[Cite as State v. Slimmer, 2023-Ohio-4756.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 30191
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE SAMUEL SLIMMER STOW MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 2021 TRC 05029
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: December 27, 2023
SUTTON, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Samuel Slimmer appeals the judgment of the Stow Municipal
Court. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} On July 31, 2021, at approximately 3:05 a.m., Officer Samantha Wike stopped Mr.
Slimmer’s vehicle for not having working taillights. Officer Wike’s observations caused her to
remove Mr. Slimmer from the vehicle for him to undergo standardized field sobriety testing.
Following the field sobriety testing and a portable breath test, Mr. Slimmer was arrested for
operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, operating a vehicle with prohibited
concentration of alcohol in the breath, and no taillights.
{¶3} A complaint was filed alleging Mr. Slimmer had violated Stow Codified
Ordinances 337.04(A), 333.01(a)(1)(D), and 333.01(a)(1)(A). Mr. Slimmer filed a motion to
suppress alleging that: (1) Officer Wike lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him for standardized 2
field sobriety testing; (2) Officer Wike failed to conduct the field sobriety tests in substantial
compliance with the NHTSA manual; and (3) Officer Wike lacked probable cause to arrest Mr.
Slimmer. A hearing was held on the motion, at which Officer Wike testified and videos of the
stop were admitted into evidence. The parties stipulated that the trial court should take judicial
notice of Section 8 of the NHTSA manual, related to field sobriety tests; however, the manual was
not admitted into evidence and is not a part of this Court’s record.
{¶4} The trial court denied Mr. Slimmer’s motion to suppress. Mr. Slimmer pleaded no
contest to violating Stow Codified Ordinance 333.01(a)(1)(A), operating a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, and the remaining charges were dismissed. Mr. Slimmer was sentenced
accordingly, and his sentence was stayed pending appeal.
{¶5} Mr. Slimmer now raises three assignments of error for this Court’s review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT OFFICER WIKE HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN [MR. SLIMMER] TO PERFORM STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS.
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Slimmer argues the trial court erred in
concluding Officer Wike had reasonable suspicion to detain him to perform standardized field
sobriety tests. Mr. Slimmer specifically asserts that: (1) slow and deliberate movements are not
an indicator of impairment in the NHTSA manual; (2) the officer’s testimony that there was a
strong odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle was not credible because the officer did not
mention the same in the narrative portion of her report; and (3) the trial court made several
references to Mr. Slimmer fumbling for and dropping documents when the officer only mentioned 3
that Mr. Slimmer fumbled for documents once. In addition, Mr. Slimmer maintains the totality of
the evidence does not amount to reasonable suspicion.
{¶7} A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v.
Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress,
the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual
questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357,
366 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court “must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are
supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8. “Accepting these facts as true, the
appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial
court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124
Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶8} “A police officer must simply have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in
order to conduct field sobriety tests.” State v. Todd, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 19AP0012, 2020-Ohio-
963, ¶ 8, citing State v. Simin, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26016, 2012-Ohio-4389, ¶ 12. “Reasonable
suspicion requires that an officer be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” Todd at ¶
8, quoting State v. Davenport, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA010136, 2012-Ohio-4427, ¶ 6. “The
totality of the circumstances is considered when determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.”
State v. Panero, 9th Dist. Medina No. 16CA0067-M, 2018-Ohio-1005, ¶ 18. “No single factor is
dispositive of whether a law enforcement officer is legally justified in conducting field sobriety
tests in any given case.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Lee, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 29597, 2020-Ohio-4970, ¶ 25. 4
{¶9} The only witness to testify at the suppression hearing was Officer Wike. At the time
of the hearing, she had been an officer with the Stow Police Department for 10 months. State’s
Exhibit A was also admitted into evidence which included the body camera video and dash camera
video of both Officer Wike and Sergeant Erik Dirker who provided backup.
{¶10} The trial court made the following factual findings:
On July 31, 2021[,] Officer Samantha Hornyak (now Wike) was on duty. At approximately 3:05 a.m. early Saturday morning, she observed a vehicle sitting in a church parking lot. The church was closed at the time. When the vehicle finally pulled out it did not have working tail[lights]. Officer Wike made a traffic stop on Darrow Road in the City of Stow. She approached the passenger side of the vehicle and knocked on the window. There were no other passengers in the vehicle. She asked the driver where he was going and he responded to his home in Medina. She asked him where he was coming from and he responded a buddy’s home on Water Street in Kent.
