliness of its subsequently filed
Certification of the appeal. Nowhere in briefing does the State cite to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-979 as statutory support for its interlocutory appeal. Moreover, the State’s
appeal is from an orally rendered Order granting a Motion to Dismiss without written
findings of fact or conclusions of law. The State, however, offers no basis or rationale
for our ability to review the orally rendered Order in this circumstance. The State’s
failure to comply with Rule 4 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure combined with its
failure to comply with Rule 28(b)(4) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure constitutes a
jurisdictional defect in the appeal depriving this Court of appellate jurisdiction
requiring dismissal of the appeal.
Nevertheless, even assuming the shortcomings in the State’s appeal and
briefing do not rise to the level of jurisdictional defects, they still constitute
substantial violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure impairing and frustrating
this Court’s ability to review the merits. See Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 201, 657 S.E.2d
at 367. Here, the defects in the appeal—at a minimum—raise substantial
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jurisdictional questions, which the State, as the appellant, fails to address before this
Court. This not only hampers our ability to judicially review this matter efficiently
and effectively but also frustrates the appellate adversarial process by not squarely
raising these issues to be briefed or addressed by Defendant. The State has also not
taken steps to recognize or remedy these defects, such as petitioning for certiorari.
Mindful of the admonishment “it is not the role of this Court to create an appeal
for an appellant or to supplement an appellant’s brief with legal authority or
arguments not contained therein[,]” Thompson v. Bass, 261 N.C. App. 285, 292, 819
S.E.2d 621, 627 (2018), we conclude the State’s violations of the appellate rules are
substantial enough to potentially warrant dismissal of its interlocutory appeal.
Thus, the State’s violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure constitute
either jurisdictional defects in the appeal mandating dismissal or substantial non-
jurisdictional violations of the appellate rules justifying dismissal of the appeal on
the basis that the State has failed to demonstrate appellate jurisdiction in this Court.
Therefore, the State—as the appellant—has failed to meet its burden of establishing
appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.
Nevertheless, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c), “[t]he Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction . . . to issue the prerogative writs, including . . . certiorari . . . in aid of its
own jurisdiction[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c) (2021). The decision to issue a writ is
governed by statute and by common law. See State v. Killette, 381 N.C. 686, 691, 873
S.E.2d 317, 320 (2022). “Our precedent establishes a two-factor test to assess
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whether certiorari review by an appellate court is appropriate. First, a writ of
certiorari should issue only if the petitioner can show ‘merit or that error was
probably committed below.’ ” Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCA of the United States,
384 N.C. 569, 572, 887 S.E.2d 848, 851 (2023). Second, a writ of certiorari should
only issue if there are extraordinary circumstances to justify it. Moore v. Moody, 304
N.C. 719, 720, 285 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1982). “There is no fixed list of ‘extraordinary
circumstances’ that warrant certiorari review, but this factor generally requires a
showing of substantial harm, considerable waste of judicial resources, or ‘wide-
reaching issues of justice and liberty at stake.’ ” Cryan, 384 N.C. at 573, 887 S.E.2d
at 851 (quoting Doe v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. App. 10, 23, 848 S.E.2d 1, 11 (2020)).
Here, despite its defects, we conclude the State’s appeal raises sufficient merit
to consider issuance of the writ of certiorari. Moreover, given the posture of the case,
judicial economy and efficient use of judicial resources weighs in favor of exercising
our discretion to issue the writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c).
However, given the substantial and gross violations of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, we tax the costs of this appeal to the State as a sanction pursuant to
N.C.R. App. P. 34(b)(2)(a).
Issue
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress on the basis the Officer did not have probable cause
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to conduct a warrantless search under the totality of the circumstances,
notwithstanding the Officer detecting the odor of marijuana.
Analysis
In reviewing a trial court’s determination on a motion to suppress, the trial
court’s findings of fact “are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent
evidence[.]” State v. O’Connor, 222 N.C. App. 235, 238, 730 S.E.2d 248, 251 (2012)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). “A trial court’s conclusions of law on a motion
to suppress are reviewed de novo and are subject to a full review, under which this
Court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of
the trial court.” State v. Ashworth, 248 N.C. App. 649, 658, 790 S.E.2d 173, 179-80
(2016).
