State v. Schwin

26 N.W. 568, 65 Wis. 207, 1886 Wisc. LEXIS 199
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 2, 1886
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 26 N.W. 568 (State v. Schwin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Schwin, 26 N.W. 568, 65 Wis. 207, 1886 Wisc. LEXIS 199 (Wis. 1886).

Opinion

ObtoN, J.

This is an action brought to recover the per diem forfeiture for the continuance of an encroachment upon Salisbury street, in Yandercook’s addition to the village of Newburg, after the service of the proper order of the town supervisors to remove the same. It is provided in sec. 3295, R. S., that it shall be sufficient [in such an action] to allege in the complaint that the defendant is' indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of the forfeiture claimed, according to the provisions of the statute which imposes it, specifying the section and chapter containing such statute.” Sec. 1330, R. S., provides for the supervisors making an order that the [210]*210occupant of the land, through which the street runs, and to which any fence, building, or fixture shall be appurtenant, to remove the same beyond the limits of the highway within thirty days; and s.ec. 1331 imposes the forfeiture in case of tire non-removal of the same. Sec. 1330 contains provisions preliminary to the imposition of the forfeiture contained in sec. 1331, and relating to the same subject matter, and may be said to be a part of the provisions imposing the forfeiture as necessary conditions of it; but strictly the latter section only can be said to impose the penalty. The complaint was framed evidently to meet the requirement of the above sec. 3295 by referring to the section imposing the forfeiture, but it referred only to sec. 1330. The defendant’s counsel moved that the plaintiff furnish a bill of particulars, which in such an action was tantamount to a motion to make the complaint more definite and certain, and thereupon the complaint was amended by the following allegations, namely: “Plaintiff states that the penalty or forfeiture named in the complaint has become due from the defendant from and on account of an enci’oachment upon a highway known as £ Salisbury street,’ situated in the village of Newburg, in said town of Trenton.” The defendant answered, denying the existence of any legal street at the place of the encroachment, and setting up adverse possession of twenty years of the locus m quo.

On the trial the defendant objected to any evidence under the complaint, because it did not state a cause of action. The first exception is to the overruling of that objection. The learned counsel of the appellant contends that the complaint, in not referring to the section imposing the forfeiture, stated no cause of action. The amendment, however, did state substantially a cause of action without reference to the section, and if the defendant was not satisfied with it because it did not describe the particular place [211]*211m the street encroached upon, and the time when, etc., he should have moved that it be made more definite and certain in these respects. But wé think, with all due deference to learned counsel of the appellant,.and to his clear and critical discussion of the law of pleading, that the amendment, in connection with the first complaint, makes it clearly evident that the reference to sec. 1330, instead of the next section, 1331, was a mere clerical error, readily detected, and could deceive no one. The main object of pleading is to apprise the opposite party of the facts upon which the action or defense is founded, that he may be prepared to- meet them. In addition to the fact that the complaint as amended must have been intended to refer to the section imposing the penalty for an encroachment upon a highway, the defendant had been already fully apprised, by the order of the board of supervisors served upon him, of all the particulars of said encroachment, and knew that the suit was instituted on account of his refusal to obey said order. The objection, therefore, was merely technical, and was properly overruled, and was afterwards obviated, if necessary, by the correction of the clerical error in the complaint, and by the verdict, which were made to refer to sec. 1331 and the previous section also.

In order to prove a record dedication to the public of Salisbury street, the record of the plat of Yandercook’s addition to the village of Newburg, and th'e recorded plat of the village of Newburg to which the addition was made, were offered in evidence by the plaintiff. The defendant objected to the introduction of the first-mentioned plat on the ground of the want of the proper certificate and acknowledgment. No specific objections were made to the original plat. In addition to these plats, the plaintiff introduced considerable evidence tending to show the dedication of this particular street by evidence in pais; such as the making of deeds by the proprietor, describing lots and blocks [212]*212in. accordance with, the plat of the addition, and the existence of fences and buildings along such street, and some other physical monuments indicating its location, and acts of estoppel on the part of the defendant in recognition of said street. By the authorities referred to by the learned counsel of the appellant there can be no doubt that the true rule is that such evidence in pans to show dedication should have been submitted to the jury. Not so, however, as to the record evidence by the plat. It is the province of the court to decide whether the law has been complied with in making such plat; and, if correctly made, it is sufficient evidence of the dedication, and the court may properly so charge the jury, and order a verdict. This case, therefore, rests upon the legality of the plat of the addition, and the location of the street thereon; for the court ordered a verdict for the plaintiff, and if the plat was fatally defective, and not sufficient evidence of dedication, it was error to have taken the question of dedication by acts in pans, away from the jury. The court admitted the plat as sufficiently certified and acknowledged, and, if this was correct, then he had the right to instruct the jury to find for the plaintiff, so far as the question of dedication is concerned.

But there was another important question depending upon the plat, and that was the location, dimensions, and identity of Salisbury street in respect to the encroachment. This question was also taken from the jury, and if such location, dimensions, and identity of the street can be ascertained from an inspection of the plats alone, it was a proper question to be decided by the court; but if it cannot, and depended upon the evidence of user and practical location introduced, then it was error to have ordered a verdict for the plaintiff so far as this question was concerned also. So that these are two important questions upon this appeal.

First, then, as to the certificate and acknowledgment of the plat. The statement made by the surveyor, which was [213]*213offered as a sufficient certificate, appears to be explicit and full as to all necessary facts of the survey, dimension of streets and lots, and other facts. The statute only requires that when the plat is made it shall be certified by the surveyor. That statement is a sufficient certificate under,sec. 4, ch. 41, R. S. 1849, under which the plat was made, in all respects except in name. It fails to state, “It is hereby cer-tifiedP To “ certify ” is “to testify to in writing“ to make known or establish as a fact.” "Webst. Diet. This statement complies with the meaning of the word “ certificate,” and is therefore a certificate in substance, and that is sufficient.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
26 N.W. 568, 65 Wis. 207, 1886 Wisc. LEXIS 199, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-schwin-wis-1886.