She observed that the defendant’s actions and speech were slow and deliberate. When she returned to the vehicle she approached the driver’s side. At that time, she smelled a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle. She also observed the defendant fumbling for and dropping documents. She continued to see slow speech and movements. The defendant struggled with his insurance information and his cell phone after contacting his mother for that information. Upon being asked by the officer on several occasions, the defendant denied drinking. In Exhibit A, the court observed that the defendant did produce his license promptly and stated his cell phone number upon request without difficulty. But the court also observed the defendant move slowly and fumbling when trying to find his insurance information.
Based on the time of day on a weekend coming from a college town in addition to her observations, Officer Wike requested that the defendant submit to standardized field sobriety tests. She found six out of six clues on the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. She observed two clues on the walk and turn test. She found one clue on the one leg stand test. Thereafter, the defendant agreed to a portable breath test (PBT) in which the results were a .142. After the PBT, the defendant was placed under arrest for Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence (OVI).
{¶11} Reviewing the videos and suppression hearing transcript provided additional details
which were not indicated by the trial court, but are consistent with its findings. In approaching the
stopped vehicle, the officer indicated she had to knock on the window to get Mr. Slimmer’s
attention. While Mr. Slimmer promptly produced his license, he mistakenly provided his 5
registration, instead of his insurance information, which was requested. Officer Wike described
Mr. Slimmer’s movements and speech as slow and deliberate. Although Mr. Slimmer ultimately
produced insurance information, after returning to the cruiser, Officer Wike noticed the coverage
was expired. Officer Wike then approached the driver’s side and “immediately noticed the strong
odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from [Mr. Slimmer] in the vehicle[.]” Officer Wike allowed
Mr. Slimmer to call his parents to get the insurance information, because the vehicle was his
father’s. Mr. Slimmer contacted his mother and instead of asking about the insurance information,
he asked his mother where the registration would be. While on the phone, Officer Wike returned
the insurance paperwork and requested Mr. Slimmer end the call. Officer Wike then described
Mr. Slimmer struggling with the phone and dropping papers. At that point, Officer Wike had Mr.
Slimmer exit the vehicle to perform standardized field sobriety tests.1
{¶12} Mr. Slimmer argues that slow and deliberate movements are not indicators of
impairment because they are not in the NHTSA manual. Officer Wike testified that even if slow
and deliberate movements were not listed in the manual as a factor, in her experience, such
movements could be an indicator that someone was under the influence. Notably, the NHTSA
manual is not in the record, so this Court has no way to confirm Mr. Slimmer’s contention.
Nevertheless, this Court has previously listed slow and lethargic movements as an indication of
impairment. See State v. Clark, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 18AP0056, 2020-Ohio-1178, ¶ 12 (“[The
trooper] testified that Mr. Clark was stumbling and unsteady on his feet, had a strong odor of
alcoholic beverage coming from his breath, and was exhibiting bloodshot and glassy eyes, “slow
lethargic movements,” and “thick slurred speech.”); State v. Hess, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0064,
1 While the officer also testified that Mr. Slimmer’s speech was slurred and that he had bloodshot eyes, those facts were not adopted by the trial court and so they will be excluded from our discussion. 6
2013-Ohio-4268, ¶ 15 (“The testimony at trial demonstrated that when Officer Saal observed [Mr.]
Hess on the night of the accident, [Mr.] Hess was “unsteady on his feet” and “slow in his actions.”
Officer Saal noticed that [Mr.] Hess’ speech was “extremely slurred” and that his eyes were “red,
bloodshot and glassy.” Officer Saal further testified that he could smell alcohol at the time [Mr.]
Hess stepped out of the van.”). Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court erred in considering
slow and deliberate movements as a factor for impairment given the testimony at the suppression
hearing.
{¶13} Mr. Slimmer next asserts Officer Wike’s testimony was not credible concerning the
odor of alcohol because Officer Wike did not discuss the same in her narrative report. However,
as noted above, the trial court is in the best position to make credibility determinations. Burnside,
100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶ 8. Here, Officer Wike’s credibility is supported by her
body camera video. In the video, Officer Wike is standing near the driver’s side of the vehicle,
when she asks Mr. Slimmer about the smell of alcohol.
{¶14} Mr. Slimmer also contends he only fumbled for documents once, and, thus, the trial
court’s multiple references to him fumbling for documents is erroneous. When Officer Wike was
asked about Mr. Slimmer fumbling for documents on cross-examination, she provided the
following response:
So when he was first trying to procure his insurance card, he was very slow and had a – it almost seemed a difficult time going into the glove box, getting his papers, riffling through them.