Generally, a warrant is required for every search and seizure. State v. Trull,
153 N.C. App. 630, 638, 571 S.E.2d 592, 598 (2002) (citation omitted). However, “[i]t
is a well-established rule that a search warrant is not required before a lawful search
based on probable cause of a motor vehicle . . . in a public vehicular area may take
place.” State v. Downing, 169 N.C. App. 790, 795, 613 S.E.2d 35, 39 (2005) (citations
omitted). Thus, “[a]n officer may search an automobile without a warrant if he has
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband.” State v. Poczontek, 90
N.C. App. 455, 457, 368 S.E.2d 659, 660-61 (1988) (citation omitted). “A court
determines whether probable cause exists under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, Section 20, of the Constitution of North Carolina with a
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totality-of-the-circumstances test.” State v. Caddell, 267 N.C. App. 426, 433, 833
S.E.2d 400, 406 (2019).
“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies
the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of
the search.” State v. Mitchell, 224 N.C. App. 171, 175, 735 S.E.2d 438, 441 (2012)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). “An officer has probable cause to believe that
contraband is concealed within a vehicle when given all the circumstances known to
him, he believes there is a ‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found’ therein.” State v. Ford, 70 N.C. App. 244, 247, 318 S.E.2d 914, 916 (1984)
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).
This Court and our state Supreme Court have repeatedly held that the odor of
marijuana alone provides probable cause to search the object or area that is the source
of that odor. See, e.g., State v. Greenwood, 301 N.C. 705, 708, 273 S.E.2d 438, 441
(1981); State v. Smith, 192 N.C. App. 690, 694, 666 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2008); State v.
Armstrong, 236 N.C. App. 130, 133, 762 S.E.2d 641, 644 (2014).
Here, however, the trial court relied on our Court’s decision in State v. Parker
to apply what it described as an “odor plus” standard in which while—as the trial
court articulated—the odor of marijuana was a factor to consider, additional
circumstances were required to establish probable cause. In Parker, this Court noted:
“The legal issues raised by the recent legalization of hemp have yet to be analyzed by
the appellate courts of this state.” Parker, 277 N.C. App. at 541, 860 S.E.2d at 29.
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This Court went on, however, to determine “in the case before us today we need not
determine whether the scent or visual identification of marijuana alone remains
sufficient to grant an officer probable cause to search a vehicle.” Id. This was so
because we determined there were additional circumstances that supported probable
cause for a warrantless search in that case beyond the odor of marijuana. Id.
As in Parker, Defendant here also relied on a memorandum published by the
State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). The SBI memo explains that industrial hemp is
a variety of the same species of plant as marijuana, but it contains lower levels of
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), which is the psychoactive chemical in marijuana.
According to the SBI memo, the legalization hemp poses significant issues for law
enforcement because “[t]here is no easy way for law enforcement to distinguish
between industrial hemp and marijuana” and there is no way for law enforcement to
quickly test and determine whether a substance is hemp or marijuana. Thus,
Defendant contended—and the trial court agreed—the odor of marijuana in this case
detected by the Officer did not itself give rise to probable cause to conduct the
warrantless search—in particular—of the Crown Royal bag on Defendant’s person.
In this case, however, as in Parker, the Officer had several reasons in addition
to the odor of marijuana to support probable cause to search the vehicle and,
consequently, the Crown Royal bag. As such, again, “we need not determine whether
the scent or visual identification of marijuana alone remains sufficient to grant an
officer probable cause to search a vehicle.” Id.
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First, as the trial court found, Defendant made “an acknowledgment, if not an
admission” that marijuana had been smoked in the car earlier. Defendant made no
assertion at the time the odor derived from legalized hemp. See id. at 541-42, 860
S.E.2d at 29 (finding probable cause where a police officer smelled marijuana, the
defendant admitted to smoking marijuana earlier, and the defendant produced a
partially smoked marijuana cigarette from his person). Further, Defendant was
driving a car with a fictitious tag, which the Officer had observed, and which
prompted this stop. Cf. State v. Murray, 192 N.C. App. 684, 688-89, 666 S.E.2d 205,
208 (2008) (finding a police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to support a traffic
stop where the vehicle was obeying all traffic laws, and a check of the license plate
showed no irregularities). Additionally, Defendant was driving with an invalid
license, which the Officer confirmed prior to the search. See State v. Duncan, 287
N.C. App. 467, 473-76, 883 S.E.2d 210, 214-16 (2023) (finding probable cause for a
warrantless arrest where law enforcement learned from a license plate check that
defendant’s driver’s license was medically cancelled).2
Additionally, the Officer had probable cause to search both the vehicle itself and the
Crown Royal bag. “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle,
2 There was also testimony—although disputed—Defendant appeared nervous to the Officer because
his hands were “shaking” and he was “fumbling through some paperwork” when the Officer approached the vehicle. See State v. Corpening, 109 N.C. App. 586, 589-90, 427 S.E.2d 892, 895 (1993) (noting that a defendant’s nervous behavior supported probable cause to search his vehicle). [T p 5-6] In rendering its Order, the trial court did not address this evidence. This underscores the utility of a written order in these circumstances including specific findings of fact and conclusions of law when allowing a motion to suppress.
