IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2021-NCCOA-314
No. COA19-250-2
Filed 6 July 2021
Alamance County, No. 13 CRS 3976
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
WILLIAM LEE SCOTT
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 July 2018 by Judge Paul C.
Ridgeway in Alamance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15
October 2019. A divided panel of this Court found no prejudicial error in defendant’s
conviction by opinion filed 21 January 2020. State v. Scott, 269 N.C. App. 457, 838
S.E.2d 676 (2020). By opinion filed 16 April 2021, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina remanded to this Court “to apply the proper standard and review this
matter[.]” State v. Scott, __ N.C. __, 2021-NCSC-41, ¶ 11 (2021).
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Kathryne E. Hathcock, for the State.
M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant-appellant.
TYSON, Judge.
¶1 The Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded this case to this Court to
determine whether the State has carried its burden to prove and to apply a harmless STATE V. SCOTT
Opinion of the Court
error beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review to Defendant’s claim of
constitutional error. Defendant’s blood had been unlawfully seized from a hospital
where Defendant was treated following an auto collision. This Court previously
concluded the admission of blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) search results of
Defendant’s blood was error. On remand, we determine whether the State has proved
the Fourth Amendment seizure violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
I. Fourth Amendment Search
¶2 The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States guarantees
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme
Court of the United States observed:
[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 919 (1966). “The
[Fourth] Amendment thus prohibits ‘unreasonable searches,’ . . . [and] the taking of
a blood sample . . . is a search.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, ___, 195 L.
Ed. 2d 560, 575 (2016); see also State v. Romano, 369 N.C. 678, 685, 800 S.E.2d 644, STATE V. SCOTT
649 (2017) (“drawing blood . . . constitutes a search under both the Federal and North
Carolina Constitutions.”).
¶3 The Supreme Court of the United States also concluded: “The reasonableness
of a search depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and
purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable
privacy expectations.” Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310, 191 L. Ed. 2d 459
(2015) (per curiam). Blood tests: (1) “require piercing the skin and extract[tion of] a
part of the subject’s body”; (2) are “significantly more intrusive than blowing into a
tube”; and (3) place in the hands of law enforcement “a sample that can be preserved
and from which it is possible to extract information beyond a simple BAC reading.”
Birchfield, 579 U.S. at ___, 195 L. Ed. 2d at 565-66 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
¶4 Without probable cause, exigent circumstances, or an exception to the warrant
requirement, a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. This Court unanimously agreed Defendant’s
constitutional rights were violated. State v. Scott, 269 N.C. App. 457, 465, 838 S.E.2d
676, 681 (2020), rev’d, __ N.C. __, 2021-NCSC-41 (2021). See U.S. Const. amend. IV;
State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 587, 342 S.E.2d 789, 794 (1986) (interpreting the
balancing test set forth in Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–72, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 919-20, as
“forbidding law enforcement authorities acting without a search warrant from STATE V. SCOTT
requiring a defendant to submit to the drawing of a blood sample unless probable
cause and exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless seizure of the blood
sample”).
¶5 This Court also unanimously agreed Defendant’s motion to suppress should
have been allowed. Scott, 269 N.C. App. at 465, 838 S.E.2d at 681. The order
resulting in the production of the blood to the State was not based on either probable
cause or exigent circumstances. Id. at 464–65, 838 S.E.2d at 681.
¶6 We previously concluded Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated
by law enforcement officers, compelling the production and seizure of his blood from
the hospital without a warrant. We review whether the State has proved the
subsequent introduction of evidence obtained from the State Bureau of Investigation
laboratory’s analysis of Defendant’s blood and its admission at trial, was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. Standard of Review
¶7 Upon remand, the State must show, and this Court applies a harmless error
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review. The standard of review for federal
constitutional errors applies to this case. See State v. Ortiz-Zape, 367 N.C. 1, 13, 743
S.E.2d 156, 164 (2013) (“When violations of a defendant’s rights under the United
States Constitution are alleged, harmless error review functions the same way in
both federal and state courts.” (quoting State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 513, 723 STATE V. SCOTT
S.E.2d 326, 331 (2012)); State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392, 399, 364 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1988)
(“[If] the search violated defendant’s constitutional rights and . . . the evidence . . .
was improperly admitted at trial, we find any such error in its admission harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 594, 652 S.E.2d 216,
222 (2007).
