State v. Savage

Court of Appeals of Georgia

State v. Savage

439 S.E.2d 738, 211 Ga. App. 512, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 4566, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1552

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedDecember 3, 1993

DocketA93A1177

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 439 S.E.2d 738 (State v. Savage) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State v. Savage, 439 S.E.2d 738, 211 Ga. App. 512, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 4566, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1552 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).

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McMurray, Presiding Judge.

Defendant Savage was charged by accusation with driving under the influence of alcohol. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress the results of an intoximeter test, finding that the arresting police officer failed to show that he had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop of the vehicle. The State appeals from that order, contending that the trial court erred in finding that the stop was unauthorized.

Shortly past 2:00 a.m. on Thursday, May 21, 1992, Officer Smith was on foot patrol in a “known drug area.” Smith observed defendant driving a truck through the area several times over a 15-minute period. After seeing the truck three times, Smith observed the truck pull over to the curb and stop. A pedestrian approached the passenger side of the truck, spoke briefly with defendant and made a gesture which alerted defendant to the officer’s presence. Apparently, defendant drove away after being alerted to the presence of Officer Smith. Smith radioed another officer who was also patrolling the area and told him to stop the truck if he saw it. Pursuant to this request, a traffic stop was made of the truck which resulted in the charge of [513]*513driving under the influence of alcohol against defendant.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Smith testified that he did not observe the truck violate any traffic laws. He also testified that he thought that defendant “was involved in a drug purchase due to observations he has made in past situations.”

In our view, Officer Smith had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity so that the stop of defendant was authorized under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889). Although the trial court found that Officer Smith did not observe any exchange of goods or money, nor view any frantic movement or immediate flight, defendant’s actions of bringing to a halt what had been transpiring between him and the person with whom he was engaged, and distancing himself from that person and from the police when alerted to the latter’s presence, was an objective manifestation of guilt.

There is no significant distinction between the facts in the case sub judice and those in other cases wherein we have held that flight upon the approach of patrolling police officers in high crime areas provided articulable suspicion for a Terry stop. Harris v. State, 205 Ga. App. 813 (1), 814 (423 SE2d 723). The trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.

Judgment reversed.

Pope, C. J., Cooper and Andrews, JJ., concur. Beasley, P. J., concurs specially. Birdsong, P. J., Johnson, Blackburn and Smith, JJ., dissent.

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McMurray, Presiding Judge.

Defendant Savage was charged by accusation with driving under the influence of alcohol. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress the results of an intoximeter test, finding that the arresting police officer failed to show that he had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop of the vehicle. The State appeals from that order, contending that the trial court erred in finding that the stop was unauthorized.

Shortly past 2:00 a.m. on Thursday, May 21, 1992, Officer Smith was on foot patrol in a “known drug area.” Smith observed defendant driving a truck through the area several times over a 15-minute period. After seeing the truck three times, Smith observed the truck pull over to the curb and stop. A pedestrian approached the passenger side of the truck, spoke briefly with defendant and made a gesture which alerted defendant to the officer’s presence. Apparently, defendant drove away after being alerted to the presence of Officer Smith. Smith radioed another officer who was also patrolling the area and told him to stop the truck if he saw it. Pursuant to this request, a traffic stop was made of the truck which resulted in the charge of [513]*513driving under the influence of alcohol against defendant.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Smith testified that he did not observe the truck violate any traffic laws. He also testified that he thought that defendant “was involved in a drug purchase due to observations he has made in past situations.”

In our view, Officer Smith had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity so that the stop of defendant was authorized under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889). Although the trial court found that Officer Smith did not observe any exchange of goods or money, nor view any frantic movement or immediate flight, defendant’s actions of bringing to a halt what had been transpiring between him and the person with whom he was engaged, and distancing himself from that person and from the police when alerted to the latter’s presence, was an objective manifestation of guilt.

There is no significant distinction between the facts in the case sub judice and those in other cases wherein we have held that flight upon the approach of patrolling police officers in high crime areas provided articulable suspicion for a Terry stop. Harris v. State, 205 Ga. App. 813 (1), 814 (423 SE2d 723). The trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.

Judgment reversed.

Pope, C. J., Cooper and Andrews, JJ., concur. Beasley, P. J., concurs specially. Birdsong, P. J., Johnson, Blackburn and Smith, JJ., dissent.

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Bluebook (online)

439 S.E.2d 738, 211 Ga. App. 512, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 4566, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1552, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-savage-gactapp-1993.

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