[Cite as State v. Scott, 2016-Ohio-1480.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SANDUSKY COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. S-15-012
Appellee Trial Court No. 14 CR 830
v.
Miller L. Scott DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: April 8, 2016
*****
Thomas L. Stierwalt, Sandusky County Prosecuting Attorney, and Norman P. Solze, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Karin L. Coble, for appellant.
Miller L. Scott, pro se.
YARBROUGH, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} This is an Anders appeal. Appellant, Miller Scott, appeals the judgment of
the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him to 60 months in prison following a jury trial in which he was found guilty of one count of burglary and one
count of assault. We affirm.
A. Procedural Background
{¶ 2} This matter originated upon an indictment entered on December 1, 2014,
charging appellant with one count of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(1), a
felony of the second degree, one count of assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), a
misdemeanor of the first degree, and one count of aggravated assault in violation of R.C.
2903.12(A)(1), a felony of the fourth degree. These charges stemmed from an incident
that occurred during the early morning hours of September 11, 2014, at a home in
Fremont, Ohio. According to the indictment, appellant trespassed into the home, which
was occupied at the time, by removing a window air conditioner and entering through the
window. Upon entry, appellant proceeded to the bedroom and assaulted an occupant,
A.S., who was sleeping at the time.
{¶ 3} Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges contained in the indictment, and,
following the completion of discovery and other pretrial matters, a jury trial commenced
on March 12, 2015.
{¶ 4} At trial, the state called several witnesses. The first witness, Officer Antonio
Olvera of the Fremont Police Department, was one of the officers who responded to the
scene of the burglary on the morning in question. Upon arrival at the scene of the
burglary, Olvera noticed that the owner of the home, Pamela Decker, was standing in her
pajamas outside the home. Olvera proceeded to enter the home, where he noticed
2. appellant sitting by the doorway with his head in his hands. Appellant’s forehead was
bleeding. Olvera questioned appellant as to why his forehead was bleeding, and
appellant indicated that he was struck in the head with a table after being invited into the
house by Decker. He stated that Decker invited him to the house via text message, and
offered to show the text messages to Olvera. Olvera testified that appellant searched his
phone for the text messages, but was unable to locate them. When pressed further,
appellant stated that A.S. was the one who struck him in the head with the table.
Appellant stated that he then began to fight with A.S. At first, appellant indicated that he
entered the home through the front door. However, at the end of Olvera’s questioning,
appellant stated that Decker let him into the home through the back door.
{¶ 5} After questioning appellant, Olvera moved to a nearby bedroom where A.S.
was being held. Inside the room, Olvera noticed that A.S. had a cut on his face. When
asked about the cause of the cut on his face, A.S. told Olvera that he was assaulted by
appellant while in bed. Startled, A.S. responded by striking appellant with a coffee table,
allegedly in self-defense.
{¶ 6} After speaking with appellant and A.S., Olvera questioned Decker as to the
events that transpired earlier in the morning. Decker stated that she was in bed when she
heard appellant pounding on the window and demanding to be allowed into the home.
Decker then heard a noise, “and the next thing she knew, she saw [appellant] in the
bedroom. When [appellant] started assaulting [A.S.], that’s when she ran out.”
3. {¶ 7} During Olvera’s testimony, the state entered several photographs into
evidence. One of these photographs depicts a window air conditioner unit sitting on the
ground outside one of the windows in the home, its power cord still plugged into the wall
inside the home. Another photograph depicts damage to the window frame and debris on
the floor, consistent with the stripping of the air conditioner unit from the window.
Appellant explained that the air conditioning unit was knocked out of the window during
the fight. However, Olvera testified that no blood was found near the window. Indeed,
Olvera stated that blood was only visible inside the bedroom and around the bedroom
door, where the two were fighting when officers arrived on the scene. No blood was
found near the front door or back door.
{¶ 8} Following the completion of Olvera’s testimony, the state called A.S. to the
stand. A.S. testified that he was present at Decker’s home on the morning of the
burglary. He stated that he went into the bedroom at around midnight and fell asleep.
