[Cite as State v. Schaaf, 2019-Ohio-196.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
PREBLE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2018-03-004
: OPINION - vs - 1/22/2019 :
GABRIEL R. SCHAAF, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM PREBLE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 17-CR-12359
Martin P. Votel, Preble County Prosecuting Attorney, Preble County Courthouse, 101 East Main Street, Eaton, Ohio 45320, for appellee
Nicole L. Rutter-Hirth, 2541 Shiloh Springs Road, Dayton, Ohio 45426, for appellant
RINGLAND, J.
{¶ 1} Gabriel Schaaf appeals from his convictions in the Preble County Court of
Common Pleas for aggravated murder, murder, and tampering with evidence. For the
reasons discussed below, this court affirms Schaaf's convictions.
{¶ 2} At approximately 5:45 p.m. on December 27, 2016, Schaaf called 9-1-1 and
reported that he had arrived home from work to find his son – 29 year-old Jonathan Schaaf –
dead in their home. Police arrived on scene and found Jonathan deceased and covered with Preble CA2018-03-004
a towel. He was face down with his head in a pool of blood. He had suffered multiple sharp
and blunt force injuries to the head, back of his neck, and upper back.
{¶ 3} Schaaf denied involvement in Jonathon's death. He told police that Jonathon
was asleep on the couch when he left for work that morning. When he returned he found a
door ajar and noticed some items out of place. Schaaf provided the investigating detectives
with potential leads on various individuals who may have wanted to harm his son.
{¶ 4} Police considered Schaaf the primary suspect in Jonathon's death.
Nonetheless, they investigated Schaaf's leads over the next six months, none of which
resulted in any furtherance of the investigation. In February 2017, detectives called Schaaf
and left him a message asking if he would speak with them about the case. Schaaf returned
the call, leaving a voicemail stating that he spoke to an attorney who told him not to talk to
the detectives. Oddly, Schaaf ended the message by telling police they could call him, or his
attorney, if they had any questions.
{¶ 5} Several months later, detectives again called Schaaf and asked if he would
speak with them concerning the death investigation. Schaaf told detectives if they wanted to
talk they would need to come to him.
{¶ 6} On June 8, 2017, detectives travelled to Schaaf's home. There they observed
Schaaf cutting his grass on a riding lawn mower. The detectives then interviewed Schaaf for
approximately one hour while he sat on the lawn mower. Detectives recorded the interview in
an audio format.
{¶ 7} The detectives confronted Schaaf with inconsistencies in his earlier statements
and the evidence revealed in the investigation. They urged Schaaf to admit his involvement
in Jonathon's homicide and suggested that the homicide could be justified if done in self-
defense. About 25 minutes into the interview, Schaaf revealed that he had been in a
physical altercation with Jonathon on December 26, 2016. In addition, Schaaf admitted that -2- Preble CA2018-03-004
he struck Jonathon several times with a hatchet.
{¶ 8} The detectives placed Schaaf under arrest and transported him to the police
station. Schaaf executed a written waiver of his Miranda rights at the station before
submitting to a second interview, which was recorded in video format.
{¶ 9} A grand jury subsequently indicted Schaaf for tampering with evidence, a
violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), murder, a violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), and aggravated
murder, a violation of R.C. 2903.01(A).
{¶ 10} The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The state introduced the testimony of the
detectives and a coroner. The state also introduced audio and video recordings of Schaaf's
statements including his initial 9-1-1 call, an interview with a responding police officer at the
crime scene, the "lawn mower" interview, and the post-arrest interview at the police station.
Schaaf rested without introducing evidence but argued self-defense in closing. The court
instructed the jury on self-defense.
{¶ 11} The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts. The court sentenced
Schaaf to 25 years to life in prison. Schaaf raises three assignments of error in this appeal.
{¶ 12} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 13} SCHAAF WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO THE PROSECUTION
COMMENTING ON SCHAAF INVOKING HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND RIGHT TO
COUNSEL.
