State v. Slagle

2025 Ohio 4655

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 8, 2025
• Docket: 2024 CA 00096
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Slagle, 2025-Ohio-4655.]

COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 2024 CA 00096

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2024 CR 00392 SARA SUE ANN SLAGLE, Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: October 8, 2025

BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Robert G. Montgomery; Kevin W. Popham, Judges

APPEARANCES: JENNY WELLS, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, KENNETH W. OSWALT, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee; BRIAN A. SMITH, for Defendant-Appellant.

Baldwin, P.J.

{¶1} The appellant’s counsel has submitted an Anders Brief in which he offers

as a potential assignment of error whether the trial court’s reference to the imposition of

a one year prison sentence on each of the three counts to which she pleaded guilty, to

be served consecutively, was supported by the record. Appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} On June 4, 2024, Licking County Sheriff’s Deputy Tyler Batross filed a

Criminal Complaint/Arrest Warrant, Felony containing the following Statement of Facts in

support: On May 30, 2024, Licking County Sheriff's Office was dispatched to

Hirst Road, Newark, Licking County, Ohio, where the caller reported the

Defendant Sara Slagle was attempting to enter the residence through a

basement window. The caller, TB reported that he has a CPO against the

Defendant. There is a protection order issued pursuant to RC 3113.31,

effective until May 24, 2025, and served on the Defendant on May 29, 2024.

Earlier in the day, Deputy J Green [sic] had served the CPO on the

Defendant, and she left the residence, per the protection order, but had

returned. The caller reported that the Defendant fled when he stated he was

calling the police. The Defendant was captured on video attempting to enter

the residence through the window as described. The Defendant was not

located on this date.

On June 3, 2024, Licking County Sheriff's Office Deputies were

dispatched to the Hirst Road address again, where the Defendant was

violating the protection order. [C.B.] also lives at this address, and called

police after he had come home and located the Defendant inside the

residence, in the basement. TB reported that he was riding his dirtbike [sic]

and observed the Defendant on the property, standing by his box trailer,

and left to avoid her and called the police also. The Defendant’s vehicle was

located a short distance away, but greater than 500 feet, parked, with a note

requesting “please don’t tow.” The keys left in the basement, reportedly by

the Defendant, unlocked the vehicle. The vehicle was towed. The

Defendant was unable to be located on this date as well. The Defendant has previously had been convicted of Violating a

Protection Order in the Licking County Municipal Court case no. [sic]

19CRB1552.

The appellant made an initial appearance on June 5, 2024, during which the trial court

provided the appellant with an application for appointed counsel, set bail at $50,000.00

cash or surety bond with a number of additional conditions for bail, and scheduled a

second bail hearing for June 7, 2024. The appellant was represented by appointed

counsel during the second bail hearing; she was released on personal recognizance with

conditions, including completion of drug and mental health assessments, no contact with

the victim, and GPS monitoring.

{¶3} On June 13, 2024, the appellant was indicted on the following charges:

• Count One, Violating a Protection Order in violation of R.C.

2919.27(A)(1), a felony of the third degree;

• Count Two, Attempted Trespass in a Habitation in violation of R.C.

2923.02 and 2911.12(B), a felony of the fifth degree;

• Count Three, Violating a Protection Order in violation of R.C.

2919.27(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree;

• Count Four, Violating a Protection Order in violation of R.C.

• Count Five, Trespass in a Habitation in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B),

a felony of the fourth degree; and,

• Count Six, Violating a Protection Order in violation of R.C.

2919.27(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree. The appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges at her July 2, 2024, arraignment. A

probable cause hearing was conducted on July 9, 2024, at which the trial court found

probable cause for the appellant’s arrest. The appellee filed a Bill of Particulars on July

24, 2024, confirming the above charges. The appellant violated the terms of her bond on

at least two occasions.

{¶4} The matter was scheduled for trial on September 25, 2024. On September

17, 2024, the appellant filed a Motion to Schedule Change of Plea, advising the trial court

that she intended to change her plea pursuant to a plea agreement with the appellee.