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it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal
the object of the search.” Mitchell, 224 N.C. App. at 175, 735 S.E.2d at 441 (emphasis
added); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009)
(holding probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity
“authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.”
(citation omitted)). This Court in Armstrong upheld the search of a vehicle’s glove
compartment even after defendants were handcuffed and secured in a police patrol
vehicle, which resulted in the discovery of cocaine. 236 N.C. App. at 133, 762 S.E.2d
at 644. There, this Court found that the officers involved had probable cause to search
the vehicle based on the odor of marijuana emanating from it. Id. at 132-33, 762
S.E.2d at 643-44. The present case is analogous.
As discussed supra, the Officer had probable cause to search the vehicle based
on the odor of marijuana and additional suspicious circumstances. On that basis, the
Officer had probable cause to search the vehicle “and its contents” for evidence.
Mitchell, 224 N.C. App. at 175, 735 S.E.2d at 441. The Crown Royal bag, as one of
the contents of the vehicle, was thus subject to the Officer’s search. The fact that
Defendant attempted to remove the Crown Royal bag is immaterial because the bag
was in the car at the time of the stop. See State v. Massenburg, 66 N.C. App. 127,
130, 310 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1984) (“The scope of the search is not defined by the nature
of the container in which the contraband is secreted but is defined by the object of the
search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe it may be found.”)
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Here, the object of the Officer’s search was evidence of marijuana, which it was
reasonable to believe could have been in the Crown Royal bag. Therefore, because
the Officer had probable cause to search the vehicle, he also had probable cause to
search the Crown Royal bag.
Thus, the Officer was aware of several suspicious circumstances—including
the odor of marijuana—at the time of the search. Therefore, under the totality of the
circumstances, the Officer had probable cause to search the Crown Royal bag.
Consequently, the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress the
evidence that resulted from the search.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s grant of Defendant’s
Motion to Suppress is reversed, and this case is remanded for additional proceedings.
Additionally, due to the substantial violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the costs of this appeal are taxed to the State.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Judge GRIFFIN concurs.
Judge MURPHY concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion.
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MURPHY, Judge, dissenting in part.
While I agree with the Majority’s analysis that we lack jurisdiction over this
appeal, I dissent from its decision to nevertheless exercise jurisdiction in this case.
Although Judge Carpenter’s reasoning below was provided by our Court in a recent
unpublished opinion, I believe that this case, in which the State has not even sought
the issuance of a writ of certiorari, fits squarely within his analysis:
“We require extraordinary circumstances because a writ of certiorari ‘is not intended as a substitute for a notice of appeal.’” [Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCAs of the U.S., 384 N.C. 569, 573 (2023) (quoting State v. Ricks, 378 N.C. 737, 741 (2021))]. “If courts issued writs of certiorari solely on the showing of some error below, it would ‘render meaningless the rules governing the time and manner of noticing appeals.’” Id. at 573 (quoting Ricks, 378 N.C. at 741). An extraordinary circumstance “generally requires a showing of substantial harm, considerable waste of judicial resources, or ‘wide-reaching issues of justice and liberty at stake.’” Id. at 573 (quoting Doe v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. App. 10, 23 (2020)).
Here, Defendant argues the trial court erred, but Defendant fails to explain why this case involves an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to excuse his failure to preserve his right to appeal. Notably, Defendant fails to mention the word “extraordinary” in his PWC. Defendant merely concludes that the “interests of justice thus require” us to grant a writ of certiorari. Defendant’s argument falls far short of our extraordinary-circumstance standard, and further, our review of the record reveals no extraordinary circumstances. See id. at 573. Therefore, we deny Defendant’s PWC and dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See [State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C. 380, 397 (1979)].
State v. Duncan, No. COA22-906, 2023 WL 8742997, at *1–2 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 19, STATE V. SPRINGS
MURPHY, J., dissenting in part
2023) (unpublished) (parallel citations omitted). The State has not argued, and the
record does not reveal, anything extraordinary regarding the State’s negligence in
invoking our jurisdiction. I decline this opportunity to do to the State’s job for it and
would dismiss its appeal.3
3 I would further note that, unlike in Lakins v. W. N.C. Conf. of United Methodist Church, the
Majority’s result does not provide this Court with an opportunity to reach the ultimate undecided issue regarding probable cause and the odor of marijuana. See Lakins v. W. N.C. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 283 N.C. App. 385, 390-91 (2022).