And then you can – the main instance that I’m speaking about, you can see on the body cam, is when I ask him to put his papers on his passenger seat. Instead of doing that he goes to put them into the little folder. He drops them, tries to hang up the phone. That’s the exact instance you can see on the body cam.
There were other instances that unfortunately the camera is hidden by the B-pillar of the vehicle and you can’t see as well. 7
{¶15} Accordingly, based upon Officer Wike’s testimony, there was evidence before the
trial court that Mr. Slimmer was fumbling for documents on multiple occasions. Mr. Slimmer has
not demonstrated the trial court erred in its characterization of his fumbling with documents.
{¶16} Lastly, Mr. Slimmer argues the totality of the circumstances did not support that
Officer Wike had reasonable suspicion to further detain him for standardized field sobriety testing.
Here, the stop occurred in the early morning hours on a Saturday and Mr. Slimmer indicated he
was driving home from Kent after spending time with his friend on Water Street. See State v. A.C.,
9th Dist. Medina No. 19CA0047-M, 2020-Ohio-713, ¶ 12 (“The stop occurred at 2:45 a.m.
approximately five blocks from a bar. A.C. acknowledged that she and her passengers were coming
from the bar[.]”). There was testimony that Mr. Slimmer’s friend lived in a college town with
multiple bars. The trial court found Mr. Slimmer’s actions and speech were slow and deliberate
based upon Officer Wike’s testimony regarding the same. See Clark, 2020-Ohio-1178, ¶ 12
(evaluating slow movements as a factor); State v. Won, 9th Dist. Medina No. 20CA0076-M, 2021-
Ohio-3869, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Evans, 127 Ohio App.3d 56, 63 (11th Dist.1998), fn.2. (listing
overly deliberate speech as a factor). Further, even defense counsel acknowledged in closing
argument that Mr. Slimmer was “very slow and deliberate with his actions[.]” Accordingly, we
conclude that this finding is supported by competent, credible evidence. See Burnside at ¶ 8.
Additionally, there was evidence presented that Mr. Slimmer fumbled with documents and had a
strong odor of alcohol coming from the driver’s side of the vehicle and his person. See State v.
Iloba, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 20AP0030, 2021-Ohio-3700, ¶ 17 (“both reasonable suspicion and
probable cause can be demonstrated with reference to physiological factors that tend to indicate
impairment, such as an odor of alcohol on a suspect's person, bloodshot or glassy eyes, slurred
speech, or a confused manner.”); Won at ¶ 19-20 (noting that actions such as “dropping keys, 8
falling over, fumbling for a wallet” might indicate a lack of coordination which can be a factor
indicating impairment). Finally, while not specifically articulated as a factor by the trial court, the
evidence also supports Mr. Slimmer had some level of impairment or confusion. Officer Wike
asked Mr. Slimmer for proof of insurance and he instead produced the vehicle registration. While
this might not be significant on its own, we note Mr. Slimmer again was confused when he asked
his mother where the registration was after Officer Wike allowed him to call his parents to obtain
the insurance information. See Iloba at ¶ 17 (citing confused manner as a potential indicator of
impairment).
{¶17} Indeed “[t]he [officer’s] observations must also be viewed through the eyes of the
reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold. A
reviewing court must give due weight to the officer’s training and experience and view the
evidence as it would be understood by those in law enforcement.” (Internal quotations and
citations omitted.) Iloba at ¶ 14.
{¶18} Considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say the trial court erred in
concluding Officer Wike had reasonable suspicion to further detain Mr. Slimmer for standardized
field sobriety testing.
{¶19} Accordingly, Mr. Slimmer’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE HGN AND WAT STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS WHEN THEY WERE NOT DONE IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE NHTSA MANUAL.
{¶20} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Slimmer argues the trial court erred in
considering the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) and walk and turn (“WAT”)
tests because they were not conducted in substantial compliance with NHTSA manual. 9
{¶21} R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b) states:
In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section, of a municipal ordinance relating to operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse, or of a municipal ordinance relating to operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of alcohol, a controlled substance, or a metabolite of a controlled substance in the whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, or urine, if a law enforcement officer has administered a field sobriety test to the operator of the vehicle involved in the violation and if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the officer administered the test in substantial compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible, and generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the time the tests were administered, including, but not limited to, any testing standards then in effect that were set by the national highway traffic safety administration, all of the following apply:
(i) The officer may testify concerning the results of the field sobriety test so administered.
