State v. Scaife

608 N.W.2d 163, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 225, 2000 WL 272193

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: March 14, 2000
• Docket: C5-99-1769
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge.

Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the trial court’s imposition of a stay of adjudication. Because the required special circumstances for such a stay did not exist, we reverse.

FACTS

Respondent James Scaife’s driving privileges were cancelled in April 1997, apparently due to a driving while intoxicated (DWI) approximately 15 to 20 years ago in Wisconsin. In September 1997, Scaife was stopped for driving after cancellation. Scaife failed to appear at his initial pretrial date, a warrant was issued and executed, and Scaife then appeared on August 16, 1999, for a jury trial in Dakota County. Scaife had three prior driving after withdrawal (DAW) convictions, but had maintained a current driver’s license since 1998. Scaife stated that if he went to jail or lost his driver’s license, he would lose his construction job. The trial court accepted Scaife’s guilty plea, sentenced him to serve 4 days in the Dakota County Jail with credit for time served, 16 days of electronic home monitoring with work release privileges, one year of probation, a fíne of $390, and stayed adjudication over the prosecution’s objection.

ISSUE

Did the trial court act within its authority by staying adjudication in this case?

ANALYSIS

While “a prosecutor has broad discretion in the exercise of the charging function,” State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 540 (Minn.1996), stays of adjudication are within a trial court’s “inherent judicial power” and are appropriate in “special circumstances.” State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Minn.1996). The trial court’s inherent judicial power to impose a stay of adjudication is to be used “sparingly and only for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the prosecutor’s dear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.” Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541 (emphasis in original).

It is evident the trial court, in deciding upon a stay of adjudication, relied upon Scaife’s statement that he needed his driver’s fícense in order to work. The possibility that a defendant might lose a job as a result of a conviction is not a “special circumstance” justifying a stay of adjudication over the prosecutor’s objection. See State v. Twiss, 570 N.W.2d 487, 487 (Minn.1997) (holding that “possibility that defendant might lose job if convicted of gross misdemeanor malicious punishment of a child was not a special circumstance”). The trial court’s desire to prevent the collateral consequence of a loss of a driver’s license “does not by itself constitute ‘special circumstances’ warranting a stay of adjudication.” State v. Thoma, 569 N.W.2d 205, 209 (Minn.App.1997), aff'd mem. 571 N.W.2d 773 (Minn.1997). Whatever the reason for the cancellation of Scaife’s driver’s license, there is no evidence that the prosecutor has abused his discretion in charging respondent. And under Minnesota caselaw, the loss of a job and the loss of a driver’s license are not sufficient “special circumstances” to justify a stay of adjudication over the prosecutor’s objection. The trial court exceeded its authority in staying adjudication in this case.

DECISION

The district court erred in staying adjudication based on Scaife’s loss of his driver’s license and subsequent possible loss of his employment, which did not constitute “special circumstances.”

Reversed.