{¶ 14} Schaaf argues that the state deprived him of a fair trial when the prosecutor,
during voir dire, stated that there would be no trial if there was no dispute as to what occurred
between Schaaf and Jonathon. Schaaf also argues that the state deprived him of a fair trial
when a detective testified that Schaaf told the police he would not speak to them on the
advice of counsel. Schaaf concedes that he did not object to either claimed instance of error
and is limited to a review for plain error. -3- Preble CA2018-03-004
{¶ 15} Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Plain error
exists where there is an obvious deviation from a legal rule that affected the defendant's
substantial rights by influencing the outcome of the proceedings. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio
St.3d 21, 27 (2002). "Plain error does not exist unless it can be said that but for the error, the
outcome of the trial would clearly have been otherwise." State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426,
436 (1997). This court should notice plain error with the utmost caution, under exceptional
circumstances and only to prevent a miscarriage of justice. State v. Widmer, 12th Dist.
Warren No. CA2011-03-027, 2012-Ohio-4342, ¶ 84.
{¶ 16} To demonstrate that the state deprived him of a fair trial, Schaaf must
demonstrate that the prosecutor's comments or actions were improper and prejudicially
affected his substantial rights. See State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St. 3d 515, 2006-Ohio-6207, ¶
62. In making such a determination, the focus is upon the fairness of the trial, not upon the
culpability of the prosecutor. State v. Gray, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-176, 2012-Ohio-
4769, ¶ 57. A finding of prosecutorial misconduct will not be grounds for reversal unless the
defendant can establish that he has been denied a fair trial because of the prosecutor's
actions. See State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2017-02-013, 2017-Ohio-7540, ¶ 29.
During voir dire, the prosecutor stated:
Does everyone understand that if everyone in this room agreed about what happened on December 26th, 2016, there wouldn't be a need for a trial? In other words, there likely will be a conflict of evidence in this case. Is there anyone who doesn't understand that?
And is there anyone who for any reason does not feel that they could be part of that function of a trier of fact and separate what they think the truth is and what they think the lies are and reach a fair and impartial verdict?
{¶ 17} These statements were appropriate and accurately relayed to jurors that facts
-4- Preble CA2018-03-004
are contested in every trial. The remarks appeared designed to prepare jurors for the unique
task of resolving conflicts in evidence in rendering a verdict. The questions posed by the
prosecutor were neutrally phrased and did not insinuate that only a guilty or dishonest
individual would seek a trial.
{¶ 18} Next, Schaaf argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting
testimony from a detective concerning Schaaf's right to remain silent. During direct
examination, the prosecutor asked the detective what the status of the police investigation
was prior to Schaaf's admission to involvement in the homicide. The detective's response
explained the various reasons why law enforcement focused its effort on Schaaf as the
primary suspect. Those reasons included that the killer had draped a towel over the body,
indicating a personal relationship with Jonathon, that the blood on scene appeared
coagulated and inconsistent with Schaaf's timeline, Schaaf's demeanor, his failure to contact
law enforcement for updates on the investigation for over two weeks following the death, and
Schaaf's cancellation of a police interview. With respect to this cancellation, the detective
stated that Schaaf called and left a voice message stating that he had talked to his attorney,
who advised him not to speak to the police.
{¶ 19} The use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt
violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Leach, 102 Ohio
St.3d 135, 2004-Ohio-2147, syllabus. In Leach, the Ohio Supreme Court held, in limited
circumstances, testimony concerning pre-arrest silence is appropriate if it is introduced as
evidence of the "course of the investigation." Id. at ¶ 32. The court concluded that while it
was improper to admit the investigator's direct testimony regarding the defendant's decision
to exercise his right to silence through the invocation of counsel over the telephone, the
investigator's testimony regarding the defendant's failure to keep his scheduled appointment
with the police was "legitimate." Id. -5- Preble CA2018-03-004
{¶ 20} In this case, detective's testimony on direct examination concerning Schaaf
cancelling an appointment based on his attorney's advice not to speak with police was the
state's use of pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of appellant's guilt and was error.1
However, assuming a Fifth Amendment violation occurred, this court would not find that
Schaaf was deprived of a fair trial. As will be addressed below, the murder verdicts were
supported by substantial evidence of Schaaf's guilt. Compare Leach at ¶ 29 (noting that the
defendant was convicted on no physical evidence and only on the credibility of the state's
complaining witnesses). Moreover, any error would be harmless because jurors were aware
that Schaaf later voluntarily agreed to speak with police and provided them with his version of
events wherein he set forth his claim of self-defense. This court overrules Schaaf's first
assignment of error.