¶8 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b) “reflects the standard of prejudice with regard
to violation of the defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United States, as
set out in the case of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 705 (1967).”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443 official cmt. (2019). The burden falls “upon the State to
demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1443(b) (2019); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630, 123 L.
Ed. 2d 353, 367 (1993); Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; 17 L. Ed. 2d at 710-11; Lawrence,
365 N.C. at 513, 723 S.E.2d at 331. “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be
held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2021-NCCOA-314
No. COA19-250-2
Filed 6 July 2021
Alamance County, No. 13 CRS 3976
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
WILLIAM LEE SCOTT
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 23 July 2018 by Judge Paul C.
Ridgeway in Alamance County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15
October 2019. A divided panel of this Court found no prejudicial error in defendant’s
conviction by opinion filed 21 January 2020. State v. Scott, 269 N.C. App. 457, 838
S.E.2d 676 (2020). By opinion filed 16 April 2021, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina remanded to this Court “to apply the proper standard and review this
matter[.]” State v. Scott, __ N.C. __, 2021-NCSC-41, ¶ 11 (2021).
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Kathryne E. Hathcock, for the State.
M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant-appellant.
TYSON, Judge.
¶1 The Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded this case to this Court to
determine whether the State has carried its burden to prove and to apply a harmless STATE V. SCOTT
Opinion of the Court
error beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review to Defendant’s claim of
constitutional error. Defendant’s blood had been unlawfully seized from a hospital
where Defendant was treated following an auto collision. This Court previously
concluded the admission of blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) search results of
Defendant’s blood was error. On remand, we determine whether the State has proved
the Fourth Amendment seizure violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
I. Fourth Amendment Search
¶2 The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States guarantees
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme
Court of the United States observed:
[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 919 (1966). “The
[Fourth] Amendment thus prohibits ‘unreasonable searches,’ . . . [and] the taking of
a blood sample . . . is a search.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, ___, 195 L.
Ed. 2d 560, 575 (2016); see also State v. Romano, 369 N.C. 678, 685, 800 S.E.2d 644, STATE V. SCOTT
649 (2017) (“drawing blood . . . constitutes a search under both the Federal and North
Carolina Constitutions.”).
¶3 The Supreme Court of the United States also concluded: “The reasonableness
of a search depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and
purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable
privacy expectations.” Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310, 191 L. Ed. 2d 459
(2015) (per curiam). Blood tests: (1) “require piercing the skin and extract[tion of] a
part of the subject’s body”; (2) are “significantly more intrusive than blowing into a
tube”; and (3) place in the hands of law enforcement “a sample that can be preserved
and from which it is possible to extract information beyond a simple BAC reading.”
Birchfield, 579 U.S. at ___, 195 L. Ed. 2d at 565-66 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
¶4 Without probable cause, exigent circumstances, or an exception to the warrant
requirement, a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. This Court unanimously agreed Defendant’s
constitutional rights were violated. State v. Scott, 269 N.C. App. 457, 465, 838 S.E.2d
676, 681 (2020), rev’d, __ N.C. __, 2021-NCSC-41 (2021). See U.S. Const. amend. IV;
State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 587, 342 S.E.2d 789, 794 (1986) (interpreting the
balancing test set forth in Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–72, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 919-20, as
“forbidding law enforcement authorities acting without a search warrant from STATE V. SCOTT
requiring a defendant to submit to the drawing of a blood sample unless probable
cause and exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless seizure of the blood
sample”).
¶5 This Court also unanimously agreed Defendant’s motion to suppress should
have been allowed. Scott, 269 N.C. App. at 465, 838 S.E.2d at 681. The order
resulting in the production of the blood to the State was not based on either probable
cause or exigent circumstances. Id. at 464–65, 838 S.E.2d at 681.
