WUEST, Chief Justice.
Defendant, Rosendo Saiz, appeals his conviction on various drug charges. We affirm.
In January, 1987, the Butte County Sheriff and State’s Attorney received information from a confidential informant that defendant had possession of one-half ounce of cocaine. According to the informant, the drugs would either be on defendant’s person, in his red Chevrolet pickup, or in his Belle Fourche trailer home.
The sheriff and the state’s attorney prepared affidavits in support of a search warrant. The sheriff’s affidavit described the place to be searched and the items to be seized and further stated that the informant was “reliable.” The state’s attorney’s affidavit stated that the informant had been “trustworthy and accurate” in the past.
The sheriff and the state’s attorney presented the affidavits to a circuit judge who issued a search warrant. A search conducted pursuant to the warrant disclosed hashish, nine grams of cocaine, and drug paraphernalia.
After a suppression hearing, the trial court determined the search warrant was invalid. The trial court, however, held the evidence was admissible under the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), reh’g denied, 468 U.S. 1250, 105 S.Ct. 52, 82 L.Ed.2d 942 (1984).
After a trial to the court, defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to thirty days for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, six years in the State Penitentiary for possession of a controlled substance, and five years for keeping a place for use or sale of controlled substances. He was also adjudged a habitual offender.
Defendant now claims the trial court found the search warrant invalid for the wrong reason. The State, however, did not appeal that decision, and since the trial court determined the issue in favor of de[826]*826fendant, we consider the matter moot and decline to discuss the probable cause issue. The only meritorious issue on appeal is whether the trial court should have applied the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule adopted in Leon.
Defendant attacks the “good faith” ruling of the trial court on two grounds. He first points out that, as this court established in State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1976), the South Dakota Constitution furnishes a supplemental source of individual rights that may afford greater protection than the federal constitution. He then contends that the “good faith” exception should not be applied to Article VI, § 11 of the South Dakota Constitution. Defendant further argues that even if we hold that the exception applies under Article VI, § 11, the trial court’s ruling should be overturned because the “good faith” requirement has not been met in this case as to either the state or the federal constitutions.
The exclusionary rule has been embroiled in controversy since it was first adopted in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). Much of that controversy has centered on the purposes of the rule.
One school of thought takes the view that the exclusionary rule should be limited to situations where it deters police from conducting illegal searches. Under this view, the rule should not apply where the rule’s societal costs outweigh its marginal or nonexistent deterrent value in certain cases. Central to this position is that the admission of illegally seized evidence does not constitute an independent Fourth Amendment violation. This school of thought has prevailed in the more recent Fourth Amendment cases that have witnessed the ascendency of the “police deterrence rationale” for the exclusionary rule and a partial narrowing of the scope of the rule. See Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986); Note, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 27 B.C.L.REV. 609 (1986).
The opposing school takes a broader view, asserting that the purpose of the rule is to restrain the government as a whole. This unitary view adopts the position taken in early cases that each branch of government is a part of a single prosecution network and that no important distinction exists between the procuring of evidence by law enforcement and its admission by the courts. Central to this position is the concept introduced in Weeks that the admission of illegally seized evidence is a separate Fourth Amendment violation. See Dripps, supra; Note, supra.
This latter approach continually expanded the exclusionary rule. Since 1974, however, the United States Supreme Court has begun to recognize that such bending application of the exclusionary rule departs from the underlying purpose for which the rule was created. We believe the analysis in Leon and its related cases has properly refocused on the purpose behind the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule is not a “necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 905, 104 S.Ct. at 3411, 82 L.Ed.2d at 687. The exclusionary rule operates as a judicially created remedy designed to deter illegal police conduct and thereby safeguard Fourth Amendment rights. It was not created as a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 S.Ct. at 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d at 687; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571 (1974).
Whether a search conducted pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights is an issue separate from the question whether the remedial exclusionary sanction should apply in a particular case. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 S.Ct. at 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d at 688; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2324, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 538-39 (1983). The latter question involves a balancing of the costs of the exclusionary rule with its deterrent value in various situations. Leon, 468 U.S. at 909-10, 104 S.Ct. at 3413, 82 L.Ed.2d at 689-90.
One consequence of the exclusionary rule is that there is an interference with the criminal justice system’s truth-finding [827]*827function. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08, 104 S.Ct. at 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d at 688-89. “[A]ny rule of evidence that denies the jury-access to clearly probative and reliable evidence must bear a heavy burden of justification, and must be carefully limited to the circumstances in which it will pay its way by deterring official lawlessness.” Id. at n. 6 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 257-58, 103 S.Ct. at 2342, 76 L.Ed.2d at 561 (White, J., concurring in judgment)).
“Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.” An objectionable collateral consequence of this interference with the criminal justice system’s truth-finding function is that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains.
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WUEST, Chief Justice.
Defendant, Rosendo Saiz, appeals his conviction on various drug charges. We affirm.
In January, 1987, the Butte County Sheriff and State’s Attorney received information from a confidential informant that defendant had possession of one-half ounce of cocaine. According to the informant, the drugs would either be on defendant’s person, in his red Chevrolet pickup, or in his Belle Fourche trailer home.
The sheriff and the state’s attorney prepared affidavits in support of a search warrant. The sheriff’s affidavit described the place to be searched and the items to be seized and further stated that the informant was “reliable.” The state’s attorney’s affidavit stated that the informant had been “trustworthy and accurate” in the past.
The sheriff and the state’s attorney presented the affidavits to a circuit judge who issued a search warrant. A search conducted pursuant to the warrant disclosed hashish, nine grams of cocaine, and drug paraphernalia.
After a suppression hearing, the trial court determined the search warrant was invalid. The trial court, however, held the evidence was admissible under the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), reh’g denied, 468 U.S. 1250, 105 S.Ct. 52, 82 L.Ed.2d 942 (1984).
After a trial to the court, defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to thirty days for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, six years in the State Penitentiary for possession of a controlled substance, and five years for keeping a place for use or sale of controlled substances. He was also adjudged a habitual offender.
Defendant now claims the trial court found the search warrant invalid for the wrong reason. The State, however, did not appeal that decision, and since the trial court determined the issue in favor of de[826]*826fendant, we consider the matter moot and decline to discuss the probable cause issue. The only meritorious issue on appeal is whether the trial court should have applied the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule adopted in Leon.
Defendant attacks the “good faith” ruling of the trial court on two grounds. He first points out that, as this court established in State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1976), the South Dakota Constitution furnishes a supplemental source of individual rights that may afford greater protection than the federal constitution. He then contends that the “good faith” exception should not be applied to Article VI, § 11 of the South Dakota Constitution. Defendant further argues that even if we hold that the exception applies under Article VI, § 11, the trial court’s ruling should be overturned because the “good faith” requirement has not been met in this case as to either the state or the federal constitutions.
The exclusionary rule has been embroiled in controversy since it was first adopted in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). Much of that controversy has centered on the purposes of the rule.
One school of thought takes the view that the exclusionary rule should be limited to situations where it deters police from conducting illegal searches. Under this view, the rule should not apply where the rule’s societal costs outweigh its marginal or nonexistent deterrent value in certain cases. Central to this position is that the admission of illegally seized evidence does not constitute an independent Fourth Amendment violation. This school of thought has prevailed in the more recent Fourth Amendment cases that have witnessed the ascendency of the “police deterrence rationale” for the exclusionary rule and a partial narrowing of the scope of the rule. See Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986); Note, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 27 B.C.L.REV. 609 (1986).
The opposing school takes a broader view, asserting that the purpose of the rule is to restrain the government as a whole. This unitary view adopts the position taken in early cases that each branch of government is a part of a single prosecution network and that no important distinction exists between the procuring of evidence by law enforcement and its admission by the courts. Central to this position is the concept introduced in Weeks that the admission of illegally seized evidence is a separate Fourth Amendment violation. See Dripps, supra; Note, supra.
This latter approach continually expanded the exclusionary rule. Since 1974, however, the United States Supreme Court has begun to recognize that such bending application of the exclusionary rule departs from the underlying purpose for which the rule was created. We believe the analysis in Leon and its related cases has properly refocused on the purpose behind the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule is not a “necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 905, 104 S.Ct. at 3411, 82 L.Ed.2d at 687. The exclusionary rule operates as a judicially created remedy designed to deter illegal police conduct and thereby safeguard Fourth Amendment rights. It was not created as a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 S.Ct. at 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d at 687; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571 (1974).
Whether a search conducted pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights is an issue separate from the question whether the remedial exclusionary sanction should apply in a particular case. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 S.Ct. at 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d at 688; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2324, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 538-39 (1983). The latter question involves a balancing of the costs of the exclusionary rule with its deterrent value in various situations. Leon, 468 U.S. at 909-10, 104 S.Ct. at 3413, 82 L.Ed.2d at 689-90.
One consequence of the exclusionary rule is that there is an interference with the criminal justice system’s truth-finding [827]*827function. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08, 104 S.Ct. at 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d at 688-89. “[A]ny rule of evidence that denies the jury-access to clearly probative and reliable evidence must bear a heavy burden of justification, and must be carefully limited to the circumstances in which it will pay its way by deterring official lawlessness.” Id. at n. 6 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 257-58, 103 S.Ct. at 2342, 76 L.Ed.2d at 561 (White, J., concurring in judgment)).
“Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.” An objectionable collateral consequence of this interference with the criminal justice system’s truth-finding function is that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains. Particularly when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.... Accordingly, “[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.”
Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08, 104 S.Ct. at 3412-13, 82 L.Ed.2d at 688-89 (citations omitted).
The balancing approach “forcefully suggest[s] that the exclusionary rule be more generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in a reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 909, 104 S.Ct. at 3413, 82 L.Ed.2d at 689 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 255, 103 S.Ct. at 2341, 76 L.Ed.2d at 559 (White, J., concurring in judgment)). The question whether the exclusionary sanction should apply in a particular case “must be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-07, 104 S.Ct. at 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d at 688.
The exclusionary rule was adopted to deter unlawful searches by police, not to punish the errors of magistrates and judges. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 3429, 82 L.Ed.2d 737, 745 (1984) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 263, 103 S.Ct. at 2346, 76 L.Ed.2d at 565 (White, J., concurring in judgment)); Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 104 S.Ct. at 3417, 82 L.Ed. 2d at 694. Judges and magistrates are not adversary law enforcement officers but are neutral and detached judicial officers with no stake in the outcome of a criminal prosecution. Leon, 468 U.S. at 917, 104 S.Ct. at 3417, 82 L.Ed.2d at 695. If the exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect, the exclusion must alter the behavior of police officers and their departments. If the remedial sanction does not have that effect, it will not meet its stated purpose. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918, 104 S.Ct. at 3418, 82 L.Ed.2d at 695.
In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. “[Ojnce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.” Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 921, 104 S.Ct. at 3419, 82 L.Ed.2d at 697 (citations omitted).
The benefits of suppressing evidence “obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. at 3420, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698. In such cases, the exclusionary rule should not apply-
However, this does not mean that exclusion is always inappropriate where an offi[828]*828cer has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms. “[T]he officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable.” Id. The question for the reviewing court is “whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” Id. at n. 23.
The Supreme Court in Leon noted four situations in which the good faith exception will not apply. Suppression will be an appropriate remedy “if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698-99. See also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). The exception will also not apply in cases where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d at 699. See also Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979). “Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d at 699 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 263-64, 103 S.Ct. at 2345-46, 76 L.Ed.2d at 564-65 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2265, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 431 (Powell, J., concurring in part)). “Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized — that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d at 699.
The four situations can be easily summarized. “In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. at 3422, 82 L.Ed.2d at 700-01.
Under both the South Dakota and the United States Constitutions, illegally seized evidence generally must be suppressed. The Supreme Court, however, has determined that evidence is admissible when police officers reasonably rely on a warrant that is subsequently invalidated because a judge finds there was an insufficient basis for the issuing magistrate to find probable cause. The Leon decision has been extensively critiqued. See Mis-ner, Limiting Leon: A Mistake of Law Analogy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 507 (1986); Comment, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule and the Development of State Constitutional Law, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 377; Dripps, supra; Note, supra. Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment question in this case is controlled by Leon. Furthermore, we find the Leon case persuasive and adopt its reasoning under the South Dakota Constitution Art. VI, § 11 as far as that case has been applied and limited.
In the present case, the officers acted reasonably under both the South Dakota and the United States Constitutions in relying on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. The trial court, in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, made the following findings of fact:
IX — That the Judge acted in a neutral and detached manner when he issued the search warrant.
‡ >fe * * Jje *
XVI — That the writers of the affidavits were not reckless in preparing their affidavits nor were they dishonest in the information supplied to the Judge.
XVII — That the officers who searched the Defendant’s premises and the writers of the affidavits reasonably believed that the search warrant issued by the judge was valid.
XVIII — That the officers who searched and the writers of the affidavits reason[829]*829ably believed that probable cause existed and that the search would uncover evidence of a crime, namely narcotics.
XVIX — -That the search warrant appeared on its face to be proper in all respects and the form of the warrant was technically sufficient.
Based on these findings, we believe the trial court was correct in admitting the evidence under the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. The facts in this case do not fall within any of the four limitations imposed upon the good faith exception by the Supreme Court in Leon. Contrary to argument made by the defendant, it cannot be argued that the affidavits so lacked probable cause as to render official belief in the validity of the warrant entirely unreasonable.
Judgment affirmed.
MORGAN and MILLER, JJ., concur.
HENDERSON, J., concurs with a writing.
SABERS, J., dissents.