SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JOHN A. PARKINS, JR. NEW CASTLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE JUDGE 500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 10400 WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3733 TELEPHONE: (302) 255-2584
April 11, 2017
Mark A. Denney, Jr., DAG Natalie S. Woloshin, Esquire John W. Downs, DAG Woloshin Lynch & Natalie, P.A. Department of Justice 3200 Concord Pike Carvel State Office Building P.O. Box 7329 820 North French Street Wilmington, Delaware 19803 Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Cleon L. Cauley, Sr., Esquire The Cauley Firm One Customs House 704 King Street, Suite 600 Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Re: State of Delaware v. Jacquez Robinson ID Nos. 1411017691A&B
Dear Counsel:
The oft-delayed trial in this murder case is scheduled to
begin on July 11, 2017. On April 3, Defendant moved to
suppress (a) a drawing he made which was seized from his prison
cell and (b) his statement made during a prison-intake interview.
The State has not had an opportunity to respond to this recently filed motion. Because the trial date is rapidly approaching, the
court has taken it upon itself to research the issues presented in
these motions with the goal of perhaps reducing the time needed
to resolve them. It finds that the motion to exclude the drawing is
frivolous and that motion will be denied without requiring a
response from the State. It further finds that the motion to
exclude the defendant’s statement presents narrow issues which
require additional development.
(a) The drawing seized from Defendant’s cell
Prison officials seized a drawing from Defendant’s cell which
appears to be gang-related symbols and mottos. Defendant’s
motion to suppress that drawing is without merit because
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell.
It goes without saying that not all seizures of a person’s
property implicate the Fourth Amendment. Rather the “capacity
to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . .
upon whether the person who claims the protection of the
Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
2 place.”1 The United States Supreme Court has held that, for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a prisoner has no
expectation of privacy in his cell. In Hudson v. Palmer it wrote:
Notwithstanding our caution in approaching claims that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in a given context, we hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions.2
Defendant cites this court’s opinion in State v. Ashley3 for the
proposition that this court “insinuated” that warrantless searches
of a cell must be routine or required by some exigency. It is true
that this court expressly found that Ashley had “standing” to
assert a Fourth Amendment claim. More than thirty years ago
the United States Supreme Court expressly abandoned “standing”
terminology in its Fourth Amendment vocabulary, holding that
the determination of whether a defendant is asserting his own
Fourth Amendment right (as opposed to one belonging to another
1 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1979); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998)(same). 2 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984). 3 1998 WL 110149 (Del. Super. Jan. 26, 1998).
3 person) is “more properly placed within the purview of
substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of
standing.”4 The appropriate inquiry is whether the defendant
“personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched,
and that his expectation is reasonable.”5 This court’s finding in
Ashley that the defendant had standing therefore suggests that it
found the defendant had some expectation of privacy in his cell.
However, this court did not cite Hudson v. Palmer and gave no
indication it was even made aware of that opinion by the litigants.
Importantly, none of the cases cited in Ashley post-dated Hudson
v. Palmer. To the extent, therefore, that Ashley may be read as
suggesting a prisoner may have a constitutional expectation of
privacy in his cell, that holding is no longer good law and the
court will not follow it. Defendant’s motion to suppress the
drawing seized from his cell is therefore DENIED.
4 State v. Manuel, 2009 WL 1228573, at *3 (Del. Super. May 5, 2009) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1979)). 5 Id. (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).
4 (b) Defendant’s statements during his admission interview
Defendant told a Department of Correction employee that he
was a member of the TMG gang and had been since its inception.
The record is undeveloped, but for the purpose of context the
court notes that the information is contained in a form entitled
“Security Threat Group/Offender Screening Work Sheet.” That
sheet is a pre-printed form with questions such as:
Are you a member of a gang?
Do you anticipate having any problems at this institution with any member or suspected member of a gang?
Have you ever been involved in a disturbance with a large group of inmates at another institution?
On the surface, at least, it appears this sheet and the interview
were used to determine if Defendant was a member of a gang and,
if so, whether that membership posed any security risks to the
Defendant or other inmates.
