State v. Ronald Strickland

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedJuly 24, 1997
Docket02C01-9608-CC-00290
StatusPublished

This text of State v. Ronald Strickland (State v. Ronald Strickland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Ronald Strickland, (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

DECEMBER 1996 SESSION FILED July 24, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr. STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Appellate C ourt Clerk ) Appellee, ) No. 02C01-9608-CC-00290 ) ) Tipton County v. ) ) Hon. Joseph H. Walker, Judge ) RONALD WAYNE STRICKLAND,) (Aggravated Sexual Battery) ) Appellant. )

For the Appellant: For the Appellee:

Frank Deslauriers Charles W. Burson P.O. Box 1156 Attorney General of Tennessee Covington, TN 38019 and Deborah A. Tullis Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Elizabeth T. Rice District Attorney General and Walt Freeland Assistant District Attorney General 302 Market Street Somerville, TN 38068

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED

Joseph M. Tipton Judge OPINION

The defendant, Ronald Wayne Strickland, was convicted of aggravated

sexual battery, a Class B felony, pursuant to a guilty plea in the Tipton County Circuit

Court. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to eight years in the

Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, he contends that the trial court

erred when it concluded that he was not eligible to be sentenced under the Community

Corrections Act. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant contends that he is eligible for a community corrections

sentence under the special needs provision of the Community Corrections Act of 1985,

T.C.A. § 40-36-106(c). 1 That section states:

Felony offenders not otherwise eligible under subsection (a), and who would be usually considered unfit for probation due to histories of chronic alcohol, drug abuse, or mental health problems, but whose special needs are treatable and could be served best in the community rather than in a correctional institution may be considered eligible for punishment in the community under the provisions of this chapter.

T.C.A. § 40-36-106(c). The defendant acknowledges that this court has interpreted the

phrase “who would be usually considered unfit for probation” to mean that a defendant

must be otherwise eligible for probation to qualify to receive a sentence under this

provision. State v. Staten, 787 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). However, he

argues that the 1993 amendments to T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a) and T.C.A. § 40-36-

106(e)(3) change the law in a way that a defendant with special needs is now eligible

for a community corrections sentence even if he is initially ineligible for probation.

Under T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a), a defendant is eligible for probation if his

sentence is eight years or less and he is not convicted of aggravated sexual battery or

one of the other enumerated offenses. In 1993, the legislature added a sentence to the

1 Having been convicted of aggravated sexual battery, a crime against a person, the defend ant does not otherw ise qu alify for a com m unity corrections s ente nce . See T.C.A. § 40-36- 106(a)(2).

2 statute which states, “A defendant shall also be eligible for probation pursuant to § 40-

36-106(e)(3).” In relevant part, T.C.A. § 40-36-106(e)(3) grants the trial court the

authority to place an offender that it terminates from a community corrections program

on probation. “This authority of the court extends to offenders not originally eligible for

probation after service of at least one (1) year.” T.C.A. § 40-36-106(e)(3). The

defendant argues that under these provisions, a community corrections sentence must

be available to a defendant who is initially ineligible for probation.

Although we agree with the defendant that some offenders who are

initially ineligible for probation are eligible for a community corrections sentence, see

T.C.A. § 40-36-106(a), we do not believe that the 1993 amendments to T.C.A. § 40-36-

106(3) and T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a) were intended to alter the requirements a defendant

must meet to fit within the special needs provision. To qualify to be sentenced pursuant

to T.C.A. § 40-36-106(c), a defendant must be eligible for probation. Staten, 787

S.W.2d at 936. The amendments do not address qualifying under this subsection.

Thus, having been convicted of an offense for which probation is statutorily prohibited,

the defendant does not meet this requirement. See T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a).

In addition to his statutory argument, the defendant relies on State v.

Robert Bryant Rhodes, No 03C01-9405-CR-00174, Blount County, slip op. at 7 (Tenn.

Crim. App. July 20, 1995), to support his contention that he is eligible for a community

corrections sentence. Rhodes, convicted of rape, was not eligible for probation

because he received a sentence greater than eight years. See T.C.A. § 40-36-

106(e)(3). This court concluded that he was ineligible for a community corrections

sentence for the sexual offense under T.C.A. § 40-36-106(a)(2), but also added,

“absent a showing that he has special needs that can best be treated in the

community.” It concluded, though, that such needs were not proven.

3 Although Rhodes indicates that a defendant who is ineligible for probation

because of the length of his sentence may be eligible to be sentenced under the special

needs provision of the Community Corrections Act, the defendant does not fit within this

category. Unlike Rhodes, the defendant in this case was convicted of an offense for

which probation is statutorily prohibited. See T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a). In any event, the

language from Rhodes upon which the defendant relies has not been followed by this

court. Other opinions have failed to recognize any distinction between ineligibility for

probation due to the crime committed and ineligibility because of the length of the

sentence imposed. See State v. Lanny Crowe, No. 01-C-01-9503-CC-00064, Wayne

County, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Staten
787 S.W.2d 934 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, 1989)
State v. Boston
938 S.W.2d 435 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
State v. Ronald Strickland, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-ronald-strickland-tenncrimapp-1997.