(ii) The prosecution may introduce the results of the field sobriety test so administered as evidence in any proceedings in the criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding.
(iii) If testimony is presented or evidence is introduced under division (D)(4)(b)(i) or (ii) of this section and if the testimony or evidence is admissible under the Rules of Evidence, the court shall admit the testimony or evidence and the trier of fact shall give it whatever weight the trier of fact considers to be appropriate.
The State bears the burden of establishing substantial compliance on the part of the administering
officer. State v. Mencini, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27322, 2015-Ohio-89, ¶ 18.
{¶22} As previously indicated, while the trial court took judicial notice of the NHTSA
manual, the manual itself was not admitted into evidence and is not before this Court on appeal.
”The [S]tate may demonstrate what the NHTSA standards are through competent testimony and/or
by introducing the applicable portions of the NHTSA manual.” (Internal quotations and citations
omitted). State v. Davis, 9th Summit No. 29273, 2020-Ohio-473, ¶ 12.
{¶23} To the extent some standards and procedures were discussed during Officer’s
Wike’s testimony, we cannot say the trial court erred in considering the HGN and WAT tests.
During cross-examination, Officer Wike admitted that, for the HGN test, the stimulus should be 10
held approximately 12-15 inches from the suspect’s eyes, slightly above eye level. On appeal, Mr.
Slimmer argues Officer Wike agreed the video showed her holding the stimulus substantially
higher. However, a review of the record indicates otherwise. During her testimony, Officer Wike
did not admit to holding the stimulus substantially higher. Instead, Officer Wike explained the
video at issue was at a “weird angle” and only at that particular angle did it look like her procedure
was not in compliance. Additional video from the stop shows a completely different view of the
scene and does not support Mr. Slimmer’s claim.
{¶24} Mr. Slimmer also asserts Officer Wike should not have performed three passes of
the portion of the HGN test used to determine if there is the onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees.
Officer Wike admitted on cross-examination that only two passes were required by the manual.
Mr. Slimmer has not explained how the third pass impacted the results of the test or prejudiced
him. Officer Wike still only scored 6 clues, two for each of the three portions of the test.
{¶25} Mr. Slimmer additionally argues Officer Wike’s instructions for the WAT test
failed to utilize the precise language from the NHTSA manual causing Mr. Slimmer to receive two
clues on the test. During cross-examination, Officer Wike agreed with what the language in the
NHTSA manual states, and she also agreed she did not recite the language exactly as it is stated in
the manual. However, Officer Wike testified she substantially complied with the NHTSA manual
in giving the instruction. In light of this record, we cannot say the trial court erred in finding
Officer Wike substantially complied in giving the instructions for the HGN and WAT tests.
{¶26} Further, to the extent we have not addressed Mr. Slimmer’s arguments specifically
referencing the NHTSA manual, we conclude we are unable to do so because the NHTSA manual
is not in the record. (“Without any standards in the record with which to compare [the officer’s] 11
procedure, it is impossible for this Court to determine whether the test was given in substantial
compliance. This Court is left to presume regularity.”) Mencini at ¶ 21.
{¶27} Accordingly, Mr. Slimmer’s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT OFFICER WIKE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST [MR. SLIMMER] UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
{¶28} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Slimmer argues the trial court erred in finding
Officer Wike had probable cause to arrest him under the totality of the circumstances.
{¶29} “Probable cause consists of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” (Internal
quotations and citations omitted.) Iloba, 2021-Ohio-3700, at ¶ 17. “When determining whether a
law enforcement officer had probable cause to arrest someone for driving under the influence,
courts must consider whether, at the moment of arrest, the police had sufficient information,
derived from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances, sufficient to cause a
prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving under the influence.” (Internal quotations
and citations omitted.) Id.
{¶30} Here, in addition to the factors discussed in the first assignment of error, the results
of the standardized field sobriety testing provided further evidence Mr. Slimmer was driving while
impaired. Officer Wike observed six out of six clues on the HGN test. Officer Wike testified if
she observed four or more clues on this test, there was an 88% chance that the suspect has a BAC
of .08 or above. In addition, Officer Wike found two of eight clues on the WAT test. Officer
Wike explained that if two or more clues are observed, there is a 68% chance that the suspect’s
BAC is .1 or above. Out of the four possible clues on the one-legged stand test, Officer Wike
observed one. Officer Wike testified there is no statistical correlation with one clue being present 12
on the one-legged stand test with respect to what Mr. Slimmer’s BAC would be. Nonetheless,
when considering the clues from the HGN test and the WAT test, Officer Wike testified they
indicated there was an 80% chance that Mr. Slimmer’s BAC was over .1.