{¶5} On November 1, 2024, the trial court conducted a change of plea hearing

at which the appellant pleaded guilty to Counts One, Three, and Five of the Indictment,

and the appellee agreed to dismiss Counts Two, Four, and Six of the Indictment. The trial

court engaged in the requisite Crim.R. 11 colloquy, and then proceeded to sentencing.

The court sentenced the appellant to three years of community control. As part of the

terms of community control, the trial court imposed a term of ninety days in the Licking

County Justice Center, with credit for sixteen days served. The trial court advised the

appellant that if she violated the terms of her community control it would impose a

sentence of one year in prison on Count One, one year in prison on Count Three, and

one year in prison on Count Five, and that the sentences would be ordered to be served

consecutively, for a total aggregate sentence of three years in prison.

{¶6} The appellant filed a timely appeal, and her counsel filed a brief pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he sets forth the following potential

assignment of error: “[w]hether the portion of trial court’s sentence, reserving the

imposition of 1-year prison sentences on each of Counts One, Three, and Five, to be served consecutively to one another, for a total aggregate sentence of 3 years in prison,

was plain error, given that the trial court’s findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) were

not supported by the record, and that [the appellant] had no prior felony convictions and

had been drug testing negative for approximately 2 1/2 months prior to [the appellant’s]

plea and sentencing hearing.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶7} The United States Supreme Court held in Anders that if, after conscientious

examination of the record, an appellant’s counsel concludes the case is wholly frivolous,

then he or she should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. Id. at 744.

Counsel must accompany the request with a brief identifying anything in the record that

could arguably support the appeal. Id. Counsel also must: (1) furnish his client with a copy

of the brief and request to withdraw; and (2) allow his client sufficient time to raise any

matters that the client chooses. Id. Once the appellant’s counsel has satisfied these

requirements, the appellate court must fully examine the proceedings below to determine

if any arguably meritorious issues exist. If the appellate court also determines that the

appeal is wholly frivolous, it may grant counsel's request to withdraw and dismiss the

appeal without violating constitutional requirements or may proceed to a decision on the

merits if state law so requires. Id.

{¶8} Attorney Brian A. Smith, the appellant’s appellate counsel, filed an Anders

brief on March 10, 2025, informing this Court that he had conscientiously examined the

case, reviewed the entire record, researched all potential issues, and determined that

there were no meritorious issues for review which would support an appeal. Attorney

Smith requested that this Court make an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any additional issues that would support an appeal, and moved the

court for permission to withdraw as counsel for the appellant “on the grounds that the

appeal is frivolous.” He served a copy of the Appellant’s Anders Brief upon the appellant

with instructions that she may file her own brief with this Court if she so wished.

{¶9} This Court informed the appellant in a May 16, 2025, Judgment Entry that

the Court received notice she had been informed by her attorney that an Anders brief had

been filed on her behalf and provided notice that supplied the appellant with a copy. In

addition, this Court granted the appellant sixty days from the date of the entry to file a pro

se brief in support of her appeal.

{¶10} Attorney Smith filed a separate Motion to Withdraw on May 21, 2025, in

which he moved for an order withdrawing him as counsel in this matter, and further stated

that he had provided the appellant with all required files and upcoming dates and

deadlines, and that all other steps had been taken to protect the appellant’s interests in

this matter.

{¶11} The appellant did not file a pro se brief.

{¶12} The record establishes that the appellant’s counsel has satisfied the

requirements set forth in Anders. Accordingly, we review the record in this case and

determine whether any arguably meritorious issues exist, “… keeping in mind that,

‘Anders equates a frivolous appeal with one that presents issues lacking in arguable

merit. An issue does not lack arguable merit merely because the prosecution can be

expected to present a strong argument in reply or because it is uncertain whether a

defendant will prevail on the issue on appeal. ‘An issue lacks arguable merit if, on the

facts and law involved, no responsible contention can be made that it offers a basis for reversal.’ State v. Pullen, 2002-Ohio-6788, ¶ 4 (2nd Dist.); State v. Marbury, 2003-Ohio-

3242, ¶ 7-8 (2nd Dist.); State v. Chessman, 2005-Ohio-2511, ¶ 16-17 (2nd Dist.).” State

v. Moore, 2009-Ohio-1416, ¶4 (2nd Dist.).’” State v. Reynolds, 2024-Ohio-1956, ¶ 10 (5th

Dist.).