Defendant contends that he was entitled to be advised of his
Miranda rights before the officer conducted this interview and
completed the form. Miranda, of course, is a prophylactic rule
which applies to custodial interrogations. Defendant asserts,
5 without citation to pertinent authority, that “defendant was
clearly in custody as he was in jail.” It may be that this was a
custodial interrogation, but that is not self-evident from the fact
that Defendant was incarcerated. According to the United States
Supreme Court:
[S]tandard conditions of confinement and associated restrictions on freedom will not necessarily implicate the same interests that the Court sought to protect when it afforded special safeguards to persons subjected to custodial interrogation. Thus, service of a term of imprisonment, without more, is not enough to constitute Miranda custody.6
Whether Defendant was “in custody” will need to be developed in
future briefing and proceedings.
Aside from the question whether Defendant was “in
custody,” there is another Miranda issue which needs to be
addressed. Many courts, including the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, have recognized a routine booking exception to
Miranda.7 Under this exception “[i]t is well established that
Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to
complete booking or pretrial services.”8 Although there is a split
6 Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JOHN A. PARKINS, JR. NEW CASTLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE JUDGE 500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 10400 WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3733 TELEPHONE: (302) 255-2584
April 11, 2017
Mark A. Denney, Jr., DAG Natalie S. Woloshin, Esquire John W. Downs, DAG Woloshin Lynch & Natalie, P.A. Department of Justice 3200 Concord Pike Carvel State Office Building P.O. Box 7329 820 North French Street Wilmington, Delaware 19803 Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Cleon L. Cauley, Sr., Esquire The Cauley Firm One Customs House 704 King Street, Suite 600 Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Re: State of Delaware v. Jacquez Robinson ID Nos. 1411017691A&B
Dear Counsel:
The oft-delayed trial in this murder case is scheduled to
begin on July 11, 2017. On April 3, Defendant moved to
suppress (a) a drawing he made which was seized from his prison
cell and (b) his statement made during a prison-intake interview.
The State has not had an opportunity to respond to this recently filed motion. Because the trial date is rapidly approaching, the
court has taken it upon itself to research the issues presented in
these motions with the goal of perhaps reducing the time needed
to resolve them. It finds that the motion to exclude the drawing is
frivolous and that motion will be denied without requiring a
response from the State. It further finds that the motion to
exclude the defendant’s statement presents narrow issues which
require additional development.
(a) The drawing seized from Defendant’s cell
Prison officials seized a drawing from Defendant’s cell which
appears to be gang-related symbols and mottos. Defendant’s
motion to suppress that drawing is without merit because
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell.
It goes without saying that not all seizures of a person’s
property implicate the Fourth Amendment. Rather the “capacity
to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . .
upon whether the person who claims the protection of the
Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
2 place.”1 The United States Supreme Court has held that, for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a prisoner has no
expectation of privacy in his cell. In Hudson v. Palmer it wrote:
Notwithstanding our caution in approaching claims that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in a given context, we hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions.2
Defendant cites this court’s opinion in State v. Ashley3 for the
proposition that this court “insinuated” that warrantless searches
of a cell must be routine or required by some exigency. It is true
that this court expressly found that Ashley had “standing” to
assert a Fourth Amendment claim. More than thirty years ago
the United States Supreme Court expressly abandoned “standing”
terminology in its Fourth Amendment vocabulary, holding that
the determination of whether a defendant is asserting his own
Fourth Amendment right (as opposed to one belonging to another
1 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1979); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998)(same). 2 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984). 3 1998 WL 110149 (Del. Super. Jan. 26, 1998).
3 person) is “more properly placed within the purview of
substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of
standing.”4 The appropriate inquiry is whether the defendant
“personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched,
and that his expectation is reasonable.”5 This court’s finding in
Ashley that the defendant had standing therefore suggests that it
found the defendant had some expectation of privacy in his cell.
However, this court did not cite Hudson v. Palmer and gave no
indication it was even made aware of that opinion by the litigants.