{¶ 21} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 22} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING SCHAAF'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS AND ALLOWING INCULPATORY STATEMENTS TO BE ADMITTED DESPITE
SCHAAF INVOKING HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND NOT BEING ADMINISTERED
MIRANDA WARNINGS.
{¶ 23} Schaaf argues that the trial court should have suppressed both the "lawn
mower" interview and his subsequent interview at the police station. Schaaf contends that
police should not have questioned him during the lawn mower interview without first advising
him of his Miranda rights because he was in "custody" during the interview as police were
"badgering" him during questioning. Schaaf also contends that police should not have
questioned him at all because he had earlier invoked his right to remain silent. Schaaf
argues that his statements during the interview at the police station are fruit of the poisonous
1. To be clear, there is no indication that the prosecutor intended to elicit this testimony. The detective provided a lengthy response to a general question. -6- Preble CA2018-03-004
tree.
{¶ 24} This court's review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Cochran, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2006-
10-023, 2007-Ohio-3353, ¶ 12. Acting as the trier of fact, the trial court is in the best position
to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. Therefore, when reviewing the
denial of a motion to suppress, a reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court's findings
of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. "An appellate court, however,
independently reviews the trial court's legal conclusions based on those facts and
determines, without deference to the trial court's decision, whether as a matter of law, the
facts satisfy the appropriate legal standard." Id. at ¶ 12.
{¶ 25} The state may not use a defendant's statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation, unless the state demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. State v.
Durham, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2013-03-023, 2013-Ohio-4764, ¶ 15. However, the police
are not required to administer the warnings set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86
S.Ct. 1602 (1966), to every individual they question. State v. Byrne, 12th Dist. Butler Nos.
CA2007-11-268 and CA2007-11-269, 2008-Ohio-4311, ¶ 10, citing Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d at
440; Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711 (1977). Rather, the "duty to
advise a suspect of constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda is only required when the police
subject a person to a custodial interrogation." State v. Fridley, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
CA2016-05-030, 2017-Ohio-4368, ¶ 35.
{¶ 26} "Miranda defines custodial interrogation as any 'questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of any action in any significant way.'" (Emphasis deleted.) State v. Matthews, 12th
Dist. Butler No. CA2012-09-175, 2013-Ohio-3482, ¶ 10, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. -7- Preble CA2018-03-004
"In determining whether an individual was in custody during an interrogation by the police, the
court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation." State v.
Gomez, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2017-03-035, 2017-Ohio-8681, ¶ 20, citing State v.
Robinson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-01-013, 2015-Ohio-4533, ¶ 12. The determination
of whether a custodial interrogation has occurred "depends on the objective circumstances of
the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or
the person being questioned." State v. Coleman, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2001-10-241, 2002
Ohio App. LEXIS 1985, *11-12 (Apr. 29. 2002), citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318,
323-324, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (1994). Therefore, "[i]n judging whether an individual has been
placed into custody the test is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a 'reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.'" State v. Gumm, 73 Ohio St.3d
413, 429 (1995), quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870
(1980).
{¶ 27} At the suppression hearing, a detective testified that he and his partner drove to
Schaaf's home in an unmarked police vehicle. Both detectives wore plain clothes with
tactical vests. They observed Schaaf in his yard cutting the grass on a riding lawn mower.