ANALYSIS

{¶13} Appellate counsel submits as a potential assignment of error that the trial

court erred when it referred to the potential imposition of a one year prison sentence on

each of the three counts to which the appellant pleaded guilty if she failed to comply with

the terms of her community control and ordered that said terms, if imposed, would be

served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of three years. Appellate counsel

submits that the potential imposition of consecutive sentences may not be supported by

the record. We disagree.

{¶14} An appellate court may vacate or modify any sentence that is not clearly

and convincingly contrary to law only if the appellate court finds by clear and convincing

evidence that the record does not support the sentence. State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-

1002, ¶ 23. “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is

more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty

as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, paragraph three of the syllabus (1954).

Thus, we may vacate or modify the appellant’s sentence only if we find by clear and

convincing evidence that the record does not support it. {¶15} The issue of consecutive sentences was discussed by the Ohio Supreme

Court in the seminal case of State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177:

On appeals involving the imposition of consecutive sentences, R.C.

2953.08(G)(2)(a) directs the appellate court “to review the record, including

the findings underlying the sentence” and to modify or vacate the sentence

“if it clearly and convincingly finds * * * [t]hat the record does not support the

sentencing court's findings under division * * * (C)(4) of section 2929.14 * *

* of the Revised Code.” But that statute does not specify where the findings

are to be made. Thus, the record must contain a basis upon which a

reviewing court can determine that the trial court made the findings required

by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before it imposed consecutive sentences.

Id. at ¶ 28. The issue was subsequently addressed by this Court in State v. Corbett, 2023-

Ohio-556 (5th Dist.):

We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in

R.C. 2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59

N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 22. In State v. Gwynne, a plurality of the Supreme Court of

Ohio held that an appellate court may only review individual felony

sentences under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, while R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)

is the exclusive means of appellate review of consecutive felony sentences.

158 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-Ohio-4761, 141 N.E.3d 169, ¶ 16-18.

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce,

modify, or vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing where we clearly

and convincingly find that either the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or

2929.20(I), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. See, also, State v.

Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.2d 659, ¶ 28;

Gwynne, supra, ¶ 16.

Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence “which will provide in

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought

to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118

(1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. “Where the degree of proof required

to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will

examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient

evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” Cross, 161 Ohio

St. at 477, 120 N.E.2d 118.

Id. at ¶24-26.

{¶16} R.C. 2929.14 specifically addresses the imposition of consecutive

sentences at subsection (C)(4):

If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of

multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison

terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender

and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness

of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,

and if the court also finds any of the following: (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses

while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised

Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part

of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of

the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses

of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime

by the offender.

{¶17} This language was applied in Corbett, supra, in which we stated:

“In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court

is required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the

sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, but

it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” State v.

Newman, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 20-CA-44, 2021-Ohio-2124, 2021 WL

2628079, ¶ 100, citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-

3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, syllabus. In other words, the sentencing court does

not have to perform “a word-for-word recitation of the language of the

statute.” Id. at ¶ 29. Therefore, “as long as the reviewing court can discern

that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences

should be upheld.” Id. If a sentencing court fails to make the findings

required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a consecutive sentence imposed is

contrary to law. Id. at ¶ 34. The trial court is not required “to give a talismanic

incantation of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings

can be found in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.”

Id. at ¶ 37.

Id. at ¶28.

{¶18} Appellate counsel sets forth as potential error the trial court’s order that the

appellant’s potential one year term of imprisonment on each of the three counts to which

she pleaded guilty be served consecutively, and submits that the potential imposition of

consecutive sentences may be in contravention of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). We disagree. Our

review of the record establishes that, in the event the appellant violates the terms of her

community control and the three-year aggregate sentence is imposed, the trial court

made the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The trial court specifically found that

consecutive sentences, if imposed, would be necessary to protect the public and punish

the appellant, would not be disproportionate to the seriousness of the appellant’s conduct

and the danger she poses to the public, and would be appropriate in light of the appellant’s

criminal history. The trial court stated:

THE COURT: Fair enough.

