FILED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
March 20, 2000
Cecil Crowson, Jr. FOR PUBLICATION Appellate Court Clerk Filed: March 20, 2000
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) APPELLEE, ) SHELBY CRIMINAL ) v. ) Hon. Joseph B. McCartie, Judge ) FREDERICK SLEDGE, ) No. W1994-00005-SC-R11-DD ) APPELLANT. )
FOR APPELLANT: FOR APPELLEE:
WILLIAM P. REDICK, JR. PAUL G. SUMMERS Whites Creek Attorney General and Reporter
MICHAEL E. MOORE Solicitor General
JENNIFER L. SMITH Assistant Attorney General Nashville
OPINION
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED HOLDER, J. OPINION
We granted review to address whether omission of a culpable mental
state in an indictment for felony murder rendered the indictment insufficient to
support a conviction. We hold that inclusion in the language of the indictment of
the explicit reference to the felony murder statutory section was sufficient to
apprise the defendant of his charge and to protect the defendant from
reprosecution for the same offense. The indictment satisfies the requirements
enunciated by this Court in State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997), Ruff v.
State, 978 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1998), and State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 149
(Tenn. 1999). The defendant has raised numerous other issues in this appeal.
We hold those issues are both moot and without merit. This case is remanded to
the trial court for resentencing pursuant to the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
FACTS
The defendant, Frederick Sledge, was convicted by a jury of first degree
murder and especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to death for the
first degree felony murder conviction and received a sentence of twenty-one
years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction to be served
consecutively.
The record indicates that the defendant admitted shooting the victim,
Johnny Harris, on December 10, 1991. The first shot entered his back,
penetrated his heart, and exited his chest. The second shot entered the back of
his knee and exited just below the kneecap. Harris was found face-up with his
pockets turned inside-out.
The defendant’s statement indicated that he and two other individuals had
followed Harris from a supermarket to Harris’s apartment. The defendant
approached Harris and demanded money. Harris gave the defendant his billfold
containing only six or seven dollars. The defendant went through the victim’s
pockets and shot him.
2 The jury found the defendant guilty of felony murder. A sentencing
hearing was held, and the jury found the existence of one aggravating
circumstance: that the defendant had been previously convicted of one or more
felonies whose statutory elements included the use of violence to the person.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2). The jury found that the aggravating
circumstance outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt. The jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction. The
appellate court found that felony murder was not sufficiently charged in one
count because the indictment failed to include an allegation of recklessness.
The court, however, went on to find that a second count alleging a deliberate and
premeditated killing lawfully charged the defendant with first degree murder,
which could then be proved by showing the defendant committed felony murder.
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the defendant’s sentence and
remanded the case for resentencing holding that the trial court: (1) improperly
allowed argument and a factual reference concerning the defendant’s prior
robbery convictions in violation of State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797 (Tenn. 1994);
and (2) unconstitutionally excluded mitigating evidence from a prison chaplain
regarding the defendant’s remorsefulness. The defendant appealed.
ANALYSIS
The defendant argues that his indictment charging felony murder is
insufficient to support his conviction. He reasons that the indictment fails to
specifically allege the requisite culpable mental state of recklessness. We
disagree.
The defendant was indicted in Count One of the indictment for the crime
of felony murder. The indictment read, in pertinent part, that the defendant:
did unlawfully kill Johnny Harris during the perpetration of Aggravated Robbery, in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-202, against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee.
3 At the time of the commission of the offense, the crime of felony murder required
“[a] reckless killing of another committed in the perpetration of . . . any . . .
robbery.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202 (Repl. 1991). The issue now
before us is whether the omission of the term “reckless” from the indictment
rendered the conviction invalid.
This Court has previously held that specific reference to a statute within
the indictment may be sufficient to place the accused on notice of the charged
offense. See State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tenn. 1999); Ruff v. State,
978 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1998). The language of the indictment provided the trial
court with ample information upon which to base a proper judgment. See Carter,
988 S.W.2d at 149; Ruff, 978 S.W.2d at 97, 99. The indictment further provided
ample information to protect the defendant from reprosecution for the same
offense. See Carter, 988 S.W.2d at 149; Ruff, 978 S.W.2d at 97, 99. The
language of the indictment was clear and concise and met the requirements of
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (Repl. 1991). 1 See Carter, 988 S.W.2d at 149;
Ruff, 978 S.W.2d at 97, 99. Lastly, we conclude that recklessness, knowledge,
or intent may be inferred from the conduct alleged in the indictment--that the
defendant unlawfully killed Harris during the perpetration of the aggravated
robbery. See generally Carter, 988 S.W.2d at 149; Ruff, 978 S.W.2d at 97, 99.
We hold that the indictment clearly satisfies the requirements set forth in Carter,
Ruff, and State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). This issue is devoid of
merit. Although for slightly different reasoning than relied upon by the Court of
Criminal Appeals, we affirm the conviction.
As a final matter, we note that the defendant has raised numerous other
issues in this appeal. 2 Although the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the
defendant’s sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing, the
defendant has raised issues in this appeal concerning the validity of his death
1 Pursu ant to T enn.
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FILED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
March 20, 2000
Cecil Crowson, Jr. FOR PUBLICATION Appellate Court Clerk Filed: March 20, 2000
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) APPELLEE, ) SHELBY CRIMINAL ) v. ) Hon. Joseph B. McCartie, Judge ) FREDERICK SLEDGE, ) No. W1994-00005-SC-R11-DD ) APPELLANT. )
FOR APPELLANT: FOR APPELLEE:
WILLIAM P. REDICK, JR. PAUL G. SUMMERS Whites Creek Attorney General and Reporter
MICHAEL E. MOORE Solicitor General
JENNIFER L. SMITH Assistant Attorney General Nashville
OPINION
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED HOLDER, J. OPINION
We granted review to address whether omission of a culpable mental
state in an indictment for felony murder rendered the indictment insufficient to
support a conviction. We hold that inclusion in the language of the indictment of
the explicit reference to the felony murder statutory section was sufficient to
apprise the defendant of his charge and to protect the defendant from
reprosecution for the same offense. The indictment satisfies the requirements
enunciated by this Court in State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997), Ruff v.