{¶ 28} The detectives motioned for Schaaf to come over to them. Schaaf did not
immediately drive over but made a few more passes with the mower. Eventually, he drove
over to the detectives, turned the mower engine off, and sat on it while they asked him
questions.
{¶ 29} The detectives stood about 15 feet from Schaaf while questioning him. The
interview lasted around 50 minutes. Audio of the interview demonstrates that the detectives
did not threaten Schaaf nor did Schaaf sound confused or disoriented. Schaaf was not
placed into handcuffs until the interview was complete and after he had made inculpatory
statements. -8- Preble CA2018-03-004
{¶ 30} This court finds that the trial court's determination that Schaaf was not in police
custody during the lawn mower interview was supported by competent and credible evidence.
Consequently, this court finds that police were not required to provide Schaaf with Miranda
warnings before the lawn mower interview commenced. Schaaf's statements were voluntary
and admissible.
{¶ 31} Next, Schaaf argues that the detectives should not have conducted the lawn
mower interview because he had earlier invoked his right to counsel. The United States
Supreme Court has held that "[a]n accused * * * having expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
at 484-485. However, the Edwards rule applies only if the accused invokes his right to an
attorney while in custody. Coleman, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1985 at *10, citing United States
v. Harris, 961 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
{¶ 32} Schaaf was not in police custody in February 2017 when he informed
detectives by phone that he had been advised against speaking to them by an attorney. For
the reasons just discussed, Schaaf was also not in police custody during the lawn mower
interview. Accordingly, Schaaf had no Fifth Amendment right to counsel during the lawn
mower interview that the detectives could have violated by questioning him. Schaaf was free
to ignore the advice of his attorney and speak to police. Based on the foregoing, the trial
court also did not err in overruling Schaaf's motion to suppress his statements at the police
station. Consequently, this court overrules Schaaf's second assignment of error.
{¶ 33} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 34} THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED
MURDER. -9- Preble CA2018-03-004
{¶ 35} Schaaf argues that his convictions for murder and aggravated murder were
supported by insufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The concept of legal sufficiency of the evidence refers to whether the conviction can be
supported as a matter of law. State v. Everitt, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2002-07-070, 2003-
Ohio-2554, ¶ 10. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must
examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed,
would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
relevant inquiry is whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found all the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph
two of the syllabus.
{¶ 36} To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, a reviewing court must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in
resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Bradbury, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-111, 2016-Ohio-5091, ¶ 17. An appellate
court will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence only in
extraordinary circumstances when the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of
acquittal. Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶ 37} The aggravated murder count required the state to prove that Schaaf purposely
caused Jonathon's death "with prior calculation and design." R.C. 2903.01(A). Schaaf
argues that there was insufficient evidence to support this element because there was no
evidence that he planned Jonathon's homicide. Instead, the evidence reflected a mutual
combat between father and son which culminated in Schaaf delivering fatal blows in self- - 10 - Preble CA2018-03-004
defense.
{¶ 38} There is no bright-line test to determine whether prior calculation and design
are present; each case must be decided on a case-by-case basis. State v. Adams, 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2009-11-293, 2011-Ohio-536, ¶ 23.
Where evidence adduced at trial reveals the presence of sufficient time and opportunity for the planning of an act of homicide to constitute prior calculation, and the circumstances surrounding the homicide show a scheme designed to implement the calculated decision to kill, a finding by the trier of fact of prior calculation and design is justified.
State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325, ¶ 61.
{¶ 39} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the state provided sufficient evidence of
prior calculation and design where, during a robbery, the defendant placed a gun to the
forehead of a cooperative and unresisting store clerk, who was standing with his hands
above his head, and pulled the trigger, instantly killing the clerk. State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio
St.3d 331, 344 (1999). Following the murder, the defendant did not flee the store. Instead,
the defendant then placed the gun to the forehead of another store clerk and ordered him to
go to the store safe. Id.