Ms. Slagle, the Court’s [sic] considered the purposes and principles

of sentencing set out under section 2929.11 as well as the seriousness and

recidivism factors set out under Section 2929.12. And part of the problem is that every time you’ve been arrested over the last - - jiminy - - 15 years, you

know, nothing happened to you. Diversion on your disorderly conduct;

violating a protection from ’19 dismissed; fines on violating a protection

order in 2019; disorderly conduct, 30 days in jail suspended; assault, 14

days in jail. You would think that would have gotten you to figure it out.

Another disorderly conduct with jail suspended. Another disorderly conduct

last year. Holy cow. You’ve been a walking nightmare. And then on your

pretrial release, you can’t stay away. You can’t stay off drugs. You can’t

figure out how to charge your GPS. Good Lord. You need - - if it’s an

emotional thing you need to learn how to control your emotions. And if you

can’t, then that’s what incarceration is for so that we can be protected from

people who can’t control their emotions.

Well, on that basis today - - Ms. Slagle, I’ll impose a term of three

years of community control here today. I’ll order that - - I’ll impose a 90 day

jail sentence. During your period of supervision, you will remain subject to

drug and alcohol monitoring, which means you’re subject to being tested

anytime or anyplace or anywhere by anyone. You simply cannot have a

positive test result or refusal. You will need to attend drug or alcohol

treatment program [sic] and mental health treatment program [sic] until you

are released in writing. You could have some other restrictions on your

lifestyle, such as where you live, who you live with, who you associate it

[sic], electronic monitoring or a curfew. You need to maintain some

employment. You cannot have alcoholic beverages or drugs of abuse anywhere where you’re located or be anywhere where they are, and you

need to go to as many meetings as may be recommended by your

supervising probation officer or treatment program provider. You need to

follow the usual terms and conditions set forth by Court Services for people

who are subject to supervision. The civil protection order which you have

been found in violation of continues until May 24 of 2029. You need to

comply with that. You need to reimburse Court Services for the costs of

supervision in the amount of $400, pay the costs associated with any

program you need to go to as well as other court costs or costs of

prosecution.

If you’re unable to follow through with those terms and conditions, I

would impose a term of one year in the state penitentiary on Counts 1, 3

and 5 and order they run consecutively for a three year prison sentence

after which you could be placed on a period of up to two years of post-

release control.

* * *

I find consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the

seriousness of your conduct or to the danger that you pose to the public,

and, further, that your criminal history necessitates consecutive findings.

{¶19} The trial court thus found that, in the event the appellant violates the terms

of her community control, consecutive sentences would be necessary to punish the

appellant, and further found that consecutive sentences would not be disproportionate to

the seriousness of the appellant’s conduct and the danger she poses to the public. These findings were also set forth in the trial court’s November 1, 2024, Judgment Entry

regarding the appellant’s plea and sentence.

{¶20} “[A]s long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in

the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the

findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” Bonnell, supra, at ¶ 29. In the case

sub judice, the record establishes that the trial court made the findings mandated by R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing, and incorporated said findings into its

sentencing entry. The record clearly supports the trial court’s findings regarding

sentencing, and the potential imposition of consecutive sentences in the event the

appellant violates the terms of her community control. CONCLUSION

{¶21} Based upon the foregoing, and after independently reviewing the record,

we agree with appellate counsel’s conclusion that there are no non-frivolous claims which

exist that would justify remand or review of the appellant’s conviction or sentence. We

find the appeal to be wholly frivolous under Anders. Attorney Smith’s motion to withdraw

as counsel for the appellant is hereby granted, and the judgment of the Licking County

Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.

{¶22} Costs to Appellant.

By: Baldwin, P.J.

Montgomery, J. and

Popham, J. concur.