A.S. was awoken by the sound of pounding on a window, and he testified that he heard
appellant demanding to be allowed inside the home. Shortly thereafter, appellant entered
the bedroom. Upon entering the bedroom, appellant proceeded to punch A.S. in the nose,
causing him to roll off of the bed. The two began to wrestle and, according to A.S.,
appellant punched him “a couple times” and bit him in the forehead and cheek. The fight
then moved into the living room. Police arrived a short while later and broke up the
fight.
4. {¶ 9} When pressed on cross-examination, A.S. acknowledged that he did not see
appellant enter the home. However, A.S. maintained that he and Decker were the only
persons inside the home on the morning of the burglary. Further, A.S. stated that he and
Decker were inside the bedroom when appellant entered the home. Regarding
appellant’s contention that the air conditioner was knocked out of the living room
window during the fight, A.S. testified that he did not come into contact with the air
conditioner during the fight, which occurred on the opposite side of the room from the air
conditioner.
{¶ 10} Next, Decker took the stand. Decker recalled receiving a text message
from appellant, her ex-boyfriend, several hours prior to the burglary, in which appellant
asked to come over to her home. According to Decker, she informed appellant that she
would have to “take a rain check” because she was not feeling well. Decker testified that
she did not grant appellant permission to enter her home on the morning of the burglary.
She stated that appellant gained access to the home by removing the air conditioner from
the living room window and climbing into the home through the window. Decker
acknowledged that she did not observe appellant removing the air conditioner, but she
stated that she overheard him as he was removing the air conditioner. She also testified
that both entry doors on the home were locked at the time of the burglary.
{¶ 11} After Decker’s testimony was complete, the state rested. After appellant’s
Crim.R. 29 motion was denied, appellant took the stand and denied having entered
5. Decker’s home without permission. Specifically, appellant explained the events as
follows:
When the bars closed, I went over to [Decker’s] house. I knocked
on the door. Nobody answered. I went and knocked on the bedroom
window, and I heard her wrestling around, so I went back and I knocked on
the front door again, then she came and she opened the door, and she told
me, she said meet me in the bedroom, I’ll be right in, and she walked
toward the kitchen. When I went into the bedroom, I reached up for the
light on the overhead * * *. When I * * * reached for it, all I seen was
bright stars and somebody grabbed me in a choke hold and took their hand
and started digging in my eye trying to scratch my eye out. About this
time, I could feel like fluid running all [down] my face, and I reached back
and I grabbed him and I flipped him over. I hit him a couple times, and I
bit him, and when I bit him, he screamed, * * * and that’s when I knew it
was [A.S.], so we fought in the bedroom. I’m almost at the point of
bleeding to death [because] I’d lost so much blood, and when I came to
again, I was standing in the middle of the living room and there was a
police officer holding my arm to hold me up because I was getting ready to
fall [because] I’d lost so much blood.
{¶ 12} Regarding Decker’s assertion that the front door was locked the entire
morning, appellant insisted that the front door was previously kicked in by a neighbor
6. and never repaired. While he did not deny that the front door was locked, appellant
indicated that the damage to the door was such that it could be easily pushed open even
when locked. He also testified that he previously secured the air conditioner to the
window frame with screws at Decker’s request. At the end of direct examination,
appellant stated that Decker allowed him into the home through the front door. He
further testified that he did not enter the home through the living room window.
{¶ 13} On cross-examination, appellant could not explain why he changed his
story while responding to Olvera’s questions about how he entered the home. He stated
that he was “delirious” as a result of losing so much blood from the fight with A.S., but
he later acknowledged that he was not given any blood when he was transported to the
emergency room later in the morning.
{¶ 14} At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found appellant guilty of burglary
and assault, but not guilty of aggravated assault. The trial court proceeded to sentencing,
at which point the court found that the burglary and assault charges were subject to
merger. The state elected to proceed on the burglary count, and the trial court sentenced
appellant to 60 months in prison. Appellant timely appealed.