Importantly, none of the cases cited in Ashley post-dated Hudson
v. Palmer. To the extent, therefore, that Ashley may be read as
suggesting a prisoner may have a constitutional expectation of
privacy in his cell, that holding is no longer good law and the
court will not follow it. Defendant’s motion to suppress the
drawing seized from his cell is therefore DENIED.
4 State v. Manuel, 2009 WL 1228573, at *3 (Del. Super. May 5, 2009) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1979)). 5 Id. (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).
4 (b) Defendant’s statements during his admission interview
Defendant told a Department of Correction employee that he
was a member of the TMG gang and had been since its inception.
The record is undeveloped, but for the purpose of context the
court notes that the information is contained in a form entitled
“Security Threat Group/Offender Screening Work Sheet.” That
sheet is a pre-printed form with questions such as:
Are you a member of a gang?
Do you anticipate having any problems at this institution with any member or suspected member of a gang?
Have you ever been involved in a disturbance with a large group of inmates at another institution?
On the surface, at least, it appears this sheet and the interview
were used to determine if Defendant was a member of a gang and,
if so, whether that membership posed any security risks to the
Defendant or other inmates.
Defendant contends that he was entitled to be advised of his
Miranda rights before the officer conducted this interview and
completed the form. Miranda, of course, is a prophylactic rule
which applies to custodial interrogations. Defendant asserts,
5 without citation to pertinent authority, that “defendant was
clearly in custody as he was in jail.” It may be that this was a
custodial interrogation, but that is not self-evident from the fact
that Defendant was incarcerated. According to the United States
Supreme Court:
[S]tandard conditions of confinement and associated restrictions on freedom will not necessarily implicate the same interests that the Court sought to protect when it afforded special safeguards to persons subjected to custodial interrogation. Thus, service of a term of imprisonment, without more, is not enough to constitute Miranda custody.6
Whether Defendant was “in custody” will need to be developed in
future briefing and proceedings.
Aside from the question whether Defendant was “in
custody,” there is another Miranda issue which needs to be
addressed. Many courts, including the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, have recognized a routine booking exception to
Miranda.7 Under this exception “[i]t is well established that
Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to
complete booking or pretrial services.”8 Although there is a split
6 Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 512 (2012). 7 United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 572 n.2 (3d. Cir. 1995) (“we join the other courts of appeals that have addressed the issue and recognize that there is a ‘routine booking exception’ to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona”). 8 United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n.2 (8th Cir. 1989).
6 of authorities, many jurisdictions have found that this exception
applies to questions about gang affiliation. For example, a few
months ago, a North Carolina federal district court wrote:
Here, the government asserts that officer Smith's questions to defendant were part of a standard booking procedure aimed, in part, at addressing safety concerns. This is in keeping with the rationale justifying other courts' application of the “routine booking question” exception to questions about gang affiliation. See, e.g., Washington, 462 F.3d at 1133 (“[A]gents routinely obtain gang moniker and gang affiliation information ... in order to ensure prisoner safety. The question regarding [defendant]'s gang moniker therefore was a routine booking question.”). Accordingly, where defendant's admission of his gang affiliation falls under the “routine booking question” exception to Miranda, the court denies the relief requested.9
There are opinions which cut the other way. For example, the
California Supreme Court has held that “questions about gang
affiliation exceed [the booking exception].”10
Because the present record is inadequate, the court will
DEFER a ruling on the motion to exclude the statements made
during the screening sheet interview. The parties will submit
simultaneous briefs on the applicability the so-called booking
exception and, if Defendant desires an evidentiary hearing, he
9 United States v. Sanmartin, 2016 WL 4506990, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2016); accord United States v. Edwards, 563 F. Supp. 2d 977 (D. Minn. 2008). 10 People v. Elizade, 351 P.3d 1010, 1018 (Cal. 2015).
7 should provide the court with a letter explaining specifically why
one is necessary. The court will conduct a teleconference to
schedule these submissions. Counsel is advised that the court
must impose a tight schedule in order to ensure timely resolution
before trial.
It is SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
John A. Parkins, Jr.
oc: Prothonotary