State v. Robinson

72 S.E.2d 857, 236 N.C. 408, 1952 N.C. LEXIS 564

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: November 5, 1952
• Docket: 290
• Status: Published

Opinion

'WiNboeNe, J.

Decision on tbis appeal as to the issue of paternity turns upon tbe answer to tbis question: Does tbe granting of a motion under G.S. 15-173 for judgment of nonsuit, or verdict of not guilty in a criminal prosecution, charging defendant witb willful neglect or refusal to support and maintain bis illegitimate child, constitute a negative finding on tbe issue of paternity? If so, tbe plea of former acquittal set up by defendant would be well taken. But if not, then tbe plea of former acquittal must fail. And in tbe light of tbe statutes, G.S. 49-2, G.S. 49-7, as interpreted and applied in decisions of tbis Court, we are of opinion, and bold that such judgment of nonsuit does not constitute an adjudication on tbe issue of paternity.

G.S. 49-2 provides that “any parent who willfully neglects or who refuses to support and maintain bis or her illegitimate child shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . .”

Tbe only prosecution contemplated under tbis statute is that grounded on tbe willful neglect or refusal of a parent to support bis or her illegitimate child, — tbe mere begetting of tbe child not being denominated a crime. S. v. Dill, 224 N.C. 57, 29 S.E. 2d 145; S. v. Stiles, 228 N.C. 137, 44 S.E. 2d 728; S. v. Bowser, 230 N.C. 330, 53 S.E. 2d 282; S. v. Thompson, 233 N.C. 345, 64 S.E. 2d 157. See also S. v. Tyson, 208 N.C. 231, 180 S.E. 85.

Tbe question of paternity is incidental to tbe prosecution for tbe crime of nonsupport. S. v. Summerlin, 224 N.C. 178, 29 S.E. 2d 462; S. v. Bowser, supra; S. v. Stiles, supra; S. v. Thompson, supra.

Moreover, this statute, as interpreted by tbis Court, creates a continuing offense. S. v. Johnson, 212 N.C. 566, 194 S.E. 319; S. v. Bradshaw, 214 N.C. 5, 197 S.E. 564; S. v. Davis, 223 N.C. 54, 25 S.E. 2d 164.

And G.S. 49-7, after prescribing jurisdiction of tbe courts in such matters, declares that “Tbe court before which tbe matter may be brought shall determine whether or not tbe defendant is a parent of tbe child on whose behalf tbe proceeding is instituted,” and that, “After tbis matter has been determined in tbe affirmative, tbe court shall proceed to determine tbe issue as to whether or not tbe defendant has neglected or refused to support and maintain tbe child who is tbe subject of tbe proceeding.”

Thus it seems clear that tbe Legislature intended that tbe issue of paternity first be determined before, and separate from determination on tbe issue of guilt or innocence of tbe offense charged.

Indeed, in tbe case of S. v. Wilson, 234 N.C. 552, 67 S.E. 2d 748, Barnhill, J., in a concurring opinion, summarizes decisions of tbis Court by saying: “Tbe only prosecution contemplated under tbe statute is grounded on tbe willful neglect or refusal of a parent to support bis illegitimate child. Tbe mere begetting tbe child is not denominated a crime. Tbe question of paternity is incidental to tbe prosecution for tbe crime of nonsupport — a preliminary requisite to conviction,” and then concludes by saying: “Hence a verdict of not guilty on the charge of willful nonsupport does no more than find the defendant not guilty of the crime laid in the bill. The verdict could not be construed to be a verdict of not guilty of begetting the child.” This declaration, when delivered, was obiter dictum. But, being so pertinent to situation in hand, it is here adopted as the law of the present case.

Hence the verdict on the first issue, that is, as to paternity, will stand. However, since there is no verdict as to guilt of defendant on the fact found as to the offense charged, there must be a new trial on the second issue, — with instruction that if the issue be answered “Yes” the jury should return a verdict of guilty, or guilty as charged.

New trial.