{¶31} Based upon the factors discussed in the first assignment of error, including a strong
odor of alcohol, time of day, slow and deliberate speech, coordination issues and confusion, in
addition to the results of the standardized field sobriety testing, we cannot say the trial court erred
in determining Officer Wike possessed probable cause to arrest Mr. Slimmer.
{¶32} Accordingly, Mr. Slimmer’s third assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶33} Mr. Slimmer’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Stow
Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Stow Municipal Court,
County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this
journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 13
Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETTY SUTTON FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, J. CONCURS.
CARR, J. DISSENTING.
{¶34} I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the majority as I would sustain
Slimmer’s first assignment of error because I would conclude that the trial court erred in finding
that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Slimmer to perform standardized field sobriety
tests.
{¶35} “Reasonable suspicion requires that an officer be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant [the] intrusion.” State v. Todd, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 19AP0012, 2020-Ohio-963, ¶ 8,
quoting State v. Davenport, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA010136, 2012-Ohio-4427, ¶ 6. “The totality
of the circumstances is considered when determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.” State
v. Panero, 9th Dist. Medina No. 16CA0067-M, 2018-Ohio-1005, ¶ 18. “[N]o single factor is
dispositive of whether a law enforcement officer is legally justified in conducting field sobriety
tests in any given case.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Lee, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 29597, 2020-Ohio-4970, ¶ 25.
[T]hese factors include, but are not limited to (1) the time and day of the stop (Friday or Saturday night as opposed to, e.g., Tuesday morning); (2) the location of the stop (whether near establishments selling alcohol); (3) any indicia of erratic 14
driving before the stop that may indicate a lack of coordination (speeding, weaving, unusual braking, etc.); (4) whether there is a cognizable report that the driver may be intoxicated; (5) the condition of the suspect’s eyes (bloodshot, glassy, glazed, etc.); (6) impairments of the suspect’s ability to speak (slurred speech, overly deliberate speech, etc.); (7) the odor of alcohol coming from the interior of the car, or, more significantly, on the suspect’s person or breath; (8) the intensity of that odor, as described by the officer (“very strong,” “strong,” “moderate,” “slight,” etc.); (9) the suspect’s demeanor (belligerent, uncooperative, etc.); (10) any actions by the suspect after the stop that might indicate a lack of coordination (dropping keys, falling over, fumbling for a wallet, etc.); and (11) the suspect’s admission of alcohol consumption, the number of drinks had, and the amount of time in which they were consumed, if given.
State v. Evans, 127 Ohio App.3d 56, 63 (11th Dist.1998), fn. 2; see also State v. Won, 9th Dist.
Medina No. 20CA0076-M, 2021-Ohio-3869, ¶ 19, citing Evans at 63, fn. 2.
{¶36} In reviewing the record, including the videos, I would conclude that the trial court
erred in deciding that the officer possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to have Slimmer
perform field sobriety testing. While there were factors that supported the officer having
reasonable suspicion, such as the day and time of the stop, Slimmer pulling out of a church parking
lot at that late hour, the odor of alcohol, and the fact that Slimmer was in Kent with a friend close
to an area with a lot of bars, the vast majority of the evidence did not. Despite the officer’s
testimony and the trial court’s findings, the videos do not support that Slimmer had slow or
deliberate movements or speech. In addition, Slimmer did not exhibit erratic or dangerous driving
and denied alcohol consumption. “For better or worse, the law prohibits drunken driving, not
driving after a drink. Likewise, it is only a crime to be in physical control of a vehicle while under
the influence.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. High, 9th Dist. Medina No.
17CA0019-M, 2017-Ohio-8264, ¶ 14. Further, Slimmer was polite in answering the officer’s
questions, and the trial court did not find that Slimmer had bloodshot or glassy eyes or slurred
speech, despite the officer’s testimony to the contrary. Considering the totality of the 15
circumstances, I cannot say that the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to detain Slimmer for
field sobriety testing. See Panero, 2018-Ohio-1005, at ¶ 18.
APPEARANCES:
DAVID C. SHELDON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
JAIME M. SYX, Director of Law, for Appellee.