B. Anders Requirements
{¶ 15} Appointed counsel has filed a brief and requested leave to withdraw as
counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493
(1967). Under Anders, if, after a conscientious examination of the case, counsel
concludes the appeal to be wholly frivolous, she should so advise the court and request
7. permission to withdraw. Id. at 744. This request must be accompanied by a brief
identifying anything in the record that could arguably support the appeal. Id. In addition,
counsel must provide the appellant with a copy of the brief and request to withdraw, and
allow the appellant sufficient time to raise any additional matters. Id. Once these
requirements are satisfied, the appellate court is required to conduct an independent
examination of the proceedings below to determine if the appeal is indeed frivolous. Id.
If it so finds, the appellate court may grant counsel’s request to withdraw, and decide the
appeal without violating any constitutional requirements. Id.
{¶ 16} Having reviewed the brief filed by appellant’s counsel, we find that counsel
has satisfied the requirements set forth in Anders. Appellant has also submitted a pro se
brief. Thus, we will examine appellant’s assignments of error in addition to the
assignments of error proposed by appellant’s counsel.
C. Assignments of Error
{¶ 17} In her Anders brief, appellant’s counsel proposes the following assignments
of error:
Proposed Assignment of Error One: Appellant was denied Equal
Protection when the only African-American was struck from the jury.
Proposed Assignment of Error Two: Appellant’s counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to properly preserve the Batson error for
review.
8. Proposed Assignment of Error Three: Appellant’s convictions are
unsupported by sufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
Proposed Assignment of Error Four: The trial court erred in failing
to order a presentence investigation report, erred in sentencing appellant,
and erred in imposing the costs of court-appointed counsel.
{¶ 18} Additionally, in appellant’s pro se brief, he assigns the following errors for
our review:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE: Appellant’s Court Appointed
Counsel rendered ineffective [a]ssistance by failing to file a pre-trial motion
to suppress evidence tainted by constitutional Miranda Rights [v]iolations.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO: Appellant’s Court Appointed
Counsel rendered [i]neffective [a]ssistance by failing to seek an expert
medical opinion to the severity of hi[s] client’s [h]ead injury.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE: Appellant’s Court Appointed
Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to Prosecutor’s
[l]ayman medical testimony.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FOUR: Appellant’s Court Appointed
Counsel rendered ineffective [a]ssistance by failing to object to the
Prosecutor using recanted [h]earsay evidence in his closing arguments.
9. II. Analysis
A. Batson Challenge
{¶ 19} In counsel’s first proposed assignment of error, she argues that appellant’s
equal protection rights were violated when the trial court struck the only African
American prospective juror from the jury. In her second proposed assignment of error,
counsel contends that appellant was rendered ineffective assistance of trial counsel
because trial counsel failed to ensure the record was clear as to the racial composition of
the jury pool, thereby failing to preserve a Batson challenge for our review.
{¶ 20} “Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to be tried by a jury
selected by nondiscriminatory criteria.” State v. Johnson, 144 Ohio St.3d 518, 2015-
Ohio-4903, --- N.E.3d ----, ¶ 20, citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86, 106 S.Ct.
1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Batson, the United States Supreme Court stated that a
prosecutor may not “challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the
assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s
case against a black defendant.” Id. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
{¶ 21} Consistent with the court’s holding in Batson, a trial court must apply a
three-step analysis when confronted with a claim of racially-based challenges to jurors.
Batson at 96. Under the first step, a defendant must make a prima facie case that the
prosecutor is engaged in racial discrimination. Id. at 96-97. To do this, the party must
show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, that the peremptory challenge will
remove a member of his race from the venire, and that there is an inference of racial
10. discrimination. Hicks v. Westinghouse Materials Co., 78 Ohio St.3d 95, 98, 676 N.E.2d
872 (1997). “In determining whether a prima facie case exists, the trial court must
consider all relevant circumstances, including statements by counsel exercising the
peremptory challenge, counsel’s questions during voir dire, and whether a pattern of
strikes against minority venire members has been exhibited.” State v. Swain, 6th Dist.