State, 978 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1998), and State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 149
(Tenn. 1999). The defendant has raised numerous other issues in this appeal.
We hold those issues are both moot and without merit. This case is remanded to
the trial court for resentencing pursuant to the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
FACTS
The defendant, Frederick Sledge, was convicted by a jury of first degree
murder and especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to death for the
first degree felony murder conviction and received a sentence of twenty-one
years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction to be served
consecutively.
The record indicates that the defendant admitted shooting the victim,
Johnny Harris, on December 10, 1991. The first shot entered his back,
penetrated his heart, and exited his chest. The second shot entered the back of
his knee and exited just below the kneecap. Harris was found face-up with his
pockets turned inside-out.
The defendant’s statement indicated that he and two other individuals had
followed Harris from a supermarket to Harris’s apartment. The defendant
approached Harris and demanded money. Harris gave the defendant his billfold
containing only six or seven dollars. The defendant went through the victim’s
pockets and shot him.
2 The jury found the defendant guilty of felony murder. A sentencing
hearing was held, and the jury found the existence of one aggravating
circumstance: that the defendant had been previously convicted of one or more
felonies whose statutory elements included the use of violence to the person.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2). The jury found that the aggravating
circumstance outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt. The jury sentenced the defendant to death by electrocution.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction. The
appellate court found that felony murder was not sufficiently charged in one
count because the indictment failed to include an allegation of recklessness.
The court, however, went on to find that a second count alleging a deliberate and
premeditated killing lawfully charged the defendant with first degree murder,
which could then be proved by showing the defendant committed felony murder.
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the defendant’s sentence and
remanded the case for resentencing holding that the trial court: (1) improperly
allowed argument and a factual reference concerning the defendant’s prior
robbery convictions in violation of State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797 (Tenn. 1994);
and (2) unconstitutionally excluded mitigating evidence from a prison chaplain
regarding the defendant’s remorsefulness. The defendant appealed.
ANALYSIS
The defendant argues that his indictment charging felony murder is
insufficient to support his conviction. He reasons that the indictment fails to
specifically allege the requisite culpable mental state of recklessness. We
disagree.
The defendant was indicted in Count One of the indictment for the crime
of felony murder. The indictment read, in pertinent part, that the defendant:
did unlawfully kill Johnny Harris during the perpetration of Aggravated Robbery, in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-202, against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee.
3 At the time of the commission of the offense, the crime of felony murder required
“[a] reckless killing of another committed in the perpetration of . . . any . . .
robbery.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202 (Repl. 1991). The issue now
before us is whether the omission of the term “reckless” from the indictment
rendered the conviction invalid.
This Court has previously held that specific reference to a statute within
the indictment may be sufficient to place the accused on notice of the charged
offense. See State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tenn. 1999); Ruff v. State,
978 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1998). The language of the indictment provided the trial
court with ample information upon which to base a proper judgment. See Carter,
988 S.W.2d at 149; Ruff, 978 S.W.2d at 97, 99. The indictment further provided
ample information to protect the defendant from reprosecution for the same
offense. See Carter, 988 S.W.2d at 149; Ruff, 978 S.W.2d at 97, 99. The
language of the indictment was clear and concise and met the requirements of
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (Repl. 1991). 1 See Carter, 988 S.W.2d at 149;
Ruff, 978 S.W.2d at 97, 99. Lastly, we conclude that recklessness, knowledge,
or intent may be inferred from the conduct alleged in the indictment--that the
defendant unlawfully killed Harris during the perpetration of the aggravated
robbery. See generally Carter, 988 S.W.2d at 149; Ruff, 978 S.W.2d at 97, 99.
We hold that the indictment clearly satisfies the requirements set forth in Carter,
Ruff, and State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). This issue is devoid of
merit. Although for slightly different reasoning than relied upon by the Court of
Criminal Appeals, we affirm the conviction.
As a final matter, we note that the defendant has raised numerous other
issues in this appeal. 2 Although the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the
defendant’s sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing, the
defendant has raised issues in this appeal concerning the validity of his death
1 Pursu ant to T enn. C ode A nn. § 40 -13-20 2 (199 0), an ind ictmen t mus t:
state the facts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise langua ge, witho ut prolixity o r repetition , in such a man ner as to ena ble a pers on o f com mo n un ders tand ing to kno w w hat is intended, and with that degree of certainty which will enable the court, o n conv iction, to pro nounc e the pr oper jud gme nt; . . . .
2 In this appeal, the defendant included in the appendix excerpts of the brief he filed in the intermediate appellate court. The issues raised in those excerpts were incorporated by reference into the defendant’s application for discretionary review to this Court. While we do not encourage this practice, we reserve the right to permit such incorporation on a case-by-case basis.
4 sentence and his sentencing hearing. While these issues would ordinarily be
considered moot, we have reviewed the issues raised. Upon review, we affirm
the disposition of the Court of Criminal Appeals with respect to the remaining
issues. The defendant, however, may raise these issues in any subsequent
appeal should the issues remain relevant following the defendant’s resentencing.
This case is remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing
pursuant to the order of the Court of Criminal Appeals. It appearing that the
defendant is indigent, costs of this appeal shall be taxed to the State.
JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE
Concurring:
Anderson, C.J. Drowota, Birch, and Barker, J.J.