{¶ 40} The court explained that the defendant's decision to place a gun against the
victim's forehead required thought. That the defendant took some additional time to decide
to pull the trigger showed calculation. The court held that these facts, coupled with the
defendant's actions following the killing, demonstrated that the murder was in furtherance of
the defendant's robbery scheme and was not a spur-of-the-moment accidental shooting. Id.
{¶ 41} The Ohio Supreme Court also found prior calculation and design where the
defendant was a participant in a planned robbery at an apartment. State v. Jackson, 92 Ohio
St.3d 436 (2001). During the robbery, the defendant struck a victim with a handgun, placed a
pillow behind her head and threatened to kill her. Id. at 436. The victim begged to be
- 11 - Preble CA2018-03-004
spared, and the defendant did not kill her. Next, the defendant ordered two other victims to
lie on the floor next to one another. The defendant then told his accomplice that these prone
victims knew who he was, and he would have to kill them. Id. One at a time, the defendant
placed a pillow against the head of the victims, hesitated, then pulled the trigger, killing both.
Id. at 436-437.
{¶ 42} The court noted that the defendant's actions again did not demonstrate a spur-
of-the-moment decision to kill. Instead, the evidence indicated that the defendant decided to
kill the defendants execution-style after he realized they recognized him, and the defendant
took time to retrieve a pillow from the couch to effectuate his calculated plan. Id. at 442.
{¶ 43} Schaaf's recorded statements to police establish that he struck Jonathon
several times on the head with a door dowel. This action rendered Jonathon unconscious,
breathing, and face down on the ground. Schaaf was aware that Jonathon was still alive but
also knew that he was "not okay." Schaaf then retrieved a hatchet. He next swung the
hatchet multiple times at the back of Jonathon's neck and shoulders. The coroner's
testimony and photographs introduced into evidence graphically demonstrated that the blows
were delivered with such force that Jonathon was essentially decapitated. Schaaf admitted
in his interview at the police station that his purpose in using the hatchet was to make sure
that Jonathon was "finished off," ostensibly so that "he wouldn't suffer."
{¶ 44} This court concludes that the evidence in this case, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to allow the jury to find prior calculation and
design. Reasonable jurors could find that Schaaf had time and opportunity to plan
Jonathon's homicide between rendering him unconscious with the dowel and the ultimate act
of killing. This is demonstrated by Schaaf observing Jonathon's failing medical state
following the dowel attack, his subsequent retrieval of a specific weapon, and the decision to
employ massive force and repeated blows to ensure that Jonathon was, in Schaaf's words, - 12 - Preble CA2018-03-004
"finished off." Schaaf's description of using the hatchet for the alleged reason of ending
Jonathon's suffering does not indicate a spur-of-the-moment killing during a mutual combat
scenario but rather a calculated choice.
{¶ 45} Next, Schaaf argues that the jurors lost their way in finding that he did not act in
self-defense. Self-defense, in a deadly force scenario, is an affirmative defense that requires
a defendant to prove three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: "(1) the defendant
was not at fault in creating the violent situation, (2) the defendant had a bona fide belief that
he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape
was the use of force, and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid
the danger." State v. Goff, 128 Ohio St.3d 169, 176, 2010-Ohio-6317, ¶ 36, citing State v.
Thomas, 77 Ohio St.3d 323, 326 (1997).
{¶ 46} Upon review, this court does not find that the jury lost its way in finding that
Schaaf did not meet his burden on self-defense. Schaaf did not testify or otherwise present
any evidence. But a self-defense case was nonetheless presented to jurors through the lawn
mower interview and his subsequent statements at the police station. Jurors were free to find
Schaaf not credible for a variety of reasons, including the absence of any self-defense type
injuries on his body, his failure to contact police immediately after the homicide, his casual
demeanor contacting 9-1-1 and speaking to a first-responding officer after reporting his son's
death, and his deliberate deception during the ensuing police investigation. Consequently,
Schaaf's murder convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the
manifest weight of the evidence and this court overrules the third assignment of error.
{¶ 47} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
- 13 -