Erie No. E-12-079, 2014-Ohio-1308, ¶ 17, citing Hicks at 98.
{¶ 22} If the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the next step requires the
prosecutor to provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge. Batson at 97-98.
Although a simple affirmation of good faith is not sufficient, the explanation “need not
rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.” Hicks at 98. The critical
issue is whether discriminatory intent is inherent in counsel’s use of the strike and that
the explanation is merely a pretext for excluding the potential juror on the basis of race.
Id.
{¶ 23} Finally, in the third step, the court must decide whether the defendant has
proved purposeful racial discrimination, taking all of the circumstances into
consideration. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). “In doing
so, the court must consider the circumstances of the challenge and assess the plausibility
of the prosecutor’s explanation in order to determine whether it is merely pretextual.”
Johnson, 144 Ohio St.3d 518, 2015-Ohio-4903, --- N.E.3d ----, at ¶ 21, citing Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); State v. Frazier,
115 Ohio St.3d 139, 2007-Ohio-5048, 873 N.E.2d 1263, ¶ 65. Relevant factors may
11. include “the prosecutor’s demeanor; * * * how reasonable, or how improbable, the
explanations are; and * * * whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted
trial strategy.” Miller-El at 339. “In addition, race-neutral reasons for peremptory
challenges often invoke a juror’s demeanor * * *, making the trial court’s firsthand
observations of even greater importance.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 128
S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008).
{¶ 24} When reviewing a claim of racially-motivated challenges to jurors on
appeal, we defer to the trial court’s resolution under Batson absent a showing of clear
error. State v. Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254, 2014-Ohio-4751, 23 N.E.3d 1096, ¶ 53.
{¶ 25} In this case, the trial court permitted the state to strike a prospective juror,
A.J., from the jury. According to appellate counsel, A.J. was the only African American
prospective juror, although counsel acknowledges that the record is silent as to the racial
makeup of the jury pool. During voir dire, A.J. responded in the affirmative when the
prospective jurors were asked whether they personally knew any of the witnesses. When
questioned further, A.J. informed the court that A.S., the victim of the assault, is her
uncle. She was then asked whether she would give more weight to A.S.’s testimony than
any other witness’s testimony. She responded: “Um, I guess I would be uncertain. I
don’t know, I couldn’t give you a guarantee that I would or wouldn’t.” A.J. subsequently
indicated a desire not to act as a juror since A.S. was involved in the case.
{¶ 26} At the end of voir dire, the state asked that A.J. be stricken from the jury,
opting to use one of its peremptory challenges. The state recognized that striking A.J.
12. from the jury presented a Batson issue, but insisted that its challenge was not motivated
by race. Rather, the state noted that A.J.’s uncle was a witness, and further explained that
A.J. did not wish to serve as a juror.
{¶ 27} Defense counsel did not object to the state’s use of its peremptory
challenge. Instead, defense counsel appears to have agreed with the state’s basis for
striking A.J., although the trial transcript is not completely clear on this point.
{¶ 28} Even assuming appellate counsel is correct in her assertion that A.J. was
the only African American prospective juror in this case, we find that the trial court did
not commit clear error in striking A.J. from the jury. Indeed, the state offered racially-
neutral bases for its peremptory challenge, including the preexisting relationship between
A.J. and A.S., and A.J.’s equivocation as to whether she would assign more weight to
A.S.’s testimony than the testimony given by other witnesses. Moreover, there is no
evidence in the record to suggest that the state’s explanation was pretextual.
{¶ 29} Accordingly, counsel’s first proposed assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 30} Having found no Batson violations even after assuming the validity of
counsel’s allegations that A.J. was the only African American prospective juror, it
follows that appellant cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s
failure to note A.J.’s race for the record, or to state the fact that A.J. was the only African
American prospective juror. Having failed to establish prejudice, which is a necessary
element in an ineffective assistance of counsel argument, Strickland v. Washington, 466
13. U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), we find that counsel’s second
proposed assignment of error is not well-taken.
B. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight
{¶ 31} In counsel’s third proposed assignment of error, she argues that appellant’s
convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
{¶ 32} The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that “the legal concepts of sufficiency
of the evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively
different.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). At its
core, sufficiency of the evidence is a determination of adequacy and a court must
consider whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction as a matter of law.
Id. The proper analysis is “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Williams, 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 576,
660 N.E.2d 724 (1996), quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492
(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 33} In contrast, a manifest weight challenge questions whether the state has met
its burden of persuasion. Thompkins at 387. When reviewing a manifest weight claim,
The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines
whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way
14. and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a
new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. State v. Lang, 129 Ohio
St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 220.
{¶ 34} As noted above in our recitation of the facts, appellant was convicted of
one count of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(1), and one count of assault in
violation of R.C. 2903.13(A). R.C. 2911.12 provides, in relevant part:
(A) No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of the
following:
(1) Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or
separately occupied portion of an occupied structure, when another person
other than an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose to commit
in the structure or in the separately secured or separately occupied portion
of the structure any criminal offense.
{¶ 35} We have previously stated that “the elements of burglary under R.C.
2911.12(A)(1) require the state to prove that the defendant (1) by force, stealth, or
deception (2) trespassed in an occupied structure when another person other than an
accomplice was present (3) with the purpose to commit any criminal offense therein.”
State v. Phillips, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-14-1061, 2015-Ohio-632, ¶ 13.
15. {¶ 36} Upon consideration, we find that the state introduced sufficient evidence as
to each of these elements. Regarding the force element, Decker and A.S. testified that
appellant entered the home by pulling the air conditioner from the window frame and
crawling through the window. This testimony was supported by pictures entered into
evidence showing the air conditioner lying on the ground outside the window, still
plugged into the wall, with debris inside the home that appears to be consistent with
forced entry.
{¶ 37} The trespass element was supported by Decker’s statement that she did not
grant appellant permission to enter her home on the morning of the burglary. The text
messages between appellant and Decker, which were entered into evidence, indicate that
Decker did not wish for appellant to come to her house because she was not feeling well.
{¶ 38} Finally, Decker’s testimony contained sufficient evidence to meet the
purpose element. Decker stated that appellant, while knocking on the bedroom window,
told her that she would need to call the police if she did not allow him inside the home,
suggesting that he was going to commit a criminal offense once inside.
{¶ 39} Turning to appellant’s conviction for assault, R.C. 2903.13(A) states that
“[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to
another’s unborn.” The evidence in this case clearly demonstrates that a fight occurred
between A.S. and appellant, a fact that appellant did not deny in his testimony at trial.
While appellant testified that he was not the aggressor in this fight, both Decker and A.S.
16. refuted this testimony when they stated that appellant punched A.S. while A.S. was
sleeping in Decker’s bedroom.
{¶ 40} Viewing the foregoing evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
burglary and assault proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, having weighed the
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, and having considered the credibility of
the witnesses, we find that this is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction. Accordingly, counsel’s third proposed assignment of
error is not well-taken.
C. Sentencing Issues
{¶ 41} In her fourth proposed assignment of error, counsel argues that the trial
court erred at sentencing by failing to order a presentence investigation report, imposing
the costs of court-appointed counsel, and sentencing appellant to 60 months in prison.
{¶ 42} First, counsel argues that the trial court erred in failing to order the
preparation of a presentence investigation report prior to sentencing. Crim.R. 32.2
provides: “In felony cases the court shall, and in misdemeanor cases the court may, order
a presentence investigation and report before imposing community control sanctions or
granting probation.” Further, R.C. 2929.19 requires that the court consider the
presentence investigation report, “if one was prepared,” and R.C. 2951.03 prevents the
imposition of community control until a written presentence investigation report has been
reviewed by the court. Where it has been determined that a defendant is not eligible for
17. community control, the trial court does not err in refusing to order a presentence
investigation report. State v. Cyrus, 63 Ohio St.3d 164, 166, 586 N.E.2d 94 (1992).