¶6 We previously concluded Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated
by law enforcement officers, compelling the production and seizure of his blood from
the hospital without a warrant. We review whether the State has proved the
subsequent introduction of evidence obtained from the State Bureau of Investigation
laboratory’s analysis of Defendant’s blood and its admission at trial, was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. Standard of Review
¶7 Upon remand, the State must show, and this Court applies a harmless error
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review. The standard of review for federal
constitutional errors applies to this case. See State v. Ortiz-Zape, 367 N.C. 1, 13, 743
S.E.2d 156, 164 (2013) (“When violations of a defendant’s rights under the United
States Constitution are alleged, harmless error review functions the same way in
both federal and state courts.” (quoting State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 513, 723 STATE V. SCOTT
S.E.2d 326, 331 (2012)); State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392, 399, 364 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1988)
(“[If] the search violated defendant’s constitutional rights and . . . the evidence . . .
was improperly admitted at trial, we find any such error in its admission harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 594, 652 S.E.2d 216,
222 (2007).
¶8 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b) “reflects the standard of prejudice with regard
to violation of the defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United States, as
set out in the case of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 705 (1967).”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443 official cmt. (2019). The burden falls “upon the State to
demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1443(b) (2019); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630, 123 L.
Ed. 2d 353, 367 (1993); Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; 17 L. Ed. 2d at 710-11; Lawrence,
365 N.C. at 513, 723 S.E.2d at 331. “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be
held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 708; see also
Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 267, 192 L. Ed. 2d 323, 332-33 (2015); N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-1443(b).
III. Harmless Error Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
¶9 This Court allowed and received supplemental briefing on this issue from both
parties. The State argues any error in the introduction and admission of the blood STATE V. SCOTT
evidence and the results of BAC testing performed on the blood was harmless error
beyond a reasonable doubt. The State argues other overwhelming evidence was
properly admitted into evidence to show both: (1) Defendant was passing another
vehicle at a high rate of speed in a no passing zone; and, (2) his admission he was
driving recklessly and grossly speeding at and near the time of the collision with
Veocia Warren’s vehicle. The State asserts this evidence independently supports the
jury’s conclusion to prove the malice required for a conviction of second-degree
murder by a motor vehicle to support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 10 The State also argues Defendant’s multiple prior convictions for impaired
driving and speeding show knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake independently
support the verdict and prove the introduction of the blood evidence was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court also instructed the jury disjunctively that
to convict, it must find “the defendant drove while impaired, and or drove in excess
of the posted speed limit, and or drove recklessly.” (emphasis supplied).
¶ 11 The trial court stated, “I’m not sure what the evidence of impairment is. You
know, there will be a motion to dismiss at the end of the State’s case. And as I
understand the case, it rises or falls on the blood evidence.” As the trial court
predicted, this Court and the Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed, “[t]he first
and only indication of Defendant’s intoxication were results of tests on Defendant’s STATE V. SCOTT
blood samples taken from the hospital and tested over a week later at the SBI
laboratory.” Scott, 269 N.C. App. at 463, 838 S.E.2d at 680.
¶ 12 No person involved in the accident or investigation suspected Defendant was
impaired. No one noticed any odor of alcohol on his breath, slur in his speech, nor
any other signs of impairment at the scene of the collision, while being transported
to the hospital, while at the hospital, nor at the home interview with officers after his
release.
¶ 13 The State’s evidence overcomes a motion to dismiss based upon Defendant’s
speeding and reckless driving and his prior record to show malice. This showing does
not end the inquiry. The State has not carried its burden to prove the admission of
the blood evidence to demonstrate the federal constitutional error is “harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 513, 723 S.E.2d at 331 (citation
omitted). See N.C.P.I. -- Crim. 206.32A (2010).
¶ 14 The jury returned a general verdict form that did not specify the specific
ground or grounds upon which it found to support malice. The day prior to trial, the
State dismissed the misdemeanor death by vehicle count. The State proceeded to
trial with the second-degree murder and felony death by vehicle charges. After the
jury’s guilty verdicts on both charges, the trial court arrested judgment on the felony
death by vehicle charge.
IV. Conclusion STATE V. SCOTT
¶ 15 The State presented sufficient evidence to survive Defendant’s motion to
dismiss. The State failed to carry its burden to demonstrate the constitutional error
in the admission of the blood evidence was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 513, 723 S.E.2d at 331. We vacate Defendant’s conviction for
second-degree murder, the trial court’s judgment entered thereon, and remand for a
new trial. It is so ordered.
NEW TRIAL.
Judges GORE and GRIFFIN concur.