{¶ 43} According to the sentencing transcript, the court refused to order a
presentence investigation report based upon its finding that a prison sentence was
warranted and that appellant was not amenable to community control. Thus, we find no
merit to counsel’s argument concerning the trial court’s refusal to order a presentence
investigation report.
{¶ 44} Next, counsel argues that the trial court erred in ordering appellant to pay
the costs of court-appointed counsel under R.C. 2941.51(D), which provides, in relevant
part:
The fees and expenses approved by the court under this section shall
not be taxed as part of the costs and shall be paid by the county. However,
if the person represented has, or reasonably may be expected to have, the
means to meet some part of the cost of the services rendered to the person,
the person shall pay the county an amount that the person reasonably can be
expected to pay.
{¶ 45} Here, the trial court specifically found that appellant had the ability to pay
the costs of his court-appointed counsel. This finding was supported by appellant’s
testimony at trial that he was currently employed, which was reiterated by counsel at
sentencing. Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s imposition of costs for court-
appointed counsel.
18. {¶ 46} Finally, we turn to counsel’s argument that the trial court, in sentencing
appellant, did not comply with the sentencing requirements outlined in the Revised Code.
{¶ 47} We review felony sentences under the two-prong approach set forth in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2). R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that an appellate court may increase,
reduce, modify, or vacate and remand a disputed sentence if it clearly and convincingly
finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings
under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of
section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,
whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶ 48} Having reviewed the record at the sentencing hearing and the subsequent
judgment entry, we find that the trial court adhered to the statutory sentencing
requirements. Since appellant was convicted of burglary, a felony of the second degree,
R.C. 2929.13(B), which governs sentencing for fourth and fifth degree felonies, does not
apply. Moreover, the court specifically found that appellant was not amenable to
community control. Consequently, a presumption in favor of prison time was applicable
under R.C. 2929.13(D). R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(e) and (C)(4) are inapplicable here as
appellant is not a repeat violent offender and the court did not impose consecutive
sentences. Likewise, R.C. 2929.20(I), relating to hearings on motions for judicial release,
does not apply in this case.
19. {¶ 49} Regarding the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11
and the sentencing factors contained in R.C. 2929.12, we note that the trial court did not
expressly indicate its consideration of these statutes. However, the court demonstrated its
consideration of the principles and purposes of sentencing when it stated the following at
the sentencing hearing: “My obligation is to attempt to protect the public from future
crime and to craft an appropriate punishment for * * * your behavior.” Further, we have
stated that “[a] sentencing court is not required to use any specific language to
demonstrate that it considered the applicable seriousness and recidivism factors under
R.C. 2929.12.” State v. Williams, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-12-039, 2014-Ohio-2693,
¶ 8, citing State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000). Indeed, the
Supreme Court of Ohio has stated: “where the trial court does not put on the record its
consideration of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, it is presumed that the trial court gave proper
consideration to those statutes.” State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912,
896 N.E.2d 124, ¶ 18, fn. 4, citing State v. Adams, 37 Ohio St.3d 295, 525 N.E.2d 1361
(1988), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 50} Turning to whether appellant’s sentence was contrary to law, we note that
appellant’s 60-month prison sentence was within the acceptable range of punishment for
a felony of the second degree. R.C. 2929.14(A)(2). Thus, we find that the sentence was
not contrary to law.
20. {¶ 51} In light of the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err in its
imposition of sentence in this case. Accordingly, counsel’s fourth proposed assignment
of error is not well-taken.
D. Appellant’s Pro Se Ineffective Assistance Arguments
{¶ 52} In each of appellant’s pro se assignments of error, he contends that he
received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
{¶ 53} In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must
satisfy the two-prong test developed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). That is, appellant must show counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and a reasonable probability exists
that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id.
at 687-688, 694.
{¶ 54} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence that was obtained during law
enforcement’s initial questioning of appellant at Decker’s home. Appellant contends that
this evidence should have been suppressed since Olvera did not inform him of his
Miranda rights prior to questioning him.
{¶ 55} Concerning the applicability of Miranda warnings, the Supreme Court of
Ohio has stated: “the requirement that police officers administer Miranda warnings
applies only when a suspect is subjected to both custody and interrogation.” State v.
Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325, 2012-Ohio-1008, 964 N.E.2d 1037, ¶ 24. In other words,
21. “Miranda rights only attach when both custody and interrogation coincide.” State v.
Tellington, 9th Dist. No. 22187, 2005-Ohio-470, ¶ 8, citing State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d
71, 83, 571 N.E.2d 97 (1991). The appropriate inquiry for determining if an individual
has been placed in custody is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave. State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d
413, 429, 653 N.E.2d 253 (1995), citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554,
100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).
{¶ 56} Here, appellant was not in custody during Olvera’s questioning. Indeed,
appellant advances no argument and points to no facts that would suggest that he was not
free to leave during Olvera’s initial questioning. Thus, appellant’s Miranda rights did not
attach. Accordingly, appellant’s trial counsel was not incompetent for failing to file a
motion to suppress based on Olvera’s failure to advise appellant of his Miranda rights.
{¶ 57} Furthermore, we find that appellant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different had trial counsel
filed a motion to suppress. Even after excluding the evidence obtained by Olvera during
his conversation with appellant, the testimony provided by A.S. and Decker, coupled with
the photographs taken at Decker’s home on the morning of the burglary, provides ample
evidence to support appellant’s convictions and refute his trial testimony. Accordingly,
appellant’s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 58} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to introduce expert testimony as to the severity of the head
22. injury he sustained during his fight with A.S. “[D]ecisions, such as the calling of
witnesses, are within the purview of defense counsel’s trial tactics.” State v. Lugli, 6th
Dist. Erie No. E-01-032, 2003-Ohio-479, ¶ 23, citing State v. Coulter, 75 Ohio App.3d
219, 230, 598 N.E.2d 1324 (12th Dist.1992). Thus, we find no merit to appellant’s
contention that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert witness to
establish the severity of his head injury. Moreover, appellant does not offer any
explanation as to how his head injury impacted the outcome of this case. Therefore, his
second assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 59} In his third assignment of error, appellant urges that his trial counsel was
ineffective insofar as counsel failed to object to the state’s layman medical testimony.
{¶ 60} Having reviewed the record in its entirety, we fail to find any instances in
which the witnesses called by the state at trial offered medical testimony. Contrary to
appellant’s assertions, no medical opinions requiring an expert were provided by the state
in this case, and appellant fails to identify any such opinions in the record. Accordingly,
appellant’s third assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 61} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant asserts that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the state’s use of “recanted hearsay evidence” during
closing arguments. Specifically, appellant objects to the state’s use of Decker’s statement
that appellant entered her home and assaulted A.S., despite her further clarification that it
was dark inside the bedroom. Appellant appears to be asserting that the state should not
have been permitted to reference Decker’s statement that appellant assaulted A.S.
23. because the reliability of that statement was in question in light of Decker’s testimony
that it was hard to see in the bedroom because of poor lighting. What is unclear from
appellant’s brief is how these statements constituted hearsay. In any event, appellant has
once again failed to indicate how he was prejudiced by the state’s use of such statements
during closing arguments. Thus, we find no merit to appellant’s contention that trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to object during the state’s closing arguments.
{¶ 62} Accordingly, appellant’s fourth assignment of error is not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 63} This court, as required under Anders, has undertaken our own examination
of the record to determine whether any issue of arguable merit is presented for appeal.
We have found none. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
{¶ 64} The judgment of the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs are hereby assessed to appellant in accordance with App.R. 24. The clerk is
ordered to serve all parties, including the defendant if he has filed a brief, with notice of
this decision.
Judgment affirmed.
24. State v. Scott C.A. No. S-15-012
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________ JUDGE Thomas J. Osowik, J. _______________________________ Stephen A. Yarbrough, J. JUDGE CONCUR. _______________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.
25.